Palestinian Authority
U.S. Assistance Is Training and Equipping Security Forces, but the Program Needs to Measure Progress and Faces Logistical Constraints Gao ID: GAO-10-505 May 11, 2010The 2003 Roadmap for Peace process sponsored by the United States and other nations obligates the Palestinian Authority (PA) and the Government of Israel to undertake security efforts as a necessary precursor for achieving the long-standing objective of establishing a Palestinian state as part of the two-state solution for peace in the Middle East. In 2005 the Department of State (State) created the office of the United States Security Coordinator (USSC) to help the parties meet these obligations. GAO was asked to (1) describe the nature and extent of U.S. security assistance to the PA since 2007; (2) assess State's efforts to measure the effectiveness of its security assistance; and (3) describe factors that may affect the implementation of U.S. security assistance programs. GAO analyzed documents; interviewed officials and regional experts; and conducted fieldwork in Jerusalem, the West Bank, Israel, and Jordan.
State has allocated about $392million to train and equip the PA security forces, oversee construction of related infrastructure projects, and develop the capacity of the PA during fiscal years 2007 through 2010. Of this total, State has allocated: (1) more than $160 million to help fund and support training, primarily for the PA's National Security Force (NSF); (2) approximately $89 million to provide nonlethal equipment; (3) about $99 million to renovate or construct several PA installations, including two of the operations camps it plans to provide; and (4) about $22 million to build the capacity of the Interior Ministry and its Strategic Planning Directorate. State also requested $150 million for its programs for fiscal year 2011. Although U.S. and international officials said that U.S. security assistance programs for the PA have helped to improve security conditions in some West Bank areas, State and USSC have not established clear and measurable outcome-based performance indicators to assess progress. Thus, it is difficult to determine how the programs support the achievement of security-related Roadmap obligations. U.S. officials attributed the lack of agreement on such performance indicators to a number of factors, including the relatively early stage of PA plans and capacity for reforming, rebuilding, and sustaining its security forces. Developing outcome-based indicators to measure and manage performance against program goals has been identified by GAO as a good management practice. Such indicators would help USSC provide objective and useful performance information for decision makers. State and USSC officials noted that they plan to incorporate performance indicators in a USSC campaign plan to be released in mid-2010. The implementation of the U.S. security assistance programs faces logistical constraints largely outside of U.S. control, and these implementation efforts outpace international efforts to develop the limited capacity of the PA police and justice sector. Logistical constraints include restrictions on the movement of USSC personnel in the West Bank, lack of a process to ensure approval and timely delivery of equipment, and difficulties in acquiring suitable land for infrastructure projects. State, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and other international donors have been assisting the PA civil police and justice-sector reforms, although these efforts are not proceeding at the same pace as the security assistance programs.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: David B. Gootnick Team: Government Accountability Office: International Affairs and Trade Phone: No phone on recordGAO-10-505, Palestinian Authority: U.S. Assistance Is Training and Equipping Security Forces, but the Program Needs to Measure Progress and Faces Logistical Constraints
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Report to the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Its Subcommittee on the
Middle East and South Asia, House of Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
May 2010:
Palestinian Authority:
U.S. Assistance Is Training and Equipping Security Forces, but the
Program Needs to Measure Progress and Faces Logistical Constraints:
GAO-10-505:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-10-505, a report to the Committee on Foreign Affairs
and its Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia, House of
Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study:
The 2003 Roadmap for Peace process sponsored by the United States and
other nations obligates the Palestinian Authority (PA) and the
Government of Israel to undertake security efforts as a necessary
precursor for achieving the long-standing objective of establishing a
Palestinian state as part of the two-state solution for peace in the
Middle East. In 2005 the Department of State (State) created the
office of the United States Security Coordinator (USSC) to help the
parties meet these obligations.
GAO was asked to (1) describe the nature and extent of U.S. security
assistance to the PA since 2007; (2) assess State‘s efforts to measure
the effectiveness of its security assistance; and (3) describe factors
that may affect the implementation of U.S. security assistance
programs. GAO analyzed documents; interviewed officials and regional
experts; and conducted fieldwork in Jerusalem, the West Bank, Israel,
and Jordan.
What GAO Found:
State has allocated about $392 million to train and equip the PA
security forces, oversee construction of related infrastructure
projects, and develop the capacity of the PA during fiscal years 2007
through 2010. Of this total, State has allocated: (1) more than $160
million to help fund and support training, primarily for the PA‘s
National Security Force (NSF); (2) approximately $89 million to
provide nonlethal equipment; (3) about $99 million to renovate or
construct several PA installations, including two of the operations
camps it plans to provide (see figure); and (4) about $22 million to
build the capacity of the Interior Ministry and its Strategic Planning
Directorate. State also requested $150 million for its programs for
fiscal year 2011.
Although U.S. and international officials said that U.S. security
assistance programs for the PA have helped to improve security
conditions in some West Bank areas, State and USSC have not
established clear and measurable outcome-based performance indicators
to assess progress. Thus, it is difficult to determine how the
programs support the achievement of security-related Roadmap
obligations. U.S. officials attributed the lack of agreement on such
performance indicators to a number of factors, including the
relatively early stage of PA plans and capacity for reforming,
rebuilding, and sustaining its security forces. Developing outcome-
based indicators to measure and manage performance against program
goals has been identified by GAO as a good management practice. Such
indicators would help USSC provide objective and useful performance
information for decision makers. State and USSC officials noted that
they plan to incorporate performance indicators in a USSC campaign
plan to be released in mid-2010.
The implementation of the U.S. security assistance programs faces
logistical constraints largely outside of U.S. control, and these
implementation efforts outpace international efforts to develop the
limited capacity of the PA police and justice sector. Logistical
constraints include restrictions on the movement of USSC personnel in
the West Bank, lack of a process to ensure approval and timely
delivery of equipment, and difficulties in acquiring suitable land for
infrastructure projects. State, USAID, and other international donors
have been assisting the PA civil police and justice-sector reforms,
although these efforts are not proceeding at the same pace as the
security assistance programs.
Figure: Status of USSC Security Assistance to the PA as of March 2010:
[Refer to PDF for image: stacked horizontal bar graph]
Number of NSF battalions: Trained;
Completed/underway: 5;
Funded: 2;
Planned: 3.
Number of NSF battalions: Equipped;
Completed/underway: 4;
Funded: 3;
Planned: 3.
Number of NSF battalions: Garrisoned;
Completed/underway: 2;
Funded: 4;
Planned: 3.
Sources: GAO analysis of State and USSC data.
[End of figure]
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that, as State develops the USSC campaign plan for
providing security assistance to the PA, the Secretary of State should
define specific objectives and establish outcome-based indicators
enabling it to assess progress.
State partially concurred with this recommendation. It agreed with the
need for more performance-based indicators, but noted that factors
outside its control influence progress.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-505] or key
components. For more information, contact David Gootnick at (202) 512-
3149 or GootnickD@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
U.S. Security Assistance to the PA Emphasizes Training, Equipment, and
Infrastructure and also Supports Capacity Building:
Although Improvements in West Bank Security Conditions Have Been
Reported, State and USSC Have not Established Clear and Measurable
Outcome-Based Performance Indicators:
U.S. Security Assistance Programs Face Logistical Constraints and
Outpace Development of the Rule of Law:
Conclusion:
Recommendations:
Agency Comments:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: List of USSC Courses Provided to the PASF in the West
Bank, July 2008 to March 2010:
Appendix III: USSC List of Equipment Approved for Provision to the NSF
3rd and 4th Battalions:
Appendix IV: State Comments on Draft Report:
Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Related GAO Products:
Tables:
Table 1: Overview of the PASF:
Table 2: Allocation of U.S. Security Assistance Funding for the
Palestinian Authority Security Sector Reform Programs, Fiscal Years
2007 through 2010 Appropriations:
Table 3: Select PA Justice-Sector Reform Programs:
Table 4: USSC-Sponsored Training Courses in the West Bank, July 2008 -
March 2010:
Table 5: Equipment Approved for Provision to the NSF 3RD and 4TH
Battalions:
Figures:
Figure 1: Map of West Bank and Gaza and Surrounding Countries:
Figure 2: Status of USSC-Sponsored NSF Battalion Level Training in
Jordan as of March 2010:
Figure 3: Status of USSC-Sponsored NSF Battalion-Level Equipping as of
March 2010:
Figure 4: Status of USSC-Sponsored NSF Operations Camps as of March
2010:
Figure 5: Map of Planned and Ongoing USSC-funded Infrastructure
Projects:
Figure 6: Location of NSF Operations Camp Near Jericho:
Figure 7: U.S. Funded Construction at the NSF Operations Camp Near
Jericho:
Figure 8: Process for Equipment Approval and Delivery:
Figure 9: Division of West Bank Territory by Oslo Area of Control and
Israeli Settlements (2009):
Abbreviations:
ATA: Anti Terrorism Assistance Program (State Bureau of Diplomatic
Security):
BST: British Support Team:
DOD: U.S. Department of Defense:
ESF: Economic Support Funds:
EUPOL COPPS: European Union Police Coordination Office for Palestinian
Police Support:
GPRA: Government Performance and Results Act:
INCLE: International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement:
INL: Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs:
JIPTC: Jordan International Police Training Center:
JSAP: Justice Sector Assistance Project:
MTT: Mobile Training Team:
NSF: National Security Forces:
OCHA: United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs:
PA: Palestinian Authority:
PASF: Palestinian Authority Security Forces:
PCP: Palestinian Civil Police:
PG: Presidential Guard:
PLO: Palestine Liberation Organization:
PRDP: Palestinian Reform and Development Plan:
SLC: Senior Leaders Course:
SPD: Strategic Planning Directorate:
SPF: Special Police Force:
SSWG: Security Sector Working Group:
UN: United Nations:
USAID: U.S. Agency for International Development:
USSC: U.S. Security Coordinator:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
May 11, 2010:
The Honorable Howard L. Berman:
Chairman:
The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Foreign Affairs:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Gary L. Ackerman:
Chairman:
The Honorable Dan Burton:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia:
Committee on Foreign Affairs:
House of Representatives:
Since 1993, the U.S. government has committed more than $3.5 billion
in bilateral aid to the Palestinians, providing humanitarian,
development, and security assistance for the West Bank and Gaza. In
2002, the United States outlined the principles for a performance-
based strategy for settling the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This
strategy--known informally as the Roadmap for Peace (Roadmap)--calls
for an independent Palestinian state coexisting peacefully with the
State of Israel and, among other things, presents a plan for
establishing the security preconditions necessary for such a state.
[Footnote 1] The United Nations, the United States, the European
Union, and Russia--known as the Quartet on the Middle East[Footnote
2]--as well as Israel and the Palestinian Authority (PA) endorsed the
strategy in April 2003. To help the PA and Israel meet their Roadmap
obligations and pave the way for a two-state solution, the Secretary
of State created the Jerusalem-based office of the United States
Security Coordinator (USSC) in 2005 to facilitate PA-Israeli
cooperation and coordinate assistance for the Palestinian Authority
Security Forces (PASF) provided by the United States and other
international donors. Beginning in 2007, USSC and the State
Department's (State) Bureau of International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs (INL) have funded and helped train, equip, and
house PA security personnel based in the West Bank.
In this report, we (1) describe the nature and extent of U.S. security
assistance to the Palestinian Authority since 2007; (2) assess State's
efforts to measure the effectiveness of its security assistance; and
(3) describe factors that may affect the implementation of U.S.
security assistance programs.
To address these objectives, we reviewed relevant documents and
interviewed officials from State, the Department of Defense (DOD), and
the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) in Washington,
D.C., and in Israel, Jerusalem, Jordan, and the West Bank. We met with
PA and Israeli government officials as well as recognized experts in
Israeli-Palestinian affairs. To describe the nature and extent of U.S.
security assistance, we also conducted site visits to observe U.S.-
sponsored training and construction projects. To assess State's
efforts to measure the effectiveness of its security assistance
programs, we examined whether State's approach identified and applied
measurable outcome-based performance indicators to measure and manage
performance against its results-oriented goals, which GAO has
identified as a good management practice because it helps provide
objective and useful performance information for decision makers when
faced with limited resources and competing priorities.[Footnote 3]
We conducted our work from July 2009 to May 2010 and in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards
require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,
appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings
and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the
evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives. See appendix I for more
detailed information about our scope and methodology.
Results in Brief:
State has allocated a total of approximately $392 million to train and
equip the PASF, oversee construction of related infrastructure
projects, and develop the capacity of the PA during fiscal years 2007
through 2010. State, through the USSC, has allocated more than $160
million of the total to help fund the training of PASF units. As of
January 2010, one Presidential Guard battalion and four National
Security Forces (NSF) special battalions had received basic training
in Jordan, and State plans to help fund training for six additional
NSF special battalions beginning in 2010.[Footnote 4] Moreover, USSC
has conducted or supported about 24 different specialized courses for
PASF personnel in the West Bank since mid-2008. In addition, State has
allocated almost $89 million of the total to provide the NSF and
Presidential Guard with vehicles and nonlethal equipment, including
uniforms with protective gear; operational equipment such as riot
shields, batons, and hand cuffs; computers; tents; and basic first aid
kits. The USSC expects to issue each battalion trained in Jordan an
initial allotment of this equipment. As of March 2010, one battalion
had received its full issuance of equipment, and four more were in the
process of being equipped. State also has allocated approximately $99
million of the total to fund and oversee the renovation or
construction of several PASF installations, including two training
centers and two operations camps. In addition, USSC and the PA plan to
build seven more operations camps to house battalions that receive
U.S.-sponsored training.[Footnote 5] Finally, State has allocated
approximately $22 million of the total to build the capacity of the
Ministry of the Interior, focusing on the creation of the Strategic
Planning Directorate, a small group responsible for conducting longer-
term strategic planning for the Ministry and the PASF.[Footnote 6]
State also has requested a total of $150 million in additional funding
for security assistance to the PA for fiscal year 2011 to continue
these activities, including $56 million for training, $33 million for
equipment, $53 million for infrastructure, and $3 million for
strategic capacity building activities.
