Wildland Fires
Better Information Needed on Effectiveness of Emergency Stabilization and Rehabilitation Treatments Gao ID: GAO-03-430 April 4, 2003Wildfires burn millions of acres annually. Most burnt land can recover naturally, but a small percentage needs short-term emergency treatment to stabilize burnt land that threatens public safety, property, or ecosystems or longer-term treatments to rehabilitate land unlikely to recover naturally. The Department of the Interior (Interior) and the Department of Agriculture's (USDA's) Forest Service--the two departments that manage most federal land--spend millions of dollars annually on such treatments. GAO was asked to (1) describe the two departments' processes for implementing their programs, (2) identify the costs and types of treatments implemented, and (3) determine whether these treatments are effective.
Both Interior and USDA's Forest Service use multidisciplinary teams of experts, such as ecologists and soil scientists, to assess damage and potential risks burnt land poses and to develop emergency stabilization and rehabilitation plans that identify needed treatments to reduce or eliminate those risks. The two departments differ in how they manage their programs, however. Interior uses a single process to assess damage and identify treatments for short-term emergency stabilization and longer-term rehabilitation, while USDA's Forest Service uses different processes for each of these two treatment types. The two departments recognize these differences and recently agreed to work toward standardizing certain aspects of their programs, such as definitions and time frames. Following the 2000 and 2001 fires, the Forest Service obligated $192 million and Interior $118 million for 421 emergency stabilization and rehabilitation treatment plans GAO reviewed. Treatments included seeding; fencing; installing soil erosion barriers such as straw bundles, or wattles; and road or trail work. Most of Interior's land--managed by the Bureau of Land Management--consists of rangeland. Thus, the bureau primarily seeded native grasses to retain soils and forage for cattle and wildlife and fenced to prevent grazing. Forest Service land is often steeply sloped and includes watersheds used for drinking water and timber. The Forest Service primarily seeded fast-growing grasses and built soil erosion barriers for emergency stabilization, and worked on roads, trails and reforested for rehabilitation. Neither the departments nor GAO could determine whether emergency stabilization and rehabilitation treatments were achieving their intended results. The departments require that treatments be monitored, but they do not specify how and the type of data to collect or analyze for determining effectiveness. The departments have stressed the need to systematically collect and share monitoring data for treatment decisions. Yet neither has developed a national interagency system to do so. Therefore, the nature and extent of data collection, analysis, and sharing vary widely. The departments recognize that they need better information on treatment effectiveness. However, they have not yet committed to this effort.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-03-430, Wildland Fires: Better Information Needed on Effectiveness of Emergency Stabilization and Rehabilitation Treatments
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Report to Congressional Requesters:
April 2003:
Wildland Fires:
Better Information Needed on Effectiveness of Emergency Stabilization
and Rehabilitation Treatments:
GAO-03-430:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Processes Differ between the Departments for Assessing the Need to
Treat Burnt Lands and Approving Treatment Plans:
Rehabilitation Plans Vary Widely in Cost and in the Number and Types of
Treatments:
Interior and the Forest Service Cannot Determine Overall Treatment
Effectiveness:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendixes:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments from the Departments of the Interior and
Agriculture:
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: Amount of Funding and Number of Plans Approved, by State Where
Wildland Fire Occurred, 2000 and 2001:
Table 2: Number and Percent of Plans in Different Cost Ranges and Total
Costs and Percentage of Total Costs within Those Ranges, 2000 and 2001:
Table 3: Number and Cost of Emergency Stabilization and Rehabilitation
Plans Approved by Interior, 2000 and 2001:
Table 4: Costs of Different Interior Emergency Stabilization and
Rehabilitation Treatments, 2000 and 2001:
Table 5: Costs of Different Forest Service Emergency Stabilization and
Rehabilitation Treatments, 2000 and 2001:
Figures:
Figure 1: Rangeland Drill Seeding in Idaho:
Figure 2: Burnt BLM Lands Needing Fencing to Exclude Grazing:
Figure 3: Burnt and Unburnt Flammable Noxious or Invasive Weeds:
Figure 4: Straw Wattles Used to Help Retain Soils and Reduce Erosion:
Figure 5: Mulching Used to Stabilize Soils:
Figure 6: Upgraded Culvert to Withstand Increased Storm Runoff:
Abbreviations:
BLM: Bureau of Land Management:
USDA: U.S. Department of Agriculture:
Letter April 4, 2003:
The Honorable Bob Goodlatte
Chairman, Committee on Agriculture
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Gil Gutknecht
Chairman, Subcommittee on Department Operations,
Oversight, Nutrition, and Forestry
Committee on Agriculture
House of Representatives:
In 2002--the second largest fire season in the past 50 years--wildland
fires burned almost 7 million acres and destroyed timber, natural
vegetation, habitat for wildlife, homes, and commercial businesses.
Wildland fire is a natural occurrence and millions of acres burn
annually. Some ecosystems rely on such fires to maintain their health,
but unnatural fuel conditions have increased the severity and extent of
some wildfires and, in some instances, the burnt landscape that remains
after a catastrophic fire can threaten human safety, property, and the
ecosystem. Rainstorms that pelt scorched and highly erosive soils can
cause rock and mud slides in watersheds and ultimately contaminate
municipal water supplies. In areas of steep terrain, sedimentary runoff
can bury homes, destroy roads, and clog streams. Wildland fires can
also create postfire environments that are ideal for the growth of
noxious or invasive weeds. If these weeds replace native plant species,
threatened or endangered animals can lose their habitat.
