Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq
Iraqi Government Has Not Met Most Legislative, Security, and Economic Benchmarks Gao ID: GAO-07-1195 September 4, 2007Public Law 110-28 requires GAO to report to Congress by September 1, 2007, on whether or not the government of Iraq has met 18 benchmarks contained in the Act, and the status of the achievement of these benchmarks. The benchmarks stem from commitments first articulated by the Iraqi government in June 2006. In comparison, the Act requires the administration to report in July and September 2007 on whether satisfactory progress is being made toward meeting the benchmarks, not whether the benchmarks have been met. To complete our work, we reviewed government documents and interviewed officials from U.S. agencies; the UN; and the government of Iraq. We also made multiple visits to Iraq during 2006 and 2007. Our analyses were enhanced by approximately 100 Iraq-related audits we have completed since May 2003.
The January 2007 U.S. strategy seeks to provide the Iraqi government with the time and space needed to help Iraqi society reconcile. Our analysis of the 18 legislative, security and economic benchmarks shows that as of August 30, 2007, the Iraqi government met 3, partially met 4, and did not meet 11 of its 18 benchmarks. Overall, key legislation has not been passed, violence remains high, and it is unclear whether the Iraqi government will spend $10 billion in reconstruction funds. These results do not diminish the courageous efforts of coalition forces. The Iraqi government has met one of eight legislative benchmarks: the rights of minority political parties in Iraq's legislature are protected. The government also partially met one other benchmark to enact and implement legislation on the formation of regions; this law was enacted in October 2006 but will not be implemented until April 2008. Six other legislative benchmarks have not been met. Specifically, a review committee has not completed work on important revisions to Iraq's constitution. Further, the government has not enacted legislation on de-Ba'athification, oil revenue sharing, provincial elections, amnesty, or militia disarmament. The Administration's July 2007 report cited progress in achieving some of these benchmarks but provided little information on what step in the legislative process each benchmark had reached. Two of nine security benchmarks have been met. Specifically, Iraq's government has established various committees in support of the Baghdad security plan and established almost all of the planned Joint Security Stations in Baghdad. The government has partially met the benchmarks of providing three trained and ready brigades for Baghdad operations and eliminating safe havens for outlawed groups. Five other benchmarks have not been met. The government has not eliminated militia control of local security, eliminated political intervention in military operations, ensured even-handed enforcement of the law, increased army units capable of independent operations, or ensured that political authorities made no false accusations against security forces. It is unclear whether sectarian violence in Iraq has decreased--a key security benchmark--since it is difficult to measure the perpetrator's intent and other measures of population security show differing trends. Finally, the Iraqi government has partially met the economic benchmark of allocating and spending $10 billion on reconstruction. Preliminary data indicates that about $1.5 billion of central ministry funds had been spent, as of July 15, 2007. As the Congress considers the way forward in Iraq, it must balance the achievement of the 18 Iraqi benchmarks with the military progress, homeland security, foreign policy, and other goals of the United States. Future administration reporting to assist the Congress would be enhanced with adoption of the recommendations we make in this report.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-07-1195, Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Iraqi Government Has Not Met Most Legislative, Security, and Economic Benchmarks
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Report to Congressional Committees:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
September 2007:
Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq:
Iraqi Government Has Not Met Most Legislative, Security, and Economic
Benchmarks:
Securing, Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq:
GAO-07-1195:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-07-1195, a report to Congressional Committees.
Why GAO Did This Study:
Public Law 110-28 requires GAO to report to Congress by September 1,
2007, on whether or not the government of Iraq has met 18 benchmarks
contained in the Act, and the status of the achievement of these
benchmarks. The benchmarks stem from commitments first articulated by
the Iraqi government in June 2006. In comparison, the Act requires the
administration to report in July and September 2007 on whether
satisfactory progress is being made toward meeting the benchmarks, not
whether the benchmarks have been met. To complete our work, we reviewed
government documents and interviewed officials from U.S. agencies; the
UN; and the government of Iraq. We also made multiple visits to Iraq
during 2006 and 2007. Our analyses were enhanced by approximately 100
Iraq-related audits we have completed since May 2003.
What GAO Found:
The January 2007 U.S. strategy seeks to provide the Iraqi government
with the time and space needed to help Iraqi society reconcile. Our
analysis of the 18 legislative, security and economic benchmarks shows
that as of August 30, 2007, the Iraqi government met 3, partially met
4, and did not meet 11 of its 18 benchmarks. (See next page). Overall,
key legislation has not been passed, violence remains high, and it is
unclear whether the Iraqi government will spend $10 billion in
reconstruction funds. These results do not diminish the courageous
efforts of coalition forces.
The Iraqi government has met one of eight legislative benchmarks: the
rights of minority political parties in Iraq‘s legislature are
protected. The government also partially met one other benchmark to
enact and implement legislation on the formation of regions; this law
was enacted in October 2006 but will not be implemented until April
2008. Six other legislative benchmarks have not been met. Specifically,
a review committee has not completed work on important revisions to
Iraq‘s constitution. Further, the government has not enacted
legislation on de-Ba‘athification, oil revenue sharing, provincial
elections, amnesty, or militia disarmament. The Administration‘s July
2007 report cited progress in achieving some of these benchmarks but
provided little information on what step in the legislative process
each benchmark had reached.
Two of nine security benchmarks have been met. Specifically, Iraq‘s
government has established various committees in support of the Baghdad
security plan and established almost all of the planned Joint Security
Stations in Baghdad. The government has partially met the benchmarks of
providing three trained and ready brigades for Baghdad operations and
eliminating safe havens for outlawed groups. Five other benchmarks have
not been met. The government has not eliminated militia control of
local security, eliminated political intervention in military
operations, ensured even-handed enforcement of the law, increased army
units capable of independent operations, or ensured that political
authorities made no false accusations against security forces. It is
unclear whether sectarian violence in Iraq has decreased”a key security
benchmark--since it is difficult to measure the perpetrator‘s intent
and other measures of population security show differing trends.
Finally, the Iraqi government has partially met the economic benchmark
of allocating and spending $10 billion on reconstruction. Preliminary
data indicates that about $1.5 billion of central ministry funds had
been spent, as of July 15, 2007. As the Congress considers the way
forward in Iraq, it must balance the achievement of the 18 Iraqi
benchmarks with the military progress, homeland security, foreign
policy, and other goals of the United States. Future administration
reporting to assist the Congress would be enhanced with adoption of the
recommendations we make in this report.
Figure:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of UN, U.S., and Iraqi data.
[End of figure]
What GAO Recommends:
In future reports to Congress on the benchmarks, we recommend that the
Secretaries of State and Defense: (1) specify clearly what step in the
Iraqi legislative process each draft law has reached; (2) identify
trends in sectarian violence together with broader measures of
population security; and (3) better identify the operational readiness
of Iraqi security forces. State and DOD concurred with our
recommendations but disagreed with our assessment of certain benchmarks
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
GAO-07-1195. For more information, contact Joseph A. Christoff at (202)
512-8979 or christoffj@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter1:
Results in Brief:
Legislative Benchmarks:
Security Benchmarks:
Economic Benchmark:
Conclusions:
Recommendations:
Agency Comments:
Appendix I: Benchmark 1 - Constitutional Review:
Issue:
Status:
Appendix II: Benchmark 2 - De-Ba'athification Reform:
Issue:
Status:
Appendix III: Benchmark 3 - Hydrocarbon Legislation:
Issue:
Status:
Appendix IV: Benchmark 4 - Semi-Autonomous Regions:
Issue:
Status:
Appendix V: Benchmark 5 - Electoral Legislation:
Issue:
Status:
Appendix VI: Benchmark 6 - Amnesty Legislation:
Issue:
Status:
Appendix VII: Benchmark 7 - Militia Disarmament:
Issue:
Status:
Appendix VIII: Benchmark 8 - Baghdad Security Plan Committees:
Issue:
Status:
Appendix IX: Benchmark 9 - Iraqi Brigades:
Issue:
Status:
Appendix X: Benchmark 10 - Commander's Authority:
Issue:
Status:
Appendix XI: Benchmark 11 - Iraqi Security Forces Enforcement of the
Law:
Issue:
Status:
Appendix XII: Benchmark 12 - Safe Havens:
Issue:
Status:
Appendix XIII: Benchmark 13 - Sectarian Violence and Militia Control:
Issue:
Status:
Appendix XIV: Benchmark 14 - Joint Security Stations:
Issue:
Status:
Appendix XV: Benchmark 15 - Iraqi Security Forces Operating
Independently:
Issue:
Status:
Appendix XVI: Benchmark 16 - Minority Party Rights:
Issue:
Status:
Appendix XVII: Benchmark 17 - Allocating and Spending Iraqi Revenues:
Issue:
Status:
Appendix XVIII: Benchmark 18 - False Accusations:
Issue:
Status:
Appendix XIX: Origin of Iraqi Benchmarks:
Appendix XX: Comparison of GAO Assessment with Administration's July
2007 Initial Benchmark Assessment Report:
Appendix XXI: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Appendix XXII: Comments from the Department of State:
GAO Comments:
Appendix XXIII: Comments from the Department of Defense:
GAO Comments:
Appendix XXIV: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgements:
Figures:
Figure 1: Enactment and Implementation Status of Six Legislative
Benchmarks:
Figure 2: GAO's Assessment of Whether the Iraqi Government Has Achieved
Security Benchmarks:
Figure 3: Average Number of Daily, Enemy-Initiated Attacks Against the
Coalition, Iraqi Security Forces, and Civilians (May 2003-July 2007):
Figure 4: Location of Joint Security Stations and Coalition Outposts in
Baghdad:
Figure 5: Average Number of Daily, Enemy-Initiated Attacks Against the
Coalition, Iraqi Security Forces, and Civilians (May 2003-July 2007):
Figure 6: Map of Joint Security Stations in Baghdad, as of August 9,
2007:
Figure 7: Origin of Iraqi Benchmarks:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
September 4, 2007:
Congressional Committees:
Over the last 4 years, the United States has provided thousands of
troops and obligated nearly $370 billion to help achieve the strategic
goal of creating a democratic Iraq that can govern and defend itself
and be an ally in the War on Terror. These troops have performed
courageously under dangerous and difficult circumstances. The U.S.
Troop Readiness, Veterans' Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq
Accountability Appropriations Act of 2007[Footnote 1] (the Act)
requires GAO to submit to Congress by September 1, 2007,[Footnote 2] an
independent assessment of whether or not the government of Iraq has met
18 benchmarks contained in the Act, and the status of the achievement
of the benchmarks. The benchmarks cover Iraqi government actions needed
to advance reconciliation within Iraqi society, improve the security of
the Iraqi population, provide essential services to the population, and
promote economic well-being. The benchmarks contained in the Act were
derived from benchmarks and commitments articulated by the Iraqi
government beginning in June 2006. (See appendix XIX for information on
the origin of these benchmarks.)
The January 2007 U.S. strategy, The New Way Forward in Iraq, is
designed to support the Iraqi efforts to quell sectarian violence and
foster conditions for national reconciliation. The U.S. strategy
recognizes that the levels of violence seen in 2006 undermined efforts
to achieve political reconciliation by fueling sectarian tensions,
emboldening extremists, and discrediting the Coalition and Iraqi
government. Amid such violence, it became increasingly difficult for
Iraqi leaders to make the compromises necessary to foster
reconciliation through the passage of legislation aimed at
reintegrating former Ba'athists and sharing hydrocarbon revenues more
equitably, among other steps. Thus, the new strategy was aimed at
providing the Iraqi government with the time and space needed to help
address reconciliation among the various segments of Iraqi society.
As required by the Act, this report provides 1) an assessment of
whether or not the Iraqi government has met 18 key legislative,
security, and economic benchmarks, and, 2) provides information on the
status of the achievement of each benchmark. Among these 18 benchmarks,
eight address legislative actions, nine address security actions, and
one is economic-related. In comparison, the Act requires the
administration to report in July and September 2007 on the status of
each benchmark, and to provide an assessment on whether satisfactory
progress is being made toward meeting the benchmarks, not whether the
benchmarks have been met. In order to meet our statutory
responsibilities in a manner consistent with GAO's core values, we
decided to use "partially met" criteria for selected benchmarks. See
appendices I-XVIII for information on our assessment and the status of
the achievement of each benchmark, and appendix XX for a comparison of
GAO's assessment with the administration's July 2007 initial benchmark
assessment report. We are also issuing a separate, classified report on
selected benchmarks.
To complete this work, we reviewed U.S. agency documents and
interviewed officials from the Departments of Defense, State, and the
Treasury; the Multi-national Force-Iraq (MNF-I) and its subordinate
commands; the Defense Intelligence Agency; the Central Intelligence
Agency; the National Intelligence Council; and the United Nations.
These officials included Ryan Crocker, the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, and
General David H. Petraeus, Commander of Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-
I). We also reviewed translated copies of Iraqi documents and met with
officials from the government of Iraq and its legislature. As part of
this work, we made multiple visits to Iraq during 2006 and 2007, most
recently from July 22 to August 1, 2007. Our analyses were enhanced by
approximately 100 Iraq-related reports and testimonies that we have
completed since May 2003.[Footnote 3] We provided drafts of the report
to the relevant U.S. agencies for review and comment. We received
formal written comments from State and Defense and technical comments
from the Central Intelligence Agency and National Intelligence Council
which we incorporated as appropriate. This letter and each appendix
describe the detailed criteria we used in making our assessments of the
18 benchmarks. As required by the mandate, we made a determination of
whether all 18 benchmarks had been met. For 14 of the 18 benchmarks, we
developed criteria for assessing whether the benchmark was "partially
met." For the remaining 4 benchmarks, we determined that they should be
judged as "met" or "not met" because the nature of the individual
benchmarks did not lend themselves to a "partially met" assessment.
Although we analyzed classified data, including the August 2007
National Intelligence Estimate for Iraq, this report only contains
unclassified information, as of August 30, 2007. We conducted our
review in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. Appendix XXI contains a detailed description of our scope
and methodology.
Results in Brief:
As of August 30, 2007, the Iraqi government met 3, partially met 4, and
did not meet 11 of its 18 benchmarks. Overall we found that:
* The constitutional review process is not complete, and laws on de-
Ba'athification, oil revenue sharing, provincial elections, and amnesty
have not passed;
* Violence remains high, the number of Iraqi security forces capable of
conducting independent operations has declined, and militias are not
disarmed; and:
* Funding for reconstruction has been allocated but is unlikely to be
spent.
As the Congress considers the way forward in Iraq, it should balance
the achievement of the 18 Iraqi government benchmarks with the military
progress, homeland security, foreign policy, and other goals of the
United States. In addition, future administration reports on the
benchmarks would be more useful to Congress if they depicted the status
of each legislative benchmark, provided data on broader measures of
violence from all relevant U.S. agencies, and assessed the performance
and loyalties of Iraqi security forces.
Legislative Benchmarks:
Our analysis shows that the Iraqi government has met one of the eight
legislative benchmarks and partially met another.[Footnote 4]
Specifically, the rights of minority political parties in the Iraqi
legislature are protected through existing provisions in the Iraqi
Constitution and Council of Representatives' by-laws; however,
minorities among the Iraqi population are vulnerable and their rights
are often violated. In addition, the Iraqi government partially met the
benchmark to enact and implement legislation on the formation of
regions; this law was enacted in October 2006 but will not be
implemented until April 2008.[Footnote 5]
Six other legislative benchmarks have not been met. The benchmark
requiring a review of the Iraqi Constitution has not been met.
Fundamental issues remain unresolved as part of the constitutional
review process, such as expanded powers for the presidency, the
resolution of disputed areas (such as Kirkuk), and power sharing
between federal and regional governments over issues such as
distribution of oil revenue. In addition, five other legislative
benchmarks have not been met. Figure 1 highlights the status of the
legislative benchmarks requiring legislative enactment and
implementation.
Figure 1: Enactment and Implementation Status of Six Legislative
Benchmarks:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of Department of State, Department of Defense, UN,
and Iraqi government data.
[A] The Iraqi legislature is considering several competing drafts.
[B] The Iraqi Constitution exempts the law on formation of regions from
following the Presidency Council's ratification process that is set out
in Article 138 of the Constitution.
[C] The draft deals with broader federal versus provincial powers,
according to UN.
[D] According to State, the Iraqi government may not need a law to set
the election date, though to date this is unclear.