Although U.S. and international officials said that U.S. security
assistance has helped the PA improve security conditions in some areas
of the West Bank, State and USSC have not established clear and
measurable outcome-based performance indicators for assessing the
progress of their security assistance programs for the PA. We have
previously identified the development of such indicators as a good
management practice because it helps provide objective and useful
performance information for executive decision makers and overseers.
State documents and annual mission strategic plans for the U.S.
Consulate General in Jerusalem identify performance indicators for
U.S. security assistance programs; however, the targets they set to
measure progress toward these indicators focus on specific program
outputs, such as the number of battalions or personnel trained and
equipped, rather than on broader program outcomes such as helping the
PA meet its Roadmap obligations to achieve the transformation of its
security sector and create a professional, right-sized PASF.[Footnote
7] U.S. officials attributed the lack of agreement on clear and
measurable outcome-based performance indicators to a number of
factors. For example, the PA plans and capacity for reforming,
rebuilding, and sustaining its security forces are changeable and
still in a relatively early stage of development, making it difficult
for the PA to set targets that the USSC could use to measure the
progress and effectiveness of its programs. Nevertheless, State and
USSC officials noted that they plan to incorporate such performance
indicators to the extent possible in a USSC campaign plan being
developed for release in mid-2010.
The implementation of the U.S. security assistance programs faces a
number of logistical constraints that are largely outside of U.S.
control, and these security assistance programs outpace efforts to
develop the limited capacity of the PA police and justice sector.
Logistical constraints include restrictions on the movement and access
of USSC personnel in the West Bank, a lack of a process to ensure
approval and timely delivery of equipment shipments, and difficulties
in acquiring suitable land for infrastructure projects in the
relatively small portion of the West Bank in which the PASF is allowed
to construct or maintain facilities. For example, State and USSC
officials noted that the process for obtaining Government of Israel
approval for the shipment and delivery of equipment for the PASF is
lengthy and may hamper the timely arrival of U.S. shipments. Moreover,
the USSC lacks the means to hold the Government of Israel or the PA
accountable if shipments are delayed or approvals withheld.[Footnote
8] Furthermore, U.S. and PA officials said sustaining the progress
they have made with U.S. assistance in the security sector may be
difficult due to the lack of capacity in the civil police and the
justice sectors with which the USSC-supported security forces must
operate. State, USAID, and other international donors have been
assisting the PA with civil police and justice-sector reforms,
although these programs are not proceeding at the same pace as the
programs to train and equip the security forces and build the capacity
of the Ministry of the Interior.
As State develops the USSC campaign plan for providing security
assistance to the PA, we recommend that the Secretary of State
establish outcome-based indicators and track them over time. State
should define specific program objectives and identify appropriate
outcome-based indicators that would demonstrate progress toward
achieving those objectives, and would enable it to, among other
things, weigh the progress made in developing the security forces,
civil police, Ministry of Interior, and justice sector.
State provided written comments on a draft of this report, which are
reprinted in appendix IV. State partially concurred with our
recommendation, agreeing that more performance-based indicators are
needed. Consistent with our report, State also cited that several
factors outside of their control influence progress toward a number of
meaningful performance-based indicators.
Background:
The Palestinian territories, comprising the West Bank and Gaza, cover
2,402 square miles and have a combined population of over 4 million
people.[Footnote 9] (See figure 1.) Both the PA and Israel administer
areas within the West Bank.
Figure 1: Map of West Bank and Gaza and Surrounding Countries:
[Refer to PDF for image: map]
The following are depicted on the map:
West Bank:
Ramallah.
Israel:
Haifa;
Tel-Aviv;
Jerusalem;
Gaza;
Gaza City;
Golan Heights (Israeli occupied).
UN Disengagement Observer Force Zone:
Lebanon:
Syria:
Jordan:
Egypt:
Saudi Arabia:
Sources: GAO (data); CIA and Map Resources (map).
[End of figure]
Security Assistance to PA since 1993:
The U.S. government, along with other countries, has provided
intermittent security assistance to the Palestinians since 1993.
1993-2003:
In 1993, the Oslo Accord called for limited Palestinian self-rule and
security responsibilities in the West Bank and Gaza.[Footnote 10] The
subsequent 1995 Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip
divided the West Bank into three zones and allotted civil and security
responsibilities, to varying degrees, to the Israeli government and
the PA. The Government of Israel allowed the PA to establish some
security forces and coordinated with the PA on the establishment of
limited self-rule in the West Bank and Gaza. The United States
provided some non-lethal equipment and a small amount of funding for
salaries to help the newly created PA security forces improve their
professionalism and combat terrorism. Other countries provided the PA
with security assistance focused on training and equipping the
security forces.
The outbreak of the second intifada (insurrection), which State
reports resulted in the death of more than 3,000 Palestinians and
about 1,000 Israelis between 2000 and 2004, disrupted security
assistance efforts.[Footnote 11] In response to the intifada, the
Israeli security forces reoccupied much of the West Bank previously
ceded to PA control, set up hundreds of checkpoints and roadblocks
throughout the territory, erected a wall separating Israel and some
Palestinian territory from the rest of the West Bank, and destroyed
much of the Palestinian security infrastructure. As a result, Israeli-
Palestinian security cooperation ceased and other governments
curtailed or halted their security assistance to the PA. Amid the
violence, efforts to negotiate a Middle East peace agreement began in
2000 at Camp David and continued until 2003.
2003-2007:
Security assistance efforts did not resume until after the PA, Israel,
United States, United Nations, European Union, and Russia agreed in
2003 to implement the Roadmap for Peace, a U.S.-proposed performance-
based strategy, which calls for an independent Palestinian state
coexisting peacefully with the State of Israel and, among other
things, provides a plan for establishing the security preconditions
necessary to create an independent Palestinian state. The Roadmap,
among other things, obligates the PA and Israel to undertake specific
actions to improve security as part of the ongoing Middle East peace
process. In particular, the Roadmap obligates the PA to perform the
following actions:
* Issue an unequivocal statement reiterating Israel's right to exist
in peace and security and calling for an immediate and unconditional
ceasefire to end armed activity and all acts of violence against
Israelis anywhere. All official Palestinian institutions end
incitement against Israel.
* Have its rebuilt and refocused security apparatus begin sustained,
targeted, and effective operations aimed at confronting all those
engaged in terror and dismantlement of terrorist capabilities and
infrastructure. This includes commencing confiscation of illegal
weapons and consolidation of security authority, free of association
with terror and corruption.
* Consolidate all Palestinian security organizations into three
services reporting to an empowered Interior Minister.
In return, the Roadmap obligates the Israelis to perform the following
actions:
* Issue an unequivocal statement affirming its commitment to the two-
state vision of an independent, viable, sovereign Palestinian state
living in peace and security alongside Israel, as expressed by
President Bush, and calling for an immediate end to violence against
Palestinians everywhere. All official Israeli institutions are also to
end incitement against Palestinians.
* Take no actions undermining trust, including deportations, attacks
on civilians; confiscation and/or demolition of Palestinian homes and
property, as a punitive measure or to facilitate Israeli construction;
destruction of Palestinian institutions and infrastructure; and other
measures specified in the Tenet work plan;[Footnote 12] and:
* Progressively withdraw the Israeli Defense Forces from areas
occupied since September 28, 2000, and the two sides restore the
status quo that existed prior to September 28, 2000, as comprehensive
security performance moves forward. Palestinian security forces to
progressively redeploy to areas vacated by the Israeli Defense Forces.
To help the PA and Israel meet their Roadmap obligations and pave the
way for a two-state solution, the Secretary of State created the
office of the USSC in 2005. The USSC, which operated with no project
funding until mid-2007, initially focused on providing advice and
guidance to the PASF on its reform efforts while also coordinating the
programs of several other security donors. In addition, USSC officials
coordinated and consulted with Israeli and Palestinian authorities in
connection with the PA's assumption of responsibility for security in
Gaza following Israel's August 2005 withdrawal.
In January 2006, the Palestinian people elected a Hamas majority to
the Palestinian Legislative Council.[Footnote 13] Following the
results of the January 2006 election and the subsequent formation of a
Fatah-Hamas unity government in 2007, the Quartet on the Middle East
announced it would continue to provide support and assistance to the
Hamas-led government only if the government would agree to
nonviolence, recognize the State of Israel, and respect previous
Israeli-Palestinian peace agreements.[Footnote 14] Hamas never
accepted these conditions. U.S. direct assistance to the Palestinians
was reduced and restructured, with the focus shifting to providing
humanitarian and project assistance indirectly through international
and non-governmental organizations. During this time, USSC focused on
coordinating international assistance aimed at improving Gaza's
economy and helped coordinate the efforts of Israel, Egypt, and the PA
to regulate and control the key Gaza border crossings. USSC also
coordinated with Britain and Canada to provide training assistance to
the PA's Presidential Guard, a security organization under the control
of the PA president with responsibility for protecting PA officials
and facilities and manning the border crossings.
2007-2010:
In June 2007, Hamas forcibly took control of the Gaza Strip. This led
the PA President to issue an emergency decree suspending the operation
of the PA government and appointing a new government, without Hamas
participation, to administer the affairs of the West Bank during the
state of emergency, under a politically independent Prime Minister. As
a result, the United States decided to re-engage with the PA directly
and increased the amount of U.S. assistance aimed at improving the
economic and security climate in the West Bank and increasing the
capacity of the PA.
As described by USSC and State officials, the USSC's current mission
is to:
(1) facilitate PA-Israeli cooperation and allay Israeli fears about
the nature and capabilities of the PASF;
(2) lead and coordinate international assistance for the PASF provided
by the United States and other international donors to eliminate
duplication of effort;[Footnote 15] and:
(3) help the PA rightsize, reform, and professionalize its security
sector by advising the PA and by training and equipping the PASF to
meet the Palestinians' obligations outlined in the Roadmap.
The head of the USSC, a lieutenant general in the U.S. Army, also
serves as the deputy for security issues to the U.S. Special Envoy for
Middle East Peace.[Footnote 16]
The office of the USSC has a core staff of approximately 45 personnel
as of March 2010. Headquartered in Jerusalem, the USSC includes up to
16 U.S. military personnel and several U.S. civilians. About 17
military staff provided to USSC by Canada operate in the West Bank,
and two or more British military personnel from Britain support the
USSC at the PA Ministry of Interior in Ramallah.[Footnote 17] USSC
also maintains staff at the U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv as liaisons to
the government of Israel. State's Bureau of International Narcotics
and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) maintains staff in Jerusalem to
implement INL program funds, most of which underwrite USSC activities.
About 28 INL-directed Dyncorps International contractors assist with
USSC training programs in the West Bank and Jordan. Other INL staff
and contractors manage equipment warehouse operations in Jerusalem and
oversee construction projects in the West Bank under this program.
PASF:
Under the current president and prime minister, the PA formalized
plans to reorganize and rebuild ministries and security forces in the
West Bank with donor assistance between 2008 and 2010. The PA has
consolidated a 23,000-strong security force under Presidential and
Interior Ministry control, as called for in the Roadmap Agreement.
[Footnote 18] As shown in figure 2, the PASF is comprised of uniformed
services, civilian organizations, and intelligence offices.[Footnote
19]
Table 1: Overview of the PASF:
Uniformed Services;
Service: National Security Forces (NSF);
Responsibilities: A lightly armed and equipped gendarmerie-style force
charged with supporting the civil police; delivering law and order;
and combating terrorism, short of acting as a true military force.[A]
To include 10 special battalions, with approximately 500 troops each;
Reports to: Minister of Interior;
Direct recipient of USSC assistance: Yes.
Uniformed Services;
Service: Presidential Guard;
Responsibilities: Elite force of about 2,300 personnel organized into
4 battalions, each specialized in different functions, including
protection of important PA officials and facilities, quick reaction,
and some gendarmerie tasks;
Reports to: PA President;
Direct recipient of USSC assistance: Yes.
Civilian Security Organizations;
Service: Palestinian Civil Police;
Responsibilities: Approximately 7,300 officers responsible for daily
policing, including arresting criminals, controlling traffic, and
keeping general order. A relatively small, special rapid deployment
unit handles complex situations such as riots or counterterrorism
activities;
Reports to: Minister of Interior;
Direct recipient of USSC assistance: No.
Civilian Security Organizations;
Service: Palestinian Civil Defense;
Responsibilities: About 650 personnel responsible for common
protection services, such as emergency rescue and fire department
services;
Reports to: Minister of Interior;
Direct recipient of USSC assistance: Yes.
Intelligence Agencies;
Service: General Intelligence Service;
Responsibilities: Responsible for collecting intelligence inside and
outside the territories, conducting counterespionage, and serving as
the Palestinian liaison with other governments' intelligence agencies;
Reports to: PA President;
Direct recipient of USSC assistance: No.
Intelligence Agencies;
Service: Preventive Security Organization;
Responsibilities: Responsible for conducting counterterrorism efforts,
monitoring opposition groups, and conducting reconnaissance and
intelligence operations;
Reports to: Minister of Interior;
Direct recipient of USSC assistance: No.
Intelligence Agencies;
Service: Military Intelligence;
Responsibilities: Responsible for arresting and interrogating
opposition activists considered a threat to the PA;
Reports to: National Security Forces;
Direct recipient of USSC assistance: No.
Source: GAO analysis.
[A] Gendarmeries are specialized units of police with military skills
to handle temporary hostile situations such as unruly crowds.
According to a State document, the NSF serves as a "gendarme-like"
organization and a back-up for the Palestinian civil police if the
latter encounter overwhelming forces with heavier weapons than the
police possess. The NSF is expected to function in small unit or
company-size formations, in a military fashion, to support civil
police to subdue civil disorders and address situations in which
police Special Weapons and Tactics teams would ordinarily be used in
the United States.