When burnt lands threaten human health and safety, property, and
ecosystems, treatment measures, such as seeding, may be undertaken to
stabilize soils and mitigate these risks. According to Department of
the Interior (Interior) and U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA's)
Forest Service data, only a small percentage of the many wildland fires
that occur each year require such treatment. Specifically, of the
roughly 39,000 wildfires that occurred in 2000 and 2001 on lands
managed by Interior and the Forest Service, only about 600 required
treatment.
The USDA's Forest Service and Interior's Bureau of Indian Affairs, its
Bureau of Land Management (BLM), its Fish and Wildlife Service, and its
National Park Service are responsible for implementing programs to
manage wildland fire, including determining whether the burnt lands
require treatment. Within Interior, BLM is the largest land manager and
oversees about half of the lands the department manages. In Interior
agencies as well as in the Forest Service, local land units, such as
national forests or national parks, are responsible for treating burnt
lands that are not likely to recover on their own.
Interior and the Forest Service categorize postwildland fire treatments
as either emergency stabilization or rehabilitation. Emergency
stabilization treatments are those judged necessary to apply following
a wildland fire to stabilize a burnt area and hence, any further
damage; and protect valued resources, such as public health and safety.
These actions usually are taken within a relatively short period of
time following a wildfire, such as before the first storm event. On the
other hand, rehabilitation treatments occur when the damages are deemed
sufficiently severe that treatments for reestablishing habitat--such as
planting shrubs and trees--and repairing fire damages--such as
rebuilding burnt structures--when local land units judge them as being
necessary. Interior funds emergency stabilization and rehabilitation
treatments for up to 2 full growing seasons but no more than 3 years
following a wildfire. The Forest Service specifies that emergency
stabilization treatments generally be undertaken within the first 2
years following a wildfire, while rehabilitation treatments may be
initiated for up to 3 years following a fire.
In response to the catastrophic wildland fires of 2000, Interior and
USDA developed the National Fire Plan--a multibillion-dollar effort to
address the nation's wildland fire threats. In supporting this plan,
Congress targeted funds for treating burnt lands that were unlikely to
recover naturally from the effects of wildland fire. In fiscal years
2001 and 2002, USDA received a total of $205 million and Interior
received a total of $125 million for treating burnt lands.
You asked us to (1) describe Interior's and USDA's processes for
implementing their emergency stabilization and rehabilitation
programs, (2) identify the costs and types of treatments the
departments have implemented, and (3) determine whether these
treatments are effective. To answer these questions, we, among other
things, reviewed 421 plans that the departments developed for carrying
out emergency stabilization and rehabilitation treatments on lands
burned by about 590 wildland fires in calendar years 2000 and
2001.[Footnote 1] These plans represent about 90 percent of the plans
that the departments developed for treating the wildland fires that
occurred in 2000 and 2001. The plans identify the risks posed by these
fires, the need for and type of emergency stabilization or
rehabilitation treatments, estimated costs for those treatments, and
the intended treatment results. In addition, we gathered monitoring
data on up to 3, including some of the most expensive, treatments for
18 emergency stabilization and rehabilitation plans for fires that
occurred in 2000 to determine if and how the departments are monitoring
treatments, and whether treatments are effective. In total, the
treatments we reviewed accounted for about 30 percent of the funding
approved by the departments for treating the fires that occurred in
2000 and 2001. In addition, we reviewed departmental studies on
monitoring and treatment effectiveness. We conducted our review from
August 2001 through February 2003 in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards. (See app. I for details on our scope and
methodology.):
Results in Brief:
Interior's and USDA's processes for stabilizing and rehabilitating
severely burnt lands often start while a wildfire is still burning or
immediately after it has been contained. To determine the need for
emergency stabilization treatments, both Interior agencies and USDA's
Forest Service use multidisciplinary teams of experts, such as wildlife
biologists, ecologists, and soil scientists, who assess the extent of
damage and the potential risks the burnt lands pose to public health
and safety. However, Interior agencies and the Forest Service differ in
their approaches to assessing the need for, and approval of, the
longer-term rehabilitation of burnt lands. Interior uses the same
process for emergency stabilization and rehabilitation by concurrently
assessing both the need for and type of treatment after a wildland
fire; and funding for such treatments. In contrast, the Forest Service
uses a separate planning process and funding to identify and set
priorities for rehabilitation treatments, after much of the fire season
has ended. According to Interior officials, it is easier to administer
the program through one process. Forest Service officials said that the
agency has two separate processes. This is because emergency treatments
to stabilize burnt lands must be undertaken quickly and generally do
not have long-term consequences for land management, whereas
rehabilitation treatments can potentially have long-term consequences
and potentially involve a number of different Forest Service programs.
The departments are not required to develop a single process to
administer their emergency stabilization and rehabilitation programs,
although federal policy encourages the departments to standardize their
processes and procedures. To this end, in January 2003, the two
departments agreed to work towards standardizing certain aspects of
their programs, such as definitions and timeframes.