[End of figure]
As figure 1 shows, legislation on de-Ba'athification reform has been
drafted but has yet to be enacted.[Footnote 6] Hydrocarbon legislation
is in the early stages of legislative action; although three key
components have been drafted, none are under active consideration by
the Council of Representatives.[Footnote 7] Although the government of
Iraq has established an independent electoral commission and appointed
commissioners, the government has not implemented legislation to
establish provincial council authorities, provincial elections law, or
a date for provincial elections. No legislation on amnesty or militia
disarmament is being considered because the conditions for a successful
program, particularly the need for a secure environment, are not
present, according to U.S. and Iraqi officials.
Prospects for additional progress in enacting legislative benchmarks
have been complicated by the withdrawal of 15 of 37 members of the
Iraqi cabinet. According to an August 2007 U.S. interagency report,
this boycott ends any claim by the Shi'ite-dominated coalition to be a
government of national unity and further undermines Iraq's already
faltering program of national reconciliation. In late August, Iraq's
senior Shi'a, and Sunni Arab and Kurdish political leaders signed a
Unity Accord signaling efforts to foster greater national
reconciliation. The Accord covered draft legislation on de-
Ba'athification reform and provincial powers laws, as well as setting
up a mechanism to release some Sunni detainees being held without
charges. However, these laws need to be passed by the Council of
Representatives. (See appendices I-VII, and XVI for further information
on these legislative benchmarks).
The Administration's July 2007 report cited progress in achieving some
of these legislative benchmarks but provided little information on what
step in the legislative process each benchmark had reached. Future
reporting should provide this important detail, as we display in figure
1.
Security Benchmarks:
Our analysis shows that the Iraqi government has met two of the nine
security benchmarks. Specifically, it has established political,
communications, economic, and services committees[Footnote 8] in
support of the Baghdad security plan and, with substantial coalition
assistance, 32 of the planned 34 Joint Security Stations[Footnote 9]
across Baghdad. Of the remaining 7 benchmarks, the Iraqi government
partially met 2 and did not meet five. (see fig. 2):
Figure 2: GAO's Assessment of Whether the Iraqi Government Has Achieved
Security Benchmarks:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of UN, U.S., and Iraqi data.
[End of figure]
The Iraqi government partially met the benchmark of providing three
trained and ready brigades to support Baghdad operations.[Footnote 10]
Since February 2007, the Iraqi government deployed nine Iraqi army
battalions equaling three brigades for 90-day rotations to support the
Baghdad Security Plan. The administration's July 2007 report to
Congress noted problems in manning the Iraqi brigades, but stated that
the three brigades were operating in support of Baghdad operations. Our
classified report provides additional information on the readiness
levels and performance of these units, which supports our assessment of
this benchmark.
The Iraqi government also partially met the benchmark of ensuring that
the Baghdad security plan will not provide a safe haven for any outlaws
regardless of their sectarian or political affiliation.[Footnote 11]
Even though the Baghdad Security Plan is aimed at eliminating safe
havens, and U.S. commanders report satisfaction with the coalition's
ability to target extremist groups, opportunities for creating
temporary safe havens exist due to the political intervention of Iraqi
government officials (see discussion in appendix X) and the strong
sectarian loyalties and militia infiltration of security forces.
The Iraqi government has not met the benchmark to reduce sectarian
violence and eliminate militia control of local security.[Footnote
12]As discussed in appendix XIII, militia control of local security
forces remains a problem. Several U.S. and UN reports have found that
militias still retain significant control or influence over local
security in parts of Baghdad and other areas of Iraq.
On trends in sectarian violence, we could not determine if sectarian
violence had declined since the start of the Baghdad Security Plan. The
administration's July 2007 report stated that MNF-I trend data
demonstrated a decrease in sectarian violence since the start of the
Baghdad Security Plan in mid-February 2007. The report acknowledged
that precise measurements vary, and that it was too early to determine
if the decrease would be sustainable. Measuring sectarian violence is
difficult since the perpetrator's intent is not always clearly known.
Given this difficulty, broader measures of population security should
be used in judging these trends. The number of attacks targeting
civilians and population displacement resulting from sectarian violence
may serve as additional indicators. For example, as displayed in figure
3, the average number of daily attacks against civilians remained about
the same over the last six months. The decrease in total average daily
attacks in July is largely due to a decrease in attacks on coalition
forces rather than civilians.
Figure 3: Average Number of Daily, Enemy-Initiated Attacks Against the
Coalition, Iraqi Security Forces, and Civilians (May 2003-July 2007):
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of DIA-reported Multi-National Force-Iraq data,
July 2007.
[End of figure]
While overall attacks declined in July compared to June, levels of
violence remain high. Enemy initiated attacks have increased around
major religious and political events, including Ramadan and
elections.[Footnote 13] For 2007, Ramadan is scheduled to begin in mid-
September. Our classified report provides further information on
measurement issues and trends in violence in Iraq obtained from other
U.S. agencies. The unclassified August 2007 National Intelligence
Estimate (NIE) on Iraq reported that Coalition forces, working with
Iraqi forces, tribal elements, and some Sunni insurgents, have reduced
al Qaeda in Iraq's (AQI) capabilities and restricted its freedom of
movement. However, the NIE further noted that the level of overall
violence, including attacks on and casualties among civilians remains
high and AQI retains the ability to conduct high-profile attacks.
For the remaining four unmet security benchmarks, we found that:
* The Iraqi government has not always allowed Iraqi commanders to make
tactical and operational decisions without political intervention,
resulting in some operational decisions being based on sectarian
interests.[Footnote 14]
* The government had not always ensured that Iraqi security forces were
providing even-handed enforcement of the law, since U.S. reports have
cited continuing sectarian-based abuses on the part of Iraqi security
forces.[Footnote 15]
* Instead of increasing, the number of Iraqi army units capable of
independent operations had decreased from March 2007 to July
2007.[Footnote 16]
* Iraqi political authorities continue to undermine and make false
accusations against Iraqi security force personnel. According to U.S.
government officials, little has changed since the administration's
July 2007 report.[Footnote 17]
(See appendices VIII-XV, and XVIII for further information on these
security benchmarks).
Economic Benchmark:
The Iraqi government partially met the benchmark to allocate and spend
$10 billion because it allocated $10 billion in reconstruction funds
when it passed its 2007 budget in February, 2007. The New Way Forward
in Iraq cited Iraq's inability to spend its own resources to rebuild
critical infrastructure and deliver essential services as an economic
challenge to Iraq's self-reliance. Iraqi government funds represent an
important source of financing for rebuilding Iraq since the United
States has obligated most of the $40 billion provided to Iraq for
reconstruction and stabilization activities since 2003.
However, it is unclear whether the $10 billion allocated by the Iraqi
government will be spent by the end of Iraq's fiscal year, December 31,
2007.[Footnote 18] Preliminary Ministry of Finance data reports that
Iraq's central ministries spent about $1.5 billion, or 24 percent, of
the approximately $6.5 billion in capital project funds allocated to
them through July 15, 2007. The remaining funds from the $10 billion
were allocated to the provinces and the Kurdish region. (See appendix
XVII for further information on the economic benchmark):
Conclusions:
As of August 30, 2007, the Iraqi government met 3, partially met 4, and
did not meet 11 of its 18 benchmarks. The Iraqi government has not
fulfilled commitments it first made in June 2006 to advance
legislative, security, and economic measures that would promote
national reconciliation among Iraq's warring factions. Of particular
concern is the lack of progress on the constitutional review that could
promote greater Sunni participation in the national government and
comprehensive hydrocarbon legislation that would distribute Iraq's vast
oil wealth. Despite Iraqi leaders recently signing a unity accord, the
polarization of Iraq's major sects and ethnic groups and fighting among
Shi'a factions diminishes the stability of Iraq's governing coalition
and its potential to enact legislation needed for sectarian
reconciliation.
Reconciliation was also premised on a reduction in violence. While the
Baghdad security plan was intended to reduce sectarian violence,
measuring such violence may be difficult since the perpetrator's intent
is not clearly known. Other measures of violence, such as the number of
enemy-initiated attacks, show that violence has remained high through
July 2007.
As the Congress considers the way forward in Iraq, it must balance the
achievement of the 18 Iraqi benchmarks with the military progress,
homeland security, foreign policy and other goals of the United States.
Future administration reports on the benchmarks would be more useful to
the Congress if they clearly depicted the status of each legislative
benchmark, provided additional quantitative and qualitative information
on violence from all relevant U.S. agencies, and specified the
performance and loyalties of Iraqi security forces supporting coalition
operations.
Recommendations:
In preparing future reports to Congress and to help increase
transparency on progress made toward achieving the benchmarks, we
recommend that:
1. The Secretary of State provide information to the President that
clearly specifies the status in drafting, enacting, and implementing
Iraqi legislation;
2. The Secretary of Defense, and the heads of other appropriate
agencies, provide information to the President on trends in sectarian
violence with appropriate caveats, as well as broader quantitative and
qualitative measures of population security, and:
3. The Secretary of Defense, and the heads of other appropriate
agencies, provides additional information on the operational readiness
of Iraqi security forces supporting the Baghdad security plan,
particularly information on their loyalty and willingness to help
secure Baghdad.
As discussed below, State and DOD concurred with these recommendations.
Agency Comments:
We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of State and
Defense, the National Intelligence Council, and the Central
Intelligence Agency. The National Intelligence Council and the Central
Intelligence Agency provided technical comments, which we incorporated
as appropriate.
The Department of State provided written comments, which are reprinted
in appendix XXII. State also provided us with technical comments and
suggested wording changes that we incorporated as appropriate. State
agreed with our recommendation to provide the President with additional
information on the specific status of key Iraqi legislation in
preparing future reports to Congress. State suggested that we note the
standards we used in assessing the 18 benchmarks differ from the
administration's standards. The highlights page and introduction of our
report discuss these differing standards. State also suggested that we
take into consideration recent political developments in Iraq, such as
the communiqué released by Iraqi political leaders on August 26, 2007.
We added additional information to the report about this communiqué and
related developments.
The Department of Defense also provided written comments, which are
reprinted in appendix XXIII. DOD also provided us with technical
comments and suggested wording changes that we incorporated as
appropriate. Defense agreed with our recommendations to provide, in
concert with other relevant agencies, information to the President on
trends in sectarian violence with appropriate caveats, as well as
broader quantitative and qualitative measures of security. Defense also
agreed to provide the President with additional information on the
operational readiness of Iraqi security forces supporting the Baghdad
security plan.
DOD also provided additional oral comments. DOD disagreed with our
conclusion in the draft report that trends in sectarian violence are
unclear. Further information on DOD's views, and our response, are
contained in our classified report. However, the additional information
that DOD provided did not warrant a change in our assessment of "not
met." We note that the unclassified August 2007 NIE stated that the
overall violence in Iraq, including attacks on and casualties among
civilians, remains high, Iraq's major sectarian groups remain
unreconciled, and levels of insurgent and sectarian violence will
remain high over the next six to twelve months.
DOD disagreed with our initial assessment of "not met" for the training
and readiness of the Iraqi brigades supporting operations in Baghdad
and provided additional information on this issue. While acknowledging
that some of these Iraqi units lacked personnel, fighting equipment,
and vehicles, the U.S. commander embedded with the units attested to
their fighting capabilities. Based on this additional information, and
our classified and unclassified information, we changed our rating from
"not met" to "partially met."
DOD did not agree with our initial assessment that the benchmark
related to safe havens was not met. DOD provided additional information
describing MNF-I efforts to conduct targeted operations in Sadr City.
For example, from January to August 2007, Coalition forces and Iraqi
security forces conducted over eighty operations that span each sector
of Sadr City. However, due to sectarian influence and infiltration of
Iraqi security forces, and support from the local population, anti-
coalition forces retain the freedom to organize and conduct operations
against coalition forces. Based on this additional information, we
changed this assessment to "partially met."
We are sending copies of this report to appropriate Members of
Congress. This report will also be available at no charge on GAO's Web
site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staffs have any questions about this report, please
contact me on (202) 512-5500 or Mr. Joseph A. Christoff, Director,
International Affairs and Trade, at (202) 512-8979. Contact points for
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs can be found
on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are
included in appendix XXIV.
Signed by:
David M. Walker:
United States Comptroller General:
Enclosures:
List of Congressional Committees:
The Honorable Carl Levin:
Chairman:
The Honorable John McCain:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Joseph R. Biden Jr.:
Chairman:
The Honorable Richard G. Lugar:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Foreign Relations:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Daniel Inouye:
Chairman:
The Honorable Ted Stevens:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Patrick J. Leahy:
Chairman:
The Honorable Judd Gregg:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs:
Committee on Appropriations:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Ike Skelton:
Chairman:
The Honorable Duncan Hunter:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Tom Lantos:
Chairman:
The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Foreign Affairs:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable John P. Murtha:
Chairman:
The Honorable C.W. Bill Young:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Nita M. Lowey:
Chairwoman:
The Honorable Frank R. Wolf:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Henry A. Waxman:
Chairman:
The Honorable Tom Davis:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable John F. Tierney:
Chairman:
The Honorable Christopher Shays:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs:
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform:
House of Representatives:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Benchmark 1 - Constitutional Review:
Forming a constitutional review committee and completing the
constitutional review.
GAO Assessment as of August 30, 2007: Not met[Footnote 19]
Issue:
Iraq's Constitution was approved in a national referendum in October
2005, but did not resolve several contentious issues, such as claims
over disputed areas including oil-rich Kirkuk. Amending the
Constitution is critical to reaching national agreement on power
sharing among Iraq's political blocs and furthering national
reconciliation, according to Iraqi leaders, U.S. officials, and the
Iraq Study Group report.
Status:
Although the Iraqi legislature formed a Constitutional Review Committee
(CRC) in November 2006, the review process is not yet
complete.[Footnote 20] First, the review committee's work is not
finished. In a May 23, 2007 report, the CRC recommended a package of
constitutional amendments to the Iraq Council of Representatives.
However, the package did not resolve the powers of the presidency;
disputed territories, including Kirkuk; and the relative powers of the
regions versus the federal government. The CRC received an extension
until the end of August 2007 to help resolve the outstanding issues,
but, according to the chairman of the CRC, Iraq's major political
groups need to reach agreement on these issues. Second, once resolved,
the Iraqi legislature must approve the package of amendments by an
absolute majority vote. Finally, if a package of amendments is
approved, the Iraqi people will need to vote on the amendments in a
referendum within 2 months after the legislature approves them.
Completion of the Constitutional Review First Requires Political
Accommodation:
To complete a package of necessary amendments to the Constitution,
Iraq's major political groups need to reach agreement on the following
three contentious issues.
* Power of the presidency. The Deputy Chairman of the CRC, a member of
the Sunni bloc, believes that the presidency should have greater power.
The Constitution gives the presidency such powers as accrediting
ambassadors. It also gives the presidency council the power to approve
or disapprove legislation in the current electoral term.[Footnote 21]
However, the legislature can adopt any disapproved legislation by a
three-fifths majority vote. In contrast, the prime minister, selected
from the legislature's largest political bloc, is commander-in-chief of
the armed forces, names the ministers for each ministry, and directs
the Council of Ministers. The Council directs the work of all
government ministries and departments, develops their plans, and
prepares the government budget. The high-ranking Sunni official said
that giving the presidency more power could allow for better power
sharing among Iraq's political groups.
* Disputed areas, particularly Kirkuk. Article 140 of the Constitution
addresses the issue of disputed areas. It requires a census and a
referendum in Kirkuk and other disputed areas by December 31, 2007 to
determine the will of its citizens. According to the Kurdistan Regional
Government's (KRG) prime minister, Kirkuk represents the Kurdish region
and must be returned to Kurdistan. Under the former regime's policy of
Arabization--removing Kurdish families from Kirkuk and replacing them
with Arab families--areas of Kirkuk were given to other governorates,
according to a Kurdish committee. KRG officials want the referendum
held by the date specified in the Constitution. Other Iraqi legislators
believe that the Kirkuk referendum should be deferred because of the
disputes over the borders of Kirkuk and continuing displacement of
people in the area.
* Power of the federal government versus regions. The CRC proposed
several amendments to the Constitution to clarify the powers of the
federal government and the shared powers with the regions, but has not
achieved compromise among major political factions on these amendments.
In particular, the CRC proposed amending Article 111 of the
Constitution to clearly state that the federal government shall collect
oil revenues and distribute them equally to all Iraqis in accordance
with the national budget law. According to the United Nations, this
amendment would provide the federal government exclusive authority for
oil revenues. In contrast, the existing constitutional framework is
widely interpreted as allowing regions to define how and whether they
share locally generated oil revenues.[Footnote 22] For this reason, the
Kurdish bloc opposes the CRC-proposed amendment.
Procedural and Logistical Challenges Confront Completion of the Review:
If agreement is reached on a package of constitutional amendments, the
Iraqi legislature must vote on the package. The amendments will be
considered approved if an absolute majority of the legislature votes
for the package. One challenge is simply holding a vote.