[End of table]
U.S. Security Assistance to the PA Emphasizes Training, Equipment, and
Infrastructure and also Supports Capacity Building:
The U.S. government, through USSC and INL has allocated over $160
million in funding for the training of certain units of the PASF's
uniformed services, primarily the NSF, since 2007. USSC has also
helped provide State-funded vehicles and nonlethal individual and unit
equipment to both the NSF and Presidential Guard, totaling about $89
million. In addition, State has allocated approximately $99 million
toward the renovation or construction of numerous PASF installations.
Finally, USSC and INL have undertaken activities to increase the PA's
capacity, including building the Ministry of Interior's capacity to
plan and oversee the PASF and coordinate international donor
assistance. State allocated $22 million in funding for these programs
since 2007. (See table 1.)
Table 2: Allocation of U.S. Security Assistance Funding for the
Palestinian Authority Security Sector Reform Programs, Fiscal Years
2007 through 2010 Appropriations (Dollars in millions):
Project area: Training;
FY 07 appropriation[A]: $28.6;
FY 08 supplemental appropriation[B]: $13.0;
FY 09 bridge supplemental appropriation[C]: $22.6;
FY 09 appropriation[D]: $13.5;
FY 09 supplemental appropriation[E]: $42.0;
FY 10 appropriation[F]: $41.0;
Total FY 07-10: $160.7.
Project area: Equipment (non-lethal);
FY 07 appropriation[A]: $22.6;
FY 08 supplemental appropriation[B]: $12.0;
FY 09 bridge supplemental appropriation[C]: 0;
FY 09 appropriation[D]: $7.0;
FY 09 supplemental appropriation[E]: $30.0;
FY 10 appropriation[F]: $17.0;
Total FY 07-10: $88.6.
Project area: Infrastructure;
FY 07 appropriation[A]: $18.6;
FY 08 supplemental appropriation[B]: 0;
FY 09 bridge supplemental appropriation[C]: $18.4;
FY 09 appropriation[D]: 0;
FY 09 supplemental appropriation[E]: $31.0;
FY 10 appropriation[F]: $30.5;
Total FY 07-10: $98.5.
Project area: Strategic/capacity development;
FY 07 appropriation[A]: $6.0;
FY 08 supplemental appropriation[B]: 0;
FY 09 bridge supplemental appropriation[C]: $4.0;
FY 09 appropriation[D]: $3.5;
FY 09 supplemental appropriation[E]: $2.0;
FY 10 appropriation[F]: $6.5;
Total FY 07-10: $22.0.
Project area: Program development & support[G];
FY 07 appropriation[A]: $10.6;
FY 08 supplemental appropriation[B]: 0;
FY 09 bridge supplemental appropriation[C]: $5.0;
FY 09 appropriation[D]: $1.0;
FY 09 supplemental appropriation[E]: $1.0;
FY 10 appropriation[F]: $5.0;
Total FY 07-10: $22.6.
Project area: Total;
FY 07 appropriation[A]: $86.4;
FY 08 supplemental appropriation[B]: $25.0;
FY 09 bridge supplemental appropriation[C]: $50.0;
FY 09 appropriation[D]: $25.0;
FY 09 supplemental appropriation[E]: $106.0;
FY 10 appropriation[F]: $100.0;
Total FY 07-10: $392.4.
Source: INL.
Note: All funding shown is from the International Narcotics Control
and Law Enforcement appropriations (INCLE) for fiscal years 2007-2010.
[A] Revised Continuing Appropriations Resolution, 2007, Pub. Law No.
110-5, Feb. 5, 2007. Funds from the Economic Support Fund appropriated
in Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs
Appropriations Act, 2006 were transferred and consolidated into the
fiscal year 2007 INCLE account pursuant to Presidential Determination
No. 2007-11 of January 26, 2007.
[B] Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2008, Pub. Law No. 110-252, June
30, 2008.
[C] Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2008, Pub. Law No. 110-252, June
30, 2008.
[D] Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009, Pub. Law No. 111-8, March 11,
2009.
[E] Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009, Pub. Law No. 111-32, June
24, 2009.
[F] Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010, Pub. Law No. 111-117, Dec.
16, 2009.
[G] Program Development and Support includes overhead items such as
salaries, travel, and housing for INL officials, program design costs,
and a contribution to the consulate's personal security detail costs,
which includes the security escorts and armored vehicles required for
travel by U.S. government personnel in the region.
[End of table]
State also has requested a total of $150 million in additional INCLE
funding for security assistance to the PA for fiscal year 2011,
including $56 million for training activities, $33 million for
equipping, $53 million for infrastructure activities, and $3 million
for strategic capacity building activities.
USSC Supports Training Focused Mainly on the NSF:
Since 2007, State, primarily through USSC, has allocated more than
$160 million to support training of PASF units in Jordan and the West
Bank. USSC has focused its training programs mainly on the NSF, and to
a lesser extent, the Presidential Guard.
Battalion-Level Training in Jordan:
The main component of the USSC training-related activities is
battalion-level basic law enforcement and security training conducted
at the Jordanian International Police Training Center outside Amman,
Jordan. As of January 2010, the Jordanian International Police
Training Center had trained four NSF battalions and one Presidential
Guard battalion totaling about 2,500 personnel. The trained units
include both existing units (Presidential Guard 3rd and NSF 2nd
special battalions) and newly recruited battalions (NSF 3rd and 4th
special battalions).[Footnote 20] This training consists of 19 weeks
of basic training for all members of a battalion, which usually
comprise approximately 500 troops.[Footnote 21] USSC officials told us
that they currently plan to train a total of 10 NSF battalions at the
Jordan center. State department officials reported that U.S. security
assistance allocated to training from 2007 through 2010 covers the
training of 7 of the proposed 10 battalions as shown in figure 2. This
would allow one trained NSF special battalion to be deployed in each
PA governorate in the West Bank (except in the municipality of
Jerusalem, where the PA does not have security control) and one
battalion to serve as a reserve for use as needed in any governorate.
Figure 2: Status of USSC-Sponsored NSF Battalion Level Training in
Jordan as of March 2010:
[Refer to PDF for image: horizontal bar graph]
Number of NSF battalions to be trained (planned): 10;
Number of NSF battalions funded for training: 7;
Number of NSF battalions trained or undergoing training: 5.
Source: GAO analysis of USSC data.
[End of figure]
The basic training includes a mix of classroom and practical exercises
focused on the broad areas of firearms operations, crowd control,
close quarters operations, patrolling, detainee operations, and
checkpoint operations. This training is also designed to help the PA
transform and professionalize its security forces by producing well
trained, capable graduates able to perform security-related duties
supporting the Palestinian Civil Police or other duties as directed by
the PA. According to U.S. officials, the training is structured to
train by battalion to foster unity of command and build camaraderie
among the troops. Although USSC and INL designed the syllabus for this
training in consultation with the PA, instructors from Jordan's Public
Security Directorate conduct the training under the supervision of INL
contractors. According to State and USSC officials, the United States
fully vet all troops participating in USSC-sponsored training to
ensure that no U.S. assistance is provided to or through individuals
or entities that advocate, plan, sponsor, engage in, or have engaged
in, terrorist activities.[Footnote 22] In addition, the PA, Israel,
and Jordan also vet participants.
Prior to the commencement of each battalion's basic training course,
the program trainers conduct three concurrent 4-week preliminary
training courses for the battalion's officers, noncommissioned
officers, and drivers. These preliminary courses, intended to provide
personnel the fundamental skills needed during the battalion training,
focus on leadership skills for the officers and noncommissioned
officers and advanced driving skills for the drivers. The Jordanian
International Police Training Center also offers four 4-week
concurrent specialized training courses for select graduates following
their completion of the basic training course.
Specialized Training in the West Bank:
The USSC also supports and INL funds specialized courses in the West
Bank to train and assist members of the NSF special battalions and
some other PASF organizations in areas such as leadership, human
rights, media awareness, equipment maintenance, and food service
operations. Some of the courses continue specialized training for
selected members of the NSF battalions that received basic training at
the Jordanian International Police Training Center. However, other
courses--including a senior leadership course and an intermediate
leadership course--are open to all branches of the PA security
services. The senior leadership course, first offered in late 2008, is
a 2-month course for about 40 commanding officers from all branches of
the PASF; as of February 2010, USSC had offered the course 6 times.
International trainers taught the initial sessions, and a team
comprised of PA and international instructors conducted the most
recent senior leadership course. The intermediate leadership course is
a new class for middle ranking and noncommissioned officers that
adapts principles taught in the senior leaders' course. Altogether,
USSC has conducted or supported 24 different specialized courses for
PASF personnel in the West Bank between mid-2008 and March 2010, and
plans to continue sessions of many of these courses while offering at
least two new courses by the end of 2010. Appendix II provides details
on current and planned USSC courses.
Other, smaller U.S. programs train Presidential Guard and Civil
Defense troops. In 2008, State's Bureau of Diplomatic Security
provided limited training exclusively to the Presidential Guard
through its Anti-Terrorism Assistance program.[Footnote 23] This
training focused on police tactical unit operations, leadership
development at the middle and senior levels, investigative skills, and
crisis response capabilities to enhance the operational effectiveness
of the Presidential Guard. Finally, USSC and INL plan to support
limited civil defense training for the Palestinian Civil Defense corps
at Jordan's regional civil defense training academy.[Footnote 24]
USSC Provides the NSF and Presidential Guard with Nonlethal Individual
and Unit Equipment:
Since 2007, State has allocated approximately $89 million to provide
nonlethal equipment to 7 NSF battalions and the Presidential Guard.
State plans to equip 10 NSF special battalions, as shown in figure 3.
USSC is working to ensure that these security forces are properly
equipped while garrisoned in their operations camps, and while
operating throughout the West Bank. USSC intends to accomplish this by
providing an initial issuance of nonlethal equipment to the battalions
that have received basic training at the Jordanian International
Police Training Center. As of March 2010, the USSC had provided the
3rd Presidential Guard battalion with an initial issuance of
equipment, and had provided partial issuances of equipment to the 1st,
2nd, 3rd, and 4th NSF special battalions. State also reported that
they have submitted the 5th NSF special battalion's equipment package
list to the Israeli government for approval.
Figure 3: Status of USSC-Sponsored NSF Battalion-Level Equipping as of
March 2010:
[Refer to PDF for image: horizontal bar graph]
Number of NSF battalions to be equipped (planned): 10;
Number of NSF battalions funded for equipment: 7;
Number of NSF battalions fully or partially equipped: 4.
Sources: GAO analysis of INL and USSC data.
[End of figure]
USSC and INL, in consultation with the PA, developed the lists of
equipment provided to each battalion, which the Government of Israel
must also approve. The initial issuance of nonlethal individual and
unit equipment for each NSF special battalion includes uniforms with
protective gear and operational equipment, including riot shields,
batons, and handcuffs as well as computers, tents, basic first aid
kits, and support vehicles. (For a list of the specific equipment
provided to an NSF battalion see appendix III.) USSC also provided the
Presidential Guard battalion with a similar initial issuance of
nonlethal individual and unit equipment, adapted for their mission
specific needs. The USSC and INL also plan to provide search-and-
rescue vehicles to the PA civil defense forces.
Because all U.S.-provided equipment is subject to end-use monitoring,
INL officials and documents note that State maintains the right to
examine the property and inspect the records that govern its use. In
addition, the United States provided the PA with equipment and
training to implement and maintain an inventory system to record and
track all U.S. equipment deliveries and disbursements.
USSC Supports Renovation and Construction of PASF Installations:
Since 2007, State has allocated approximately $99 million to renovate
or construct PASF installations. The main focus of USSC and INL
infrastructure activities is to fund and oversee construction of
operations camps for 9 of the 10 NSF battalions trained at the
Jordanian International Police Training Center.[Footnote 25] U.S.
security assistance allocated to infrastructure from 2007 through 2010
covers the renovation or construction of six of the proposed nine
camps (see figure 4). The operations camps will serve as garrison
facilities for the battalion as well as function as a base for
conducting operations in the West Bank.
Figure 4: Status of USSC-Sponsored NSF Operations Camps as of March
2010:
[Refer to PDF for image: horizontal bar graph]
Number of NSF operations camps planned: 9;
Number of NSF operations camps funded: 6;
Number of NSF operations camps started: 2.
Sources: GAO analysis of INL and USSC data.
[End of figure]
USSC and INL are also funding and overseeing the construction or
renovation of training and ministry facilities in the West Bank.
Figure 5 shows the six planned and six ongoing or completed
infrastructure projects, including the two NSF operations camps, as of
March 2010.
Figure 5: Map of Planned and Ongoing USSC-funded Infrastructure
Projects:
[Refer to PDF for image: map and associated information]
Projects that are ongoing or completed:
Jenin: NSF Operations Camp; Estimated completion: 4th quarter 2010.
Ramallah: MOI/SPD Expanded Offices: Completed.
Jerico: Nuweimah Training Center: Estimated completion phase I: July
2010.
Jerico: Presidential Guard Training College: Estimated completion:
June 2010.
Jerico: NSF Operations Camp; Estimated completion: June 2010.
Hebron: Hebron NSF/SPF Renovation: Completion: Mid 2010.
Projects that are proposed:
Tulkarm: Proposed site for NSF Operations Camp.
Tubas: Proposed site for NSF Operations Camp.
Ramallah: Ramallah Civil Defense Center: In development.
Ramallah: Proposed site for NSF Operations Camp.
Bethlehem: Proposed site for NSF Operations Camp.
Hebron: Proposed site for NSF Operations Camp.
Sources: GAO analysis of USSC data; United Nations (maps).
