Information on Port Security in the Caribbean Basin
Gao ID: GAO-07-804R June 29, 2007Referred to as our "third border," the Caribbean Basin has significant maritime links with the United States. Given these links and the region's proximity, the United States is particularly interested in ensuring that the ports in the Caribbean Basin--through which goods bound for this country's ports and cruise ships carrying its citizens must travel--are secure. Section 233 (c) of the Security and Accountability for Every Port Act of 2006 (SAFE Port Act) requires GAO to report on various security-related aspects of Caribbean Basin ports. Our specific objectives were to identify and describe the (1) threats and security concerns in the Caribbean Basin related to port security, (2) actions that foreign governments and local stakeholders have taken in the Caribbean Basin to implement international port security requirements and the challenges that remain, (3) activities reported to be under way by U.S. government agencies to enhance port security in the Caribbean Basin, and (4) potential economic impacts of port security and terrorist attacks in the Caribbean Basin. Between March 29 and April 13, 2007, we briefed Congress on the results of our work to address these objectives. This report summarizes the information provided during those discussions. We conducted our work from October 2006 through June 2007 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
While intelligence sources report that no specific, credible terrorist threats to maritime security exist in the Caribbean Basin, the officials we spoke to indicated that there are a number of security concerns that could affect port security in the region. Caribbean ports contain a variety of facilities such as cargo facilities, cruise ship terminals, and facilities that handle petroleum products and liquefied natural gas. Additionally, several Caribbean ports are among the top cruise ship destinations in the world. Given the volume and value of this maritime trade, the facilities and infrastructure of the maritime transportation system may be attractive targets for a terrorist attack. Our prior work on maritime security issues has revealed that the three most likely modes of attack in the port environment are a suicide attack using an explosive-laden vehicle or vessel, a standoff attack using small arms or rockets, and the traditional armed assault. Beyond the types of facilities and modes of attack to be considered, officials we spoke to identified a number of overarching security concerns that relate to the Caribbean Basin as a whole. Among these concerns are (1) the level of corruption that exists in some Caribbean nations to undermine the rule of law in these countries, (2) organized gang activity occurring in proximity to or within port facilities, and (3) the geographic proximity of many Caribbean countries, which has made them transit countries for cocaine and heroin destined for U.S. markets. Other security concerns in the Caribbean Basin mentioned by U.S. agency officials include stowaways, illegal migration, and the growing influence of Islamic radical groups and other foreign terrorist organizations.
GAO-07-804R, Information on Port Security in the Caribbean Basin
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June 29, 2007:
Congressional Committees:
Subject: Information on Port Security in the Caribbean Basin:
Referred to as our "third border," the Caribbean Basin has significant
maritime links with the United States.[Footnote 1] Given these links
and the region's proximity, the United States is particularly
interested in ensuring that the ports in the Caribbean Basin--through
which goods bound for this country's ports and cruise ships carrying
its citizens must travel--are secure.
Section 233 (c) of the Security and Accountability for Every Port Act
of 2006 (SAFE Port Act)[Footnote 2] requires GAO to report on various
security-related aspects of Caribbean Basin ports. Our specific
objectives were to identify and describe the:
* threats and security concerns in the Caribbean Basin related to port
security,
* actions that foreign governments and local stakeholders have taken in
the Caribbean Basin to implement international port security
requirements and the challenges that remain,
* activities reported to be under way by U.S. government agencies to
enhance port security in the Caribbean Basin, and:
* potential economic impacts of port security and terrorist attacks in
the Caribbean Basin.
To determine the threats and security concerns in the Caribbean Basin
related to port security, we interviewed officials from federal
agencies, international organizations and associations, and various
stakeholders (such as facility operators and government officials of
Caribbean countries) involved in port security in the region. To
determine the actions taken by Caribbean Basin countries to implement
international port security requirements and the challenges they face,
we visited several Caribbean nations and reviewed information provided
by agencies and organizations working in the region. To determine the
activities under way by U.S. government agencies to enhance port
security in the Caribbean Basin, we met with agency officials and
reviewed pertinent documents. Finally, to identify the potential
economic impacts of port security in the Caribbean Basin, we met with
officials from the countries we visited, as well as from U.S. agencies
and international organizations, and reviewed various analyses by a
government agency and nongovernmental researchers. Because the mandate
gave us a limited time frame within which to complete our work, this
report is descriptive in nature and does not provide a detailed
analysis of the actions taken or efforts made regarding port security
in the Caribbean Basin. Enclosure II describes our scope and
methodology in more detail.
Between March 29 and April 13, 2007, we briefed your offices on the
results of our work to address these objectives. This report summarizes
the information provided during those discussions and provides the
detailed handouts in enclosure I. Additional information received from
the agencies since the briefings were presented is contained in the
body and agency comments section of this document.
We conducted our work from October 2006 through June 2007 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Summary:
While intelligence sources report that no specific, credible terrorist
threats to maritime security exist in the Caribbean Basin, the
officials we spoke to indicated that there are a number of security
concerns that could affect port security in the region. Caribbean ports
contain a variety of facilities such as cargo facilities, cruise ship
terminals, and facilities that handle petroleum products and liquefied
natural gas. Additionally, several Caribbean ports are among the top
cruise ship destinations in the world. Given the volume and value of
this maritime trade, the facilities and infrastructure of the maritime
transportation system may be attractive targets for a terrorist attack.
Our prior work on maritime security issues has revealed that the three
most likely modes of attack in the port environment are a suicide
attack using an explosive-laden vehicle or vessel, a standoff attack
using small arms or rockets, and the traditional armed assault. Beyond
the types of facilities and modes of attack to be considered, officials
we spoke to identified a number of overarching security concerns that
relate to the Caribbean Basin as a whole. Among these concerns are (1)
the level of corruption that exists in some Caribbean nations to
undermine the rule of law in these countries, (2) organized gang
activity occurring in proximity to or within port facilities, and (3)
the geographic proximity of many Caribbean countries, which has made
them transit countries for cocaine and heroin destined for U.S.
markets. Other security concerns in the Caribbean Basin mentioned by
U.S. agency officials include stowaways, illegal migration, and the
growing influence of Islamic radical groups and other foreign terrorist
organizations.
Foreign governments and local stakeholders in the Caribbean Basin have
taken a number of steps to implement the International Ship and Port
Facility Security (ISPS) Code, although challenges for further progress
remain.[Footnote 3] The U.S. Coast Guard has visited a number of
Caribbean Basin countries to observe the security and antiterrorism
measures put in place at their ports to determine the degree to which
the ISPS Code has been implemented. Final reports from these visits
have been issued for 14 of the 29 Caribbean Nations included in this
report. Most of the countries were found to have "substantially
implemented the ISPS Code." Even so, the Coast Guard also found that
facilities within some countries needed to make improvements or take
additional measures. According to a Coast Guard official, while the
Coast Guard cannot require the facilities to make improvements to
respond to Coast Guard's findings, improvements have been made in order
to avoid potential difficulties in conducting trade with the United
States. We also visited five countries in the region and found that
security measures were generally in place, although there were areas of
concern, such as maintaining access controls, conducting security plan
exercises, and maintaining security records.[Footnote 4] Our
discussions with facility operators as well as government officials and
a regional association during these visits revealed that challenges
exist, such as obtaining additional training for their security
personnel and funding for the further enhancement of port security
measures in the region.