Despite Iraqi leaders signing a unity accord, as of August 29, 2007,
several Iraqi parties were boycotting the government, including Iraq's
largest Sunni bloc. Although the other parties in the legislature could
form an absolute majority to pass a package of amendments, it would
defeat the purpose of trying to reach a broad political accommodation.
If the legislature approves the constitutional amendments, the
government must hold a national referendum within 2 months of approval.
According to the United Nations, before a referendum can occur, the
Iraq Electoral Commission must develop a valid voting roster, educate
the public about the proposed amendments, print referendum ballots, and
locate and staff polling places. In a July 2007 report, the Iraq High
Electoral Commission stated that it faced challenges to developing a
valid voting roster because of the large movement of displaced persons--
an estimated 800,000 since February 2006.[Footnote 23]
[End of section]
Appendix II: Benchmark 2 - De-Ba'athification Reform:
Enacting and implementing legislation on de-Ba'athification reform.
GAO Assessment as of August 30, 2007: Not met[Footnote 24]
Issue:
Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) Order 1 dissolved the Ba'athist
party, removed Ba'athist leaders and senior party members from
government, and banned them from future employment in the public
sector. The CPA further provided for investigation and removal of even
junior members of the party from upper-level management in government
ministries, universities, and hospitals. Most of Iraqi's technocratic
class was pushed out of government due to de-Ba'athification and many
Sunni Arabs remain angry about policies to de-Ba'athify Iraqi society,
according to the Iraq Study Group report.
Status:
Although Iraqi leaders have drafted several pieces of legislation to
reform de-Ba'athification, none has sufficient support among Iraq's
political factions to have a first reading in the Iraqi legislature,
according to U.S. officials. No consensus exists on reforming the
current de-Ba'athification policy and many Iraqis are concerned by the
prospects of former Ba'athist tormenters returning to power. However,
according to an August 2007 U.S. interagency report, Iraq's senior
Shi'a and Sunni Arab and Kurdish political leaders signed a Unity
Accord, including consensus on draft legislation on de-Ba'thification
reform. Such a law would need to be drafted, passed by the Council of
Representatives, and implemented.
According to U.S. officials, reforms to the law would more likely
promote reconciliation if the reforms target Ba'athists who had command
responsibility within the party or committed human rights violations or
other crimes.[Footnote 25] Removing individuals based purely on party
membership increases the chances that segments of the Iraqi public will
see the system as unfair, according to these officials. Draft
legislation on de-Ba'athification reform, dated July 2007 before the
Unity Accord, provides for a special commission, a panel of judges to
make decisions, and the right to appeal the panel's decisions. The
draft legislation also specifies that the commission will be dissolved
6 months after the law is passed.
[End of section]
Appendix III: Benchmark 3 - Hydrocarbon Legislation:
Enacting and implementing legislation to ensure the equitable
distribution of hydrocarbon resources of the people of Iraq without
regard to the sect or ethnicity of recipients, and enacting and
implementing legislation to ensure that the energy resources of Iraq
benefit Sunni Arabs, Shi'a Arabs, Kurds, and other Iraqi citizens in an
equitable manner.
GAO Assessment as of August 30, 2007: Not met[Footnote 26]
Issue:
The importance of oil revenues for the Iraqi economy is widely
recognized, as is the need to create a new legal framework for the
development and management of the country's oil sector. The oil sector
accounts for over half of Iraq's gross domestic product and over 90
percent of its revenues. The timely and equitable distribution of these
revenues is essential to Iraq's ability to provide for its needs,
including the reconstruction of a unified Iraq.
Status:
The government of Iraq has not enacted and implemented any of the four
separate yet interrelated pieces of legislation needed to ensure the
equitable distribution of hydrocarbon resources. As of August 2007, the
Iraqi government had drafted three pieces of legislation: (1)
hydrocarbon framework legislation that establishes the structure,
management, and oversight for the oil sector; (2) revenue-sharing
legislation; and (3) legislation restructuring the Ministry of Oil.
However, none of the legislation is currently under consideration by
Iraq's parliament (Council of Representatives). A fourth piece of
legislation establishing the Iraq National Oil Company (INOC) has not
been drafted, according to State officials.
Hydrocarbon framework legislation was approved by the Iraqi cabinet
(Council of Ministers) in February 2007, and sent to the Oil and Gas
Committee of Iraq's parliament for review in July 2007. However, before
the legislation was submitted to the parliament, the Iraqi government
amended the draft to address substantive changes made by the Shura
council. According to State, the Shura council reviews draft
legislation to ensure constitutionality and to avoid contradictions
with Iraq's legal system, including Islamic law. The Kurdistan Regional
Government (KRG) did not agree to the council's revisions. Accordingly,
the Oil and Gas Committee chairman is taking no legislative action
until the Iraqi cabinet and the KRG agree on a new draft, according to
State. It is not clear if this legislation will include annexes
intended to allocate the control of particular oil fields and
exploration areas to either the central or regional governments.
According to the Iraqi government, the annexes remain under
consideration.
Revenue-sharing legislation is intended to ensure the equitable
distribution of Iraq's financial resources, including oil and gas
revenues. The central government and the KRG agreed on draft revenue-
sharing legislation[Footnote 27] in June 2007. However, the Iraqi
cabinet has not yet approved the legislation and submitted it to Iraq's
parliament for consideration.
This draft legislation is linked to proposed amendments to the Iraqi
Constitution regarding the role of the federal government and regions
and the management of oil revenues. Under the existing Constitution, if
there is a contradiction between regional and national law with respect
to a matter outside the exclusive authority of the federal government,
regional law takes priority and regional powers have the right to amend
the application of the national legislation within that region. As oil
revenue sharing is not a power exclusively reserved for the federal
government in the existing Constitution, according to officials,
regions may determine how and whether they share locally generated oil
revenues with the remainder of Iraq, regardless of what is stated in
the federal law.[Footnote 28] In response, the Iraqi Constitutional
Review Committee has proposed amendments to the Constitution that would
provide for the national collection and distribution of oil revenues.
Legislation restructuring the Ministry of Oil has been drafted but has
not yet been submitted to the Council of Ministers, according to State.
Legislation establishing the Iraq National Oil Company (INOC) is being
drafted, according to State.
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Benchmark 4 - Semi-Autonomous Regions:
Enacting and implementing legislation on procedures to form semi-
autonomous regions.
GAO Assessment as of August 30, 2007: Partially met[Footnote 29]
Issue:
Iraq's Constitution requires the Council of Representatives to enact a
law that defines the executive procedures needed to form regions within
6 months of the date of its first session. Some Iraqi legislators
believe that the right to form regions, with authority similar to the
Kurdistan region, would help protect their rights.
Status:
In October 2006, the Iraqi legislature passed a law establishing
procedures to form regions, but the law delays implementation for 18
months.[Footnote 30] According to U.S. officials, this means that no
steps to form regions, such as holding provincial referendums, can be
taken before April 2008. According to State, this is in the best
interests of Iraq as it will allow the government to deal with some
outstanding issues. The United Nations has identified two issues that
may impact implementation of this law--the ongoing review of Iraq's
Constitution and the capacity of new regional governments.
According to members of Iraq's Constitutional Review Committee (CRC),
the law on procedures to form regions was delayed for 18 months to
allow the constitutional review process to be completed. Some of the
proposed amendments to the constitution would clarify the powers of the
federal government versus regions and governorates For example,
according to the United Nations, the CRC proposed amendments that would
give federal law priority over regional law with respect to water,
customs, ports, and oil and revenue sharing. Other proposed amendments
would give the federal government exclusive power over electricity
generation, railways, and pension funds.[Footnote 31] Moreover, the
constitutional review could also help resolve the status of disputed
areas, which could impact regional boundaries. Until the constitutional
review is completed and the constitutional referendum is held,
residents in areas considering regional formation may not have all the
information they need to make decisions.
The capability of the regions to govern themselves will also impact
implementation of the law. Article 121 of the Constitution accords
significant executive, judicial, and management authorities to the
regions. The regions have responsibility for maintaining their internal
security forces, administering allocations from national revenues, and
maintaining representational offices in embassies and consuls.
Moreover, the law on formation of regions provides that once formed,
the regions must undertake to create elected provisional legislative
councils. According to the United Nations, this will require a
substantial investment of resources and significant management
responsibility. GAO has reported on significant shortages of competent
personnel in national ministries charged with delivering services to
the Iraqi people; moreover, these shortages are greater at the
provincial level of government, according to State and USAID officials.
We have also reported that the poor security situation and high levels
of violence have contributed to the continued and accelerating "brain
drain" of professional Iraqis that would be needed to manage the new
regional administrations[Footnote 32].
[End of section]
Appendix V: Benchmark 5 - Electoral Legislation:
Enacting and implementing legislation establishing an Independent High
Electoral Commission, provincial elections law, provincial council
authorities, and a date for provincial elections.
GAO Assessment as of August 30, 2007: Not met[Footnote 33]
Issue:
When provincial elections were first held on January 2005, many Sunnis
boycotted the election, resulting in largely Shi'a and Kurd provincial
councils in provinces with majority Sunni populations. To redress the
under-representation of Sunnis in provincial councils, Iraq needs to
hold new provincial elections, but must first establish an electoral
commission, write provincial election laws, define provincial powers so
voters know the stakes, and set a date for elections.
Status:
Although the government of Iraq has enacted and implemented legislation
establishing an Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC), it has
not enacted and implemented legislation establishing a provincial
elections law, provincial council authorities, or a date for provincial
elections.
* Although the government of Iraq has enacted and implemented
legislation to establish an IHEC, certain steps still remain in
establishing the commission. According to the U.S. government, the
Council of Representatives (COR) passed the IHEC Law on January 23,
2007, and subsequently appointed the nine IHEC Commissioners, as
required under the law, in a process the UN deemed in compliance with
international standards. However, a provision in the IHEC law requires
the COR to nominate and the Board of Commissioners to appoint the
directors of the Governorate Electoral Offices in each province. Twelve
of these positions are vacant, but, according to State, the process of
appointing the directors is progressing. The law also requires the IHEC
to establish and update a voter registry in collaboration with the
Governorate and Regional Electoral Offices. However, before they can
complete an update of the voter registry (which was last updated in mid-
2005), an election law must be enacted that defines the residency and
voter eligibility requirements. Finally, the IHEC still needs a budget
to fund its activities.
* Iraq has not enacted and implemented legislation for provincial
elections. According to the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad, the Prime
Minster's office is drafting legislation governing provincial
elections, including setting a date for elections to occur. However,
according to the Embassy, some key political parties are hesitant to
hold provincial elections due to concerns that they will lose
representation, potentially to more extreme parties. Additionally,
several parties are demanding that any election law ensure that
eligible refugees and internally displaced persons be allowed to vote.
* Provincial powers legislation, which will define the authorities and
structures of local governments, has not been enacted and implemented.
According to the U.S. government, the draft legislation has been
approved and submitted to the Council of Representatives, where it has
had two of the three required readings. However, the U.S. government
reported in July 2007 that changes were being considered, particularly
related to the powers of the governor and the authority of the federal
government at the local level. The U.S. Embassy cited key issues with
the draft, including that it cedes most power to the provinces. The
United Nations pointed out that the draft fails to clarify the role of
the governorate and that the draft law does not deal adequately with
the effective delivery of public goods and services in the
governorates. According to the U.S. Embassy, on July 8, 2007, the
relevant COR committee presented a report outlining suggested changes
to the law, some of which the Embassy supported.
* The government of Iraq has not set a date for provincial elections.
The Iraq Study Group emphasized the need for provincial elections at
the earliest possible date. The Embassy is urging the Iraqi government
to take the legislative and administrative action necessary to ensure
timely and fair elections. According to the U.S. Embassy, it is
intensively engaged with the Iraqi government and the COR at all levels
to expedite legislation or amendments to existing legislation that will
allow provincial elections to take place and secure funding for
elections.
In comments on this appendix, State said that this benchmark should be
partially met since the Iraq High Electoral Commission has been
established and the benchmark calls only for its establishment.
However, the benchmark requires more than the establishment of the
IHEC, and Iraq has not enacted and implemented a provincial elections
law, provincial council authorities, or a date for provincial
elections, as required by the benchmark.
[End of section]
Appendix VI: Benchmark 6 - Amnesty Legislation:
Enacting and implementing legislation addressing amnesty.
GAO Assessment as of August 30, 2007: Not met[Footnote 34]
Issue:
Iraqi government officials believe that amnesty for insurgents and
others who have not committed terrorist acts is an important tool to
promote reconciliation and could help pacify insurgents. In addition,
the Iraqi government and coalition forces hold thousands of detainees,
some of whom could be eligible for an amnesty program when conditions
are right.
Status:
The Iraqi government has not drafted legislation on amnesty, according
to U.S. officials, and the conditions for a successful program are not
present. As figure 2 in the cover letter shows, many steps remain in
the legislative process, including drafting the legislation and
obtaining approval in the Iraqi cabinet and Council of Representatives.
However, the government of Iraq is not pressing for the development of
amnesty legislation.
Little Progress Made in Considering Amnesty Legislation:
Although amnesty was proposed as part of the Prime Minister's national
reconciliation plan in June 2006, little progress has been made. The
plan called for issuing amnesty to prisoners not involved in crimes
against humanity or terrorist acts. At that time, the Iraqi government
announced that it would release 2,500 detainees; 2,500 prisoners were
subsequently released. According to U.S. officials in Baghdad, no large-
scale releases have been made since 2006, and there has been little
discussion of amnesty since then. However, the Prime Minister's office
and Iraq's Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Committee
sponsored a workshop on amnesty in May 2007. The workshop recommended
that amnesty should not proceed, but rather should result from national
reconciliation and that the government's military has to be superior to
armed groups as a condition for offering amnesty.
The scope of an amnesty program is also an issue. The United Nations
takes the position that in considering the categories of perpetrators
to be included or excluded in amnesty, international law does not allow
amnesty to be granted to those who committed genocide, crimes against
humanity, or other serious violations of international humanitarian
law. In addition, Iraqi government officials have recommended that an
amnesty program consider all detained individuals held by Iraq and by
coalition forces. There are currently thousands of detainees, including
over 24,000 held by coalition forces. According to multinational force
officials, there could be considerably more detainees in the future as
the Baghdad security plan progresses. The Coalition's Task Force 134 is
building and expanding prison facilities to accommodate additional
detainees.
[End of section]
Appendix VII: Benchmark 7 - Militia Disarmament:
Enacting and implementing legislation establishing a strong militia
disarmament program to ensure that such security forces are accountable
only to the central government and loyal to the Constitution of Iraq.
GAO Assessment as of August 30, 2007: Not met[Footnote 35]
Issue:
Militias contribute to the high levels of violence in Iraq, are
responsible for sectarian killings, fuel ongoing corruption, and have
heavily infiltrated the Iraqi army and national police. Efforts to
dissolve or bring militias under control have been ongoing since 2004.
In March 2007, 77 percent of Iraqis in a nationwide poll agreed that
militias should be dissolved.
Status:
The Iraqi government has not drafted legislation on disarming militias.
CPA Order 91, issued in 2004, prohibited armed forces and militias
within Iraq, except for those allowed under the Order.[Footnote 36]
Multiple steps are needed to enact and implement further legislation to
disarm militias. More importantly, according to U.S. officials,
conditions are not right for a traditional disarmament, demobilization,
and reintegration program (DDR); accordingly, there is currently no
momentum in the government of Iraq for such a program. Thus, militias
pose a severe challenge to stability and reconciliation in Iraq.
Militias Pose a Challenge, but Little Progress Has Been Made in
Demobilizing Them:
Militias have contributed to the high levels of violence in Iraq.
According to the Defense Intelligence Agency Director, the Jayash al-
Mahdi (the militia associated with Muqtada al Sadr), often operates
under the protection or approval of Iraqi police to detain and kill
suspected Sunni insurgents and civilians. A June 2007 Defense
Department report further notes that many Jayash al-Mahdi fighters have
left Baghdad as a result of expanded coalition and Iraqi presence. They
now engage in ethnic and sectarian violence in northern and central
Iraq and have increased conflict with the Badr Organization in southern
Iraq leading to a significant increase in attacks against the coalition
in Basrah. The June 2007 report also states that Shi'a militia
infiltration of the Ministry of Interior is a problem. Militia
influence impacts every component of the Ministry, particularly in
Baghdad and other key cities.