Following the calendar year 2000 and 2001 fires, Interior obligated
about $118 million, and USDA's Forest Service about $192 million, on
emergency stabilization and rehabilitation for the 421 wildland fire
plans we reviewed. The bulk of these funds--82 percent--were to treat
burnt lands in Idaho, Montana, Nevada, and New Mexico. These four
states experienced a relatively high percentage of the catastrophic
fires in 2000 and 2001 that required treatment. Most of the
departments' individual emergency stabilization and rehabilitation
plans called for spending less than $1 million for one or more
projects, but the plans varied widely in terms of the cost and scope of
work, ranging from about $2,000 to over $40 million. Most of the funds
were used to seed, reforest, and repair roads and trails. Although the
Forest Service and Interior agencies used similar treatments, they
varied in which treatments they used most frequently, primarily because
the lands they manage have different characteristics. For example, most
of Interior's land is managed by BLM. Because much of BLM's lands
consist of rangeland, including land that is arid and semi-arid, it
relies primarily on treatments such as seeding with native grasses to
retain soils and forage for cattle and wildlife, and fencing to prevent
grazing on burnt lands. In contrast, Forest Service land is often
steeply sloped and includes watersheds that are used as drinking water
sources and timber growth. As a result, the Forest Service relies
primarily on emergency treatments, such as stabilizing soils and slopes
by, for example, installing soil erosion barriers such as straw
bundles, or wattles, and seeding with fast-growing grasses; the Forest
Service's rehabilitation treatments include longer-term treatments
such as road and trail work and reforestation.
The departments do not, and we could not, determine the overall
effectiveness of emergency stabilization and rehabilitation treatments
because most land units do not routinely document monitoring results,
use comparable monitoring procedures, collect comparable data, or
report monitoring results to the agencies' regional or national
offices. Both departments either require or strongly encourage land
units to monitor for treatment effectiveness, but neither department
provides specific standardized guidance on how these units should
monitor. As a result, we found that local land units used different
monitoring methods, making it difficult to assess the effectiveness of
treatments. Three national forests treating similarly burnt slopes with
the same treatment--soil erosion barriers--illustrate this point. In
one forest, staff only visually observed the treated slopes; in another
the staff both visually observed and collected soil erosion data, which
they analyzed to assess treatment effectiveness; and in the third the
staff both visually observed and collected soil erosion data, which,
because of data limitations, they were unable to analyze to assess
treatment effectiveness. To judge whether soil erosion barriers were
effective, each forest developed its own standard for treatment
effectiveness. Because these national forests used different methods
and standards to assess and judge treatment effectiveness, we could not
draw overall conclusions about the effectiveness of erosion barriers in
protecting resources at risk at these three forests. In addition, even
when local land units collected data and made assessments of treatment
effectiveness, they had not generally shared results with other land
units or reported these results to the agencies' regional or national
offices. The departments' internal reviews noted similar concerns about
differences in monitoring procedures, the quality of monitoring data,
the inability to assess the effectiveness of treatments, and the lack
of data analysis and dissemination. The departments recognize the need
for improved monitoring and data dissemination, but a lack of priority
and concern about the extent of work that could be required to
accomplish this has resulted in little effort being spent to address
these issues. Consequently, the departments can neither compile nor
verify the accuracy of monitoring results to determine overall
treatment effectiveness or lessons learned.
To better judge the effectiveness of emergency stabilization and
rehabilitation treatments in accomplishing their intended purposes and
to benefit from lessons learned, we are recommending that the
Secretaries of Agriculture and of the Interior specify the monitoring
data that local land units should gather and require their agencies to
collect, analyze, and disseminate the results of these data.
In responding to a draft of this report, the departments generally
agreed with our recommendations and acknowledged that more needs to be
done to ensure that funds for emergency stabilization and
rehabilitation treatments on burnt lands are used as effectively as
possible. The departments provided us with some examples on how they
have tried or are trying to obtain and share better data on treatment
effectiveness. For the most part, these examples are either (1)
individual agency actions, as opposed to interagency or
interdepartmental collaborative efforts, or (2) not extensive enough to
ensure that sufficient data are routinely collected, analyzed, and
disseminated.
Background:
Recent fire seasons have shown that past fire suppression policies have
not worked as effectively as was once thought. In fact, they have had
major unintended consequences, particularly on federally owned lands.
For decades, the federal wildland fire community followed a policy of
suppressing all wildland fires as soon as possible. As a result, over
the years, brush, small trees, and other vegetation accumulated that
can fuel fires and cause them to spread more rapidly. This combination
of accumulated underbrush and rapidly spreading fires heighten the
potential for fires to become catastrophic. The buildup of excessive
underbrush is not the only cause of catastrophic wildfires, however.
The weather phenomenon known as La Nina, characterized by unusually
cold Pacific ocean temperatures, changed normal weather patterns when
it formed in 1998. It caused severe, long-lasting drought across much
of the country, drying out forests and rangelands. This drought is
cited by some as one of the major causes for the 2002 catastrophic
wildland fires, which nearly surpassed those of 2000.
BLM, the Fish and Wildlife Service, the National Park Service, and the
Forest Service manage about 700 million acres, or 96 percent of all
federal lands. In addition, Interior's Bureau of Indian Affairs manages
another 55 million acres. Most federal lands in the 48 contiguous
United States are located in 11 western states, many of which have seen
a dramatic surge in population over the last two decades, complicating
the management of wildland fires. New development is occurring in fire-
prone areas, often adjacent to federal lands, and creating a wildland-
urban interface--an area where structures and other human development
meet or intermingle with undeveloped wildland. This relatively new
phenomenon means that more communities and structures are threatened by
wildland fire and of potential postfire effects, including increased
erosion and flooding.