Several U.S. agencies reported being involved in activities in the
Caribbean Basin that could help enhance port security in the region.
Through its embassies, the Department of State serves as the lead
coordinator of the activities of other U.S. federal agencies in the
Caribbean nations. The State Department has also been involved through
the Organization of American States to coordinate and fund projects to
improve maritime security. The Coast Guard is involved in the region
through its International Port Security Program to assess the
effectiveness of anti-terrorism measures in place in other countries.
The Coast Guard monitors the implementation of ISPS Code requirements
in these countries and provides them with best practices to help them
improve port security. The Coast Guard also has a Port State Control
(PSC) program in which officials board and inspect foreign vessels
arriving at U.S. ports to ensure that the vessels are complying with
security standards. To address a potential mass migration event from a
Caribbean nation such as Haiti or Cuba, the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) has developed a plan that involves dozens of federal,
state, and local agencies. Customs and Border Protection, another DHS
component, has provided training assistance to a number of Caribbean
nations and is also operating its Container Security Initiative in the
Bahamas, the Dominican Republic, Honduras, and Jamaica. Under this
initiative, Customs and Border Protection staff are placed at foreign
seaports to screen containers for weapons of mass destruction. Related
to the security of containers in the ports, the Department of Energy
(DOE) also has efforts under way in the Caribbean Basin related to its
Megaports Initiative, which provides equipment to scan containers for
nuclear and radiological materials. This initiative is currently
operational in the Bahamas and is expected to eventually operate in
other countries as well. The U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID), already active throughout the Caribbean because of its role in
administering assistance programs, also has directly contributed funds
toward a project to help Haiti comply with the requirements of the ISPS
Code. The Department of Defense (DOD), through its Southern Command
(SOUTHCOM), is active in the Caribbean through its Enduring Friendship
program, which seeks to achieve regional security cooperation and build
maritime security capabilities. Finally, there are several interagency
efforts under way in the region to help secure cargo and counter
illicit trafficking, migration, and narcoterrorism operations. For
example, one effort involves coordinating the efforts of Coast Guard,
Customs and Border Protection, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and
the U.S. Attorney's Office to target illegal migration and
narcotrafficking near Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands.
Although the potential economic impact of port security (or lack
thereof) in the Caribbean Basin is difficult to determine, our review
of analyses performed by a government agency and nongovernmental
researchers identified a number of factors that could influence the
economic impact of port security and a terrorist attack in the maritime
domain. These factors include (1) the target of the attack, (2) the
tactics employed and objectives of the attack, (3) the amount of
destruction caused by the attack, and (4) the ability to recover from
the disruption or loss of facilities resulting from the attack. As part
of an effective risk management approach--a framework that can aid in
determining which vulnerabilities should be addressed in ways within
available resources--government officials and port stakeholders must
determine which security measures to implement by considering their
benefits and costs with these factors in mind. To address the risk
posed by vessels seeking entry into the United States from foreign
ports that do not maintain effective antiterrorism measures as
determined through the country visits completed under the International
Port Security Program, the U.S. Coast Guard is authorized to take
certain actions such as boarding vessels or conducting inspections of
vessels. These actions can result, for example, in costs to shippers
and others because of time lost while the vessel is boarded or being
inspected. From July 10, 2006, when the Coast Guard began data
measurements of its activities with these vessels, to April 2007, only
two vessels have been subjected to a boarding offshore by Coast Guard
officials prior to gaining entry to a U.S. port solely because they
arrived from a Caribbean Basin port facility deemed by the Coast Guard
as not maintaining effective antiterrorism measures. To determine the
potential costs of such boardings, we talked with a variety of maritime
stakeholders in the region, such as facility operators and a shipping
association, who indicated that such boardings have not been a
significant source of delay or financial loss for their businesses.
Thus the economic impact on the maritime industry--of actions taken to
date by the Coast Guard in response to security problems at Caribbean
Ports--appears to be insignificant.
Agency Comments:
We provided a draft of this report to the Department of Defense, the
Department of Energy, the Department of Homeland Security and its
component agencies (the Coast Guard, Customs and Border Protection, and
Immigration and Customs Enforcement), the Department of State, and the
U.S. Agency for International Development for their review and comment.
We received technical comments from the Department of Defense and the
Coast Guard, which we incorporated where appropriate. The Department of
Homeland Security and the U.S. Agency for International Development
provided formal written comments, which are presented in enclosures III
and IV. These comments and the supplemental comments provided by the
Coast Guard, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and the Department of
State are discussed below. The Department of Energy did not provide
comments on the report.
In its comments, the Department of Homeland Security suggested that
additional information be included on other Customs and Border
Protection programs and initiatives under way in the region. CBP
officials subsequently provided the following information on two of
these programs:
* The Caribbean Corridor Initiative: Established in April 2005, this is
a multi-agency initiative that targets drug trafficking in the Eastern
and Central Caribbean areas. The mission of this operation is to
identify, disrupt, and dismantle South American drug trafficking
organizations that utilize the maritime domain to smuggle narcotics
into and throughout the Caribbean. The agencies that are part of this
initiative include Customs and Border Protection (CBP), Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE), the Drug Enforcement Administration, the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, the U.S. Coast Guard Investigative
Services (USCIS), and the U.S. Attorney for the District of Puerto
Rico. Under this initiative, CBP has provided training to countries in
the region on the use of cargo scanning technologies and identifying
fraudulent documents.
* The Secure Freight Initiative: Formally initiated in December 2006,
this initiative will fuse commercial data from the supply chain,
information on the vessel and crew, information about cargo movement
and integrity, and an integrated foreign and domestic radiography and
radiation detection scan to create an enhanced risk assessment for the
maritime domain.
Coast Guard officials commented that the individuals involved in the
recent JFK International Airport terrorist plot were from Trinidad and
Guyana and are believed to have been in contact with that the radical
Islamic group Jamaat al Muslimeen, which has been active in Trinidad.
Related to the security of domestic U.S. ports, waterways and coastal
areas, Coast Guard officials also noted that operational activities
conducted by the Coast Guard and its federal, state, and local partners
are guided by a Coast Guard operations order called Operation Neptune
Shield, which contains a classified set of requirements establishing
the Coast Guard's homeland security activity levels with performance
minimums that escalate as the maritime security (MARSEC) level
increases. Operational activities covered by this order include patrols
to provide deterrence and response, boardings of vessels, escorts of
selected vessels during transits, deployment of antiterrorism and
counterterrorism assets, and enforcement of security zones among other
things.