Despite the challenge the militias pose, little progress has been made
to disarm and demobilize them. Nine parties, with militias numbering an
estimated 100,000 fighters, agreed to a transition and reintegration
process in 2004. The Coalition Provisional Authority estimated that 90
percent of these fighters would complete the transition and
reintegration process by January 2005. However, according to the
administration's July 15, 2007 report, no armed group has committed to
disarm. Moreover, according to U.S. officials in Baghdad, the Iraqi DDR
commission has not developed a plan for DDR and has not received
funding for its work.
Conditions for Traditional DDR Do Not Exist:
A May 2007 UN assessment on DDR for Iraq states that minimum
requirements for a successful DDR program in Iraq include a secure
environment, the inclusion of all belligerent parties, an overarching
political agreement, sustainable funding, and appropriate reintegration
opportunities. GAO's reports and analysis show that these conditions do
not exist in Iraq. For example:
* As figure 2 in the cover letter shows, the overall level of attacks
against Iraqi civilians, coalition personnel, and Iraqi security forces
has risen since 2003, creating a poor security environment. Classified
and unclassified GAO reports provide further information on security in
Iraq.[Footnote 37]
* In June 2006, the prime minister sought to include insurgent groups
as part of his reconciliation plan. However, according to
administration and DOD reports, efforts at reconciliation have stalled.
In addition, Iraqi officials reject terrorist groups, such as al Qaeda
in Iraq, and a report done for the U.S. Embassy comments that some
groups cannot be reconciled. Also, the support of external actors is an
important element of disarmament and demobilization, but according to
U.S. reports, some external groups are not helpful. For example, Iran's
Islamic Revolutionary Guard provides deadly arms and funding to Iraq's
militias and contributes to the ongoing instability.
The Iraqi government provided $150 million for DDR in its 2007 budget
and the Congress has made available up to $156 million from the Iraq
Security Forces fund, to be used to assist the government of Iraq for
this purpose. However, Iraq has prepared no plan for DDR and has not
made progress in enacting legislation. Thus, it is uncertain whether
such funding is needed at this time.
[End of section]
Appendix VIII: Benchmark 8 - Baghdad Security Plan Committees:
Establish supporting political, media, economic, and services
committees in support of the Baghdad Security Plan.
GAO Assessment as of August 30, 2007: Met[Footnote 38]
Issue:
The U.S. and Iraqi governments began the current Baghdad security
plan[Footnote 39] in mid-February 2007 to stem the violence in Baghdad
and surrounding areas. During the summer of 2006, MNF-I and the Iraqi
security forces implemented two other plans to secure Baghdad, but
these operations failed to reduce violence for a variety of reasons.
Unlike the earlier operations, the current Baghdad Security Plan
encompasses political, economic, and security activities that the Iraqi
government needed to coordinate at the national level.
Status:
In February 2007, the Iraqi government created the Executive Steering
Committee (the executive committee) and six subcommittees to coordinate
political, economic and military activities and make decisions in
support of the Baghdad Security Plan. According to a Department of
State official, the executive committee's major objective was to
increase the coordination and capacity of the Iraqi government to
improve the quality of life of Baghdad's population as part of the
Baghdad Security Plan. Each of the subcommittees addresses one of six
issues related to the plan's implementation: economics, services,
political, communication, popular mobilization, and security. The
executive committee and subcommittees meet on a weekly basis.
The committees consist of Iraqi and U.S. participants. The Iraqi Prime
Minister chairs the executive committee, while senior-level Iraqi
ministry officials chair the various subcommittees. For example, a
deputy prime minister chairs the economic subcommittee and the services
subcommittee. Representatives from the relevant Iraqi ministries serve
on each subcommittee. Two senior U.S. officials are observers to the
executive committee and attend its weekly meetings. A senior MNF-I or
U.S. embassy official is also assigned to each subcommittee. This
official provides advice on the subcommittees' agendas and other
support when called upon.
According to a Department of State official, the executive committee
and subcommittees have worked to ensure that the Iraqi government
provided sufficient Iraqi forces to assist MNF-I in implementing the
Baghdad Security Plan. For example, when the Iraqi Army provided
brigades that were not at full strength, the executive committee and
security subcommittee identified forces from other parts of the country
to move to Baghdad. The committees also found ways to house and feed
the Iraqi troops supporting the security plan. In addition, the
communication subcommittee has helped publicize the security plan's
goals and the other subcommittees' efforts to get resources to Baghdad
districts that have been cleared of insurgents.
We did not assess the effectiveness of the executive committee or
subcommittees in providing overall coordination and supporting the
implementation of the Baghdad Security Plan. However, the
administration's July 2007 report to Congress stated that the
effectiveness of each committee varied.
[End of section]
Appendix IX: Benchmark 9 - Iraqi Brigades:
Provide three trained and ready Iraqi brigades to support Baghdad
operations.
GAO Assessment as of August 30, 2007: Partially met[Footnote 40]
Issue:
During the summer of 2006, a large number of Iraqi security forces
refused to deploy to Baghdad to conduct operations in support of the
previous Baghdad Security Plans. In January 2007, the President said
that the Iraqi government had agreed to resolve this problem under the
current plan and had committed three additional Iraqi brigades to
support the new plan.
Status:
Since February 2007, the Iraqi government deployed nine Iraqi army
battalions equaling three brigades for 90-day rotations to support the
Baghdad Security Plan. In the July 2007 report, the administration
stated that the Iraqi government had difficulty deploying three
additional army brigades to Baghdad at sufficient strength. In
commenting on our draft report, DOD stated that current present for
duty rates for deployed units is 75 percent of authorized strength.
However, the July 2007 administration report stated that the government
has deployed battalions from multiple Iraqi Army divisions to provide
the required three brigade-equivalent forces to support the Baghdad
security plan. After the initial deployment of the required brigades,
the Iraqi government began the rotation plan. 19 units have currently
deployed in support of the Baghdad security plan. Several of these
units voluntarily extended, and others were rotated every 90 days in
accordance with the plan. In addition, all of the Iraqi units had pre-
deployment training to support operations in Baghdad. The
administration's July 2007 report states that progress toward this
benchmark has been satisfactory, and the overall effect has been
satisfactory in that three brigades are operating in Baghdad.
However, in commenting on this report, DOD stated that performance of
the units currently supporting Baghdad operations has been varied. Some
units had performed exceptionally well, proven themselves and raised
their readiness ratings. Others had marked time and slowly regressed
over their 90-day deployment. Of the 19 Iraqi units that had supported
operations in Baghdad, 5 units had performed well while the remaining
had proven to be problematic for several reasons: lack of personnel,
lack of individual fighting equipment and lack of vehicles to conduct
their assigned missions. We obtained classified information that
indicates other problems with these Iraqi army units. Our classified
briefing report provides more information on this benchmark.
[End of section]
Appendix X: Benchmark 10 - Commander's Authority:
Providing Iraqi commanders with all authorities to execute this plan
and to make tactical and operational decisions, in consultation with
U.S commanders, without political intervention, to include the
authority to pursue all extremists, including Sunni insurgents and
Shi'ite militias.
GAO Assessment as of August 30, 2007: Not met[Footnote 41]
Issue:
As stated in the President's January 10, 2007, speech on the Baghdad
security plan, previous Baghdad security plans failed, in part, because
Iraqi political and sectarian interference prevented forces from taking
action against militias. According to the administration's initial
assessment, Iraq's Prime Minister stated that political or sectarian
interference in the affairs of the Iraqi security forces will not be
tolerated, and actions have been taken to address political
intervention.
Status:
In July 2007, the administration reported that the government of Iraq
has not made satisfactory progress toward providing Iraqi commanders
with all authorities to execute the Baghdad security plan and to make
tactical and operational decisions in consultation with U.S. commanders
without political intervention. The report noted that political
intervention in the conduct of some security operations continues even
though new rules of engagement for the Baghdad Operational Command have
come into effect and commanders have been given the authority to attack
insurgents and militias.
According to U.S. officials and other experts, sectarian and political
interference in the conduct of military operations continues. Tribal
and ethno-sectarian loyalties remain strong within many Iraqi military
units, hindering efforts to take actions against militias. These
loyalties are often the basis for relationships between key officers in
units and higher-level authorities who are not always in the direct
chain of command. For example, sectarian militias control many local
police. Additionally, some army units sent to Baghdad have mixed
loyalties, and some have had ties to Shi'a militias making it difficult
to target Shi'a extremist networks. Further, according to DOD, evidence
exists of target lists emanating from the Office of the Commander in
Chief that bypassed operational commanders and directed lower-level
intelligence officers and commanders to make arrests, primarily of
Sunnis. In addition, sectarian bias in the appointment of senior
military and police commanders continues, giving rise to suspicions
that political considerations may drive Iraqi commanders' decisions
about which operations to undertake or support.
In commenting on this benchmark, DOD noted that all 9 of the brigade
commanders and 17 of the 27 national police battalion commanders have
been replaced for failure to command or enforce non-sectarian
operations.
[End of section]
Appendix XI: Benchmark 11 - Iraqi Security Forces Enforcement of the
Law:
Ensuring that Iraqi Security Forces are providing even-handed
enforcement of the law.
GAO Assessment as of August 30, 2007: Not met[Footnote 42]
Issue:
During 2006, according to a Department of State human rights report,
the Iraqi security forces committed serious human rights violations in
Baghdad and other areas of Iraq. These actions added to the increasing
violence against the civilian population during 2006. In support of the
Baghdad security plan, the Iraqi Prime Minister pledged to provide even-
handed enforcement of the law.
Status:
According to U.S. reports, the government of Iraq has not ensured that
the Iraqi security forces are providing even-handed enforcement of the
law. In May 2007, the U.S. Commission on International Religious
Freedom[Footnote 43] reported that Iraq's Shi'a-dominated government
bears responsibility for engaging in sectarian-based human rights
violations, as well as tolerating abuses committed by Shi'a militias
with ties to political factions in the governing coalition. According
to the commission, the Iraqi government through its security forces has
committed arbitrary arrest, prolonged detention without due process,
targeted executions, and torture against non-Shi'a Iraqis. In
committing these abuses, the security forces target Sunnis on the basis
of their religious identity, as well as terrorists and insurgents.
Furthermore, the commission reported that the Iraqi government
tolerates and fails to control religiously motivated attacks and other
abuses carried out by Shi'a militias, specifically Jayash al-Mahdi and
Badr Organization. These militias have targeted Sunnis on the basis of
their religious identity and have committed such abuses as abductions,
beatings, targeted killings, intimidation, forced resettlement, murder,
rape, and torture. According to the commission's report, relationships
between these militias and leading Shi'a factions within Iraq's
ministries and governing coalition indicate that the Jayash al- Mahdi
and Badr Organization are parastate actors operating with impunity or
even with governmental complicity.
In mid-August 2007, Department of State officials stated that the Iraqi
government and security forces continue to engage in sectarian-based
abuses. State's March 2007 human rights report[Footnote 44] cited
widely reported incidents of unauthorized government agent involvement
in extrajudicial killings throughout the country. These incidents
included Shi'a militia members wearing police uniforms and driving
police cars in carrying out killings and kidnapping in the southern
city of Basra. In addition, death squads affiliated with the Ministry
of Interior targeted Sunnis and conducted kidnapping raids in Baghdad
and its environs, largely with impunity.
The administration's July 2007 report stated that the Iraqi government
and many Iraqi security force units are still applying the law on a
sectarian basis when left on their own. The report attributed any
progress made by the security forces in enforcing the law more even-
handedly to the presence of coalition units and embedded training
teams, rather than to the Iraqi government.
[End of section]
Appendix XII: Benchmark 12 - Safe Havens:
Ensuring that, according to President Bush, Prime Minister Maliki said
"the Baghdad security plan will not provide a safe haven for any
outlaws, regardless of [their] sectarian or political affiliation."
GAO Assessment as of August 30, 2007: Partially met[Footnote 45]
Issue:
As stated in the President's January 10, 2007, speech on the Baghdad
security plan, previous plans to secure Baghdad have failed, in part,
because political and sectarian interference and rules of engagement in
place for those plans prevented Iraqi and coalition forces from
entering neighborhoods that are safe havens to those fueling the
sectarian violence. On January 6, 2007, the Iraqi Prime Minister
stated, "The Baghdad security plan will not offer a safe shelter for
outlaws regardless of their ethnic and political affiliations, and we
will punish anyone who hesitates to implement orders because of his
ethnic and political background."
Status:
Although the Iraqi government has allowed MNF-I to conduct operations
in all areas of Baghdad, temporary safe havens still exist due to
strong sectarian loyalties and militia infiltration of security forces.
According to State, terrorist safe havens are defined as ungoverned,
under-governed, or ill-governed areas of a country and non-physical
areas where terrorists that constitute a threat to U.S. national
security interests are able to organize, plan, raise funds,
communicate, recruit, train, and operate in relative security because
of inadequate governance capacity, political will, or both.
U.S. commanders report overall satisfaction with their ability to
target any and all extremist groups. In commenting on our draft report,
DOD stated that coalition forces and Iraqi security forces conducted
over eighty operations that span each sector of Sadr City from January
to August 2007. According to DOD, the surge has resulted in significant
reductions in safe havens for al Qaeda in Iraq inside Baghdad and in al
Anbar and Diyala provinces. In previous Baghdad operations, the Iraqi
government prevented Iraqi and coalition forces from going into Sadr
City. Although MNF-I conducts operations in Sadr City, MNF-I and Iraqi
security forces maintain only one Joint Security Station on the border
of Sadr City, with none within the city itself (see fig. 4). In
addition to Joint Security Stations, MNF-I established about 30
coalition outposts throughout Baghdad, including one on the border of
Sadr City.
Figure 4: Location of Joint Security Stations and Coalition Outposts in
Baghdad:
[See PDF for image]
Source: Multinational Division-Baghdad.
[End of figure]
However, due to sectarian influence and infiltration of Iraqi security
forces and support from the local population, anti-coalition forces
retain the freedom to organize and conduct operations against coalition
forces. Thus temporary safe havens still exist in Baghdad, which
supports a rating of partially met. A June 2007 DOD report describes
some of the conditions that allow safe havens to exist. For example,
the Shi'a militia continues to function as the de facto government in
Sadr City. Further, militia influence impacts every component of the
Iraqi Ministry of the Interior, particularly in Baghdad and several
other key cities, according to the DOD report.
Our classified briefing report provides more information on the
existence of safe havens.
[End of section]
Appendix XIII: Benchmark 13 - Sectarian Violence and Militia Control:
Reducing the level of sectarian violence in Iraq and eliminating
militia control of local security.
GAO Assessment as of August 30, 2007: Not met[Footnote 46]
Issue:
During 2006, according to State and UN reports,[Footnote 47]
insurgents, death squads, militias, and terrorists increased their
attacks against civilians, largely on a sectarian basis. In addition,
the number of internally displaced persons in Iraq sharply increased
following the February 2006 bombing of the Samarra mosque, primarily as
a result of sectarian intimidation and violence that forced many people
from their homes. By the end of 2006, according to the UN, many Baghdad
neighborhoods had become divided along Sunni and Shi'a lines and were
increasingly controlled by armed groups claiming to act as protectors
and defenders of these areas.[Footnote 48] In January 2007, the
President announced that the United States would increase force levels
in Iraq to help the Iraqis carry out their campaign to reduce sectarian
violence and bring security to Baghdad.
Status:
While it is not clear if sectarian violence has been reduced, militia
control over security forces has not been eliminated and remains a
serious problem in Baghdad and other areas of Iraq.
According to the administration's July 2007 report to Congress, MNF-I
data showed a decrease in sectarian violence, particularly in Baghdad,
since the start of the Baghdad security plan. MNF-I counts sectarian
incidents and murders in determining trends in sectarian
violence.[Footnote 49] The administration's July 2007 report concluded
that the Iraqi government, with substantial coalition assistance, had
made satisfactory progress toward reducing sectarian violence. The
report acknowledged that precise measurements vary, and it was too
early to determine if the decrease would be sustainable.
GAO cannot determine whether sectarian violence in Iraq has been
reduced because measuring such violence requires understanding the
perpetrator's intent, which may not be known. The number of attacks
targeting civilians and population displacement resulting from
sectarian violence may serve as additional indicators. For example, as
displayed in figure 5, the average number of daily attacks against
civilians remained about the same over the last six months. The
decrease in total average daily attacks in July is largely due to a
decrease in attacks on coalition forces rather than civilians.
Figure 5: Average Number of Daily, Enemy-Initiated Attacks Against the
Coalition, Iraqi Security Forces, and Civilians (May 2003-July 2007):
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of DIA-reported Multi-National Force-Iraq data,
July 2007.