[End of figure]
The six ongoing or completed infrastructure projects include NSF
operations camps, training facilities, and Ministry of Interior
facilities, and account for about $41 million of the total allocated
for infrastructure. They are in varying stages of completion; however,
INL officials expect that all ongoing infrastructure projects will be
completed by early 2011.
NSF Operations Camps and Garrison Facilities:
* Jericho NSF Operations Camp. This operations camp is to serve as the
garrison for the 2nd Special Battalion. The camp is to accommodate
approximately 750 personnel and provide workspaces, basic vehicle
maintenance facilities, parking for approximately 145 squad vehicles
and 40 large vehicles, clinical facilities, tactical communications
facilities, separate officer berthing and accommodation spaces, a
logistic warehouse facility, and K-9 animal housing spaces. State
allocated about $11.3 million to this project, which USSC and INL
expect to complete by mid-2010. (See figures 6 and 7.)
* Jenin NSF Operations Camp. This operations camp will consist of two
barracks buildings that will accommodate approximately 576 troops, one
officers' accommodations building that will house over 100 officers,
an operational center, mess hall, and gym. State allocated $11 million
to this renovation, which USSC and INL officials expect to complete by
the end of 2010.
* Hebron NSF and Special Police Force (SPF) Building. In this joint
NSF and Special Police Force building, the police occupy the ground
floor and the NSF the first floor. The goal is to make this building
habitable by units from the NSF special battalions deployed to Hebron
and make it usable for its intended security functions, including the
provision of a safe and secure operating environment, that is capable
of being shared with other PA security services. State allocated
$170,000 for this renovation, which USSC and INL expect to complete in
mid-2010.
Figure 6: Location of NSF Operations Camp Near Jericho:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph and associated information]
Depicted on the photograph:
City of Jerico;
Israeli Surveillance Tower;
NSF Operations Camp;
PA Civil Protection Center.
Source: GAO photo.
[End of figure]
Figure 7: U.S. Funded Construction at the NSF Operations Camp Near
Jericho:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph and associated information]
Depicted on the photograph:
City of Jerico;
Construction at NSF Operations Camp;
PA Civil Protection Center.
Source: GAO photo.
[End of figure]
Training Facilities:
* Nuweimah Training Center. The current training facility in Nuweimah
is being refurbished and expanded with funding from INL, to serve as
an NSF training facility. The facility is to include accommodations
for approximately 2,000 troops and 24 classrooms for approximately
1,500 students. The PA's initial plan was to renovate two NSF basic
training facilities in Jericho--Nuweimah and Alami. However, according
to an INL official the PA and USSC decided not to renovate the Alami
site, owing to difficulties in securing needed land titles, and
instead to shift all funds to Nuweimah. State allocated about $8
million to this project, which USSC and INL expect to complete by
early 2011.
* Presidential Guard Training College (Jericho). The PA intends to use
the college to house and train 500 law, order, and security personnel
at any given time. This facility has classroom space and
accommodations for 250 personnel, as well as dining and support
facilities for 500 personnel. State has allocated about $9 million to
construct this facility. According to an INL official, original work
on the facility was carried out by the UN Office for Project Services,
under INL supervision.[Footnote 26] This facility is currently fully
operational, and USSC and INL expect construction to be complete by
mid-2010.
Ministry Facilities:
* Ministry of Interior's Strategic Planning Directorate renovation
(Ramallah). USSC is renovating space in the Ministry of Interior to
provide additional office space and a training hub for the Strategic
Planning Directorate. The renovation is to add 90 spaces for new staff
and two large classrooms, a meeting room, and a security room. State
allocated $1.1 million to this renovation, which was completed in
February 2010.
To spend the remaining $58 million in infrastructure funding, USSC and
INL proposed additional projects, including building NSF operations
camps in Hebron, Bethlehem, Ramallah, Tulkarm, Tubas, and a civil
defense center in or near Ramallah. However, one U.S. official told us
that, because of difficulties in obtaining suitable land and other
delays, the USSC is reviewing other options for the NSF operations
camps, including constructing temporary operations camps until a
permanent site can be identified or renovating existing joint security
force facilities to allow them to be used to garrison NSF special
battalions. As of March 2010, preliminary design work had begun on a
temporary operations camp near Tubas.
USSC Has Centered Capacity Building Programs on Interior Ministry:
Since 2007, State has allocated approximately $22 million for capacity-
building activities, focused mainly on creating the Ministry of
Interior's Strategic Planning Directorate. The Minister of Interior
oversees all the security forces reporting to the PA prime minister.
According to an INL document, the directorate conducts strategic
planning to support security decision making at the executive and
ministry level to help the PA establish law and order and facilitate
other longer-term security-sector reforms. The directorate is staffed
by individuals with strategic planning, logistics capability, and
other expertise. According to USSC officials, when Gaza fell to Hamas
in mid-2007 and the PA President issued presidential decrees declaring
a state of emergency, suspending the current government, and forming a
new, more moderate government, the Ministry of Interior lost its
entire staff, leaving the newly appointed minister the task of
building an entirely new ministry. INL-funded activities include
providing technical assistance to the Strategic Planning Directorate,
in particular, funding and assigning six international technical
advisors to work within the directorate, and training for Ministry and
Strategic Planning Directorate staff. According to State documents and
officials, as of April 2010, after 2 years of service, the contracts
of all six of these advisors had expired, and, at the request of the
Minister of Interior, State did not renew them. According to a State
official, the Minister of Interior stated in January 2010 that this
effort had been concluded to the Ministry's satisfaction, so there are
no plans to replace these advisors. He noted that State has offered to
make technical assistance available on an ad hoc basis and at the
request of the Minister, and, along with other international donors,
plans to continue to fund other training and equipping efforts at the
Ministry in fiscal year 2011.
In addition to forming the Strategic Planning Directorate, USSC and
INL have undertaken other programs to increase the PA's capacity.
Examples include the following:
* USSC and INL are providing assistance in building the PA's capacity
to coordinate international security assistance. As part of this
effort, USSC serves as a technical advisor to a security sector aid-
coordinating body co-chaired by the Interior Minister and the
government of the United Kingdom.
* USSC and INL are supporting a Canadian-funded effort to develop PASF
capacity at the governorate level through the creation of Joint
Operations Centers, which are intended to give PASF area commanders in
each governorate the command and communications facilities necessary
to conduct integrated security operations.
* In support of the PA justice sector, INL launched a $1.5 million
small scale justice sector assistance project in Jenin.[Footnote 27]
The program provides technical assistance, training, and modest
amounts of equipment to improve capacity of the police to conduct
criminal investigations and help the public prosecutor's office manage
its caseload. A U.S. official reported that this program could be
replicated if successful in other governorates.
Although Improvements in West Bank Security Conditions Have Been
Reported, State and USSC Have not Established Clear and Measurable
Outcome-Based Performance Indicators:
U.S. and international officials have observed improved security
conditions in some areas of the West Bank since the PA began deploying
units trained and equipped with USSC assistance, although they
acknowledge these improvements may not be directly or wholly
attributable to USSC programs. However, State and USSC have not
assessed how their programs contribute to the achievement of the PA's
Roadmap obligations because they have not developed clear and
measurable outcome-based performance indicators and targets linking
their program activities to stated U.S. program objectives.
Numerous U.S. and International Officials Observed Improved Security
Conditions in the West Bank since PA Began Deploying USSC-Trained and
Equipped Units:
Numerous U.S., PA, Israeli, and other government officials stated that
both the PA and the Government of Israel are satisfied with the impact
USSC-trained and -equipped PASF battalions have had on improving the
security conditions in the West Bank. PA and U.S. officials cited
these improvements as examples of how U.S. security assistance is
aiding PA progress toward attaining its security obligations under the
Roadmap, including having its rebuilt and refocused security apparatus
begin sustained, targeted, and effective operations to dismantle
terrorist capabilities and infrastructure. These improved conditions
include the following.
* Better PASF capacity to control potentially violent situations.
According to U.S., international, PA and Government of Israel
officials, USSC-supported and -trained PASF units contributed
successfully to restored security and conducted counterterrorism
operations in Jenin, Hebron, Bethlehem, and other areas between 2008
and 2009.[Footnote 28] Several U.S. and international officials also
noted the lack of spontaneous or organized violence in PASF-controlled
areas in response to the December 2008 through January 2009 Israeli
incursion into Gaza was an indicator of the PASF's growing capacity to
anticipate and handle large scale demonstrations and limit potential
violence.
* Fewer Israeli government checkpoints. Several U.S. officials
suggested that the USSC also could point to some indicators as
measures of the growing effectiveness of USSC-supported security
forces, including the decline in the key manned Israeli security
checkpoints in the West Bank. However, the officials stated they could
not independently verify the validity or accuracy of the reported
declines, nor would they directly attribute these outcomes to USSC
activities.[Footnote 29]
* Revived economic activity. According to PA and U.S. officials and
documents, the subsequent revival of private investment in Jenin,
Hebron, Bethlehem, and other areas where USSC-trained and -equipped
PASF battalions were deployed is another indicator that USSC
assistance has influenced the security situation, although a senior PA
official noted that PA fiscal policies may have also contributed to
this revival.
* Improved public attitudes toward security forces. In addition, both
State and PA officials noted that Palestinian polling suggests
people's views of the PASF have improved, and a State report cited
such a poll as indicating growing understanding and confidence of the
West Bank populace in their security forces.
State and USSC Officials Have Not Established Clear and Measurable
Outcome-based Performance Indicators for PA Security Assistance:
Although State and USSC report on PASF program outputs such as the
number of personnel vetted, trained, and equipped, USSC has not
defined or established outcome-based performance measures to assess
the progress, impacts, and estimated costs of achieving USSC
objectives. For example, USSC documents and officials note that USSC
objectives include helping the PA create right-sized, professional
security forces in support of its Roadmap obligations but do not
specify measurable outcome-based program performance indicators.
[Footnote 30] USSC and State officials attributed the lack of clear
and measurable outcome-based performance indicators and their
associated targets for their programs to three factors--(1) changing
force requirements, (2) the early stages of PA planning and its
limited capacity to rebuild and sustain its security forces, and (3)
lack of detailed guidance from State about USSC program objectives,
time frames, and reporting requirements.
First, the PA's planned force requirements have undergone several
revisions. According to a U.S. official, and as U.S. and PA documents
demonstrate, the planned size and composition of the NSF has changed
from seven special battalions (five in the West Bank, two in Gaza) in
early 2007, to five special battalions solely in the West Bank after
the Hamas takeover of Gaza in June 2007. According to State officials
and documents, the PA increased the number of battalions for the West
Bank from five to seven by mid-2008, although the projected total
number of personnel remained at 3,500 as each battalion was reduced in
size from 700 to 500 personnel in part to create smaller units better
suited for the urban environment in which they would operate. In 2009,
the PA raised the projected size of the NSF to 10 special battalions,
according to USSC officials.[Footnote 31] Some State officials and
documents also noted that the PASF has not clarified the role of the
Presidential Guard and that some of its units had assumed gendarmerie
tasks beyond its original mandate, which may overlap with NSF
responsibilities.
The revised and unclear requirements reflect that the parties to the
Roadmap agreement--the PA and Israel--have not agreed on common
measures to assess progress in meeting their Roadmap security
obligations, according to USSC officials. For example, a September
2008 USSC report noted that the Government of Israel and the PA have
not developed "effects-based metrics" needed to define a successful
PASF security or counterterrorism effort under the Roadmap.[Footnote
32] State officials stated that the Government of Israel prefers not
to establish objectives or measures that might limit its flexibility
to conduct security operations within the West Bank.
Second, the PA's plans and capacity to reform, rebuild, and sustain
its security forces are still in a relatively early stage of
development.[Footnote 33] As a result, State and USSC officials said
it is difficult to set outcome-based targets to measure the progress
or outcomes of their programs. For example, the PA's capacity to
direct its own transformation was lacking until recently. According to
a senior PA official, the Minister of the Interior did not consolidate
within the ministry the authority to request, accept, and coordinate
all foreign donor security assistance until August 2009.
Third, USSC officials said that State did not give USSC a "blueprint"
for attaining defined and measurable objectives for its programs
within a set period of time, or for estimating the amount and type of
resources needed to achieve such USSC goals as aiding in the
transformation of the PA security sector and the creation of a
professional, right-sized security force. According to State, this
stemmed from the absence of a requirements-based budget allocation
process for USSC programs until 2008. Since then, however, State
officials said they required USSC and INL to provide performance
indicators beginning with the fiscal year 2009 Jerusalem mission
strategic plan. Furthermore, a senior USSC official said they had
little incentive to emphasize or develop performance targets because
State had shown little interest in tracking performance in the past;
in fact, regular monthly reports from USSC to State on its activities
resumed only in November 2009 after a hiatus of more than a year.
Despite these factors, deriving indicators to measure and manage
performance against an agency's results-oriented goals has been
identified by GAO as good management practice because it would help
provide objective and useful performance information for decision
makers when faced with limited resources and competing priorities.
[Footnote 34] GAO has previously reported that while agency managers
encounter difficulties in setting outcome-oriented goals or collecting
useful data on expected results in general, it is difficult to design
effective strategies or measure the impact of programs without
them.[Footnote 35] State and USSC officials noted that USSC was
developing a campaign plan for release in mid-2010 to help the
Palestinians implement their own revised security strategy--which was
still not released as of March 2010-and expected the plan to
incorporate performance indicators to the extent possible. According
to U.S. military doctrine, effective planning cannot occur without a
clear understanding of the desired end state and the conditions that
must exist to in order to end the operation. Moreover, a campaign plan
should provide an estimate of the time and forces required to reach
the conditions for mission success or termination. Determining when
conditions are met requires "measures of effectiveness," such as
outcome-based performance measures.[Footnote 36] GAO has reported on
the importance of outcome-based performance indicators as a key
characteristic of effective national security strategy planning and a
necessary component of developing and executing campaign plans based
on these strategies (see list of related GAO products at end of
report).