ICE officials commented that the Caribbean Basin region continues to
remain as a major center for drug trafficking, money laundering, and
potential major staging area for terrorist operations. They stated that
commercial vessels departing from Colombia, Venezuela, Panama, Haiti,
and the Dominican Republic pose a direct threat to U.S. law enforcement
assets assigned to the detection and monitoring of narcotics traffic
and national security as well. ICE officials also stated that steps
have been taken to monitor and detect high-risk shipments and
containers coming from the region. In addition to these security
concerns, ICE officials noted that the United States depends greatly on
critical energy infrastructure located in the region and that any
destabilization of this infrastructure could negatively affect the U.S.
economy.
The Department of State stated in its comments that the threat by an
explosive-laden vehicle to a cruise ship port facility or directly to a
cruise ship should be a matter of great concern to U.S. government
authorities and that U.S. citizens can be particularly vulnerable in
this area. According to the State Department, such an attack can cause
loss of life to American cruise line passengers and considerable
economic impact on American cruise line and tourist industries in the
United States. In addition, the State Department stated that compliance
with the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code does not
necessarily mean that a port is secure from a terrorist attack. The
State Department noted that it and its contractors have witnessed open
gates, poor screening of vehicles, and inadequate physical protections
at ports with cruise line activity. The State Department stated that
these deficiencies, coupled with poorly trained security personnel, can
make cruise line terminals and cruise ships vulnerable to attack.
According to the State Department, poor training of port security
personnel is also an overarching security concern.
The U.S. Agency for International Development expressed agreement with
the contents of this report.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of the
Departments of Defense, Energy, Homeland Security, and State, as well
as the Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development,
and other interested congressional committees. We will also make copies
available to others upon request. Additionally, this report will be
available at no charge on GAO's Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any further questions about this report,
please contact me at (202) 512-9610 or CaldwellS@gao.gov. Contact
points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs
may be found on the last page of this letter. Individuals making key
contributions to this report include Richard Ascarate, Jonathan
Bachman, Charles Bausell, Steven Calvo, Wayne Ekblad, Geoffrey
Hamilton, Christopher Hatscher, Ryan Lambert, and Nicholas Larson.
Signed by:
Stephen L. Caldwell:
Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues:
List of Committees:
The Honorable Robert C. Byrd:
Chairman:
The Honorable Thad Cochran:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Appropriations:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Max Baucus:
Chairman:
The Honorable Charles Grassley:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Finance:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman:
Chairman:
The Honorable Susan M. Collins:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye:
Chairman:
The Honorable Ted Stevens:
Vice Chairman:
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation:
United States Senate:
The Honorable David R. Obey:
Chairman:
The Honorable Jerry Lewis:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Charles B. Rangel:
Chairman:
The Honorable Jim McCrery:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Ways and Means:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable James L. Oberstar:
Chairman:
The Honorable John L. Mica:
Ranking Republican Member:
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson:
Chairman:
The Honorable Peter T. King:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Homeland Security:
House of Representatives:
[End of section]
Enclosure I: Briefing Slides:
Port Security in the Caribbean Basin:
Presented to the Cognizant Committees as Required by the SAFE Port Act
of 2006:
April 13, 2007:
Briefing Overview:
* Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
* Background:
* Summary of Findings:
* Security Concerns in the Caribbean Basin:
* Implementation of Port Security Standards:
* U.S. Activities to Enhance Port Security:
* Potential Economic Impacts of Port Security and Terrorist Attacks:
Objectives, Scope, And Methodology:
Source Of Work:
Section 233 (c) of the SAFE Port Act of 2006 requires GAO to report on
various aspects relating to the security of ports in the Caribbean
Basin.
The Act requires GAO to provide this report to the following cognizant
committees:
U.S. Senate:
Committee on Appropriations:
Committee on Finance:
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs:
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation:
House of Representatives:
Committee on Appropriations:
Committee on Ways and Means:
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure:
Committee on Homeland Security:
The act, signed into law on October 13, 2006, requires GAO to report
its findings no later than 180 days (6 months) after enactment.
Objectives:
(1) What are the threats and security concerns in the Caribbean Basin
related to port security?
(2) What actions have been taken by foreign governments and local
stakeholders in the Caribbean Basin to implement international port
security code requirements and what challenges remain?
(3) What activities are under way by U.S. government agencies to
enhance port security in the Caribbean Basin?
(4) What are the potential economic impacts of port security and
terrorist attacks in the Caribbean Basin?
Scope and Methodology:
Interviewed officials from U.S. agencies (Coast Guard, Immigration and
Customs Enforcement, Department of Defense, Department of State, and
the U.S. Agency for International Development) to determine key threats
and security concerns in the Caribbean Basin, identify the agencies'
roles in support of port security in the region, and obtain estimates
of the potential economic impacts of port security in the region.
Reviewed agency briefings on regional maritime security issues and
Coast Guard reports on the countries' implementation of the
International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code. We also
reviewed previous GAO work on U.S. federal programs related to cargo
security in the region.
Interviewed officials of organizations such as the Organization of
American States, the Caribbean Shipping Association, and Caribbean-
Central American Action to obtain their views on port security in the
region and the potential economic impacts of problems in security.
Visited 5 countries in the Caribbean Basin to meet with facility
operators and government officials to discuss and observe the degree to
which security measures were in place. The facility types visited
included container, bulk cargo, energy, and cruise ship-ferry
terminals. We also accompanied Coast Guard officials during their visit
one country to observe the security measures in place at that country's
ports.
The selection of the countries and facilities for visits was based on
criteria designed to provide diversity with respect to location, type
of facility, cargo handled, and proficiency of implementation of the
ISPS Code based on Coast Guard reports and observations.
Limitations:
Given the time frames required by the mandate to complete this work,
this work is descriptive and not evaluative of the actions and efforts
related to port security.
While this briefing describes the activities of U.S. agencies in the
Caribbean Basin, GAO did not review the extent or effectiveness of the
coordination between these agencies.
The criteria for selection were meant to be illustrative of the
countries and facilities visited, and may not necessarily be
representative of the condition of the facilities within the region as
a whole.
With a few exceptions, we have not observed the implementation of the
ISPS Code at ports in other regions of the world. Consequently, we are
unable to make comparisons of the Caribbean Basin's implementation of
the ISPS Code relative to that in other regions of the world.
We conducted our work between October 2006 and April 2007 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Background: Caribbean Basin Defined:
The Caribbean Basin can be geographically defined using the boundaries
of the Caribbean Basin Initiative:
* The Caribbean Basin Initiative was launched in 1983 to promote
economic growth and diversification in the region. The initiative
provides 24 beneficiary countries and territories in the region with
duty-free access to the U.S. market for most goods.
* For the purposes of this briefing, the Caribbean Basin also includes
the countries of Mexico, Cuba, Colombia, Venezuela, and Suriname.
The region has been referred to as the "Third Border" of the United
States.
Figure: Map of the The Caribbean Basin:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO; Map, Map Resources (presentation).
[End of figure]
Importance of Port Security in the Caribbean Basin:
Caribbean nations are important partners on trade, health, and
education issues. However, a number of factors exist in the region that
may pose an additional threat to the United States.
Effective implementation of the ISPS Code may be particularly important
in Caribbean ports, given various concerns, such as * their proximity
to the United States:
* illicit trafficking and migration activities:
* substantial numbers of U.S. tourists and cruise ships in the region:
* relatively high levels of poverty and corruption.