[End of figure]
While overall attacks declined in July compared with June, levels of
violence remain high. Enemy initiated attacks have increased around
major religious and political events, including Ramadan and
elections.[Footnote 50] For 2007, Ramadan is scheduled to begin in mid-
September.
The August 2007 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq[Footnote 51]
(NIE) also reports that the level of overall violence in Iraq,
including attacks on and casualties among civilians, remains high.
Further, the NIE states that Iraq's security will continue to improve
modestly, but that levels of insurgent and sectarian violence will
remain high over the next 6 to 12 months. Similarly, recent March and
June 2007 United Nations reports state that attacks against civilians
persist and the continuing systematic, widespread attacks against the
civilian population in Iraq are tantamount to crimes against humanity
and violate the laws of war.
The violence in Iraq has resulted in a large number of Iraqis displaced
from their homes. A report by the Iraqi Red Crescent Organization found
that internally displaced persons increased from about 499,000 in
February 2007 to about 1,128,000 in July 2007. The United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimated that an additional 1.8
million Iraqi citizens were displaced to nearby countries, primarily to
Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Iran, and Egypt. The UNHCR predicted that
40,000 to 50,000 people will continue to be displaced each month even
if the security plan succeeds in solving the displacement problem.
Currently, the number of displaced persons is increasing at an average
of 80,000 to 100,000 each month, according to the Red Crescent.
The August 2007 National Intelligence Estimate for Iraq stated that
population displacement resulting from sectarian violence continues,
imposing burdens on provincial governments and some neighboring states.
As the International Organization for Migration and the UN recently
reported, most of Iraq's internally displaced persons are moving from
mixed areas[Footnote 52] to seek refuge in homogeneous areas, largely
because of direct threats or forcible displacement from their homes due
to their religious and sectarian identities. Where population
displacements have led to significant sectarian separation, according
to the August 2007 National Intelligence Estimate, conflict levels have
diminished to some extent because warring communities find it more
difficult to penetrate communal enclaves.
Our classified report provides further information on trends associated
with violence in Iraq.
Militia control over local security forces - the second part of the
benchmark--has not been eliminated. Numerous U.S. and UN reports have
stated that militias still retain significant control or influence over
local security in parts of Baghdad and other areas of Iraq. For
example, in July 2007, the administration reported that militia
presence is still strong and will likely remain so until the security
situation begins to stabilize. The report stated that the Iraqi
government has made unsatisfactory progress towards eliminating militia
control of local security, which continues to negatively affect the
public perception of the authority and fairness of the Iraqi
government. In addition, DOD's June 2007 report to Congress called
militia influence of local police a significant problem and added that
some security forces remain prone to intimidation by, or collusion
with, criminal gangs. Further, the Department of State's human rights
report characterized Iraqi police effectiveness as seriously
compromised by militias and sectarianism, with rampant corruption and a
culture of impunity. Finally, in March 2007, the United Nations
reported cases of possible collusion between armed militia and Iraqi
security forces in raids and security operations, as well as the
failure of these security forces to intervene and prevent kidnapping
and murder and other crimes.
[End of section]
Appendix XIV: Benchmark 14 - Joint Security Stations:
Establishing all of the planned joint security stations in
neighborhoods across Baghdad.
GAO Assessment as of August 30, 2007: Met[Footnote 53]
Issue:
Past Baghdad security plans failed, in part, because the coalition and
Iraqi forces did not hold neighborhoods after clearing them of
insurgents. The current Baghdad security plan and the related increase
of U.S. and Iraqi forces into Baghdad is intended to clear insurgents,
militias, and organized criminal gangs from neighborhoods; maintain a
security presence in those areas; and provide for follow-on assistance
efforts. As part of this effort, MNF-I and Iraqi security forces are
establishing Joint Security Stations across Baghdad to improve
population protection by providing a continuous presence in Baghdad's
neighborhoods.
Status:
As of August 9, 2007, the Iraqi government, with substantial coalition
assistance, had established 32 of the 34 planned Joint Security
Stations in Baghdad (see fig. 6). This figure includes Joint Security
Stations that had achieved initial or full operational capability.
Figure 6: Map of Joint Security Stations in Baghdad, as of August 9,
2007:
[See PDF for image]
Source: Multinational Division-Baghdad.
Note: Figure 6 shows the 28 joint security stations that were located
in Baghdad's security districts as of August 9, 2007. Three additional
joint security stations are located in Baghdad but are outside of the
security districts, and another joint security station has been
transferred to Iraqi control.
[End of figure]
Joint Security Stations are staffed by Iraqi local police, national
police, and army personnel, as well as coalition forces. According to
the administration's July 2007 report, the security stations are
designed to improve population protection by providing a 24-hour
security presence in Baghdad neighborhoods. They also allow greater
oversight of Iraqi security forces by U.S. military personnel.
[End of section]
Appendix XV: Benchmark 15 - Iraqi Security Forces Operating
Independently:
Increasing the number of Iraqi security forces' units capable of
operating independently.
GAO Assessment: Not met[Footnote 54]
Issue:
In August 2003, the Coalition Provisional Authority dissolved the Iraqi
military and began the process of rebuilding the Iraqi military and
police. Since 2003, the United States has provided about $19.2 billion
to train and equip about 350,000 Iraqi soldiers and police officers, in
an effort to develop Iraqi security forces, transfer security
responsibilities to them and the Iraqi government, and ultimately
withdraw U.S. troops from Iraq. The coalition began embedding
transition teams with Iraqi security forces in 2005 to help develop
their ability to conduct counterinsurgency operations. These teams use
the Operational Readiness Assessment process to evaluate the readiness
of Iraqi security force units to conduct operations with or without
coalition support.[Footnote 55]
Status:
While the Iraqi security forces have grown in size and are increasingly
leading counterinsurgency operations, the number of Iraqi army units
operating independently decreased between March 2007 and July
2007.[Footnote 56] According to the administration's July 2007 report,
an Iraqi unit can be considered independent if it has achieved an
Operational Readiness Assessment rating of level 1, which means it is
capable of planning, executing, and sustaining counterinsurgency
operations.[Footnote 57]
Manning shortages as well as logistics and sustainment shortfalls have
contributed to the decrease in the number of Iraqi battalions capable
of operating independently, according to DOD reports. Sectarian and
militia influences further complicate the development of Iraqi forces.
In June 2007, DOD reported that while coalition forces are the target
of most enemy attacks, Iraqi security forces and civilians account for
the majority of casualties, contributing to the decline in the
readiness of some Iraqi units. Attrition also has affected the Iraqi
security forces. Annual attrition is estimated to be between 15 and 18
percent for the Iraqi army and between 20 and 22 percent for the
police. In addition, according to a June 2007 report from DOD to
Congress, only about 65 percent of authorized Iraqi personnel are in
the field at any given time due to a liberal leave policy and absences
without leave. To increase the number of soldiers on hand for
operations, the Iraqi government and MNF-I decided that they will
increase manning to 120 percent of authorization levels.[Footnote 58]
Due to Iraq's immature logistics systems, many Iraqi military and
police units will continue to depend on MNF-I for key sustainment and
logistics support until December 2008. DOD reports that the Iraqi
forces' limited capacity in these areas hinders their ability to assume
missions from MNF-I and requires continued development in some key
areas through the end of 2008. For instance, DOD has set a December
2008 goal for the Iraqi government to provide day-to-day items such as
food, water, and electricity to the Ministry of Defense's National
Depot. In addition, the Ministry of Interior aims to become self
sufficient in procuring and managing repair parts by the end of 2008.
MNF-I and the Iraqi government continue to struggle with sectarian and
militia influences while trying to develop the Iraqi security forces.
Because of the sectarian leaning of some national police units, MNF-I
is providing continuing oversight of Iraqi security forces. In
addition, militia influence affects every component of the Ministry of
the Interior, especially in Baghdad and other key cities, according to
DOD. This influence, along with corruption and illegal activity,
constrains progress in the development of Ministry of Interior forces.
[End of section]
Appendix XVI: Benchmark 16 - Minority Party Rights:
Ensuring that the rights of minority political parties in the Iraqi
legislature are protected.
GAO Assessment as of August 30, 2007: Met[Footnote 59]
Issue:
Minority parties or groups had no rights under the former Ba'athist
regime. Ensuring the rights of minority parties was a key Iraqi goal to
ensure broad representation and fairness in the new Iraq.
Status:
The rights of minority political parties in the Iraqi legislature are
protected through provisions in the Iraqi Constitution and the Council
of Representatives' by-laws. However, in practice, the rights of
minorities throughout Iraq remain unprotected.
Rights of Minority Political Parties in the Legislature Are Protected:
The Iraqi Constitution and the Council of Representatives' by-laws
include provisions to ensure the full participation of minority
political parties within the Iraqi Council of Representatives. These
provisions include:
* Article 39 of Iraq's Constitution, which guarantees the freedom to
form and join associations and political parties and also prohibits
forcing any person to join in any party, society, or political entity
or to continue membership in it.
* Article 3 of the Council of Representatives by-laws, which guarantees
the freedom of expressions, opinions, and thoughts of all members of
the Council of Representatives. This guarantee is made regardless of a
representative's party or political affiliation in a way that does not
contradict the provisions of the Constitution, including the freedom of
objective opposition, constructive criticism, and achieving cooperation
between the Council of Representatives and other constitutional
institutions.
According to Iraqi legislators from minority parties, their rights in
the legislature are protected and they are not physically intimidated.
The legislators also said that they have the right to speak before
Parliament, and to offer legislation even though they are often not
consulted on legislative issues. According to the U.S. government, the
electoral system--provincial proportional representation--that was used
to elect the current Council was chosen in 2005 to balance a number of
factors, including the ability of women and small minority parties to
gain representation. The Council of Representatives elected in December
2005 includes members from the Shi'a, Sunni, Kurdish, Turkmen, Chaldo-
Assyrian Christian, and Yazidi communities.
Human Rights of Iraqi Minorities Across Iraq Remain Unprotected:
Although the rights of minority parties are protected in the
legislature, widespread violence across Iraq has seriously compromised
the government's ability to protect human rights. According to the
United Nations, attacks against religious and ethnic minorities
continued unabated in most areas of Iraq, prompting these communities
to seek ways to leave the country.[Footnote 60] The conflicts
reportedly bear the mark of sectarian polarization and "cleansing" in
neighborhoods formerly comprised of different religions.[Footnote 61]
According to a non-governmental organization, all of Iraq's minority
communities have suffered violations that include destruction and
defacement of religious buildings; mass murder of congregations
gathered in and around them; abduction, ransoming, and murder of
religious and civic leaders and individuals including children; and
forced conversion to Islam using tactics such as death threats, rape,
and forced marriage.[Footnote 62]
In comments on this benchmark, State wrote that GAO should not refer to
the general human rights problems of Iraqi minorities because to do so
goes beyond the scope of the benchmark and State addresses these
problems in other reports. We disagree. We assessed this benchmark as
met based on our interpretation of the benchmark and our criteria.
However, we believe it is important to provide some context of minority
rights in Iraq. Iraqi legislators we interviewed insisted that the
situation in their communities has a direct bearing on their work in
the legislature, their freedom of movement to and from the legislature,
and their ability to engage fully in Iraq political life.
[End of section]
Appendix XVII: Benchmark 17 - Allocating and Spending Iraqi Revenues:
Allocating and spending $10 billion in Iraqi revenues for
reconstruction projects, including delivery of essential services on an
equitable basis.
GAO Assessment: Partially met[Footnote 63]
Issue:
The President's New Way Forward in Iraq identified Iraq's inability to
fully spend its own resources to rebuild its infrastructure and deliver
essential services as a critical economic challenge to Iraq's self-
reliance. Iraqi government funds are a necessary source of financing
for Iraq's rebuilding effort, particularly since the United States has
obligated most of the $40 billion it provided to Iraq for
reconstruction since 2003. However, the government of Iraq has had
difficulty spending its resources on capital projects. In 2006, the
government spent only 22 percent of its non-provincial capital projects
and reconstruction budget. Furthermore, in the critical oil sector,
which provides over 90 percent of Iraq's revenues, the government spent
less than 3 percent of the $3.5 billion allocated for oil
reconstruction projects in 2006. In its 2007 budget, Iraq committed to
spending $10 billion on capital projects and reconstruction.
Status:
The government of Iraq allocated $10 billion of its revenues for
capital projects and reconstruction when it passed its 2007 budget in
February 2007, including capital funds for the provinces based on their
populations. However, available data from the government of Iraq and
analysis from U.S. and coalition officials show that, while spending
has increased compared with spending in 2006, a large portion of Iraq's
$10 billion capital projects and reconstruction budget in fiscal year
2007 will likely go unspent.[Footnote 64] Iraq's Financial Management
Law generally requires budgeted funds to be spent by the end of the
fiscal year. The Ministry of Oil and the provinces (excluding the
Kurdistan region) were allocated almost half of the government's 2007
capital projects and reconstruction budget; however, they are unlikely
to spend a large share of their budgets in 2007, according to U.S. and
coalition officials. We are conducting a review of U.S. efforts to help
Iraq spend its budget and will issue a separate report at a later date.
Iraq's Ministries Have Increased Spending in 2007, but Are Unlikely to
Spend a Large Share of their 2007 Capital Projects and Reconstruction
Budgets:
The U.S. Embassy in Baghdad reported that Iraqi government ministries
spent about $1.5 billion, or 24 percent, of the $6.25 billion allocated
to their capital projects and reconstruction budgets through July 15th,
just over half-way through the fiscal year.[Footnote 65] This level of
spending already exceeds the $1.4 billion spent in 2006. However, Iraqi
ministries have less than 6 months left in the year to spend the
remaining 76 percent of their budgets. In its July 2007 report, the
administration cited satisfactory progress with this benchmark because
the Ministry of Finance was releasing funds to ministries and
provinces. The U.S. Embassy reported that the Ministry of Finance
released 25 percent and 10 percent of 2007 capital project and
reconstruction budget funds to ministries and provinces, respectively,
in the first 5 months of the year. However, funding releases are not
expenditures and may not be a reliable indicator of future spending by
ministries and provinces. The administration's report noted that
capacity constraints and security problems may affect Iraq's ability to
accelerate its spending and procurement activities.
Ministry of Oil and Provinces Are Unlikely to Spend a Large Share of
Their 2007 Capital Projects and Reconstruction Budgets:
The Ministry of Oil's capital project and reconstruction budget for
2007 is $2.4 billion, almost a quarter of the government's total. The
ministry has already surpassed last year's spending total; however,
U.S. officials stated that the ministry is not likely to spend a large
share of its capital projects and reconstruction budget due to a
variety of challenges, including a difficult security environment and
burdensome and complex procurement rules. According to U.S. officials,
the ministry has undertaken reform efforts to eliminate bottlenecks in
the budget execution process. The U.S. Embassy reported that the
Ministry of Oil had spent $500 million through July 15, 2007, or 21
percent of its budget for the year. However, the Special Inspector
General for Iraq Reconstruction reported statements by U.S. officials
that the ministry may not have spent all of these funds, but instead
shifted them to its subsidiaries, such as the State Oil Marketing
Organization, which have responsibility for spending much of the Oil
Ministry's capital projects and reconstruction budget.[Footnote 66]
In addition, the government provided over $2 billion, or over 20
percent of the 2007 capital projects and reconstruction budget, to the
provinces (not including the semi-autonomous Kurdistan region) based on
their populations.[Footnote 67] These funds are in addition to $2
billion 2006 provincial funds for capital projects, most of which had
not been transferred to the provinces until November and December of
2006.[Footnote 68] U.S. and foreign officials stated that the provinces
have little experience planning and executing infrastructure projects
and are likely to spend little of their 2007 capital projects and
reconstruction budgets. According to information collected and reported
by Provincial Reconstruction Teams, the provinces had committed 44
percent of their 2007 allocation to contracts for capital projects, as
of July 15, 2007.[Footnote 69] However, it is not clear whether the
value of committed contracts is a reliable indicator of actual
spending. Given the capacity and security challenges currently facing
Iraq, many committed contracts may not be executed and, therefore,
would not result in actual expenditures.[Footnote 70] The Government of
Iraq is undertaking a number of initiatives, including budget execution
training sessions, to help provincial officials spend their capital
budgets, according to U.S. officials.
[End of section]
Appendix XVIII: Benchmark 18 - False Accusations:
Ensuring that Iraq's political authorities are not undermining or
making false accusations against members of the Iraqi Security Forces.
GAO Assessment as of August 30, 2007: Not met[Footnote 71]
Issue:
According to U.S. government reporting, qualified Iraqi officers may be
discouraged from operating in a professional, non-sectarian manner if
Iraq's political authorities undermine or make false accusations
against members of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF).