Interior agencies and the Forest Service have undertaken postwildfire
measures aimed at reducing potential postfire effects for several
years. Since the early 1960s, BLM has had a program to curb damages
often associated with wildfires--soil erosion and potential changes in
vegetation. Similarly, the Forest Service has implemented postfire
measures, such as seeding, since the 1930s. According to a Forest
Service analysis of such measures implemented between 1973 and 1998 in
the western United States, more than $110 million, in total, has been
spent on treating burnt lands.[Footnote 2] Furthermore, postfire
expenditures have increased substantially, especially during the 1990s,
as the number of Forest Service acres that burn annually increased and
as the Forest Service used treatments more extensively. This finding is
consistent with Interior's analysis of emergency stabilization fire
treatments on BLM lands.[Footnote 3] Similarly, according to Fish and
Wildlife Service officials, even though it has undertaken postwildfire
measures for several years, its policy on what measures are appropriate
has evolved from measures aimed primarily at "keeping the soil in
place" to those having additional functions such as combating invasive
or noxious weeds or plants.
Responding in the aftermath of the disastrous 1994 fire season, when
several lives were lost, Interior, the Forest Service, and other
federal agencies undertook an extensive interagency review and revision
of federal fire management policies.[Footnote 4] The resulting 1995
Federal Wildland Fire Policy and Program Review proposed a set of
uniform federal policies to enhance effective and efficient operations
across administrative boundaries and improve the agencies' capabilities
to meet challenges posed by wildland fire conditions.[Footnote 5]
Large-scale wildfires continued to burn throughout the United States,
with severe fire seasons in 1996, 1999, and 2000. Following the 2000
wildland fires, the administration asked USDA and Interior to recommend
how best to respond to the 2000 fires and how to reduce the impacts of
such fires in the future. The resulting report--the National Fire Plan-
-recommended increased funding for several key activities, such as
suppressing wildland fires and reducing the buildup of unwanted
hazardous fuels. The report also recommended expanded efforts to
restore burnt lands because some of the fires burned with such
intensity that they drastically changed ecosystems, and, without
intervention, these ecosystems would recover slowly. The report
recognized two key aspects of treatment activities: short-term
treatments to remove hazards and stabilize soils and slopes, such as
constructing dams to hold soil on slopes, and longer-term treatments to
repair or improve lands unlikely to recover naturally from severe fire
damage by, for example, reforesting desired tree species. To set
priorities, restoration was to be undertaken on burnt lands that could
affect:
* public health and safety, as in the case of lands used as sources for
domestic water supplies--that is, municipal watersheds;
* unique natural and cultural resources, such as salmon and bull trout
habitat, and burnt land susceptible to the introduction of nonnative
invasive species; and:
* other environmentally sensitive areas where economic hardship may
result from a lack of reinvestment in restoring damaged land, such as
land used for recreation and tourism.
To fund the National Fire Plan, Congress appropriated $2.9 billion for
the two departments' fiscal year 2001 wildland fire needs--an increase
of $1.4 billion over the departments' prior year funding of $1.5
billion. Of the $2.9 billion appropriated in 2001, $227 million was to
be used for treating burnt lands. For fiscal year 2002 wildland fire
needs, Congress appropriated $2.3 billion for the two departments and
specified that $103 million was to be used for treating burnt lands. To
carry out national fire plan goals and objectives, including those for
treating burnt lands, Interior and the Forest Service have each
designated national fire plan coordinators. To achieve more consistent
and coordinated efforts in implementing the Federal Wildland Fire
Policy and the National Fire Plan, and in response to a recommendation
made by the National Academy of Public Administration,[Footnote 6] the
Secretaries of Agriculture and of the Interior established a Wildland
Fire Leadership Council in April 2002. Comprised of members of both
departments, the council is charged with, among other things,
coordinating efforts to restore ecosystem health and monitoring
performance.
Within the agencies of Interior and the Forest Service, wildland fire
activities are largely carried out by local land units. Within
Interior, BLM's local land units include district or field offices; the
Fish and Wildlife Service's and the National Park Service's local land
units consist of facilities, refuges, or parks; and the Bureau of
Indian Affairs' local land units consist of agencies. The Forest
Service's local land units consist of national forests and grasslands.
BLM's state offices oversee the local land units, while the Bureau of
Indian Affairs, Fish and Wildlife Service, National Park Service, and
Forest Service regional offices oversee local land units.
Processes Differ between the Departments for Assessing the Need to
Treat Burnt Lands and Approving Treatment Plans:
Interior and USDA have different policies and procedures to assess
whether burnt lands need to receive any short-term or longer-term
treatments following wildland fire. Interior has one overall policy and
procedure for its four land management agencies to determine the need
for both short-and longer-term treatments. USDA's Forest Service has
separate policies and procedures for assessing the need for short-term
emergency stabilization treatments immediately following a wildland
fire and for longer-term nonemergency treatments for rehabilitating
burnt lands. Interior and the Forest Service have attempted to adopt
the same policies and procedures for treating burnt lands, even though
the National Fire Plan does not require them to do so and recently
agreed to work towards standardizing certain aspects of their programs.
Interior Has a Single Process to Identify Both Emergency Stabilization
and Rehabilitation Treatments:
Under Interior's policy and procedure for implementing its emergency
stabilization and rehabilitation program to treat burnt lands, its
agencies are to take four key steps. The agencies are to (1) assess
burnt lands to determine whether treatments should be taken to
stabilize or rehabilitate them, (2) identify treatments when actions
are considered necessary,
(3) approve and fund necessary treatments, and (4) implement treatments
once funding is available.