Summary Of Findings:
Intelligence sources report that no specific, credible terrorist
threats to maritime security exist in the Caribbean Basin. However,
officials we met with identified several concerns in the region related
to port security such as corruption, the rise of radical Islamic
groups, drug trafficking, and illegal migration, among others.
Based on Coast Guard visits to selected countries, measures meant to
comply with ISPS Code standards appear to have been widely implemented
in the region, although deficiencies are still being identified in
areas such as access controls and security plan exercises. GAO's visits
to countries in the region corroborated these findings.
According to Coast Guard officials, the level of implementation of the
ISPS Code in the Caribbean Basin varies widely among countries. For
example, one country within the region has not substantially
implemented the ISPS Code, while another country has exceeded it in
some respects. However, according to a Coast Guard official, the region
as a whole is further along than sub-Saharan Africa in implementing the
ISPS Code but has not implemented the ISPS Code as much as most
European countries.
Several U.S. agencies are involved in activities in the Caribbean Basin
that could help enhance port security in the region. These activities
include programs to monitor the implementation of ISPS Code
requirements, efforts to train regional security officials, and
programs to monitor the security of cargo transiting from the Caribbean
Basin to the United States, among others.
While the Coast Guard reported that it has boarded vessels as a result
of arriving from a Caribbean Basin port facility that was not in
compliance with the ISPS Code requirements, such boardings are rare and
have not had a significant adverse economic impact, according to
industry representatives.
Although the potential economic impact of these actions is difficult to
determine, analyses by government agencies and others indicate that
there are several factors that may determine the impacts, including the
economic impact of a terrorist attack in the maritime domain. Such
factors include the type of attack, the target, and the level of
resulting damage or casualties.
Objective 1:
Security Concerns In The Caribbean Basin:
A Variety of Port Infrastructure:
Caribbean Basin ports contain a variety of facilities such as:
Container Cargo Facilities:
Their central location relative to the Panama Canal and the North and
South American continents has enabled Caribbean ports to become
important transshipment points for cargo containers.
Cruise Ships and Terminals:
The Caribbean and the Bahamas are the top cruise destinations in the
world and served nearly 7 million North American cruise passengers in
2006.
Critical Energy Infrastructure:
The region is a significant supplier of oil and gas to the United
States.
* Trinidad and Tobago supplies about 70 percent of imported Liquefied
Natural Gas to the United States.
* Countries such as Venezuela and Mexico are also major suppliers of
petroleum to the United States.
Potential Threats and Types of Attacks:
According to intelligence officials, there are currently no specific
credible threats to port security for these facilities.
Our previously issued work in port security has revealed three types of
general attack scenarios that are considered most likely in the port
environment:
Suicide Attacks:
Attacks carried out using an explosive-laden boat or vehicle that is
rammed into a vessel or facility.
Standoff Attacks:
A rocket, mortar, or rocket-propelled grenade is launched against a
target from a sufficient distance to evade defensive fire.
Armed Assaults:
Attacks on vessels and infrastructure.
Additional Concerns for Security:
In addition to the attack scenarios above agency officials we
interviewed identified other security concerns in the region:
Corruption and Organized Gang Activities:
Corruption and its threat to the rule of law is a concern in the
region.
Some nations have identified organized gang activity within their port
infrastructure.
Creation and sale of fraudulent documentation may be used to finance
illicit activities.
Geography:
There are many isolated islands in the region in proximity to the
United States, a fact that makes enforcement against illicit
trafficking difficult.
The many island nations in the Caribbean also present unique challenges
for controlling access and smuggling from the waterside.
Vessel Cargo:
Soft-top containers and break-bulk cargo make it difficult to safeguard
cargo.
Stowaways:
Principal sources of stowaways aboard vessels include the Dominican
Republic and Haiti.
Drug Trafficking:
The Caribbean accounts for about 35 percent of illegal narcotics
transported into the United States annually:
The region is often used as a transshipment point from South America.
* Shifting trafficking patterns make enforcement a constant challenge.
Illegal Migration:
Traditional patterns are through the Florida Straits and the Bahamas as
well as toward Puerto Rico and through Central America and Mexico.
There are reports of increased use of third countries to carry out
smuggling. For example, smuggling of Chinese and Middle-Easterners to
the U.S. Virgin Islands and St. Martin has increased via countries
neighboring the Caribbean Basin such as Suriname.
Islamic Radical Groups and Foreign Terrorist Organizations:
Islamic groups have a presence in some Caribbean Basin countries. For
example, Trinidad and Tobago is home to the terrorist Muslim extremist
group Jamaat-al Musilmeen.
Other groups such as Hezbollah, have a presence in countries
neighboring the Caribbean Basin, such as Venezuela and Colombia.
Objective 2:
Implementation Of Port Security Standards:
International Port Security Standard:
The international standards for security in the port and maritime
environments are contained in the International Maritime Organization's
(IMO) International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code:
Developed after the September 11, 2001, attacks:
Amended the 1974 Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) Convention:
Established measures to enhance the security of ships and port
facilities and provide a standardized, consistent security framework:
Implemented by individual countries, which self-report to the IMO the
facilities within the country that have an approved security plan:
Requirements are performance-based, so compliance can be achieved with
a variety of ways or approaches:
International Ship and Port Facility Security Code:
Using a risk management approach, the ISPS Code requires facilities to
conduct an assessment to identify threats and vulnerabilities. The ISPS
Code also suggests that an assessment be done of physical security,
structural integrity, communication systems, and other areas within a
port facility that might be a likely target.
On the basis of the assessment, the ISPS Code requires port facilities
to develop security plans. For example, the ISPS Code requires port
facility security plans to address, among other things:
measures designed to prevent unauthorized access to the port facility,
procedures for responding to security threats or breaches of security,
and:
measures designed to ensure effective security of cargo and the cargo-
handling equipment at the port facility.
The ISPS Code also suggests that port facility security plans include,
among other things:
the capability to monitor the security of the facility, and:
details on the necessary communications systems to allow the effective
continuous operation of The organization and its links with others.
Coast Guard Observations of Implementation:
Through its International Port Security Program, the Coast Guard
reports that it has visited and observed the implementation of the ISPS
Code at 21 Caribbean Basin countries as of April 2007.
During country visits, the Coast Guard focuses on physical security
measures and access controls, as well as policies)procedures any proper
training to determine the level of implementation of the ISPS Code.
The conditions of the visits, such as timing and locations, are
negotiated between the Coast Guard and the host nation.
In addition to making the country visits, Coast Guard officials make
annual visits to the countries to obtain additional observations on the
implementation of security measures and ensure deficiencies found
during the country visits are addressed.
Coast Guard also conducts its visits with Customs and Border Protection
when possible for CBP's Container Security Initiative (CSI).
Coast Guard Findings of Implementation:
Findings of the International Port Security Program in the Caribbean
Basin:
Of the 14 countries for which final reports have been issued, 12 were
found to have "substantially implemented the security code."