Status:
Iraq's political authorities continue to undermine and make false
accusations against members of the ISF. According to U.S. government
officials, little has changed since the U.S. Administration's July 2007
Initial Benchmark Assessment. Each month the U.S. government receives
reports alleging wrongdoing by ISF members considered by MNF-I to be
non-sectarian in their approach to security. The U.S. assessment
further stated that in most cases the U.S. government was unable to
determine the validity of these allegations but believed them to be
untrue. The assessment concluded that these accusations undermine the
independence and non-sectarianism of the ISF and that the Iraqi
government does not adequately address the accusations. According to
MNF-I officials in Baghdad, some cases resulted in detention of
military officers, but the cases did not provide justification or
specific charges against the officers. Further information is
classified.
The U.S. government further reported that anecdotal evidence suggests
that Iraqi political authorities may not be pursuing allegations even-
handedly. According to U.S. government reporting, the de-
Ba'athification Commission fabricated charges to cleanse Sunni officers
from military units, and the Office of Commander in Chief has issued
questionable judicial warrants as a more recent technique to target
Sunni commanders. In addition, the ISF's formal command structure is
compromised by influential sectarian leaders linked to the security
ministries. These actions have reportedly led to the arrest and
detention of several military officials. According to U.S. officials,
this tactic is primarily used against Sunni Ministry of Defense
officials and does not occur at the predominantly Shi'a Ministry of
Interior. The U.S. government also reported that some Sunni politicians
have made unsubstantiated claims against ISF officials. Moreover, Iraqi
government support for the ISF has been uneven. Some members of the
Council of Ministers and Council of Representatives have publicly
supported ISF leaders while behind the scenes they continue to ignore
sectarian activities, according to the U.S. government.
[End of section]
Appendix XIX: Origin of Iraqi Benchmarks:
Figure 7: Origin of Iraqi Benchmarks:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of Department of State, Department of Defense, and
Iraqi government data.
[A] Iraq's Policy Committee on National Security agreed upon a set of
political, security, and economic benchmarks and an associated timeline
in September 2006. These were reaffirmed by the Presidency Council on
October 16, 2006.
[B] In December 2006, MNF-I and the government of Iraq agreed to
establish joint security stations.
[End of figure]
[End of section]
Appendix XX: Comparison of GAO Assessment with Administration's July
2007 Initial Benchmark Assessment Report:
Figure: Comparison of GAO Assessment with Administrations July 2007
Initial Benchmark Assessment Report:
[See PDF for image]
[A] According to the U.S. State Department, conditions are not present
for these benchmarks.
[End of figure]
[End of section]
Appendix XXI: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
The U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans' Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq
Accountability Appropriations Act of 2007[Footnote 72] (the Act)
requires GAO to submit to Congress by September 1, 2007, an independent
assessment of whether or not the government of Iraq has met 18
benchmarks contained in the Act and the status of the achievement of
the benchmarks. This report (1) provides an assessment of whether or
not the Iraqi government has met 18 legislative, security, and economic
benchmarks, and (2) provides information on the status of the
achievement of each benchmark. These benchmarks address 8 legislative,
9 security and 1 economic-related action.
To complete this work, we reviewed U.S. agency documents and
interviewed officials from the Departments of Defense, State, and the
Treasury; the Multi-national Force-Iraq (MNF-I) and its subordinate
commands; the Defense Intelligence Agency; the Central Intelligence
Agency; the National Intelligence Council; and the United Nations.
These officials included Ryan Crocker, the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, and
General David H. Petraeus, Commander of Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-
I). We also reviewed translated copies of Iraqi documents and met with
officials from the government of Iraq and its legislature. As part of
this work, we made multiple visits to Iraq during 2006 and 2007,
including a visit from July 22 to August 1, 2007. Our analyses were
enhanced by approximately 100 Iraq-related audits we have completed
since May 2003.[Footnote 73] We provided drafts of the report to the
relevant U.S. agencies for review and comment, which we incorporated as
appropriate. Although we analyzed classified data, this report only
contains unclassified information, as of August 30, 2007. We conducted
our review in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards.
Legislative Benchmarks:
To determine if the Iraqi government is completing actions related to
review of the Iraqi Constitution; enacting and implementing legislation
on de-Ba'athification, the equitable distribution of hydrocarbon
resources, procedures to form semi-autonomous regions, the independent
high electoral commission, provincial elections, provincial council
authorities, amnesty, and militia disarmament; and ensuring that the
rights of minority political parties in the Iraqi legislature are
protected, we took a number of actions. Specifically, we interviewed
and reviewed documentation from the Iraqi government, Iraqi legislators
in Baghdad, UN, U.S. Institute for Peace, IFES[Footnote 74], the
Independent High Electoral Commission, non-governmental organizations,
and the Departments of Defense and State in Washington, D.C. and
Baghdad, Iraq. The documents reviewed included the administration's
July 2007 initial benchmark assessment, the Iraqi Constitution, draft
laws related to each of the benchmarks, the International Compact with
Iraq 2007 Mid-Year Progress Report, and UN analyses of the laws
addressed by the benchmarks.
For our assessment of the status of the hydrocarbon legislation, we
relied on prior GAO reporting[Footnote 75] and updated information
where appropriate. We interviewed and reviewed documentation from the
Iraqi government, UN, U.S. Institute for Peace, and State Department in
Washington, D.C. and Baghdad, Iraq. We compared central government
draft oil laws with the Iraqi Constitution and the Kurdistan Regional
Government Oil and Gas law.
Additionally, to determine if the Iraqi government is ensuring that the
rights of minority political parties in the Iraqi legislature are
protected, we obtained and reviewed the Administration's report on
progress in Iraq, the Iraqi constitution, and the Council of
Representatives Bylaws. We interviewed Iraqi legislators in Baghdad,
Iraq, including the leader of the Iraqi Minority Council. We also
reviewed human rights reports from nongovernmental organizations, the
United Nations, and the U.S. government to determine whether the rights
of minorities throughout Iraq are protected.
Security Benchmarks:
To determine if the Iraqi government is (1) establishing supporting
political, media, economic, and services committees in support of the
Baghdad Security Plan; (2) providing three trained and ready Iraqi
brigades to support Baghdad operations; (3) providing Iraqi commanders
with all authorities to execute the Baghdad Security Plan without
political intervention; (4) ensuring that the Iraqi security forces are
providing even-handed law enforcement; (5) eliminating safe havens; (6)
reducing the level of sectarian violence and eliminating militia
control of local security; (7) establishing all planned joint security
stations; (8) increasing the number of security units capable of
operating independently; and (9) ensuring that Iraq's political
authorities are not undermining or making false accusations against
members of the Iraqi Security Forces, we took a number of actions.
Specifically, we examined U.S. Department of State cables and other
documents that discussed the establishment of the supporting
committees. We reviewed classified and unclassified documents and
reports showing the Iraqi Army units that had deployed to Baghdad and
analyzed the U.S. Department of Defense Operational Readiness
Assessments (ORA) formerly known as Transitional Readiness Assessments,
for these units. In addition, we reviewed classified and unclassified
assessments of the authorities granted to unit commanders, the level of
sectarian influence and levels of militia infiltration of army and
police units, and reports of incidents where Iraqi officials interfered
with the chain of command.
To understand the range of methodological issues associated with
measuring levels of sectarian violence, and to collect information
related to broader trends in population security, we interviewed
officials from the U.S. Department of State and Department of Defense
in Washington, D.C., and Baghdad, Iraq; the Central Intelligence
Agency; the Defense Intelligence Agency; the National Intelligence
Council; the United Nations; and the International Organization for
Migration in Washington, D.C., Baghdad, Iraq, and Amman, Jordan. We
also met with these officials to discuss the other benchmarks.
Economic Benchmark:
To assess the extent to which the government of Iraq is allocating and
spending $10 billion in Iraqi revenues for reconstruction projects,
including delivery of essential services on an equitable basis, we
interviewed U.S. government officials and contractors, and obtained and
analyzed supporting documents. We interviewed officials in Washington
D.C. and Baghdad with the Departments of Defense, State, and the
Treasury; the U.S. Agency for International Development; the Embassy
Iraq Transition Assistance Office; and consultants to the Ministry of
Finance. To assess progress in allocating and spending Iraqi revenues
we reviewed official Iraqi Ministry of Finance capital budget and
expenditure data for fiscal years 2006 and 2007 provided by the U.S.
Department of the Treasury, and unofficial Ministry of Planning and
Development Cooperation data on capital expenditures reported by
Multinational Force-Iraq.
We also reviewed unofficial unreconciled data on capital budget
execution by the provinces in 2006 and 2007 collected by U.S.
Provincial Reconstruction Teams. We compared 2007 capital allocations
to the provinces with their populations to assess the equity of capital
funding allocations. We discussed the reliability of allocation and
expenditure data with U.S. Treasury officials and contractors advising
the Ministry of Finance. We also reviewed relevant reports by DOD and
State, the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, World
Bank, IMF, public accountants and Iraqi government budget
implementation documents. We found that these data were sufficiently
reliable for the purpose of showing trends in budget expenditures.
[End of section]
Appendix XXII: Comments from the Department of State:
Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the report text appear at the
end of this appendix.
United States Department of State:
Assistant Secretary for Resource Management:
and Chief Financial Officer:
Washington, D.C. 20520:
August 29, 2007:
Ms. Jacquelyn Williams-Bridgers:
Managing Director:
International Affairs and Trade:
Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.:
Washington, D.C. 20548-0001:
Dear Ms. Williams-Bridgers:
We appreciate the opportunity to review your draft report, "Securing,
Stabilizing And Rebuilding Iraq: Iraqi Government Has Not Met Most
Legislative, Security, and Economic Benchmarks," GAO Job Code 320511.
The enclosed Department of State comments are provided for
incorporation with this letter as an appendix to the final report.
If you have any questions concerning this response, please contact
William Cavness, Iraq Desk Officer, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs at
(202) 647-5211.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Bradford R. Higgins
cc: GAO – Judy McCloskey:
NEA – C. David Welch:
State/OIG – Mark Duda:
Department of State Comments on GAO Draft Report:
Securing, Stabilizing And Rebuilding Iraq: Iraqi Government Has Not Met
Most Legislative, Security, and Economic Benchmarks (GAO-07-1195, GAO
Code 320511):
Thank you for allowing the Department of State the opportunity to
comment on the draft report "Securing, Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq:
Iraqi Government Has Not Met Most Legislative, Security, and Economic
Benchmarks."
General Comments:
Different standards of evaluation:
As noted in the draft report (p.3, para 1), the legislation requiring
the GAO and administration reports sets different standards for the two
reports: the GAO is required to assess whether the Iraqi government has
met 18 key benchmarks, while the administration is required to assess
whether the Iraqi government is making "satisfactory progress" toward
meeting the benchmarks. The GAO refines this further with its
definitions of legislative benchmarks as "met," "partially met," or
"not met" (footnote 4, pp. 4-5).
As a result, the GAO assessment in some cases differs from the
administration's assessment focusing on "satisfactory progress." For
example, on benchmark (v) regarding the Independent High Electoral
Commission (IHEC) and provincial elections, Embassy Baghdad and State
assess the first component (establishment of the IHEC) as
"satisfactory." The law creating the IHEC has been passed, members have
been appointed and approved, and the process of recruiting and training
provincial staff is' underway. Because the process is not complete,
however, GAO assesses this component "not met."
We believe that it is important for the GAO to highlight the differing
standards and the effect of this on its conclusions.
Timing of the report:
The GAO report states that its information will be current as of August
30, 2007. It should therefore take into consideration recent political
developments, such as the communique released by Iraqi political
leaders on August 26, 2007. The communique included compromises on a
number of key issues, e.g., de- Ba'athification, provincial powers, and
power sharing.
Treatment of hydrocarbons and revenue management legislation:
The omission of any mention by the GAO of the Kurdistan Regional
Government's (KRG) new oil law could be misconstrued as a tacit U.S.
government approval of that KRG initiative. In fact, U.S. government
policy seeks to achieve unified national hydrocarbons and revenue
management legislation. We are suggesting amended language to that
effect in the attached matrix.
Budget execution:
In our view, GAO's focus on unspent funds in Iraq's reconstruction
budget ignores the progress that Iraq has made in this important area.
This is another area in which the GAO's different standard of
assessment leads to an outcome than State's view of "satisfactory
progress." We will provide GAO with detailed comments on its assessment
of benchmark (xvii).
Treatment of human rights:
Benchmark (xvi) deals only with protection of minority political
parties in the Council of Representatives. There is no basis for
including other human rights issues in this report, and that language
should be removed.
Response to Recommendation(s) Recommendation:
In preparing future reports to Congress and to help increase
transparency on progress made toward achieving the benchmarks, we
recommend that the Secretaries of State and Defense provide information
to the President that:
(1) Clearly specify the status in drafting, enacting and implementing
Iraqi legislation.
Response:
The Department of State provides information on the status of key
legislation in various reports to the Congress, and can provide
additional details on the drafting, enacting, and implementing of that
legislation in future reports.
Department of State:
Unclassified GAO Draft Report:
Securing, Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq: Iraqi Government Has Not Met
Most Legislative, Security and Economic Benchmarks:
Comment Resolution Matrix:
Page #: 1;
Paragraph #: [Empty];
Type * (A,S,C) Formal/Informal: (S) Formal;
Recommendations: Status chart benchmark xvi refers to citizens' rights;
Comment/Rational: The benchmark legislation refers only to rights of
minority parties in the Council of Representatives. This reference to
citizens' rights should be eliminated, along with all other language in
the report related to minority rights not specifically referring to
minority parties in the Council of Representatives;
Page #: 4;
Paragraph #: (3);
Type * (A,S,C) Formal/Informal: (C) Formal;
Recommendations: GAO makes general reference to minority rights in
Iraq;
Comment/Rational: See comment above for p.1. GAO should eliminate
reference to minority rights;
Page #: 11;
Paragraph #: (1);
Type * (A,S,C) Formal/Informal: (C) Formal;
Recommendations: First and second bullets make categorical statements
about government interference ans bias;
Comment/Rational: The judgment as written are too sweeping and are
therefore inaccurate. We recommend for the first bullet "has not always
allowed" and for the second bullet "has not always assured";
Page #: 15;
Paragraph #: [Empty];
Type * (A,S,C) Formal/Informal: (S) Formal;
Recommendations: (i) GAO evaluated status as "not met";
Comment/Rational: The July report gives the status as "Satisfactory
progress," based on the formal establishment of the CRC and the
operational definition of "satisfactory progress" we are using, i.e.,
"present trend data demonstrates positive trajectory." We stand by our
July assessment;
Page #: 21;
Paragraph #: [Empty];
Type * (A,S,C) Formal/Informal: (S) Formal;
Recommendations: (iii) GAO evaluated status as "not met";
Comment/Rational: The GAO report does not mention that the Khurdish
National Assembly passed an oil law in August that is at variance with
important provisions of the framework law and oil revenue management
law under consideration by the Council of Representatives. The United
States continues to believe that Iraq's interests are better served by
the adoption of a single set of national oil and gas laws, which will
help foster national unity and promote reconciliation;
Page #: 24;
Paragraph #: (1);
Type * (A,S,C) Formal/Informal: (S) Formal;
Recommendations: (iv) GAO comments on attitude of Iraq's political
leaders toward regions law;
Comment/Rational: The wording of the last sentence in para (1) implies
that all Iraqi political leaders support the right to form regions.
This is not the case, and was a factor in delaying the implementation
of the legitimate for 18 months. This sentence should be deleted;
Page #: 26;
Paragraph #: [Empty];
Type * (A,S,C) Formal/Informal: (S) Formal;
Recommendations: (v) GAO evaluated status as "not met" and, of
particular note, progress on establishing IHEC as "not met";
Comment/Rational: The July report rates part one of benchmark
(establishment of IHEC) as "satisfactory" and "not satisfactory" on the
other three parts. The IHEC has been established, and while it may not
have completed all tasks assigned to it, e.g., appointment of directors
of directors of provincial Government Election Officers, this does not
merit the GAO's "not met: assessment. The benchmark calls only for
establishment of the IHEC. Selection/training of the new election
officers has been underway for some time. In our view, the GAO
assessment on this element of the benchmark could therefore be
"partially met." GAO assessments on remaining three elements of this
benchmark track with our assessments;
Page #: 28;
Paragraph #: (1);
Type * (A,S,C) Formal/Informal: (C) Formal;
Recommendations: (v) No legislation setting date for elections;
Comment/Rational: CHange to "The government has not set a date for
provincial elections." Rationale: Setting a date for election foes not
require legislation;
Page #: 31;
Paragraph #: (2);
Type * (A,S,C) Formal/Informal: (C) Formal;
Recommendations: (vii) GAO evaluated DDR status as "not met" with "no
momentum in the government of Iraq" toward DDR;
Comment/Rational: Change sentence in first para to read "Conditions are
not right for a traditional disarmament, demobilization and
reintegration program, according to U.S. and U.N. officials, and
accordingly, there is no momentum for such a program at present."