Local land unit managers are responsible for having burnt lands
assessed to determine whether stabilization or rehabilitation is
needed. Interior recommends that these managers start the process
before a fire is contained in order to identify any emerging issues,
conduct a preliminary risk analysis, and ensure a smooth transition
from fire suppression to emergency stabilization and rehabilitation.
Local land unit managers decide whether an intensive assessment of the
burnt lands is warranted. In most cases, these managers decide that no
such assessment is needed because they believe that the burnt lands
pose no risk and that the lands will recover on their own within a
relatively short period.
If local land unit managers decide that an intensive assessment is
warranted, they assemble an interdisciplinary teams from the local land
units to assess the burnt lands and where appropriate, propose
treatment. The team's composition varies according to the complexity of
the fire and availability of personnel with different skills and
backgrounds. In general, Interior's interagency guidance recommends
that teams comprised of staff specializing in, for example, wildlife,
ecology, rangeland, soils, and watersheds. The guidance also suggests
that managers include expertise from cooperating agencies' offices,
especially when needed skills are not available within the local
office. The agencies can also have available state or regional staff
assist local teams. While the teams are comprised of agency officials,
they can and do consult, as needed, with other organizations and
individuals, including those from local communities.
In some instances, wildland fires may encompass multiple agencies'
lands, result in burnt conditions that are beyond the capability of the
local staff to assess, or place many valued resources at risk. In these
situations, the local land unit manager can ask Interior to deploy one
of two interagency teams to assess large, multijurisdictional wildland
fires. Interior's national wildland fire management office must approve
any request for assistance. These teams include specialists from each
of the affected agencies and represent a wide variety of skills. In
2000 and 2001, these multiagency teams were deployed eight times to
assess fires we included in our review.
Both local and multiagency teams evaluate whether and what kinds of
treatments are needed. They review any applicable land or resource
management plans for the affected land management units to ensure that
any recommended treatment action will be compatible with these
plans.[Footnote 7] The teams also review other available data that may
help identify resources at risk, including data on cultural resources;
threatened and endangered species; vegetation inventories, including
information on invasive species; and soil types.
Upon completing their field inspections, teams brief local land unit
managers on whether and what type of treatments may be appropriate. If
the local land unit managers decide to proceed with treatment, they
direct the team to prepare a treatment plan, which includes, among
other things, a summary of activities and costs. In developing these
plans, the team must consider the requirements of the National
Environmental Policy Act and any other relevant statutes.[Footnote 8]
In general, a team requires about 2 to 3 weeks to review the necessary
land and resource management plan, data associated with the wildland
fire, and any other data that may identify resources at risk; conduct
the site inspection; and prepare the treatment plan.
While Interior has a single process and uses the same funds and plans
to identify both emergency stabilization and rehabilitation treatments,
it recognizes that the treatments are intended for different purposes.
Emergency stabilization treatments include those to (1) stabilize and
prevent unacceptable degradation to natural or cultural resources, (2)
minimize threats to life or property, or (3) repair, replace, or
construct improvements to prevent land or resource degradation.
Rehabilitation treatments include those to repair or improve lands
unlikely to recover naturally. While Interior's guidance indicates that
plans are to identify treatments undertaken for emergency stabilization
purposes as opposed to rehabilitation, our review of Interior's
emergency stabilization and rehabilitation plans for calendar year 2000
and 2001 fires indicates that they do not always make such a
distinction. Interior's guidance also states that both emergency
stabilization and rehabilitation treatments are to be designed to be
cost-effective and to meet treatment objectives.
The agencies differ in how quickly they require that treatment plans be
completed--from 5 days to 1 month. Once the treatment plan is
completed, the Interior agencies must approve it, usually within 1 to 2
weeks. The agencies' processes for approval vary, depending upon the
cost of the treatment. For example, BLM has delegated approval
authority for plans of less than $100,000 to its state offices, while
its national office must approve plans of $100,000 or more. In
contrast, the National Park Service does not delegate any approval
authority to its local land management units; its regional offices
approve plans of less than $300,000, while its national office approves
plans of $300,000 or more. When a treatment plan and funding is
approved, the local land unit officials are generally responsible for
having the treatments specified in the plan implemented. Interior
requires that treatments be implemented within 3 years.
The Forest Service Has Different Processes to Identify Emergency
Stabilization and Rehabilitation Treatments:
The Forest Service distinguishes between short-term emergency
treatments to stabilize lands burnt by wildland fires and longer-term
rehabilitation treatments. Its process for short-term treatments is
similar to Interior's. Under this process, local land units are
responsible for assembling interdisciplinary teams of agency officials
to survey fires that are 300 acres or larger to determine if emergency
conditions exist and if so, whether treatments are needed. Forest
Service teams can also consult with other agencies and individuals, as
necessary. The Forest Service does not have a national team to assess
large, multijurisdictional fires. However, Forest Service staff are
members of Interior's interagency teams and these teams have assessed
fires on National Forest System lands. The Forest Service's
rehabilitation process, however, differs from Interior's.