The Coast Guard recently visited another Caribbean Basin country for
which it had found that the country had not yet fully implemented the
ISPS Code, and that country will be subject to a reassessment.
At the facility level, the Coast Guard found several facilities needed
to make improvements or take additional measures. To date, one facility
in the Caribbean Basin has been designated as "not maintaining
effective antiterrorism measures." According to Coast Guard officials,
the deficiencies noted at this facility have been corrected.
According to a International Port Security Program official, the level
of ISPS Code compliance in the Caribbean Basin varies widely among
countries. Some countries have substantially implemented or even
exceeded Code requirements, while other countries have not
substantially implemented the ISPS Code. Generally, the region as a
whole has not implemented the ISPS Code as much as in Europe, but is
further along than Sub-Saharan Africa, according to a Coast Guard
official.
GAO Observations of Implementation:
In general, the facilities we visited in five countries had security
measures in place designed to carry out provisions of the ISPS Code
such as:
Perimeter fencing and access controls:
Closed circuit television to monitor areas and discourage corruption:
Radios and cell phones for security personnel:
Land and waterside patrols to monitor restricted areas:
Photographs:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
GAO Observations of Areas of Concern:
While we observed that actions were taken to implement the ISPS Code,
we also observed areas of concern at some facilities:
Access controls-at one facility, a guard came to the guard station
entrance only when signaled by our escort, and fences were collapsed in
some places and had holes in others.
Security plan exercises-although ISPS Code guidance suggests conducting
an exercise at least once each calendar year, one facility had just
begun planning its first exercise since the implementation of the ISPS
Code in July 2004.
Security records-some facilities had not always kept updated records as
required to show security incidents, exercises and drills, or training.
Challenges Cited by Regional Stakeholders Involved in Security:
Despite the efforts to implement the ISPS Code, challenges were cited
by port facility operators, government officials, and a regional
association toward further advancement of port security in the
Caribbean Basin:
Training-port facility operators and government officials stated they
needed additional training--both basic ISPS Code training as well as
courses in more technical areas such as access control and bomb
detection.
Funding--port facility operators and government officials expressed the
need for additional funds to utilize more technologically advanced and
reliable security systems or to make further enhancements to current
security plans.
Support and maintenance for equipment-embassy officials noted that some
nations lack the necessary resources or skills to effectively operate
and maintain assets such as patrol boats.
Varying implementation of security measures-Caribbean stakehoLders
expressed concerns about wide variation in how security measures are
implemented between ports in the region.
Objective 3:
U.S. Activities To Enhance Port Security:
Several Federal Agencies Are Involved:
Department of Homeland Security (DHS):
Coast Guard, Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE):
Department of Defense (DOD):
Southern Command (SOUTHCOM):
Department of State:
Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL):
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID):
The Maritime Security Alliance for Haiti:
Department of Energy (DOE):
National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA):
Coordination and Cooperative Security Efforts:
There are many activities and programs U.S. federal agencies are
carrying out to address security concerns within the Caribbean Basin.
The Department of State, through its embassies, is the lead coordinator
of the activities U.S. federal agencies are involved in within the
respective countries. GAO did not review as part of this work the
effectiveness of the coordination between these agencies.
The embassies also coordinate among U.S. agencies and countries for
cooperative efforts. Examples of some of the cooperative activities
U.S. agencies are carrying out with countries in the region include:
Conferences and Training:
In the Dominican Republic, the Coast Guard and SOUTHCOM have worked
with the national government to provide conferences on port security.
In addition, there are cooperative and intergovernmental efforts under
way between U.S. agencies and foreign governments:
Bilateral and Intergovernmental Efforts:
The Coast Guard and other federal agencies also exchange law
enforcement information with several partner nations such as the
Dominican Republic, as part of bilateral agreements to fight illegal
migration and drug trafficking.
According to Coast Guard officials, another intergovernmental effort--
Operation Bahama, Turks and Caicos (OPBAT) --is a multi-agency
international operation that coordinates operations of the Dru
Enforcement Administration, Coast Guard, State Department, DOD, ICE, an
he governments of the Bahamas and Turks and Caicos to stop
narcotrafficking to the United States.
According to program ram officials, the Coast Guard is also working
with the OAS Inter-American Committee for Counter-Terrorism to
facilitate port security capacity-building projects in Latin America,
including Central America and the Caribbean. The Coast Guard also
reported having assisted INL in identifying countries in need of port
security training and technical assistance.
Coast Guard International Port Security Program:
As mentioned previously, the Coast Guard's International Port Security
Program assesses the effectiveness of anti-terrorism measures in
foreign ports. In addition, the program also provides a means for the
Coast Guard to carry out other tasks to facilitate the implementation
of security code requirements. For example:
Coast Guard officers make periodic visits to promote bilateral
relations, and share best security practices to help ensure a
comprehensive and consistent approach to maritime security in ports
worldwide.
Countries can make reciprocal visits to U.S. ports to observe U.S.
implementation of the ISPS Code, obtaining ideas for implementation of
the ISPS Code in their ports. To date, four Caribbean Basin countries --
the Dominican Republic, Mexico, Colombia, and Guatemala --have
completed reciprocal visits to U.S. ports, and Trinidad and Tobago is
currently scheduled to visit in, June 2007.
Coast Guard Port State Control Program:
Port State Control is the primary means in which a government may
exercise oversight of vessels operating under the flag of a foreign
country.
This program, established in 1994, is intended to ensure that all
applicable foreign car q o and passenger vessels entering a U.S. port
are in compliance with domestic and international safety and
environmental regulations.
The program expanded in 2004 to include enforcement of applicable
security standards.
Coast Guard personnel assign a score to each incoming vessel based on
identified risk-based criteria to prioritize vessel inspections and
armed security boardings. This targeting process considers risk factors
such as:
flag state (country in which vessel is registered),
vessel owner or operator,
security compliance history,
history of recent ports called,
ship type (i.e., tankers, container vessels, bulk-cargo vessels, etc.)
or:
information obtained during Coast Guard country visits such as which
port facilities have not implemented effective antiterrorism measures.
Program Results:
The Coast Guard routinely conducts a variety of inspections and
boardings of vessels arriving from the Caribbean through a combination
of risk-based targeting, random selection, and intelligence-based
threats.
Coast Guard District Seven which receives the greatest number of
vessels operating in, or arriving from, the Caribbean Basin conducted
1,352 security compliance examinations in 2006. Among these, 25
Caribbean vessels were found to have major security deficiencies that
required a detention or other major control action.
Coast Guard District Seven also requires all vessels with a last port
of call in Haiti to conduct a security sweep for stowaways prior to
entry into the port. A similar requirement for vessels arriving from
the Dominican Republic was recently lifted.
Operation Plan Vigilant Sentry:
Background:
A multi-agency contingency plan, developed in 2003, to address a mass
migration event from Cuba, Haiti, or other Caribbean nation.
Dozens of federal, state, and local agencies would be involved,
including USCG, DOD, CBP, ICE, and regional partners, among others.
Migrants from Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Cuba made up 89
percent of the total migrant interdictions in 2006.