Rationale: There is no program because the conditions are no present,
bot because there is no government momentum. We object to the GAO's
characterization of State's evaluation as "N/A." See additional not for
p. 64;
Page #: 35;
Paragraph #: (2);
Type * (A,S,C) Formal/Informal: (C) Formal;
Recommendations: (viii) GAO commented that the committees worked to
provide forces for Baghdad Security Plan, found ways to house and feed
troops in Baghdad, etc.;
Comment/Rational: The executive committee and subcommittee may have
engaged in these activities early in the course of the Baghdad Security
Plan, but no longer do so. The entire paragraph should be omitted;
Page #: 55;
Paragraph #: (2);
Type * (A,S,C) Formal/Informal: (C) Formal;
Recommendations: (xvi) GAO evaluated status as "met" but with caveats
related to the general human rights situation for minorities in Iraq;
Comment/Rational: The benchmark refers only to rights of minorities
represented in the COR, and so the GAO assessment should not refer to
the general human rights problem of Iraqi minorities. The State
Department addresses these problems in detail in other reports. Request
deletion of sentence beginning, "However, this benchmark...";
Page #: 56;
Paragraph #: [Empty];
Type * (A,S,C) (C) Formal/Informal;
Recommendations: Selection on human rights of Iraqi minorities;
Comment/Rational:Again, this section foes beyond the scope of the
benchmarks report and should be deleted;
Page #: 58;
Paragraph #: [Empty];
Type * (A,S,C) Formal/Informal: (C) Formal;
Recommendations: (xvii) GAO assesses status as "partially met;
Comment/Rational: The July report indicates "satisfactory progress."
From the U.S. government perspective, the most important point in that
the Iraqis are making steady progress, and will significantly improve
over last year's performances on budget execution, though the exact
amount remains unclear. Indeed, the GOI ministries have already spent
more of their 2007 capital budget from their total spending in all of
2006.
Provincial performance on budget execution is particularly noteworthy,
considering that the provincial officials have little prior experience
with planning and executing their own budgets. To date, provinces have
committed 100 percent of the 2006 funds and 47 per cent of their 2007
funds, with most of this work being done during 2007;
It is difficult to make a definitive judgment in September regarding
how much of the capital budget will be spent, given that:
1. The budget was passed at the end of February, and there was little
money allocated until March.
2. Performance usually accelerates during the last half of the year.
3. There are significant lags in the official GOI data-Ministry of
Finance data currently go only through May.
State will provide a detailed response on the GAO text directly to
GAO;
Page #: 64;
Paragraph #: [Empty];
Type * (A,S,C) Formal/Informal: (S) Formal;
Recommendations: Summary chart, benchmarks (vi) and (vii) describes
State assessment as "N/A";
Comment/Rational: GAO should use State's formula of "prerequisites not
present" or equivalent language, but not "N/A";
Page #: 66;
Paragraph #: (3);
Type * (A,S,C) Formal/Informal: (C) Formal;
Recommendations: More on human rights in Iraq;
Comment/Rational: Request GAO delete last sentence since the statement
goes beyond the required scope of the report.
* A= Administrative; S= Substantive; C= Critical:
* Formal- recommends comments should be published as part of official
State response to GAO.
* Informal- recommends comments should be provided to GAO but not be
published in report.
The following are GAO's comments on the State Department's letter dated
August 30, 2007.
GAO Comments:
1. We agree with State that legislation on the Iraq High Electoral
Commission has been enacted and implemented. However, our assessment of
"not met" on the electoral benchmark is based on the Iraqi government
not enacting and implementing three of four components of this
benchmark--legislation on provincial authorities, provincial elections,
and an election date.
5. We have highlighted the different standards of assessment between
our report and the administration's reports. We also specify our
assessment criteria in the cover letter and each appendix to make our
judgments fully transparent.
6. We have included information about the recent communiqué in the
cover letter and appendices as appropriate.
7. We have included information about the Kurdish Regional Government's
new law and the U.S. position on it in the appendix on hydrocarbon
legislation.
8. Our report acknowledges the progress that the Iraqi government has
made in allocating and spending $10 billion of fiscal year 2007 funds
on capital projects and reconstruction. While these funds have been
allocated, our report also notes that a large portion of these funds
will likely go unspent. Consequently, we rated this benchmark as
"partially met."
9. We disagree with State's comment. We assessed this benchmark as
"met." However, Iraqi legislators we interviewed insisted that the
situation in their communities has a direct bearing on their work in
the legislature, their freedom of movement to and from the legislature,
and their ability to engage fully in Iraq political life. Thus we
included additional relevant information about minority human rights in
Iraq.
10. See comment 6.
11. See comment 6.
12. We revised our text.
13. Under our criteria, we considered the benchmark as "not met"
because the Constitutional Review Committee was still continuing work
on devising a package of necessary amendments, the Iraqi legislature
had not voted on the package, and a referendum had not been held.
14. We added information to our already existing reference to the
Kurdish National Assembly legislation.
15. We revised this sentence.
16. Under our criteria, this benchmark was not met.
17. We revised the text to reflect State's comments.
18. We revised the text to reflect State's comments.
19. Our paragraph provides context for the committees' work and the
text makes it clear that these actions were in the past so we retained
our original language.
20. See comment 6.
21. See comment 6.
22. See comment 5.
23. We revised the text.
24. See comment 6.
[End of section]
Appendix XXIII: Comments from the Department of Defense:
See States response in appendix XXII.
Office Of The Assistant Secretary Of Defense:
2400 Defense Pentagon:
Washington, DC 20301-2400:
August 30, 2007:
Mr. Joseph Christoff:
Director, International Affairs and Trade:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street N.W.:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Christoff:
The Department of Defense appreciates the opportunity to respond to the
GAO draft report, GAO-07-1195, "Securing, Stabilizing And Rebuilding
Iraq: Iraqi Government Has Not Met Most Legislative, Security, and
Economic Benchmarks," dated August 27, 2007 (GAO Code 320511). DoD's
response covers the last two of the draft report's three
recommendations. The Department of State has agreed to respond to the
first recommendation.
The GAO recommends that in preparing future reports to Congress and to
help increase transparency on progress made toward achieving the
benchmarks:
Recommendation 2: The Secretary of Defense, and the heads of other
appropriate departments and agencies, provides information to the
President on trends in sectarian violence with appropriate caveats, as
well as broader quantitative and qualitative measures of security.
DoD concurs.
Recommendation 3: The Secretary of Defense, and the heads of other
appropriate agencies, provides additional information on the
operational readiness of Iraqi security forces supporting the Baghdad
security plan.
DoD concurs.
Attached is a matrix with comments on the unclassified report. A
comment matrix for the classified briefing will be provided under
separate cover.
DoD appreciates the opportunity to comment. If you have any questions
concerning these comments, my point of contact is Mr. James Stahlman at
703-571-2526.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Mark T. Kimmitt:
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense:
for the Middle East:
Attachments:
As stated:
August 30, 2007:
Department of Defense Comments on: Unclassified GAO Draft Report:
Securing, Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq:
Iraqi Government Has Not Met Most Legislative, Security and Economic
Benchmarks:
Comment Resolution Matrix:
Formal Comments:
#: 1;
Page #: 2;
Para #: 2;
Recommendation: Change to "help the Iraqi government achieve these
benchmarks to "support Iraqi efforts to quell sectarian violence and
foster conditions for Iraqi national reconciliation;
Comment/Rational: Accuracy. Strategy was not designed to solely achieve
benchmarks. Benchmarks are Iraqi government inputs necessary to achieve
strategic goals, they are not the goals;
#: 2;
Page #: 10;
Para #: 3;
Recommendation: Change "eliminating safe haven" to "ensuring that the
Baghdad security plan will not provide a safe haven for any outlaws,
regardless of [their] sectarian or political affiliation";
Comment/Rationale: Accuracy. There is no benchmark for "achieving safe
havens." Recommended change is the correct benchmark;
#: 3;
Page #: 11;
Para #: bullet 1;
Recommendations: Add "always" to make sentences read "The Iraqi
government has not always allowed...";
Comment/Rationale: Accuracy. As written, all tactical and operational
decisions were influenced by political intervention. This is not
accurate;
#: 4;
Page #: 47;
Para #: Chart;
Recommendation: Change labels to read "monthly attacks" instead of
"average daily attacks."
Comment/Rationale: Accuracy;
#: 5;
Page #: 48;
Para #: 4;
Recommendation: Add "parts of" after "influence over local security
in";
Comment/Rationale: Accuracy;
#: 6;
Page #: 53;
Para #: 1;
Recommendation: Delete "sectarian and militia influences" as a factor
contributing to the decrease in the number of Iraqi battalions capable
of operating independently.
Comment/Rationale: Accuracy. No unit is assessed to have regressed on
the basis of "sectarian and militia influences";
#: 7;
Page #: 53;
Para #: 1;
Recommendation: Paragraph says,"only about 65% of authorized Iraqi
personnel are in the field at any given time." Should say, "only about
71% of authorized Iraqi personnel are in the field at any given time";
Comment/Rationale: Accuracy. Authorized Iraqi personnel in the field at
any given time is 71%, not 65%.
GAO Comments:
1. We have revised the text.
2. We have revised the text.
3. We have modified the sentence by adding not ’always.“
4. We have replaced this chart.
5. We have qualified the sentence by adding ’parts of .“
6. We disagree with DOD‘s comment. The Iraq benchmark calls for
increasing the number of Iraqi security units capable of operating
independently. A key impediment to Iraqi training and readiness,
particularly of the police, is sectarian and militia influence. DOD‘s
June 2007 report to Congress states that sectarian bias has constrained
the development of MOI forces.
7. DOD commented that 71 percent of Iraqi authorized personnel are in
the field at any one time, compared to 65 percent, which we report. We
are retaining the 65 percent in our report because it is from a
published DOD source and we do not have further documentation on the
new figure.
[End of section]
Appendix XXIV: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgements:
GAO Contacts:
Joseph Christoff (202) 512-8979 or christoffj@gao.gov:
Staff Acknowledgements:
Steve Lord, David Bruno, Howard Cott, Tim Fairbanks, Mattias Fenton,
Whitney Havens, Dorian Herring, Bruce Kutnick, Judy McCloskey, Tet
Miyabara, and Kathleen Monahan.
In addition, Robert Alarapon Ashley Alley, Monica Brym, Lessie M Burke-
Johnson, Joe Carney, Miriam Carroll, Thomas Costa, Lynn Cothern, Debra
Chung, Joyee Dasgupta, Martin de Alteriis, Etana Finkler, Muriel
Forster, Patrick Hickey, Michael Jenkins, Sona Kalapura, Jeremy
Latimer, Mary Moutsos, Mimi Nguyen, Sidney Schwartz, Jena Sinkfield,
Audrey Solis, Cynthia Taylor, and Christina Werth provided technical
assistance.
Footnotes:
[1] Section 1314 of Public Law 110-28.
[2] GAO is providing this report to Congress on September 4TH, 2007,
the first business day following September 1st.
[3] For example, see GAO, Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq:
Key Issues for Congressional Oversight, GAO-07-308SP (Washington, D.C.:
January 9, 2007). See GAO's website at http://www.gao.gov for a
complete list of GAO's Iraq-related reports.
[4] For those legislative benchmarks requiring the enacting and
implementing of legislation, we defined a benchmark as "met" if all
components of the relevant law have been enacted and implemented;
defined the benchmark as "partially met" if the law has been enacted
but not implemented or, in instances involving multiple pieces of
legislation, at least half have been enacted and implemented; and
defined "not met" as having not met the requirements of "met" or
"partially met." For the constitutional review, we would have
considered the benchmark as met if, in accordance with Article 142 of
the Iraqi Constitution, (1) the Constitutional Review Committee had
been formed; (2) the Council of Representatives had voted on the
recommendations of the review committee; and, if approved by the
Council, (3) a national referendum had been held on the proposed
amendments to the constitution. We would have considered the benchmark
partially met if the first two steps of the constitutional review
process were completed.
[5] Because this law will not be implemented until April 2008,
publication in the Official Gazette has been deferred, according to
State officials, who assert that a delay in implementation is in the
best interest of Iraq.
[6] According to U.S. and other officials and documents, enacting
legislation generally includes the following steps, though the process
is evolving: The Presidency Council and the Council of Ministers have
authority to draft laws, and the Iraqi legislature--either a committee
or 10 members --has the authority to propose laws. Laws drafted by the
Presidency Council or Council of Ministers are reviewed on legal
soundness and subject matter by the Shura Council, an institution in
the Ministry of Justice. Laws drafted by the legislature must first
pass through its Legal Committee. The legislation then proceeds through
three readings. The legislation is presented at the first reading. The
relevant committee may amend the law and the Speaker's Office places it
on the calendar. After the first reading, the legislature discusses the
proposed law at a second reading. At the third reading, a final vote is
taken article by article. Laws that receive an affirmative vote are
sent to the Presidency Council, which can disapprove the law. The
legislature can override the disapproval with a three-fifths majority.
This ratification process only applies during the transition period
when the Presidency Council is in existence. Final laws are published
in the Official Gazette and become effective on the date of publication
in the gazette unless stipulated otherwise. The Prime Minister issues
an order to implement the law. Laws are implemented by the appropriate
ministry, commission, or government office and implementing guidance is
written.
[7] For additional information on Iraq's hydrocarbon sector, see GAO,
Rebuilding Iraq: Serious Challenges Impair Efforts to Restore Iraq's
Oil Sector and Enact Hydrocarbon Legislation, GAO-07-1107T (Washington,
D.C.: July 18, 2007).
[8] In February 2007, the Iraqi government created the Executive
Steering Committee and six subcommittees to coordinate political,
economic, and military activities and make decisions in support of the
Baghdad Security Plan. According to a State department official, the
executive committee's major objective was to increase the coordination
and capacity of the Iraqi government to improve the quality of life of
Baghdad's population as part of the Baghdad security plan. We defined
this benchmark as "met" if the committees were established in support
of the Baghdad Security Plan; defined this benchmark as "partially met"
if at least half of the committees were established in support of the
Baghdad Security Plan; and defined this benchmark as "not met" if less
than half of the committees were established in support of the Baghdad
Security Plan. For additional information, see appendix VIII.
[9] Joint Security Stations are staffed by Iraqi local police, national
police, and army personnel, as well as coalition forces. According to
the administration's July 2007 report, the security stations are
designed to improve population protection by providing a 24-hour
security presence in Baghdad neighborhoods. We defined this benchmark
as "met" if nearly all of the planned Joint Security Stations were
established. We defined this benchmark as "partially met" if half of
the planned Joint Security Stations were established. We defined this
benchmark as "not met" if less than half of the planned Joint Security
Stations were established. For additional information, see appendix
XIV.
[10] We defined this benchmark as "met" if the Government of Iraq had
provided three trained and ready brigades, or an equivalent number of
battalions, to support Baghdad operations; as "partially met" if some
of the units were trained and ready to support Baghdad security
operations; and as "not met" if none of the units provided were trained
and ready to support Baghdad security operations. The assessment was
based on each unit's transition readiness assessments and intelligence
reporting on their reliability.
[11] We defined this benchmark as "met" if Iraqi government policy did
not allow safe havens and none existed; defined this benchmark as
"partially met" if Iraqi government policy prohibited safe havens yet
some existed; and defined this benchmark as "not met" if the Iraqi
government had no stated policy on safe havens.
[12] We defined this benchmark as "met" if there was clear and reliable
evidence that the level of sectarian violence was reduced and militia
control of local security was eliminated; defined this benchmark as
"partially met" if there was clear and reliable evidence that the level
of sectarian violence was reduced or if militia control of local
security was eliminated, but not both; and defined this benchmark as
"not met" if there was no clear and reliable evidence that the level of
sectarian violence was reduced and that militia control of local
security was eliminated.
[13] Ramadan is the ninth month of the Islamic calendar. Over the past
4 years, Ramadan began about October 27, 2003; October 16, 2004;
October 5, 2005; and September 24, 2006.
[14] We defined this benchmark as "met" if Iraqi commanders did not
face political intervention in executing the plan and making tactical
and operational decisions. We defined this benchmark as "not met" if
Iraqi commanders faced political intervention in executing the plan and
making tactical and operational decisions.