Although the fiscal year 2010 Jerusalem mission strategic plan
identifies performance indicators for U.S. security assistance
programs, the targets to measure progress towards achieving these
indicators focus on program outputs rather than program outcomes. For
example, the plan identified the performance indicator "building
Palestinian security capabilities" to assess progress toward achieving
State's broader goal of reforming Palestinian security forces to
improve law and order and reduce terrorism.[Footnote 37] However, this
indicator is measured based on output targets such as "completing the
training and equipping of at least one PG and one NSF battalion" in
fiscal year 2008 rather than on outcomes such as reduced terrorism as
measured by, for example, changes in the number of terrorist-related
incidents or changes in crime rates. Moreover, neither the performance
plan nor USSC documents establish measurable outcome targets for
assessing progress towards such stated USSC objectives as creating a
"right-sized, professional" security force or helping the PA transform
its security sector. Nor do these plans and documents contain
information on expected time frames or estimated total costs for
achieving these goals.[Footnote 38]
State and USSC officials acknowledged that it would be useful to
describe the impacts of U.S. security assistance on such outcomes as
reductions in the number of Israeli security checkpoints in the West
Bank. Similarly, they acknowledged it would be useful to tailor some
survey questions to establish baselines and assess over time the
extent to which polling data suggesting growing Palestinian confidence
in their security can be attributed to the conduct and actions of USSC-
trained PASF personnel, but noted the difficulty in separating the
impact of U.S. security assistance from the impact of such external
factors as Israeli political and security actions. In March 2010,
State and USSC officials said that they had tasked an officer to
clarify how USSC activities achieve State objectives and to improve
reporting on USSC performance.
U.S. Security Assistance Programs Face Logistical Constraints and
Outpace Development of the Rule of Law:
Logistical constraints on personnel movement and access, equipment
delivery, and acquisition of land for infrastructure projects
challenge the implementation of U.S. security assistance programs. In
addition, State, USSC, and international officials and documents note
that programs to develop the capacity of the civil police and the
justice sector are not proceeding at the same pace as U.S. security
sector reform programs.
U.S. Security Assistance Faces Several Logistical Constraints:
Logistical constraints--largely outside U.S. control-involving
personnel movement and access, equipment approval and delivery, and
land acquisition challenge the implementation of U.S. security
assistance in the West Bank and Gaza.
Constraints on Personnel Movement and Access:
State travel restrictions and Israeli Defense Force security
checkpoints limit the movement and access of U.S. personnel into and
within the West Bank. State restricts U.S. government personnel travel
into and within the West Bank and requires that they travel in armored
vehicles with security teams when traveling to State designated high
threat areas. However, such restrictions do not apply to personnel
from other countries supporting the USSC, such as the United Kingdom
and Canada, according to State officials. As a result, according to
U.S. officials, USSC relies on non-U.S. personnel to visit Palestinian
security leaders on a daily basis, gauge local conditions, and conduct
training in the West Bank. Israeli security checkpoints when traveling
into and out of the West Bank border also limit U.S. government
personnel movement and access, according to U.S. officials. For
example, on more than one occasion, U.S. government delegations,
including staff from USSC and State, were prevented from entering or
exiting the West Bank, according to USSC and State officials. PA
officials also face movement and access difficulties crossing at
Israeli checkpoints when traveling into and out of the West Bank,
which hampers the ability of USSC to meet with PA outside of the West
Bank.
Delays in Equipment Approval and Delivery:
While a process exists for equipment approval and delivery as shown in
figure 8, U.S. officials said problems affecting the approval and
delivery of equipment have hampered USSC's ability to equip the PASF
in a timely manner. USSC officials noted that without a significant
effort at a higher political level to streamline this process, delays
will frequently occur with little recourse available to USSC.
Figure 8: Process for Equipment Approval and Delivery:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
Process:
USSC or INL requests pre-approval;
Israel grants approval: No:
USSC or INL modifies request (potential delay);
Israel grants approval: Yes:
INL contractor is responsible for procuring equipment and shipping to
Israel:
Israel grants customs approval (USSC or INL stores equipment until it
passes customs inspections: potential delay).
No approval: USSC or INL changes equipment to pass customs (potential
delay);
Approval:
Israel inspects equipment at checkpoints and border crossings
(potential delay):
INL contractor ships to destination.
INL: Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs.
Source: GAO analysis of USSC data.
[End of figure]
Delays in equipment approval and delivery have occurred throughout
this process, for example:
* Delays in approval. An absence of agreed-upon terms for the approval
of equipment requests, such as equipment specifications or a set
timeframe to make approval decisions, has resulted in delayed Israeli
approval of shipments of USSC and other donor equipment, according to
U.S. and other donor officials.[Footnote 39] For example, State and EU
donor officials told us that the Government of Israel has not agreed
to specific procedures for pre-approval of equipment orders as it
prefers to continue to approve or deny each equipment request on a
case-by-case basis. According to an Israeli official, each equipment
request must be reviewed on its own merits, as specifications can
change. For example, an Israeli official stated that although the
Government of Israel had approved procurement of a shipment of
raincoats, it did not guarantee the approval of future shipments of
raincoats of comparable types and quantities. In addition, because the
parties have not agreed on time frames for submitting or approving
equipment requests, significant differences between the amounts of
time needed to approve various items have constrained USSC's ability
to estimate equipment delivery dates. For instance, some vehicles
ordered for the Presidential Guard and NSF 2nd Special Battalion in
March 2008 were delivered in June 2008 while others were not delivered
until January 2009. On the other hand, USSC officials said in March
2010 that the time needed to complete the approval process has
declined from approximately 3 months to 2 weeks for items that had
been approved in prior shipments by the Israeli government.
Nevertheless, these officials note there is no guarantee that
previously approved items will continue to be approved by the
Government of Israel. For example, they noted that as of November 2009
INL has paid at least $176,000 to store a $2.3 million shipment of
approximately 1,400 radios and associated gear that the Israeli
government approved for delivery, but was then impounded by Israeli
customs upon arrival in port in early 2009 after the Government of
Israel revoked this approval.[Footnote 40]
* Delays in delivery. Delays have occurred at Israeli customs and
during shipment into the West Bank, constraining USSC's mission of
properly equipping the NSF and Presidential Guard, according to
officials we spoke with. USSC officials stated that shipping items to
Israel takes about 1 month by sea and as little as 1 day by air from
the United States. However, USSC officials also stated that while the
time needed for Israeli customs to approve shipments averages about 2
months, approval can take up to a year or more for items that require
modification by the Israelis in order to pass Israeli customs
inspections. For example, USSC officials noted that vehicles and
trailers were held up as Israeli customs required modifications to
their lights, brakes, and other specifications before they would
release them. According to an Israeli official, the PA also
contributes to the equipment delays at customs by not following the
shipment instructions in the approved requests. For example, in one
case equipment was shipped with other types of goods destined for the
West Bank and the quantity of equipment was lower than the approved
amount. In another case, the shipper consolidated a shipment of PASF
items with items for other customers. The increasing number of
equipment deliveries in 2009 has also added to the delays in clearing
customs, according to the Israeli government official. Additional
unexpected delays in delivery have occurred when Israeli customs
inspectors have not released equipment shipments they have approved,
according to USSC and INL officials.[Footnote 41] These officials told
us that security inspections required at Israeli border crossings and
checkpoints in the West Bank have also delayed delivery. USSC and INL
officials noted that they have taken steps to improve their ability to
deliver equipment on time, including: developing standardized NSF
battalion equipment packages to minimize Israeli opportunities to
question equipment specifications; requiring the contracted freight
forwarder in Virginia to check every item against shipment manifests
prior to shipment; and making greater use of airfreight delivery. In
addition, USSC officials said they have shortened the lead times
needed to procure and ship equipment over time by pre-ordering items
previously approved by the Israelis to be included in later shipments.
Moreover, USSC, INL, and PA officials and staff have found it
difficult to check on the status of the shipment or to hold parties
accountable for delays, according to USSC officials. These officials
stated that conflict appears to exist between various Israeli
government departments related to the equipping process, which
periodically results in unexplained delays in equipment release or
approval. According to USSC, it is unclear with whom USSC or PA
officials should speak to seek redress for unexplained equipment
delays; as a result, delays are often elevated to high level U.S. and
Israeli officials, who then negotiate a resolution. These delays have
hampered USSC's ability to equip the trained NSF and Presidential
Guard battalions in a timely manner. While the USSC planned to deliver
equipment to these battalions upon their graduation from JIPTC, some
of these battalions have operated for several months after graduation
without all of their needed equipment. For example, INL ordered
equipment for the PG 3rd battalion and NSF 2nd special battalion in
December 2007 to be distributed at the time of their May 2008
graduation; however, USSC and INL officials noted that although these
two battalions had received all of their vehicles as of March 2010,
they had yet to receive 14 percent of their equipment. As of March
2010, the 3RD and 4TH NSF special battalions that had completed
training in Jordan prior to December 2010 had received over 90 percent
of their vehicles but only 44 to 50 percent of their other equipment,
according to State officials. These officials said that the 1ST NSF
special battalion, which graduated in January 2010, had not received
any of the purchased vehicles and only 2 percent of its other
equipment as of March 2010.[Footnote 42]
INL officials stated that these equipment shortfalls had not
significantly affected the ability of the NSF special battalions to
operate once they were deployed back to the West Bank. However, they
acknowledged that these units had been deployed to the field lacking
critical items, such as helmets, armored vests, and communications
gear, that had been proposed, and in some cases procured, by the USSC
and INL but had not been approved for delivery by the government of
Israel.
Constraints on Land Acquisition:
The completion of U.S.-funded infrastructure projects has been delayed
by constraints on acquiring land in the West Bank that are largely
outside of U.S. control, according to USSC, INL, and PA officials.
Israel must approve the location of all proposed facilities and does
not set formal standards by which locations are approved, according to
USSC officials. These officials also said the PA is largely limited to
building in Oslo Area A, which is solely under PA authority but
comprises less than 20 percent of the West Bank's territory. USSC
officials also stated that it is difficult to determine whether a
proposed installation site includes land solely in Area A. In
addition, the Government of Israel requires that the proposed
installation sites must not be near Israeli settlements or access
routes. After the Government of Israel approves an installation site,
USSC officials stated they face a lengthy Palestinian process for
establishing ownership rights and obtaining legal title to the land.
These officials noted that conflicting land and property claims on the
site also create a challenge to acquiring land for PA infrastructure
projects. Figure 9 depicts areas where the PA usually can acquire land
for security installations in the West Bank (area A) and areas where
it cannot (areas B and C).
Figure 9: Division of West Bank Territory by Oslo Area of Control and
Israeli Settlements (2009):
[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated map]
The following are indicated on the map:
Israeli settlements:
Area A: PA civil and security authority.
Area B: PA civil authority and Israeli security authority.
Area C: Israeli civil and security authority.
PA: Indicates Palestinian Authority.
Sources: GAO analysis of USSC data; United Nations (maps).
[End of figure]
Because of these restrictions and delays, USSC and INL officials said
efforts to develop NSF operations camps beyond the two already under
construction remain stalled as of March 2010. Owing to delays in
acquiring suitable land for permanent camps and the need to house
newly trained battalions, USSC and INL officials said they have built
temporary operations camps. Similarly, because of delays in land
acquisition, USSC and INL canceled renovation plans of an NSF facility
in Alami and redirected the funding to the Nuweimah facility,
according to an INL official. Originally designed to house 700
trainees, Nuweimah will be expanded to house 2,000 trainees upon
completion in fiscal year 2011. To work around restricted property in
certain urban areas, the USSC and INL are planning to construct or
renovate multistory buildings within urban-based security compounds
known as muquata'as. This effort is underway or being planned for
compounds in Tulkarm and other urban locations. As a result, some U.S.-
funded PASF centers are holding more troops than originally planned
and facilities are being built in a way that allows them to be
expanded upon if needed, according to USSC and INL officials. These
land acquisition problems constrain USSC's goal to provide housing for
each of the NSF special battalions upon their completion of training
in Jordan.
Capacity Development of PA Civil Police and Justice Sector Is Limited:
U.S. and international officials noted that PA civil police and
justice sector reforms are not proceeding at the same pace as U.S.
security sector reforms.
* Palestinian Civil Police (PCP) capacity is limited. According to
EUPOL COPPS advisors, the PCP lags behind all other Palestinian
security forces in funding for infrastructure and equipment. Although
infrastructure exists, such as joint operation centers and prison
facilities, about 60 new police stations need to be rebuilt or
constructed and existing facilities need to be refurbished, according
to a USSC document. The PCP also have difficulties obtaining certain
types of equipment, such as finger printing equipment, radios, and
personal protective equipment, according to EUPOL COPPS. Also, the
judicial police--charged with serving court orders, protecting judges
and judicial facilities, and transporting prisoners--lack vehicles and
operating capabilities outside of Ramallah, according to a USSC
report. According to a U.S. official, a decision was made in 2008 to
increase the size of the NSF in the West Bank from 5 to 10 NSF special
battalions in part to compensate for the lack of PCP capacity.
According to State and international officials, the NSF and the PCP do
not coordinate programs to a large extent. Although the NSF receives
training on operating with the PCP at JIPTC and PCP are trained on
operating with NSF at many different levels, including at USSC-
sponsored courses, the NSF and PCP coordination needs to be
strengthened, according to U.S. and other officials. While an INL
official said the PA is taking efforts to increase coordination
between these two security forces through the Interior Ministry's
Strategic Planning Directorate, the PCP's lack of communication
equipment, such as radios, limits coordination. A EUPOL COPPS official
told us that it is difficult for the PCP to obtain radios and
frequencies and such a lack of communication equipment constrains the
building of a sophisticated and well-equipped civil police force.