Photograph:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Plan Components:
At-sea rescue and interdiction operations in response to a migration
event:
Deterrence and dissuasion of potential migrants:
Land-based law enforcement operations:
Migrant processing, protection, and detention procedures:
Roles and Responsibilities:
The Homeland Security Task Force-Southeast (HSTF-SE is a standing group
of multiple DHS representatives that, when fully activated, is
responsible for providing the framework for coordinating a unified
response to a mass migration event.
The Director of the HSTF-SE has the authority to direct and reallocate
all DHS personnel and assets within the HSTF-SE area of responsibility
as necessary to address the key components of the plan.
The DHS Secretary is responsible for activating the plan, authorizing
vessel movement restrictions, and changing parole and detention
policies for migrants landing on U.S. soil.
The President may issue a determination that a mass migration. event
constitutes a threat to national security, thereby authorizing
assistance and assets from DOD. Upon a governor's request, the
President may also issue a declaration for emergency assistance under
the Stafford Act.
Unified Support '07 Exercise Program:
To test the elements of the mass-migration plan, a series of exercises
was conducted in 2006 and 2007, culminating in a full-scale exercise
completed in March 2007.
* Hundreds of response personnel from nearly 40 federal, state, county,
and local agencies participated in the full-scale exercise.
According to USCG officials, the exercise effectively served to
familiarize the various agencies with their potential roles and
clarified communication protocols.
An updated plan, incorporating a number of revisions, is currently
being reviewed and is scheduled for final approval by the DHS
Secretary.
Department of Defense- Enduring Friendship Program:
Background:
An initiative to achieve regional security cooperation and build
maritime security capabilities for partnering with other nations to
combat illicit trafficking and other activities.
Contingent upon funding, assistance to partner nations will be targeted
based upon illicit trafficking volume and level of political support.
Program Results:
As of January 2007, capability assessments for all nations were
completed according to DOD officials.
Panama and the Dominican Republic are conducting training and are
scheduled to receive communication equipment and interceptor boats,
according to DOD officials.
Intelligence seminars and training activities have also been conducted
in Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, and Guyana.
To fully fund the security requirements identified, DOD officials
estimated a total program cost of approximately $155 million until
completed.
Department of State:
The U.S. Department of State works with Organization of American States
(OAS) to coordinate and fund projects to improve maritime security in
the Caribbean Basin:
Within OAS, the Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism spent
$320,000 from INL (State Department) during fiscal year 2006. According
to officials, this money, along with funding from other countries, is
used to:
* conduct crisis management tabletop exercises at port facilities,
* conduct port security assessments,
* provide training and follow-up evaluations, and:
* make recommendations to host countries concerning the implementation
of security measures.
U.S. Agency for International Development:
USAID administers assistance programs in the following Caribbean Basin
countries: Colombia, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guyana,
Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico Nicaragua, and Panama.
USAID also provides assistance to other small island nations.
According to USAID officials USAID provides assistance to strengthen
competitiveness and expand investment, promote democracy and effective
political institutions, and integrate disaster risk reduction into
national policies and budgets. In addition to these efforts, USAID has
a number of health, education, and environmental related assistance
programs.
To enhance port security in Haiti, USAID has contributed a total of
$2.35 million across fiscal years 2004-2006 toward the Maritime
Security Alliance for Haitian Ports (MSAH ). Caribbean Central American
Action, the coordinating entity for MSAH created a public-private
sector coalition, to help ensure that Haiti become fully compliant with
all of the ISPS Code requirements.
Customs and Border Protection:
Training to Country Officials:
According to CBP officials, CBP has provided training assistance to
countries such as Grenada, Jamaica, the Dominican Republic, and St.
Lucia in areas such as seaport border enforcement, border control best
practices, and examination of fraudulent documents.
Security of Container Cargo:
Through its Container Security Initiative (CSI), CBP places staff at
foreign seaports to screen containers for weapons of mass destruction.
Nonintrusive inspection and radiation detection technology are used to
screen high-risk containers before they are shipped to U.S. ports.
CSI is operational in seaports located in Honduras, Jamaica, the
Dominican Republic, and the Bahamas.
Department of Energy:
Megaports Initiative --National Nuclear Security Administration:
A DOE program to install radiation detection equipment for containers
at foreign seaports.
The equipment is used by foreign personnel at seaports to screen
containers for nuclear and radiological material.
Operational in the Bahamas with agreements reached to eventually
include ports in Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Honduras, Jamaica,
and Panama.
Photograph:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Cooperative Interagency Efforts:
In addition to their individual activities and programs described
previously, U.S. agencies report that they are also working together
through interagency efforts in the region:
Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATF-South):
A joint interagency command of SOUTHCOM that includes the Army, Air
Force, Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, as well as agencies such as
CBP, ICE, the Drug Enforcement Agency Agency, FBI, and CIA. Colombia,
El Salvador, and Mexico are among 12 partner nations that have liaison
officers at JIATF-South.
Serves as coordinator for fusing intelligence and efforts to counter
illicit trafficking and narcoterrorist operations in the Caribbean and
South America.
Caribbean Border Interagency Group (CBIG):
CBIG serves to coordinate the operations of the Coast Guard, CBP, ICE,
and the U.S. Attorney's Office targeting illegal migration and
narcotrafficking near Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands.
Intended to increase the maritime domain awareness and sharing of
intelligence between agencies:
Secure Freight Initiative:
Announced in December 2006, this initiative between DHS and DOE scans
containers from foreign ports for radiation and risk factors before
they are allowed to depart for the United States.
Honduras is one of six countries to be included in the first phase.
Objective 4:
Potential Economic Impacts Of Port Security:
Economic Importance and Flows of the Caribbean Basin:
The Caribbean Basin is a region of economic significance to the United
States. According to industry and trade statistics:
Hundreds of billions of dollars worth of merchandise trade was
conducted between the United States and Caribbean Basin countries in
2006.
Approximately 6.8 million out of nearly 10 million North American
cruise passengers cruised within the Caribbean Basin in n 2006.
Given these economic links, a successful terrorist attack on or in the
port infrastructure of the Caribbean Basin could have a substantial
economic impact, especially on the Caribbean Basin countries.
Factors Influencing the Potential Economic Impact of an Attack:
Our review of various analyses performed by a government agency and
nongovernmental researchers of terrorist scenarios in the maritime
environment has identified some of the possible factors that could
affect the outcomes, and potential economic impacts, of an attack:
type of weapon used and its destructive capability --i.e., explosives
or Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs),
maritime facility or asset targeted (i.e., cruise ship, critical
infrastructure, container terminals, powerplants, or refineries),
objectives of an attack (i.e., human casualties, economic losses,
environmental damage),
type of attack or tactics used by the terrorists (i.e., explosives in
suicide boats, ramming with vessels, exploding fuel tankers, W WMDs in
cargo ships), and:
ability to recover from the disruptions resulting from the attack
(i.e., repair damage or reroute economic activity):
However, because terrorist attacks are highly unpredictable, the
potential economic impacts of a terrorist attack are highly variable as
well.