[15] We defined this benchmark as "met" if Iraqi security forces
provided even-handed enforcement of the law. We defined this benchmark
as "not met" if Iraqi security forces did not provide even-handed
enforcement of the law.
[16] We defined this benchmark as "met" if the government of Iraq
increased the number of Iraqi security forces' units capable of
operating independently. We defined this benchmark as "not met" if the
government of Iraq did not increase the number of Iraqi security
forces' units capable of operating independently.
[17] We defined this benchmark as "met" if there was no evidence of
undermining or false accusations against Iraqi security force
personnel. We defined this benchmark as "not met" if there was evidence
of undermining or false accusations against Iraqi security force
personnel.
[18] We defined this benchmark as "met" if the funds had been allocated
and either they had been spent or there was a high likelihood that they
would be spent by the end of the fiscal year. We defined this benchmark
as "partially met" if funds were allocated but it appeared questionable
or unlikely that the funds would be spent by the end of the fiscal
year. We defined the benchmark as "not met" if the funds had not been
allocated.
[19] For the constitutional review, we would have considered the
benchmark as met if, in accordance with Article 142 of the Iraqi
Constitution, the Constitutional Review Committee had been formed; the
Council of Representatives had voted on the recommendations of the
review committee; and, if approved by the Council, a national
referendum had been held on the proposed amendments to the
constitution. We would have considered the benchmark partially met if
the first two steps of the constitutional review process were
completed. See benchmark 2 for a description of the criteria for
meeting legislative benchmarks.
[20] The constitutional review process consists of the following: (1)
the Council of Representatives forms a review committee, which presents
to the Council a report on recommendations of necessary amendments that
could be made to the Constitution; (2) the proposed amendments shall be
presented to the Council all at once for a vote upon them and are
approved with the agreement of an absolute majority of the members of
the Council; and (3) the articles amended by the Council shall be
presented to the people in a referendum within two months from the date
of approval by the Council and the referendum will be successful if
approved by the majority of voters and if not rejected by two-thirds of
the voters in three or more governorates.
[21] According to the Iraqi Constitution, in the current electoral
term, which is 4 years, a presidency council consisting of a president
and 2 vice-presidents is in place and exercises the powers of the
presidency. If these constitutional provisions are not amended, at the
start of the next electoral term, power will revert to a single
president and the power to approve and disapprove legislation that is
explicitly granted to the presidency council will lapse. The president
will then have the power to ratify and issue laws passed by the
legislature, although such laws are considered ratified 15 days after
the president receives them.
[22] Under the existing Constitution, if there is a contradiction
between regional and national law with respect to a matter outside the
exclusive authority of the federal government, regional law takes
priority and regional powers have the right to amend the application of
the national legislation within that region.
[23] United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq, Humanitarian Briefing
on the Crisis in Iraq, May 2007.
[24] For those legislative benchmarks requiring the enacting and
implementing of legislation, we defined a benchmark as "met" if all
components of the relevant law have been enacted and implemented;
defined the benchmark as "partially met" if the law has been enacted
but not implemented or, in instances involving multiple pieces of
legislation, at least half have been enacted and implemented; and
defined "not met" as having not met the requirements of "met" or
"partially met."
[25] The doctrine of command responsibility holds that individuals can
be liable for actions they did not actually commit if: (1) they issued
orders to those who committed the human rights violations or crimes;
(2) they should have known or should have been in a position to know
that their subordinates were committing human rights violations or
crimes; or (3) they did not take reasonable measures to prevent the
human rights violations or other crimes or did not punish the
perpetrators.
[26] For those legislative benchmarks requiring the enacting and
implementing of legislation, we defined a benchmark as "met" if all
components of the relevant law have been enacted and implemented;
defined the benchmark as "partially met" if the law has been enacted
but not implemented or, in instances involving multiple pieces of
legislation, at least half have been enacted and implemented; and
defined "not met" as having not met the requirements of "met" or
"partially met."
[27] This legislation is also referred to as the "Law of Financial
Resources" and the "Revenue Management Law."
[28] The Kurdistan National Assembly (Kurdish Regional parliament) has
passed a "Kurdistan Oil and Gas Law" (also referred to as the
"Petroleum Law of the Kurdistan Region - Iraq"), in August, 2007, which
conditions cooperation with the federal authorities in the oil sector
on a set of comprehensive conditions. According to the UN, it would
likely take time for full agreement on these arrangements to be reached
and for implementation of national revenue sharing to begin. It is
unclear how this will affect the national debate on revenue sharing or
the hydrocarbon framework legislation at this time. According to the
State Department, the United States continues to believe that Iraq's
interests are better served by the adoption of a single set of national
oil and gas laws, which will help foster national unity and promote
reconciliation.
[29] For those legislative benchmarks requiring the enacting and
implementing of legislation, we defined a benchmark as "met" if all
components of the relevant law have been enacted and implemented;
defined the benchmark as "partially met" if the law has been enacted
but not implemented or, in instances involving multiple pieces of
legislation, at least half have been enacted and implemented; and
defined "not met" as having not met the requirements of "met" or
"partially met."
[30] Iraq has 18 governorates and the Iraqi Constitution states that
one or more governorates have the right to organize into a region.
Article 117 of the Constitution further recognizes the region of
Kurdistan, which consists of three provinces in northern Iraq. The
final version of the law on executive procedures regarding the
formation of regions states that a region consists of one province or
more.
[31] The lack of clarity about power sharing between federal and
regional governments is highlighted by problems over power generation.
As of the summer of 2007, a number of provinces have been ignoring the
federal government's shared authority over power generation and
distribution by failing to provide their required allocations of power
to Baghdad, contributing to national blackouts. In August 2007, these
provincial authorities were threatening to disconnect their local power
generating sources from the national electricity grid.
[32] GAO, Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Key Issues for
Congressional Oversight, GAO-07-308SP (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 9. 2007);
GAO, forthcoming Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq: U.S. Ministry
Capacity Development Efforts Need an Overall Integrated Strategy to
Guide Efforts and Manage Risk, GAO-07-903 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 18,
2007).
[33] For those legislative benchmarks requiring the enacting and
implementing of legislation, we defined a benchmark as "met" if all
components of the relevant law have been enacted and implemented;
defined the benchmark as "partially met" if the law has been enacted
but not implemented or, in instances involving multiple pieces of
legislation, at least half have been enacted and implemented; and
defined "not met" as having not met the requirements of "met" or
"partially met."
[34] For those legislative benchmarks requiring the enacting and
implementing of legislation, we defined a benchmark as "met" if all
components of the relevant law have been enacted and implemented;
defined the benchmark as "partially met" if the law has been enacted
but not implemented or, in instances involving multiple pieces of
legislation, at least half have been enacted and implemented; and
defined "not met" as having not met the requirements of "met" or
"partially met."
[35] For those legislative benchmarks requiring the enacting and
implementing of legislation, we defined a benchmark as "met" if all
components of the relevant law have been enacted and implemented;
defined the benchmark as "partially met" if the law has been enacted
but not implemented or, in instances involving multiple pieces of
legislation, at least half have been enacted and implemented; and
defined "not met" as having not met the requirements of "met" or
"partially met."
[36] Rebuilding Iraq: Resource, Security, Governance, Essential
Services, and Oversight Issues (GAO-04-902R, Washington, D.C.: June 28,
2004).
[37] GAO, Stabilizing Iraq: Factors Impeding the Development of Capable
Iraqi Security Forces, GAO-07-612T) Washington, D.C.: March 13, 2007);
GAO, Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Key Issues for
Congressional Oversight, (GAO-07-308SP) Washington, D.C.: January 9,
2007; GAO, Rebuilding Iraq: DOD Reports Should Link Economic,
Governance, and Security Indicators to Conditions for Stabilizing Iraq,
(GAO-06-217C) Washington, D.C.: October 31, 2005.
[38] We defined this benchmark as "met" if the committees were
established in support of the Baghdad Security Plan; defined this
benchmark as "partially met" if at least half of the committees were
established in support of the Baghdad Security Plan; and defined this
benchmark as "not met" if less than half of the committees were
established in support of the Baghdad Security Plan.
[39] The current Baghdad security plan is also known as Operation Fardh
al-Qanoon.
[40] We defined this benchmark as "met" if the government of Iraq had
provided three trained and ready brigades, or an equivalent number of
battalions, to support Baghdad operations; as "partially met" if some
of the units were trained and ready to support Baghdad security
operations; and as "not met" if none of the units provided were trained
and ready to support Baghdad security operations. The assessment was
based on each unit's transition readiness assessments and intelligence
reporting on their reliability. Consequently, our determination of
"partially met" was based largely on classified information. (see
classified appendix).
[41] We defined this benchmark as "met" if Iraqi commanders did not
face political intervention in executing the plan and making tactical
and operational decisions. We defined this benchmark as "not met" if
Iraqi commanders faced political intervention in executing the plan and
making tactical and operational decisions.
[42] We defined this benchmark as "met" if Iraqi security forces
provided even-handed enforcement of the law. We defined this benchmark
as "not met" if Iraqi security forces did not provide even-handed
enforcement of the law.
[43] U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, Annual Report
of the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (Washington
D.C.: May 2007). The U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom
was created by the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (IRFA)
to monitor violations of the right to freedom of thought, conscience,
and religion or belief abroad, as defined in IRFA and set forth in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and related international
instruments, and to give independent policy recommendations to the
President, Secretary of State, and Congress.
[44] U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 6, 2007).
[45] We defined this benchmark as "met" if Iraqi government policy did
not allow safe havens and none existed; defined this benchmark as
"partially met" if Iraqi government policy prohibited safe havens yet
some existed; and defined this benchmark as "not met" if the Iraqi
government had no stated policy on safe havens.
[46] We defined this benchmark as "met" if there was clear and reliable
evidence that the level of sectarian violence was reduced and militia
control of local security was eliminated; defined this benchmark as
"partially met" if there was clear and reliable evidence that the level
of sectarian violence was reduced or if militia control of local
security was eliminated, but not both; and defined this benchmark as
"not met" if there was no clear and reliable evidence that the level of
sectarian violence was reduced and that militia control of local
security was eliminated.
[47] U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 6, 2007); UN Assistance Mission for Iraq
(UNAMI), Human Rights Report (Sept. 1-Oct. 31, 2006); UNAMI, Human
Rights Report (Nov. 1-Dec. 31, 2006).
[48] According to State's human rights report, an overall campaign
aimed at forcibly displacing citizens was the main reason for the
increasing polarization of areas within and outside Baghdad during
2006. State noted numerous reports that indicated a Shi'a militia, the
Jayash al- Mahdi, was responsible for a growing number of raids and
killings of Sunni citizens in Baghdad and other parts of the country
during the year.
[49] DOD, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq (Washington, D.C.:
June 2007).
[50] Ramadan is the ninth month of the Islamic calendar. Over the past
4 years, Ramadan began about October 27, 2003; October 16, 2004;
October 5, 2005; and September 24, 2006.
[51] National Intelligence Council, Prospects for Iraq's Stability:
Some Security Progress but Political Reconciliation Elusive, Update to
NIE, Prospects for Iraq's Stability: A Challenging Road Ahead
(Washington, D.C.: August 2007).
[52] According to a UN report, sectarian violence was most pronounced
in areas with diverse ethnic and religious groups or where such groups
were located in close proximity to each other, such as in Baghdad,
Diyala, Kirkuk, and Mosul. Anbar province, where attack levels have
decreased significantly over the past several months, is a
predominantly Sunni Arab province.
[53] We defined this benchmark as "met" if nearly all of the planned
Joint Security Stations were established. We defined this benchmark as
"partially met" if half of the planned Joint Security Stations were
established. We defined this benchmark as "not met" if less than half
of the planned Joint Security Stations were established.
[54] We defined this benchmark as "met" if the government of Iraq
increased the number of Iraqi security forces' units capable of
operating independently. We defined this benchmark as "not met" if the
government of Iraq did not increase the number of Iraqi security
forces' units capable of operating independently.
[55] The Operational Readiness Assessment was previously known as the
Transitional Readiness Assessment process.
[56] As of May 2007, the Iraqi army had established over 100
battalions.
[57] In 2006, MNF-I changed the definition of a level 1 unit.
Previously, in guidance provided to coalition transition teams for use
in evaluating Iraqi security forces, a level 1 unit was said to be
fully capable of planning, executing, and sustaining independent
operations. In 2006, MNF-I removed the words "fully" and "independent"
from the definition. DOD officials could not provide a rationale for
the change.
[58] The administration's July 2007 interim assessment stated that the
number of units assessed at level 1 had decreased, in part, due to a 20-
percent increase in unit authorization levels.
[59] We considered this benchmark as "met" if the Iraqi government had
laws or regulations ensuring the rights of minority parties in the
legislature and minority parties received these rights; considered this
benchmark as "partially met" if the Iraqi government had such laws but
did not protect these rights; and considered this benchmark as "not
met" if the Iraqi government had no law or regulation protecting
minority party rights.
[60] UN Assistance Mission for Iraq, Human Rights Report, Jan. 1-Mar.
31, 2007.
[61] Congressional Research Service, Iraqi Refugees and Internally
Displaced Persons: A Deepening Humanitarian Crisis? (Washington D.C.:
Mar. 23, 2007).
[62] Preti Taneja, Minority Rights Group International, Assimilation,
Exodus, Eradication: Iraq's Minority Communities Since 2003 (United
Kingdom: February 2007).
[63] We would have considered this benchmark as "met" if the funds had
been allocated and either the funds had been spent or there was a high
likelihood that they would be spent by the end of the fiscal year. We
would have considered this benchmark as "partially met" if funds were
allocated but it was not clear that the funds would be spent by the end
of the fiscal year. We would have considered the benchmark as "not met"
if the funds had not yet been allocated or if funds were allocated but
clearly not spent.
[64] Iraq's fiscal year begins on January 1st.
[65] The expenditure data presented by the U.S. Embassy are preliminary
data provided by the Ministry of Finance and do not include figures for
the Kurdistan region or the other provinces. In its official May 2007
monthly report, the Ministry of Finance did not report any expenditures
for capital projects and reconstruction. In the absence of official
data, the information presented by the U.S. Embassy provides an
indication of Iraq's ability to spend its capital projects and
reconstruction budget in the first half of the year.
[66] Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Quarterly
Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress (Arlington,
VA, July 30, 2007).
[67] The Kurdistan region received a separate allocation of $1.56
billion, or 16 percent of the total 2007 capital projects and
reconstruction budget. U.S. officials believe the Kurdistan region is
able to execute its budget successfully because of its years of
experience as a semi-autonomous region.
[68] The $2 billion in 2006 capital project and reconstruction funds
for the provinces did not include the Kurdistan region, which received
a separate allocation. The government of Iraq permitted the provinces
to carry over $1.3 billion in unspent 2006 funds. Unspent 2007 capital
funds for the provinces may not be carried over, according to U.S.
officials.
[69] This percentage differs from preliminary Ministry of Finance data
provided by the U.S. Department of the Treasury indicating that the
provinces "spent and committed" 18 percent of their 2007 allocations
for capital projects and reconstruction, as of July 15, 2007.
[70] The term "commitment" in Iraq is similar to an obligation under
the U.S. budget process, although the government of Iraq's official
expenditure data, as reported by the Ministry of Finance, does not
include commitments or obligations.
[71] We defined this benchmark as "met" if there was no evidence of
undermining or false accusations against Iraqi security force
personnel. We defined this benchmark as "not met" if there was evidence
of undermining or false accusations against Iraqi security force
personnel.
[72] Section 1314 of Public Law 110-28.
[73] For example, see GAO, Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq:
Key Issues for Congressional Oversight, GAO-07-308SP (Washington, D.C.:
January 9, 2007). See GAO's website at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]
for a complete list of GAO's Iraq-related reports.
[74] IFES was formally known as the International Foundation for
Election Systems.
[75] GAO, Rebuilding Iraq: Serious Challenges Impair Efforts to Restore
Iraq's Oil Sector and Enact Hydrocarbon Legislation, GAO-07-1107T
(Washington, D.C.: July 18, 2007) and Rebuilding Iraq: Integrated
Strategic Plan Needed to Help Restore Iraq's Oil and Electricity
Sectors, GAO-07-677 (Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2007).
We defined this benchmark as "met" if the funds had been allocated and
either they had been spent or there was a high likelihood that they
would be spent by the end of the fiscal year. We defined this benchmark
as "partially met" if funds were allocated but it appeared questionable
or unlikely that the funds would be spent by the end of the fiscal
year. We defined the benchmark as "not met" if the funds had not been
allocated.
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