* Justice sector capacity is limited. The PA justice sector still
lacks sufficient infrastructure, organization, and updated laws,
according to PA, U.S., and international documents and officials.
[Footnote 43] Justice-sector infrastructure, such as facilities and
courts in each governorate, require upgrades and improvements by 2011,
according to USSC. U.S. and foreign officials told us that to improve
justice-sector organization, the PA needs to more clearly define the
roles of its government agencies. According to a USSC report,
cooperation between the elements of the criminal justice system--the
courts, police, and prosecutors--is poor. In addition, USSC reported
that the physical separation of government agencies within and between
governorates results in poor coordination.[Footnote 44] USSC further
reported that the lack of clarity and consistency in PA laws and the
lack of a working legislature also undermine PA civil police and
justice-sector capacity. USSC reported that the PASF, including the
civil police, are constrained in their ability to conduct security
operations and to detain persons who present a security threat and the
justice sector is constrained in convicting such persons because
Palestinian laws on some related issues are vague and sometimes
contradictory. However, such laws cannot be reviewed and updated until
after a new Palestinian Legislative Council is installed.[Footnote 45]
Moreover, a State document noted that the civil police and justice-
sector capacity limitations have become a matter of greater concern as
it has become apparent that other donors are not providing the
necessary civil policing, justice-sector, and other pledged assistance
necessary to keep pace with the progress the U.S. security assistance
programs are achieving. According to U.S. and PA officials and
documents, sustaining the progress they have made with U.S. assistance
in the security sector may be difficult unless the lack of capacity in
the civil police and the justice sectors with which the USSC-supported
security forces must operate are addressed. To help address some of
these gaps, State officials said State had recently reinforced its
role for facilitating coordination among U.S. agencies and
international donors for justice-sector issues. Examples of U.S. and
international justice-sector reform programs include: the INL's
Justice Sector Assistance Project, USAID's Rule of Law and Justice
Enforcement Program, EUPOL COPPS' civil police and rule of law
program, and the Canadian International Development Agency's "Sharaka"
Program, as shown in table 3.
Table 3: Select PA Justice-Sector Reform Programs:
Donor/program: U.S. INL Justice Sector Assistance Project;
Description: Improve the capacity of the Jenin justice sector,
primarily the police and public prosecution, to investigate and
prosecute cases to reduce the current case backlog through technical
assistance, training, and modest amounts of equipment. Plans to expand
program to strengthen cooperation between criminal investigators and
prosecutors.
Donor/program: USAID Rule of Law and Justice Enforcement Program;
Description: Build the management capacity and case management system
of the courts and increase public confidence in the justice sector
through outreach programs.
Donor/program: EUPOL COPPS;
Description: Advise and monitor the functioning of the PA justice
sector through the Civil Police, the Ministry of Justice, the
prosecutor's offices, and courts.
Donor/program: Canadian International Development Agency "Sharaka"
Program;
Description: Provide training, equipment, infrastructure, information
technology systems, and support to the Office of Attorney General and
the Public Prosecution Service. Also provide support to forensics and
courthouses.
Source: GAO analysis of U.S. and international program documents.
[End of table]
Conclusion:
In fiscal years 2007 through 2010, State allocated approximately $392
million in USSC assistance to support U.S. strategic goals and Roadmap
objectives in the Middle East, and has requested $150 million more for
fiscal year 2011. Most of this assistance has supported training and
equipping new PASF battalions deployed in the West Bank. Although U.S.
and international officials said that U.S. security assistance has
helped the PA improve security conditions in some areas of the West
Bank and is progressing faster than PA civil police and justice sector
reforms, State and USSC have not established clear and measurable
outcome-based performance indicators to assess and report on the
progress of their security assistance. As such, it is difficult for
State and the USSC to gauge whether or not their security assistance
programs are helping the PA achieve its Roadmap obligations to
undertake security sector transformation and create a right-sized,
professional security force. Establishing and tracking outcome-based
performance measures in the proposed USSC campaign plan would help
inform decisions about the costs, progress, and impact of U.S.
security assistance to the PA particularly given that this assistance
is progressing faster than the PA civil police and justice-sector
reforms.
Recommendations:
As State develops the USSC campaign plan for providing security
assistance to the PA, we recommend that the Secretary of State
establish outcome-based indicators and track them over time. State
should define specific program objectives and identify appropriate
outcome-based indicators that would demonstrate progress toward
achieving those objectives, and would enable it to, among other
things, weigh the progress made in developing the security forces,
civil police, Ministry of Interior, and justice sectors.
Agency Comments:
State provided written comments on a draft of this report, which are
reprinted in appendix IV. State partially concurred with our
recommendation that the Secretary of State establish outcome-based
indicators and track them over time. State commented that they
recognize the need for such indicators and have tried to develop ones
that are meaningful at this stage of the program's development. For
example, State mentioned that they have included broad performance
measures in the Mission Strategic Plan. INL has also factored
performance measures into all of its funding obligating documents.
State, however, accepts our point that these measures should be more
performance-based. Now that trained and equipped security force units
are in place, State anticipates developing meaningful security-related
baseline data for measuring the progress of U.S. sponsored trained
units. State further commented that they have already started to do
this with the Jenin justice project, whereby the PA will be able to
generate comparative data on the number, speed, and success of the
cases they prosecute. In addition, State commented that INL is in the
process of crafting a new Letter of Agreement with the Palestinian
Authority. This letter is to contain project goals, objectives, and
milestones that reflect the program's recent and anticipated future
growth in size and complexity.
State cautioned that, as we reported, several factors outside of
State's control influence progress toward the most meaningful
performance-based indicators. State noted that while security
assistance provided by the United States can strengthen the
capabilities of the Palestinian security forces to operate
increasingly in certain areas, the Palestinian Authority will only be
able to do so if it and the Government of Israel agree on the
direction and pace of this deployment. Ultimately, State added, such
an agreement depends on a range of political, economic, and social
factors that encompass more than just the enhanced law enforcement and
security capabilities U.S. assistance gives the PA security forces.
State also provided technical comments that we incorporated, as
appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional
committees and the Secretary of State. In addition, the report will be
available at no charge on the GAO Web site at [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov].
If you or any of your staffs have any question about this report,
please contact me at (202) 512-3149 or gootnickd@gao.gov. Contact
points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs
may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major
contribution to this report are listed in appendix V.
Signed by:
David Gootnick:
Director, International Affairs and Trade.
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To describe the nature and extent of U.S. security assistance to the
Palestinian Authority since 2007, we reviewed relevant documents and
interviewed officials from the Departments of State (State) and
Defense (DOD), the Office of the United States Security Coordinator
(USSC), and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) in
Washington, D.C., in the West Bank, at the U.S. Consulate in
Jerusalem, and the U.S. Embassies in Tel Aviv and Amman, Jordan. We
also met with PA, Israeli, and Jordanian government and security
officials as well as recognized experts in Israeli-Palestinian
affairs. We reviewed State's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs (INL) budget justifications for fiscal years 2008
through 2010 to determine the levels of International Narcotics and
Law Enforcement (INCLE) funding allocated to USSC and INL security
assistance programs in the West Bank. We determined that the INCLE
funding allocation data was sufficiently reliable for our purposes.
To describe the nature and extent of the training programs, we
reviewed INL, USSC, and contractor status report documentation and
conducted site visits to observe U.S.-sponsored training at the
Jordanian International Police Training Center. We reviewed examples
of training reports, student surveys, and after action reports used by
USSC contractors to review the performance of their trainees during
and after every National Security Forces (NSF) training session. To
describe the status of USSC programs to equip the NSF, we reviewed
equipment delivery lists, contractor statements of work, equipment
delivery work orders, and summaries of equipment end use monitoring
reports. We interviewed INL, USSC, Palestinian Authority Security
Forces (PASF), and Jordanian officials about the status of equipment
deliveries. To describe the status of the construction of PASF
installations, we reviewed the August 2007 "Framework Agreement"
signed between the Secretary of State and the PA Prime Minister as
well as INL contract summary data and progress reports; visited
construction projects in and around the city of Jericho; and
interviewed PA and INL contract staff about project objectives, plans,
and funding issues. We assessed the reliability of the data on the
battalions trained and equipped by the USSC, and on the infrastructure
construction data provided by INL. We did not assess the reliability
of the data on the current size and structure of the PASF because we
are presenting them for background purposes only.
To assess State's efforts to measure the effectiveness of its security
assistance programs, we examined whether its approach identified and
applied measurable performance indicators necessary to gauge results--
as called for in a number of GAO products listed at the end of this
report. These reports state that developing and applying outcome-based
performance indicators are (1) a management best practice; (2) one of
the key characteristics of effective national security strategy
planning, particularly when developing counterterrorism strategies;
and (3) a necessary component of developing and executing campaign
plans based on these strategies. We also reviewed other GAO reports
assessing the extent to which other U.S. assistance projects develop
and apply results-based performance indicators. We reviewed the
strategic plans for State's Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs and the
mission performance and the mission strategic plans for the U.S.
Consulate in Jerusalem for fiscal years 2009 through 2011, as well as
the four monthly activity reports the USSC has produced between
November 2009 and March 2010. We examined United Nations Office for
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs data and an Israeli Ministry of
Defense report for changes in the number of Israeli roadblocks within
the West Bank from 2007 to 2009.
To determine factors that may affect the implementation of U.S.
security assistance to the Palestinian Authority, we analyzed reports,
conference presentations, and U.S. government sponsored studies to
identify issues that affect U.S. programs. We conducted interviews
with State, INL, and USSC officials in Washington, D.C., and in the
field. We also met with Israeli, PA, Jordanian, and other
international officials during our fieldwork in Israel, the West Bank,
Jerusalem, and Jordan. To assess logistical constraints, we reviewed
relevant UN and State documents on access and movement; INL and USSC
documents on the logistics of providing equipment to the PA; and met
with USSC officials to discuss challenges in acquiring land for U.S.-
funded infrastructure in the West Bank. To illustrate the U.S.-funded
equipment approval and delivery process, we developed a schematic
representation and identified points during which the process may
experience problems based on discussions with U.S., Israeli, and PA
officials. We consulted with INL and USSC officials and incorporated
their comments into our representation of the equipment approval and
delivery process. To assess the capacity of the PA police and justice
sector and its impact on U.S. security assistance, we reviewed
documents from and met with USSC, Israeli, PA, and international
officials. To examine the pace of U.S. and international assistance to
the PA civil police and justice sector, we also reviewed State
documents and met with current PA police and justice sector donors,
including USAID, INL, and EUPOL COPPS.
We conducted our work from July 2009 to May 2010 and in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards
require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,
appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings
and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the
evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives.
[End of section]
Appendix II: List of USSC Courses Provided to the PASF in the West
Bank, July 2008 to March 2010:
Table 4 shows the 24 different specialized courses the USSC has
conducted or supported for PASF personnel in the West Bank between mid-
2008 and March 2010, and the two additional courses it planned to
offer as of March 2010.
Table 4: USSC-Sponsored Training Courses in the West Bank, July 2008 -
March 2010:
Course title: PASF Senior Leaders Course;
Approximate course length: 60 days;
Start date: Oct. 2008;
Approximate number trained: 6 courses held with selected PASF
personnel.
Course title: PASF Intermediate Leaders Course;
Approximate course length: 30 days;
Start date: Feb. 2010;
Approximate number trained: 2 courses held with selected PASF
personnel.
Course title: Human Rights/Use of Force;
Approximate course length: 35 hours;
Start date: Mar. 2010;
Approximate number trained: 40 PASF students.
Course title: HQ Staff Training;
Approximate course length: 30 days;
Start date: July 2008;
Approximate number trained: Selected staff from 4 NSF battalions.
Course title: Advanced Staff Training;
Approximate course length: 30 days;
Start date: Oct. 2008;
Approximate number trained: Selected staff from 3 NSF battalions.
Course title: Intermediate English Language Training;
Approximate course length: 10 weeks;
Start date: Sept. 2008;
Approximate number trained: 86 students.
Course title: Advanced English Language Training;
Approximate course length: 10 weeks (or 5 weeks intensive);
Start date: Nov. 2008;
Approximate number trained: 108 students.
Course title: Map Reading and Symbols;
Approximate course length: 30 days;
Start date: July 2009;
Approximate number trained: 40 NSF students.
Course title: Media Awareness Training;
Approximate course length: 30 days;
Start date: March 2010;
Approximate number trained: 20 PASF students.
Course title: Medical Refresher Training;
Approximate course length: 30 days;
Start date: Feb. 2009;
Approximate number trained: Selected personnel from 4 NSF battalions.
Course title: Basic Lifesaver First Aid;
Approximate course length: 5 days;
Start date: Nov. 2009;
Approximate number trained: 80 students.
Course title: First Responder;
Approximate course length: 6-8 weeks;
Start date: Dec. 2009;
Approximate number trained: 80 students.
Course title: Tactical Logistics;
Approximate course length: 30 days;
Start date: June 2009;
Approximate number trained: Selected personnel from 3 NSF battalions.
Course title: Basic Driver Training;
Approximate course length: 30 days;
Start date: Oct. 2008;
Approximate number trained: Selected personnel from 3 NSF battalions,
120 NSF students, 120 PASF students.
Course title: Vehicle Maintenance;
Approximate course length: 30 days;
Start date: March 2009;
Approximate number trained: Selected personnel from 3 battalions.
Course title: 15 Ton Drivers Training;
Approximate course length: 15 weeks;
Start date: Nov. 2009;
Approximate number trained: 30 NSF students.
Course title: Recovery Vehicle Training;
Approximate course length: 3-4 months;
Start date: May 2009;
Approximate number trained: Selected personnel from 3 NSF battalions.
Course title: Fleet Management;
Approximate course length: 30 days;
Start date: Dec. 2008;
Approximate number trained: Selected personnel from 3 NSF battalions.