Costs and Benefits of Port Security Measures:
As part of an effective risk management approach, decision-makers such
as port security stakeholders and government agencies must consider the
costs and benefits of the security measures considered to determine the
benefits derived from them relative to the costs associated with
implementing them.
The ongoing costs of security are the direct and indirect costs
incurred to reduce the chance of a terrorist attack:
* Direct costs are the expenditures on the necessary equipment and
manpower needed to provide the additional protection. For example,
costs incurred to install fences or hire and rain security guards.
* Indirect costs are those that may result in an increase in
transaction costs that security measures often impose on third parties.
In the case of port security, the secondary costs would include
increased transit times and other compliance costs associated with
security standards. The maritime industry may pass along some of these
higher security costs to its customers.
* The costs of security are incurred by many port stakeholders. For
example port facility and vessel operators who implement the measures,
government agencies that oversee compliance with security requirements
or implement security programs, and transportation stakeholders such as
truckers who might face delays due to the added security measures.
The benefits of security are the net outcomes from implementing the
security measures. For example, implementation of security measures
could over costs to society at large if the measures foil a terrorist
attack and thereby prevent a costly disruption as well as saving lives.
Other benefits may include lower insurance premiums resulting from a
reduced level of theft.
Vessels Visiting Ports without Effective Antiterrorism Measures:
As an example of the actions the Coast Guard can take to reduce
security risks, the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (MTSA)
authorizes specified types of action to be taken against vessels
seeking entry into the United States arriving from foreign ports that
do not maintain effective antiterrorism measures:
According to the Coast Guard, so far they have identified only one port
facility in the Caribbean Basin has been identified as not maintaining
effective antiterrorism measures.
The facility was posted in June 2006 on the Coast Guard's High Interest
Vessel (HIV) list that is used for targeting which vessels are boarded
prior to gaining entry to a U.S. port.
As a result of this targeting, two vessels that visited this facility
were subjected to an offshore Coast Guard law enforcement boarding.
Costs of Vessels Visiting Ports without Effective Antiterrorism
Measures:
There is a lack of information on the potential economic impact of
these actions the Coast Guard has taken:
We met with stakeholders such as the Caribbean Shipping Association,
facility operators, and government officials in the Caribbean to
discuss the potential economic impact of these boardings.
* These stakeholders stated that Coast Guard vessel boardings for
security did not pose a significant problem or source of delay for
their businesses.
* Consequently, information has not been tracked on the costs resulting
from such boardings.
* The Coast Guard has also not estimated the potential economic impact
of taking these actions.
It would appear that given the infrequency of actions and anecdotal
evidence, the economic impact of Coast Guard actions in response to
security problems at Caribbean Basin Ports has been small to date.
[End of section]
Enclosure II: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
The objectives of this review were to identify and describe (1) the
threats and security concerns in the Caribbean Basin related to port
security, (2) the actions that foreign governments and local
stakeholders have taken in the Caribbean Basin to implement
international port security code requirements and the challenges that
remain, (3) the activities under way by U.S. government agencies to
enhance port security in the Caribbean Basin, and (4) the potential
economic impacts of port security and terrorist attacks in the
Caribbean Basin.
To determine the threats and security concerns in the Caribbean Basin
related to port security, we interviewed officials from federal
agencies, international organizations and associations, and various
stakeholders (such as facility operators and government officials of
Caribbean countries) involved in port security in the region. The
federal agencies we met with included the Coast Guard, Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE), the Department of Defense's Southern Command
(SOUTHCOM), the Department of State (State), and the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID). We also received agency briefings on
regional maritime security issues and reviewed Coast Guard reports on
the implementation of the International Ship and Port Facility Security
(ISPS) Code[Footnote 5] by various Caribbean nations. Finally, we met
with officials from international organizations and associations that
are active in the region--such as the Organization of American States
(OAS), the Caribbean Shipping Association (CSA), and Caribbean-Central
American Action (C-CAA)--to obtain information and viewpoints on the
state of port security in the region and the actions taken to implement
international requirements for maritime security.
To determine the actions taken by Caribbean Basin countries to
implement international port security requirements and the challenges
they face, we used the relevant data and information provided by the
agencies and organizations detailed above. We supplemented this
information by conducting site visits to facilities in five Caribbean
Basin countries. The selection of the countries and facilities for
these visits was designed to provide diversity with respect to
location, type of facility, cargo handled, and proficiency of
implementation of the ISPS Code based on Coast Guard observations. The
specific facilities visited included a cross section of port facility
types, including bulk cargo, container, petroleum and natural gas, and
cruise ship-ferry terminals. While in these countries we met with
facility, private sector, and governmental officials to discuss and
observe the security measures implemented. During these visits, we also
discussed the challenges faced in attempting to further enhance
maritime security in their countries and the assistance that they felt
was needed to do so. In addition to these visits, we accompanied the
Coast Guard on its official country visit to one of the countries in
the Caribbean Basin to observe the maritime security measures
implemented at that country's port facilities.
To determine the activities under way by U.S. government agencies to
enhance port security in the Caribbean Basin, we met with officials and
reviewed documents from the Coast Guard, CBP, the Department of Energy
(DOE), SOUTHCOM, State, and USAID. During interviews with some of these
officials, we also discussed and obtained updated information on the
programs and plans in place to respond to issues such as mass illegal
migration.
To determine the potential economic impacts of port security and
terrorist attacks in the Caribbean Basin, during our visits to
countries in the Caribbean we met with officials and reviewed documents
from the Coast Guard, State, and USAID, the C-CAA, CSA, and OAS, and
government officials and facility operators. We also reviewed analyses
by a government agency and other nongovernmental researchers.
Because the mandate gave us a limited time frame within which to
complete our work, this report is descriptive in nature and does not
provide a detailed analysis of the actions taken or efforts made
regarding port security in the Caribbean Basin. For example, while
these briefing slides describe the activities of U.S. agencies in the
Caribbean Basin, we did not perform a detailed assessment the
effectiveness of these efforts or the extent to which interagency
coordination was being accomplished. Additionally, we were able to
visit the port facilities in only a few countries. Thus, the results of
these visits may not necessarily represent the condition of the ports
within the entire Caribbean Basin. Finally, with a few exceptions, we
have not had the opportunity to observe the implementation of the ISPS
Code at ports in other parts of the world and are therefore unable to
compare how it is being implemented in the Caribbean Basin to how it is
being implemented in other regions of the world.
We conducted our work from October 2006 to June 2007 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Enclosure III: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Washington. DC 20528:
June 11, 2007:
Mr. Stephen L. Caldwell:
Director:
Homeland Security and Justice Issues:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, NW:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Caldwell:
Thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on the Government
Accountability Office's (GAO's) draft report GAO-07-804R entitled
Information on Port Security in the Caribbean Basin. Technical comments
have been provided under separate cover.
GAO found that intelligence sources report that no specific, credible
terrorist threats to maritime security exist in the Caribbean Basin.
However, the officials GAO spoke to identified several concerns in the
region related to port security, such as corruption, the rise of
radical Islamic groups, drug trafficking, and illegal migration, among
others.