Emergency Stabilization:
Under the Forest Service's emergency stabilization process, local land
units are to undertake only those treatments necessary to alleviate
emergency conditions following wildfire. These treatments include those
necessary to protect life and property and to prevent additional damage
to resources. The Forest Service directs that treatments be undertaken
only when an analysis of risks shows that planned actions are likely to
reduce risks significantly and are cost-effective. Further, because the
Forest Service funds emergency stabilization with emergency wildland
fire funding, to qualify for funding the Forest Service requires that
treatment measures provide essential and proven protection at minimum
cost. According to Forest Service officials, because the treatments are
considered as emergency actions, the Forest Service does not complete
environmental impact statements.[Footnote 9] In keeping with the
emergency status of these treatments, the Forest Service requires that
plans be developed and approved within 10 to 13 days following total
containment of the wildland fire. Delegated approval authorities vary
by Forest Service region. Certain regions, with a history of more
frequent and larger fires, have higher approval authorities than other
regions. For example, the Forest Service's Pacific Southwest and
Pacific Northwest regions (regions 5 and 6, respectively), which
generally have most of the catastrophic wildfires, could approve plans
costing up to $200,000 in 2000, while the Southern and Eastern regions
(regions 8 and 9, respectively), where large, catastrophic fires are
rare, were delegated no approval authority. Forest Service headquarters
must approve plans exceeding regional delegated levels of approval
authority. As with the Interior agencies, once an emergency
stabilization plan is approved, the local land unit officials implement
the plan. The Forest Service generally requires that treatments be
implemented within the first year, but provides for funding to maintain
or install additional treatments the next year.
Longer-Term Rehabilitation:
While the Forest Service's short-term process for emergency
stabilization is similar to Interior's, its longer-term rehabilitation
process is not. According to Forest Service officials, the agency
developed a different process for undertaking longer-term treatment on
burnt lands when the National Fire Plan was being developed and
Congress was considering appropriating additional funds to the Forest
Service for restoring damaged lands. Before the National Fire Plan, the
Forest Service spent little money on rehabilitation because it did not
receive appropriations specifically for such an effort. Once the agency
realized that additional funding would be available through the
National Fire Plan, it began planning a separate rehabilitation
process. According to Forest Service officials, the agency decided to
have two separate processes because emergency treatments to stabilize
burnt lands are funded with emergency funding and must be undertaken
quickly. Further, such treatments generally do not have long-term
consequences for land management, whereas rehabilitation treatments can
potentially have long-term consequences, which may require an
environmental assessment,[Footnote 10] and involve a number of
different Forest Service programs.
In October 2000, the Forest Service asked the regional foresters to
identify proposed rehabilitation projects that supported the National
Fire Plan. In accordance with that plan, the Forest Service's national
fire plan coordinator gave primary responsibility to the regions for
implementing the rehabilitation program. The coordinator instructed the
regions to focus rehabilitation efforts on restoring watershed
conditions, including protecting basic soil, water resources, and
habitat for various native species such as plants and animals. Projects
were envisioned to be those long-term efforts to rehabilitate or
improve lands unlikely to recover naturally from wildland damage, or to
repair or replace minor facilities damaged by fire. The coordinator
also stressed the need for projects to be (1) consistent with long-term
goals and approved land use plans; (2) based on sound analyses of the
projects' potential consequences; (3) developed cooperatively with
other federal, state, or local jurisdictions when wildland fires
crossed their jurisdictional boundaries; (4) those that meet the basic
objective of protecting life, property, and unique or critical cultural
and natural resources; and (5) undertaken within the perimeter of the
burned area. Funding to the regions was allocated based on acres burned
and acres severely burned. The funding for such projects can be
available for up to 3 years.
Building on these instructions, the Forest Service regions developed
different processes to identify proposed rehabilitation projects, as
illustrated by the experiences of the Northern and Intermountain
regions, respectively (regions 1 and 4) and the Southwestern Region
(region 3). Regions 1 and 4--which encompass Idaho, Montana, Nevada,
North Dakota, Utah, and portions of South Dakota and Wyoming--were most
affected by catastrophic wildland fires in 2000.[Footnote 11] The two
regions jointly developed additional criteria to use in identifying and
reviewing rehabilitation projects for fires that occurred in 2000.
These criteria included whether the proposed project would:
* improve or protect water quality, or restore long-term watershed
functions;
* restore municipal watersheds;
* involve community partnerships;
* involve nonfederal partners;
* integrate several components in the project;
* restore threatened or endangered species habitat;
* protect public health and safety;
* improve infrastructure as a necessary step in completing the project;
* address noxious or invasive weeds as a component of the project;
* be emphasized by the regional forester; or:
* have visible accomplishments within the first year.
According to region 1 and 4 officials, the regions developed these
additional criteria for reviewing their forests' rehabilitation
proposals because Forest Service guidance was too general to assess and
set priorities for projects. These additional criteria allowed the two
regions to better compare proposals that the forests
submitted.[Footnote 12]
Region 3, which encompasses Arizona and New Mexico, and which was the
next region most affected by wildland fires in 2000, used a different
approach to identify and set priorities for projects.[Footnote 13]
According to the region 3 emergency stabilization and rehabilitation
program coordinator, while Congress was considering appropriating
additional funding for the National Fire Plan, the region assembled a
team to determine which fires were catastrophic in 2000 based on the
(1) value of the losses incurred as a result of the fire, (2)
capability to repair or restore the loss, and (3) potential cost to
repair or restore the loss. Given these criteria, region 3 considered
as catastrophic 5 of the 18 largest fires that occurred in 2000 and
eligible for rehabilitation projects.