Course title: Equipment Maintenance;
Approximate course length: 30 days;
Start date: Nov. 2009;
Approximate number trained: Selected personnel from 1 NSF battalion.
Course title: Warehouse Management;
Approximate course length: 30 days;
Start date: Feb. 2009;
Approximate number trained: Selected personnel from 4 NSF battalions.
Course title: Training/Training Management;
Approximate course length: N/A;
Start date: Planned;
Approximate number trained: N/A.
Course title: Communications Training;
Approximate course length: 30 days;
Start date: March 2010;
Approximate number trained: 150 NSF students.
Course title: Communications Maintenance;
Approximate course length: 4 months;
Start date: March 2010;
Approximate number trained: None complete as of March 31, 2010.
Course title: Computer Skills Training;
Approximate course length: 30 days;
Start date: Dec. 2009;
Approximate number trained: 20 students.
Course title: Food Service Operations;
Approximate course length: 4 months;
Start date: Feb. 2010;
Approximate number trained: None complete as of March 31, 2010.
Course title: Nutrition Training;
Approximate course length: 3 months;
Start date: Planned;
Approximate number trained: None complete as of March 31, 2010.
Source: GAO analysis of USSC data.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix III: USSC List of Equipment Approved for Provision to the NSF
3RD and 4TH Battalions:
Table 5 shows the type and quantity of equipment approved for the NSF
3RD and 4TH battalions. USSC procures an initial issuance of equipment
for battalions trained with U.S. funds at the Jordanian International
Police Training Center adjusting the issuance slightly for each
battalion. An average battalion consists of 500 troops.
Table 5: Equipment Approved for Provision to the NSF 3RD and 4TH
Battalions:
Vehicles:
Description: Ambulances;
Quantity: 3.
Description: 4-Door Sedan (Surveillance vehicle);
Quantity: 8.
Description: Isuzu D-MAX 4x4 Supercrew Truck;
Quantity: 64.
Description: Benches, rack systems and tarps for Isuzu D-MAX;
Quantity: 64.
Description: 3500 Truck, Diesel 4x4;
Quantity: 15.
Description: 3500 Truck, Diesel 4x4;
Quantity: 15.
Description: Prisoner transport van (Paddy Wagon);
Quantity: 2.
Description: Tow Truck;
Quantity: 2.
Description: Generator trailer;
Quantity: 4.
Description: Water trailer, 500 gallon;
Quantity: 5.
Description: Tool Box, truck mounted;
Quantity: 2.
Organizational (Recon Platoon):
Description: Video camera/Camcorder (No tape);
Quantity: 4.
Description: 4GB Memory stick for cameras, camcorders;
Quantity: 8.
Description: Camera;
Quantity: 4.
Description: 10 X 50 Binoculars;
Quantity: 16.
Specialty Equipment:
Description: Extendable mirror;
Quantity: 12.
Description: Rappelling gloves;
Quantity: 68.
Description: Grenadier gloves;
Quantity: 15.
Description: Rappelling harness system;
Quantity: 68.
Police Entry Equipment:
Description: Dual Handled Entry Sledge/Door Ram;
Quantity: 6.
Description: Climbing Rope;
Quantity: 10.
Description: Climbing Ladders;
Quantity: 10.
Description: Brean-N-Rake Entry Bar for windows;
Quantity: 6.
Description: Dynamic Entry Back Kit (cutters, sledge, bar);
Quantity: 6.
Description: Close Quarter Dynamic Entry Sledge;
Quantity: 6.
Description: Hydraulic Spreaderbar (doorway);
Quantity: 6.
Description: Gorilla Entry Bar (doorway);
Quantity: 6.
Description: Ballistic Entry Shield (Level IIIA);
Quantity: 6.
Description: Fence Climbing Kit;
Quantity: 6.
Description: Dynamic Entry Sledge (Regular);
Quantity: 6.
Description: Ladder, Telescopic;
Quantity: 6.
General Equipment:
Description: Mobile Light Trailer;
Quantity: 10.
Description: Handheld Spot Lights (rechargable);
Quantity: 100.
Description: Road Cones;
Quantity: 100.
Description: Metal Bars for checkpoints;
Quantity: 50.
Description: Spike Strips;
Quantity: 30.
Description: Metal Detectors;
Quantity: 24.
Description: Steel Handcuffs;
Quantity: 500.
Description: Head Flashlights (rechargable);
Quantity: 550.
Description: Bullhorns;
Quantity: 10.
Description: Camera, Snake;
Quantity: 6.
Description: Handheld Monitor;
Quantity: 6.
Description: Spotting Scope with camera adapter;
Quantity: 4.
Description: Rubber training mat;
Quantity: 1.
Description: Printer;
Quantity: 5.
Description: Scanner/Fax;
Quantity: 4.
Description: Copier Machine;
Quantity: 2.
Description: Projectors;
Quantity: 4.
Description: Wallboards;
Quantity: 14.
Description: Paper Shredder;
Quantity: 3.
Description: DVD Player/VCR;
Quantity: 6.
Description: Laminator;
Quantity: 2.
Description: Laptops;
Quantity: 6.
Description: Desktops;
Quantity: 6.
Description: Water Coolers;
Quantity: 30.
Description: Television;
Quantity: 6.
Description: Road Emergency Kit (triangle, fire ext., reflective vest);
Quantity: 64.
Description: Rain Tarp;
Quantity: 15.
Description: Washer and Dryer;
Quantity: 1.
Medical Equipment:
Description: Tactical Trauma Kit;
Quantity: 15.
Description: First Responder Kit;
Quantity: 120.
Description: Resuscitation Mannequin;
Quantity: 2.
Description: Litter, Non-Rigid Poleless;
Quantity: 20.
Description: Litter, Folding Rigid Aluminum Nylon;
Quantity: 8.
Description: Litter, Stand;
Quantity: 8.
Description: Litter, Straps;
Quantity: 6.
Description: First Aid Kits, small, individual, with case;
Quantity: 550.
Riot Gear:
Description: Riot Shield;
Quantity: 300.
Description: Riot Helmet;
Quantity: 300.
Description: Riot Gloves;
Quantity: 300.
Description: Knee Pads;
Quantity: 300.
Description: Elbow Pads;
Quantity: 300.
Description: Riot Control Gas Mask;
Quantity: 300.
Description: Gas Mask Cartridges (2 per person);
Quantity: 600.
Description: Riot Baton;
Quantity: 300.
Individual Equipment:
Description: Helmets, Level I;
Quantity: 550.
Description: Body Armor, Level II;
Quantity: 550.
Uniforms:
Description: PT Gear (shorts, shirt, track suit, shoes, socks);
Quantity: 550.
Description: Field Jacket;
Quantity: 550.
Description: Rain Suit;
Quantity: 550.
Description: Patch, Palestinian flag;
Quantity: 1,100.
Description: Patch, NSF;
Quantity: 1,100.
Description: Patch, Battalion;
Quantity: 1,100.
Description: Patch, eagle logo, on beret;
Quantity: 550.
Description: Boots;
Quantity: 1,100.
Description: Beret;
Quantity: 550.
Description: Ball cap, BDU;
Quantity: 550.
Description: Military sweater;
Quantity: 550.
Description: Coveralls;
Quantity: 20.
Description: Cold Weather Suit;
Quantity: 550.
Description: Undershirt, Cotton, Green (3 per person);
Quantity: 1,650.
Description: Undershirt, CW Green, POLYPRO;
Quantity: 550.
Description: Trousers, Green, 70% cotton (2 per person);
Quantity: 1,100.
Description: Shirt, Green with pockets, 70% cotton (2 per person);
Quantity: 1,100.
Description: Socks, black, 100% cotton (3 pairs per person);
Quantity: 1,650.
Description: Scarf, wool, knit;
Quantity: 550.
Description: Drawers, Olive drab, 100% cotton (3 per person);
Quantity: 1,650.
Description: Drawers, CW POLYPRO;
Quantity: 550.
Description: Cap, watch, black, fleece;
Quantity: 550.
Standard Issue:
Description: Sleeping bag;
Quantity: 550.
Description: Tactical Vest;
Quantity: 550.
Description: Canteens, with case;
Quantity: 550.
Description: Mission bag;
Quantity: 550.
Description: Tent, GP Medium;
Quantity: 20.
Description: Web belts;
Quantity: 1,050.
Description: Foam sleeping pad;
Quantity: 550.
Description: Poncho liner;
Quantity: 550.
Description: Bag, Duffle;
Quantity: 550.
Description: Bag, barracks (laundry);
Quantity: 550.
Description: Cup, canteen;
Quantity: 550.
Description: Towels;
Quantity: 1,050.
Description: Bag, waterproof;
Quantity: 550.
Description: Sheets;
Quantity: 1,000.
Source: USSC.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix IV: State Comments on Draft Report:
United States Department of State:
Chief Financial Officer:
Washington, D.C. 20520:
April 26, 2010:
Ms. Jacquelyn Williams-Bridgers:
Managing Director:
International Affairs and Trade:
Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20548-0001:
Dear Ms. Williams-Bridgers:
We appreciate the opportunity to review your draft report,
"Palestinian Authority: U.S. Assistance is Training and Equipping
Security Forces but the Program Needs to Measure Progress and Faces
Logistical Constraints," GAO Job Code 320683.
The enclosed Department of State comments are provided for
incorporation with this letter as an appendix to the final report.
If you have any questions concerning this response, please contact
Steve Peterson, Program Officer, Bureau of International Narcotics and
Law Enforcement Affairs at (202) 736-4376.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
James L. Millette:
cc: GAO ” David B. Gootnick:
INL ” David Johnson:
State/OIG ” Tracy Burnett:
[End of letter]
Department of State Comments on GAO Draft Report:
Palestinian Authority: U.S. Assistance is Training and Equipping
Security Forces but the Program Needs to Measure Progress and Faces
Logistical Constraints (GAO-10-505, GAO Code 320683):
Thank you for the opportunity to comment on your draft report entitled
"Palestinian Authority: U.S. Assistance is Training and Equipping
Security Forces but the Program Needs to Measure Progress and Faces
Logistical Constraints." Supporting the Palestinian development of the
Palestinian Authority's (PA) Security Forces in accordance with the
goals and objectives of the Roadmap for Peace supports the U.S.
Government's foreign policy and national security priorities. It is a
component in our overall effort to promote a two state solution where
the Palestinian State lives side by side in peace and security with
Israel. For this reason and in light of the foreign assistance funding
Congress has appropriated for the Palestinian Authority Security
Forces, we welcome the GAO's review of our programs and the
opportunity to improve upon our efforts.
The Department of State partially concurs with the recommendation of
the GAO report that the Secretary of State establish outcome-based
indicators and track them over time. More specifically, that State
should define specific program objectives and identify appropriate
outcome-based indicators that would demonstrate progress toward
achieving those objectives, and would enable it to, among other things
weigh the progress made in developing the security forces, civil
police, Ministry of Interior, and justice sectors. State includes
performance measures and indicators for its programs, but would agree
that they could be further refined. We appreciate the fact that the
report acknowledges several challenges, including the still early
stage of the program's development, its fluidity, and the complex
political and security environment.
State recognizes the need for such indicators and has tried to develop
ones that are meaningful at this stage of the program's development.
For instance, every year since this program became operational in
August 2007, we have included broad performance measures in the
Mission Strategic Plan. INL also factors performance measures into all
of its funding obligating documents: contracts with DynCorp
International and DPK, amended letters of agreement with the
Government of Jordan and the Palestinian Authority, and implementation
letters with the Palestinian Authority. We accept GAO's point,
however, that these measures should be more performance-based and now
that trained and equipped security force units are in place, we
anticipate developing meaningful security-related baseline data for
measuring the progress of these units. We have already started to do
this with our Jenin justice project, whereby the PA will be able to
generate comparative data on the number, speed, and success of the
cases they prosecute. In addition, INL is in the process of crafting a
new Letter of Agreement (LOA) with the Palestinian Authority that will
contain project goals, objectives, and milestones that reflect the
program's recent and anticipated future growth in size and complexity.
This LOA will replace the existing one that has been in effect since
2005, including several amendments.
We would like to caution, however, that as the report notes, there are
several factors we cannot control that influence progress toward the
most meaningful performance-based indicators. According to the
Roadmap, "comprehensive security performance" will be measured over
time by the redeployment of Palestinian security forces to areas
vacated by the Israeli Defense Forces. While security assistance
provided by the United States ” and other donors ” can strengthen the
capabilities of the Palestinian security forces to operate
increasingly in these areas, the Palestinian Authority will only be
able to do so if it and the Government of Israel agree on the
direction and pace of this deployment. Ultimately, such an agreement
depends on a range of political, economic, and social factors that
encompass more than just the enhanced law enforcement and security
capabilities our assistance gives the PA security forces.
[End of section]
Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
David Gootnick (202) 512-3149 or Gootnickd@gao.gov.
Staff Acknowledgments:
Cheryl Goodman, Assistant Director; B. Patrick Hickey; Michael
Maslowski; Jillena Roberts; Martin De Alteriis; Mary Moutsos; Reid L.
Lowe; and Joseph P. Carney made key contributions to this report.
Etana Finkler provided technical support.
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
The following GAO reports discuss how outcome-based performance
indicators can be developed and applied as a management best practice:
Human Trafficking: Monitoring and Evaluation of International Projects
are Limited, but Experts Suggest Improvements. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-1034] (Washington, D.C.: July 26,
2007).
Security Assistance: State and DOD Need to Assess How the Foreign
Military Financing Program for Egypt Achieves U.S. Foreign Policy and
Security Goals. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-437]
(Washington, D.C.: April 2006).
Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance and
Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-15] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21,
2005).
Results-Oriented Government: GPRA Has Established a Solid Foundation
for Achieving Greater Results. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-38] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 10,
2004).