GAO states in its report that because the mandate gave GAO a limited
time frame within which to complete its work, this report is
descriptive in nature and does not provide a detailed analysis of the
actions taken or efforts made regarding port security in the Caribbean
Basin. However, we recommend that GAO consider including in its report
some additional information regarding Customs and Border Protection
(CBP) programs that describe CBP's traditional and current role in this
area.
The Department recommends that GAO explain in greater detail and update
information for some of CBP's programs that will have a dramatic impact
on port security in the Caribbean Basin, including the Container
Security Initiative, the Secure Freight Initiative, the Regional
Carrier Liaison Group, and the Business Anti Smuggling Coalition. We
also recommend that the report discuss the Caribbean Corridor
Initiative, a multi-agency initiative established to target drug
trafficking in the Eastern and Central Caribbean areas. If the intent
of the report is to capture activities sponsored by the U.S. Government
that have contributed, directly or indirectly, to enhance port security
and have a secure and safe supply chain, we recommend that these
programs be included in the report.
Thank you again for the opportunity to comment on this draft report and
we look forward to working with you on future homeland security issues.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Steven J. Pecinovsky:
Director:
Departmental GAO/OIG Liaison Office:
[End of section]
Enclosure IV: Comments from the U.S. Agency for International
Development:
USAID: From the American People:
Office of the Counselor to the Agency:
Jun 13 2007:
Mr. Stephen L. Caldwell:
Director:
Homeland Security and Justice:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.
Dear Mr. Caldwell:
I hereby provide the U.S. Agency for International Development's
(USAID) formal response on the draft GAO report entitled Information on
Port Security in the Caribbean [GAO-07-804R]. I am pleased to note the
high level of inter-agency cooperation as evidenced in the report and
its accurate description of USAID's presence and activities to enhance
port security in the Caribbean Basin.
Thank you for the opportunity to respond to the GAO draft report and
for courtesies extended by your staff in the conduct of this review.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Mosina H. Jordan:
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
Maritime Security: Observations on Selected Aspects of the SAFE Port
Act. GAO-07-754T. Washington, D.C.: April 26, 2007.
Transportation Security: TSA Has Made Progress in Implementing the
Transportation Worker Identification Credentialing Program, but
Challenges Remain. GAO-07-681T. Washington, D.C.: April 12, 2007.
Customs Revenue: Customs and Border Protection Needs to Improve
Workforce Planning and Accountability. GAO-07-529. Washington, D.C.:
April 12, 2007.
Port Risk Management: Additional Federal Guidance Would Aid Ports in
Disaster Planning and Recovery. GAO-07-412. Washington, D.C.: March 28,
2007.
Transportation Security: DHS Should Address Key Challenges before
Implementing the Transportation Worker Identification Credential
Program. GAO-06-982. Washington, D.C.: September 29, 2006.
Maritime Security: Information-Sharing Efforts Are Improving. GAO-06-
933T. Washington, D.C.: July 10, 2006.
Cargo Container Inspections: Preliminary Observations on the Status of
Efforts to Improve the Automated Targeting System. GAO-06-591T.
Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2006.
Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Efforts to Deploy Radiation Detection
Equipment in the United States and in Other Countries. GAO-05-840T.
Washington, D.C.: June 21, 2005.
Container Security: A Flexible Staffing Model and Minimum Equipment
Requirements Would Improve Overseas Targeting and Inspection Efforts.
GAO-05-557. Washington, D.C.: April 26, 2005.
Homeland Security: Key Cargo Security Programs Can Be Improved. GAO-05-
466T. Washington, D.C.: May 26, 2005.
Maritime Security: Enhancements Made, but Implementation and
Sustainability Remain Key Challenges. GAO-05-448T. Washington, D.C.:
May 17, 2005.
Cargo Security: Partnership Program Grants Importers Reduced Scrutiny
with Limited Assurance of Improved Security. GAO-05-404. Washington,
D.C.: March 11, 2005.
Maritime Security: New Structures Have Improved Information Sharing,
but Security Clearance Processing Requires Further Attention. GAO-05-
394. Washington, D.C.: April 15, 2005.
Preventing Nuclear Smuggling: DOE Has Made Limited Progress in
Installing Radiation Detection Equipment at Highest Priority Foreign
Seaports. GAO-05-375. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2005.
Protection of Chemical and Water Infrastructure: Federal Requirements,
Actions of Selected Facilities, and Remaining Challenges. GAO-05-327.
Washington, D.C.: March 2005:
Homeland Security: Process for Reporting Lessons Learned from Seaport
Exercises Needs Further Attention. GAO-05-170. Washington, D.C.:
January 14, 2005.
Port Security: Better Planning Needed to Develop and Operate Maritime
Worker Identification Program. GAO-05-106. Washington, D.C.: December
2004.
Maritime Security: Substantial Work Remains to Translate New Planning
Requirements into Effective Port Security. GAO-04-838. Washington,
D.C.: June 2004.
Container Security: Expansion of Key Customs Programs Will Require
Greater Attention to Critical Success Factors. GAO-03-770. Washington,
D.C.: July 25, 2003.
(440578):
FOOTNOTES
[1] We defined the Caribbean Basin using the boundaries established in
the U.S. trade programs known collectively as the Caribbean Basin
Initiative (CBI). In 1983 the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act
(Pub. L. No. 98-67, 97 Stat. 369 (1983)), enacted the CBI into law. The
CBI was substantially expanded in 2000 through the U.S.-Caribbean Basin
Trade Partnership Act (Pub. L. No. 106-200, 114 Stat. 251 (2000)), and
currently provides 24 beneficiary countries with duty-free access to
U.S. markets. These countries are Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, Bahamas,
Belize, British Virgin Islands, Costa Rica, Dominica, Dominican
Republic, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras,
Jamaica, Montserrat, Netherlands Antilles, Nicaragua, Panama, St. Kitts
and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and Trinidad and
Tobago. For the purposes of this letter, however, five additional
countries were included: Colombia, Cuba, Mexico, Suriname, and
Venezuela.
[2] Pub. L. No. 109-347, 120 Stat. 1884 (2006).
[3] The International Ship and Port Facility Security Code was adopted
under the auspices of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) by
the Conference of Contracting Governments to the International
Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS). In accordance with
the SOLAS Convention as amended in 2002, the code establishes
requirements for contracting governments of countries where ports are
located, contracting governments of countries where ships are
registered, operators of port facilities, and operators of vessels
traveling on the high seas.Individual nations can set higher standards
for facilities on their soil and for vessels registered in that
country. As of November 30, 2006, there were 156 contracting
governments to the SOLAS Convention.
[4] Of the five countries we visited, the Coast Guard had issued final
reports of its country visits to four of them, while one had just been
visited.
[5] Developed after the attacks of September 11, 2001, the ISPS Code is
the international standard for security in port and maritime
environments. The ISPS Code amended the 1974 Safety of Life at Sea
(SOLAS) Convention and established measures to enhance the security of
ships and port facilities and provided a standardized, consistent
security framework.
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