Forest Service officials said that the agency and regions undertook
similar processes to identify rehabilitation projects in 2002. However,
the Forest Service did not distribute all of the $63 million
appropriated in fiscal year 2002 because it needed some of these funds
for wildfire suppression. The agency used some of this appropriation
for suppression because putting out fires is the agency's top
priority.[Footnote 14] According to the Forest Service national
rehabilitation program coordinator, the severe wildland fires in 2002
required the Forest Service to use $84 million in rehabilitation
funding--a portion of the $63 million appropriated in fiscal year 2002
and a portion of the $142 million appropriated in fiscal year 2001 but
not yet expended.
The Departments Are Working to Coordinate Their Processes for
Administering Treatments Even Though Their Missions and Types of Land
Differ:
As noted previously, prior to receiving additional funding under the
National Fire Plan, USDA's Forest Service largely limited its
postwildland fire treatments to emergency stabilization. However, in
1998, Interior and USDA initiated an effort to apply a consistent
approach for both emergency stabilization and longer-term
rehabilitation. This included an effort to develop an interagency
handbook that agencies in both departments could use. This effort was
undertaken, in part, in response to the 1995 Federal Wildland Fire
Policy, which recommended that agencies work toward standardizing their
policies and procedures. The Wildland Fire Leadership Council recently
addressed this effort, which was abandoned in 2002 because of
differences the agencies perceived in their missions, lands, and use of
resources.
According to Interior and Forest Service officials, they had worked to
integrate their different approaches, but discontinued this effort in
2002 because they decided that integration would be too difficult. The
difficulty arose because, according to these officials, their agencies
and the lands they manage are too dissimilar to have a consistent
approach for treating burnt lands. For example, BLM's emergency
stabilization and rehabilitation efforts focus on stabilizing soils and
ensuring a diversity of animal and plant species because its mission
emphasizes sustaining its lands for multiple uses. The National Park
Service's emergency stabilization and rehabilitation efforts focus on
naturally preserving the lands and resources for use by people. In
contrast, the Forest Service stated that, historically, its efforts
have focused on short-term stabilization treatments that are intended
to protect life and property and prevent additional resource damage
because its mission emphasizes protecting and improving forests and
preserving watersheds. With the advent of the National Fire Plan,
however, the Forest Service enlarged this focus to consider not only
watersheds but also longer-term treatments to improve lands unlikely to
recover naturally by, for example, planting trees or monitoring for and
treating noxious plants or weeds. Because of this emphasis and the
funding specifically authorized for rehabilitation, the Forest Service
established a separate process for these longer-term efforts. The
following illustrates the extent of the difference between Interior and
the Forest Service: Interior uses the same process, staff, and funds to
implement its emergency stabilization and rehabilitation program
because, according to Interior officials, it is easier to do so. The
Forest Service uses different processes, staff, and funds to implement
its emergency stabilization program and its rehabilitation program
because emergency stabilization has existed for about 25 years while it
considers rehabilitation as an expanded mission based on the National
Fire Plan appropriations language.[Footnote 15] The difference in how
the two departments fund emergency stabilization and rehabilitation
treatments resulted in the Office of Management and Budget directing
the Department of the Interior to identify nonemergency funding options
for its nonemergency treatments by March 2003.
Interior and Forest Service officials acknowledged that the Federal
Wildland Fire Policy encourages federal agencies to standardize
processes and procedures and said that their respective departments are
working together to better coordinate their programs. Even though the
Fire Policy and the National Fire Plan do not require that the
departments have the same processes for their respective programs or
that they be fully integrated, the Wildland Fire Leadership Council
addressed differences in the departments' emergency stabilization and
rehabilitation programs. In January 2003, the council decided that both
departments should have standard and uniform definitions, time frames,
and funding mechanisms for efforts they take under their respective
programs. According to the Forest Service's national emergency
stabilization program coordinator, the council's decision will result
in the two departments resuming their efforts to develop and adopt the
same interagency handbook for carrying out their emergency
stabilization and rehabilitation programs.
Rehabilitation Plans Vary Widely in Cost and in the Number and Types of
Treatments:
Following the calendar years 2000 and 2001 fires, Interior and USDA's
Forest Service approved 421 plans for stabilization and rehabilitation
treatments for an estimated total of more than $310 million. Nearly all
of the plans and costs were to treat fires that occurred in western
states. Within Interior, BLM accounted for the most plans--210 out of
266--and approved the bulk of Interior's funds--$88 million out of $118
million. The Forest Service accounted for the next largest number of
plans--155--and approved $192 million--$53 million for short-term
emergency stabilization and $139 million for longer-term
rehabilitation. While the two departments implemented the same types of
treatments on their lands following wildland fire, such as seeding, the
frequency with which they relied on these treatments varied, primarily
because of the types of lands they manage.
Emergency Stabilization and Rehabilitation Plans Were Concentrated in
Western States and the Cost of Treatment Varied:
As shown in table 1 for both Interior and the Forest Service, most
emergency stabilization and rehabilitation treatments occurred in
western states. Treatments occurred there primarily because much of the
lands Interior and the Forest Service manage are in these states.
Furthermore, during the summers of 2000 and 2001, states in the
intermountain west were especially hard hit by drought and persistently
dry conditions, which gave rise to two of the worst wildfire seasons in
the past 50 years.
Table 1: Amount of Funding and Number of Plans Approved, by State Where
Wildland Fire Occurred, 2000 and 2001:
Dollars in millions: State: Montana: Funding: $96.0; Percent of
total[A]: 30.9; Number of plans: 33; Percent of total: 7.8.