The following GAO reports describe outcome-based performance
indicators as one of the characteristics of effective national
security strategy planning:
Rebuilding Iraq: More Comprehensive National Strategy Needed to Help
Achieve U.S. Goals. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-788] (Washington, D.C.: July 11,
2006).
Combating Terrorism: Evaluation of Selected Characteristics in
National Strategies Related to Terrorism. GAO-04-408T (Washington,
D.C.: Feb. 3, 2004).
The following reports describe outcome-based performance indicators as
a necessary component of campaign planning and execution:
Combating Terrorism: The United States Lacks Comprehensive Plan to
Destroy the Terrorist Threat and Close the Safe Haven in Pakistan's
Federally Administered Tribal Areas. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-622] (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 17,
2008).
Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq Progress Report: Some Gains
Made, Updated Strategy Needed. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-837] (Washington, D.C.: June 23,
2008).
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] "Performance-Based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution to
the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict," (UN Document S/2003/529, May 7,
2003). Among other things, this agreement obligated the Israelis and
Palestinians to undertake a series of coordinated steps to disengage
Israeli troops from areas in the Palestinian territories occupied
after the 2000 intifada (insurrection) and replace them with
consolidated and retrained PA security forces operating under the
direction of the PA Interior Minister.
[2] The Quartet is involved in mediating the peace process between the
State of Israel and the PA.
[3] GAO has described how such outcome-based performance indicators
can be developed and applied to program planning and management in a
number of reports. GAO has also reported that performance indicators
are one of the characteristics of effective U.S. national security
strategic planning and a necessary component of campaign plans created
to execute those strategies. See list of related GAO products at the
end of the report.
[4] The NSF is the largest uniformed service within the PASF. A
battalion is made up of approximately 500 troops.
[5] State plans to build a total of nine operations camps for the 10
planned NSF battalions; State expects the 10th battalion to be
deployed in other installations as a reserve force.
[6] State also allocated about $23 million for overhead items such as
program design costs and the security escorts and armored vehicles
State requires for U.S. government personnel to travel in the region.
[7] We have previously defined output measures as measures of an
agency's products or services; outcome measures demonstrate to an
external party whether the agency is achieving its intended results.
See Results-Oriented Government: GPRA Has Established a Solid
Foundation for Achieving Greater Results, GAO-04-38 (Washington, D.C.:
Mar. 10, 2004).
[8] Approval process and delivery delays also constrain the efforts by
other donors to provide the Presidential guard and NSF with light
weapons and other lethal equipment. PA officials said the security
forces lack weapons and that PA and international donor efforts to
transform the security sector would be significantly hampered if these
forces could not be fully armed.
[9] An additional 187,000 Israeli settlers live in the West Bank as of
2009.
[10] The Oslo Accord called for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from
parts of Gaza and the West Bank and the creation of the Palestinian
Interim Self-Government Authority.
[11] The first intifada refers to the Palestinian insurrection against
Israeli security forces in the West Bank and Gaza between 1987 and
1993.
[12] The Tenet work plan refers to the plan to implement a cease-fire
and restore security cooperation drawn up by then-Central Intelligence
Agency Director George Tenet. The PA and the Government of Israel
agreed to the work plan in June 2002.
[13] Hamas is a U.S. designated terrorist organization. Provisions in
U.S. annual appropriations have placed restrictions on funds being
provided to Hamas. The most recent provision placed restriction on
funds being provided to Hamas, a Hamas-controlled entity, or any power-
sharing government of which Hamas is a member, though assistance may
be provided to such a power-sharing government if the President
certifies that Hamas has taken certain steps such as publicly
acknowledging the Jewish state of Israel's right to exist, or for
national security reasons. See Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010,
Public Law No. 111-117, December 16, 2009. Likewise, U.S. law also
places restrictions on assistance to a Hamas-controlled Palestinian
Authority unless the President certifies that certain steps have been
met or for national security reasons. See 22 U.S.C. § 2378b.
[14] Fatah, the secular nationalist movement formerly led by Yasser
Arafat, has been the largest and dominant faction in the Palestine
Liberation Organization (PLO) since 1969. The PLO recognized the right
of Israel to exist in 1993. Since the establishment of the PA and
limited self-rule in 1994, Fatah has dominated the PA, except for the
period of Hamas participation during 2006 and 2007.
[15] USSC security assistance activities are conducted in conjunction
with a broader international effort to implement PA security-sector
reforms and develop government capacity. State, USAID, Canada, and
other international donors provide assistance for the PA justice and
penal systems, according to U.S. officials, while the European Union
advises and coordinates training and other assistance for the civil
police. The international community pledged $242 million at the June
2008 donor conference to support rule of law efforts and the
Palestinian Civil Police through fiscal year 2011. In particular, the
European Union's Police Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police
Support (EUPOL COPPS) is coordinating member nation efforts to
increase the capacity of the Palestinian Civil Police with equipment
donations and training support. Moreover, according to State
documents, the PA Ministry of the Interior reported 16 countries and
international organizations sponsored or conducted training sessions
for PASF personnel between late 2008 and early 2009.
[16] In January 2009, the President appointed a Special Envoy for
Middle East Peace who named the head of the USSC as his deputy for
security issues. In this role the USSC head is responsible for, among
other things, ensuring that U.S. security assistance efforts are
effective and fully integrated with other political and economic
efforts being undertaken by the U.S. government in support of the PA
and peace in the region. However, the USSC formally reports through
State's Near East and Asia Bureau.
[17] DOD limits the participation of U.S. military personnel in the
USSC to 16, according to State and DOD officials. The Canadian Forces'
Operation Proteus provides military officers in support of the USSC,
including mobile observation teams deployed to the West Bank. USSC
officials stated that Turkey also contributed military officers in
support of the USSC.
[18] The force of 23,000 personnel represents a significant decrease
from the 86,000 active and retired personnel on the PASF payroll in
early 2007, according to State sources.
[19] The PASF operates under the concept of policing primacy. This is
a metropolitan police concept from the United Kingdom, applied in the
West Bank by the European Union to define the PASF as a national-level
policing organization that has all of the capabilities, minus an army,
required to deliver law and order in accordance with Roadmap security
obligations for a new Palestinian state.
[20] The term "special battalion" distinguishes the new USSC-trained
and -equipped units from the older NSF units these new battalions are
replacing.
[21] The newly recruited battalions also receive preliminary training
in the West Bank prior to their arrival in Jordan.
[22] We have reported previously on the extent to which USAID vetting
procedures for its Palestinian aid program contractors complied with
its antiterrorism policies, and the extent to which State and UN
policies and procedures conform with U.S. statutory requirements that,
among other things, no Palestinian refugee who has engaged in any act
of terrorism receives funding. See GAO, Measures to Prevent
Inadvertent Payments to Terrorists under Palestinian Aid Programs Have
Been Strengthened, but Some Weaknesses Remain, GAO-09-622 (Washington,
D.C.: May 19, 2009).
[23] In fiscal year 2007, INL provided $4.6 million for this training.
While State budget documents note that the department allocated $2.5
million from its fiscal year 2010 budget for anti-terrorism
assistance, State officials noted that they intend to reprogram those
funds as they had no plans to conduct anti-terrorism activities with
the PA in 2010.
[24] USSC has also funded the participation of PASF officials at a
number of conferences and seminars in 2008 and 2009 on security and
terrorism issues at the George C. Marshall European Center for
Security Studies in Garmisch, Germany, and at the National Defense
University's Near East-South Asia Center in Washington, D.C.
[25] State expects the 10th battalion to be deployed in other
installations as a reserve force.
[26] The UN's Office for Project Services oversaw the initial
construction. State and PA officials said they replaced this office
with Palestinian contractors due to concerns about the quality of the
building construction. GAO previously reported that this UN office had
not assessed the effectiveness of management reforms undertaken to
address key concerns raised by various audits and investigations of
its operation. See UN Office for Project Services: Management Reforms
Proceeding but Effectiveness Not Assessed, and USAID's Oversight of
Grants Has Weaknesses, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-168] (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 19,
2009).
[27] The Justice Sector Assistance Program in Jenin is designed to
enhance the legitimacy and effectiveness of the PA justice sector. It
seeks to build on INL's previous assistance to the PASF by improving
the capacity of the Jenin justice sector, primarily the police and
public prosecution, to more effectively and transparently investigate
and prosecute cases.
[28] PA units initiated some security operations before they received
USSC assistance. For example, the PASF initiated an ongoing effort to
secure Nablus in November 2007, before the start of USSC-sponsored
training.
[29] While State officials agreed that there has been a decline in the
number of significant roadblocks, there is not a common agreement on
the number or the definition of what constitutes a significant
roadblock. Some officials stated they based this assessment on data
from the government of Israel indicating the number of such roadblocks
declined from 41 to 14, although the United Nations Office for
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) reports do not highlight
this particular decline. OCHA reported that the total number of
barriers (including staffed and unstaffed checkpoints, roadblocks, and
mobile or other temporary barriers) rose from 561 in October 2007 to
630 in September 2008, before decreasing to 578 by October 2009. The
number of staffed checkpoints (both within the West Bank and along the
security barricade separating it from Israel) decreased from 93 to 69
in the same period between September 2008 and October 2009.
[30] GAO defines performance measurement as the ongoing monitoring and
reporting of program accomplishments, particularly progress toward
preestablished goals, and is typically conducted by program or agency
management. Program measures or indicators may address, among others,
the direct products and services delivered by a program (outputs), or
the results of those products and services (outcomes). See GAO,
Performance Measurement and Evaluation, Definitions and Relationships,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-739SP] (Washington,
D.C.: May 2005).
[31] According to a former USSC official, the PA also decided to
increase the size of the NSF in part to compensate for perceived
shortfalls in civil police capabilities.
[32] For example, PA officials expressed concerns about their ability
to conduct effective counterterrorism efforts, and the USSC has
contemplated additional counterterrorism programs in the West Bank and
considered further developing specialized counterterrorism units to
conduct high-risk arrests and other specialized duties. However, an
Israeli official stated that his government is not in favor of the
counterterrorism courses proposed by the USSC. State noted a final
decision by the U.S. government on holding these courses had not yet
been made as of April 2010.
[33] For example, the Palestinian Reform and Development Plan (PRDP)
for 2008 through 2010, which set out basic, broad goals for Security
Sector Reforms, was only adopted in 2007. The more detailed Plan for
the Reorganization, Restructuring and Development of the Palestinian
Security Establishment proposed in 2008 to develop the broad
objectives set in the PRDP, may undergo further revision as a result
of a PASF strategic review undertaken in January 2010, according to
USSC officials.
[34] GAO described how such performance indicators can be developed
and applied in a number of reports, including Security Assistance:
State and DOD Need to Assess How the Foreign Military Financing
Program for Egypt Achieves U.S. Foreign Policy and Security Goals,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-437] (Washington, D.C.:
April 2006). See list of related GAO products at the end of the report.
[35] Previous GAO reports have noted that effective U.S. government
strategies encompass certain desirable characteristics, including
providing outcome-related performance measures that address priorities
and milestones for progress; identify risks; and assess plans to
integrate U.S., international, and host country efforts. For a full
description of these characteristics, see GAO, Rebuilding Iraq: More
Comprehensive National Strategy Needed to Help Achieve U.S. Goals,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-788] (Washington, D.C.:
July 11, 2006).
[36] See DOD, Joint Publication 5-0: Joint Operation Planning (Dec.
26, 2006); and GAO, Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq
Progress Report: Some Gains Made, Updated Strategy Needed, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-837] (Washington, D.C.: June 23,
2008).
[37] GAO has highlighted the importance of establishing specific
outcome-based performance measures in the development of national and
multinational strategies to combat terrorism. See the list of related
GAO products at the end of the report.
[38] While the mission strategic plan for fiscal year 2011 did set as
a target that NSF battalions be "fully equipped and housed" in fiscal
year 2010, USSC plans as of February 2010 do not reflect this as a
goal.
[39] USSC and INL officials noted that other factors have also delayed
the approval and delivery of equipment, including the lead times
needed to redress shortfalls in manufacturers' stocks, the time needed
to identify foreign vendors and obtain waivers for orders placed for
items not available in the United States, and the limited availability
of ships that meet program requirements that they be U.S.-flagged
carriers and in compliance with Israeli port restrictions (e.g.,
prohibitions on the docking of ships that have visited certain Arab
ports 6 months prior to arrival in Israel).
[40] An Israeli government official stated that the radios were
impounded to insure their transmission frequencies do not interfere
with Israeli or Jordanian frequencies. State noted that the radios
remained impounded as of March 2010, even though the radios will be
programmed to Government of Israel approved frequencies.
[41] State noted in some cases Israeli customs inspectors impounded
approved shipments of equipment to verify whether or not some approved
items were missing from the shipment.
[42] Efforts by other donors to provide the PG and NSF with light
weapons and other lethal equipment have similarly been constrained by
the approval process and delivery delays. For example, a USSC official
noted a shipment of 1,000 AK-47 rifles approved by the Israeli
government had been detained in customs. PA officials said the
security forces lack weapons and that PA and international donor
efforts to transform the security sector would be significantly
hampered if these forces could not be fully armed. An Israeli Ministry
of Defense official disputed this assertion, contending that the PASF
had sufficient weapons.
[43] The Palestinian Reform and Development Plan of 2008 - 2010
created a justice-sector program, "Justice Now," which focuses on
elements such as justice-sector infrastructure and capacity
development.
[44] For example, according to a USSC report, the physical separation
between the elements of the criminal justice sector in Jenin may form
an obstacle to personal and professional cooperation, and impedes the
ability of external actors to effectively monitor or assist criminal
justice-sector reform.
[45] The Palestinian Legislative Council's term expired in January
2010 and no elections have yet been held to replace it. According to
State officials, elections for both the President of the PA and the
Legislative Council await resolution of issues concerning the scope
and conduct of the elections and the eligibility of voters in Hamas-
controlled Gaza to participate.
[End of section]
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