Dollars in millions: State: Idaho: Funding: 59.7; Percent of
total[A]: 19.2; Number of plans: 99; Percent of total: 23.5.
Dollars in millions: State: Nevada: Funding: 56.1; Percent of
total[A]: 18.1; Number of plans: 98; Percent of total: 23.3.
Dollars in millions: State: New Mexico: Funding: 42.9; Percent of
total[A]: 13.8; Number of plans: 26; Percent of total: 6.2.
Dollars in millions: State: Oregon: Funding: 15.7; Percent of
total[A]: 5.1; Number of plans: 40; Percent of total: 9.5.
Dollars in millions: State: Utah: Funding: 10.8; Percent of total[A]:
3.5; Number of plans: 49; Percent of total: 11.6.
Dollars in millions: State: Other: Funding: 29.0; Percent of
total[A]: 9.3; Number of plans: 76; Percent of total: 18.1.
Dollars in millions: State: Total: Funding: $310.2; Percent of
total[A]: 100.0; Number of plans: 421; Percent of total: 100.0.
Source: Forest Service and Interior.
Note: GAO analysis of Forest Service and Interior data.
[A] The sum of the numbers does not add to the total because of
rounding.
[End of table]
As table 1 shows, Montana and Idaho received more than 50 percent of
the stabilization and rehabilitation funding for the 2000 and 2001
fires. Montana, which received the largest allocation, proposed to use
almost half of its funds for longer-term rehabilitation treatments in
the Bitterroot National Forest.
According to the estimates provided in the stabilization and
rehabilitation plans, the costs to treat wildfires varied widely. About
56 percent ($174.3 million) of the estimated $310 million was
associated with only 18 of the 421 plans. Most of the plans (87
percent) estimated that treatment costs would be under $1 million and
the majority of those were less than $100,000. Table 2 shows the number
and percentage of plans that fall within various cost estimate ranges
and the total estimated costs and percentage within these ranges.
Table 2: Number and Percent of Plans in Different Cost Ranges and Total
Costs and Percentage of Total Costs within Those Ranges, 2000 and 2001:
Dollars in millions.
$10 million and over; Number of plans: 5; Percent of plans: 1.2:
Cost: $96.2; Percent of total cost: 31.0.
$4 million to $9.999 million; Number of plans: ; 13; Percent of plans:
3.1: Cost: 78.1; Percent of total cost: 25.2.
$2 million to $3.999 million; Number of plans: 14; Percent of plans:
3.3: Cost: 37.0; Percent of total cost: 11.9.
$1 million to $1.999 million; Number of plans: 22; Percent of plans:
5.2: Cost: 30.7; Percent of total cost: 9.9.
Under $1 million; Number of plans: 367; Percent of plans: 87.2: Cost:
68.1; Percent of total cost: 22.0.
Total; Number of plans: 421; Percent of plans: 100.0: Cost: $310.1;
Percent of total cost: 100.0.
Source: Forest Service and Interior.
Note: GAO analysis of Forest Service and Interior data.
[End of table]
The cost of individual emergency stabilization and rehabilitation
treatments ranged from about $2,000 to about $42 million. Cost
differences occurred primarily because of the number and type of
treatments included in the plan and the number of acres to be treated.
This is illustrated in the following examples:
* The most costly plan involved longer-term rehabilitation for the
Bitterroot National Forest in Montana. In this plan, the Forest Service
regional office included 5 different but almost simultaneous fires that
engulfed about 185,000 acres in 2000.[Footnote 16] This plan includes
planting trees, roadwork--including cleaning drainage structures,
restoring road surfacing, and taking roads out of service--and removing
dead and dying timber. The entire proposed cost of the plan is about
$42 million, which, according to Forest Service officials, would be
spent over a period of several years.
* One of the least costly plans--for the Lower Rio Grande Valley
National Wildlife Refuge in southern Texas--proposed spending only
about $2,500. While the fire was relatively small and only grew to
about 10 acres, the tract was in an urban area, surrounded by many
homes and farms. Given the fire's location and the unique climate,
geology, vegetation, and wildlife of the site, the Fish and Wildlife
Service proposed to revegetate 5 of the burnt acres with native brush.
Interior's Bureau of Land Management Used the Most Treatments,
Primarily for Restoring Forage Used for Grazing and Wildlife Habitat:
Interior's 4 agencies approved 266 plans, costing about $118.5 million.
Of the four agencies, BLM approved the largest number of plans and had
the largest share of total costs. Table 3 provides information on the
number and cost of plans approved by Interior's agencies in 2000 and
2001.
Table 3: Number and Cost of Emergency Stabilization and Rehabilitation
Plans Approved by Interior, 2000 and 2001:
Dollars in millions.
BLM: Number of plans: 210; Dollars in millions:
Percent of plans: 78.9; : Cost: $87.9; Dollars in
millions: Percent of cost: 74.2.
Bureau of Indian Affairs; Number of plans: 26;
: Percent of plans: 9.8;
Cost: 17.6; Percent of cost: 14.9.
Fish and Wildlife Service; Number of plans: 17;
: Percent of plans: 6.4;
Cost: 8.7; Percent of cost: 7.3.
National Park Service; Number of plans: 13;
: Percent of plans: 4.9;
Cost: 4.3; Percent of cost: 3.6.
Total; Number of plans: 266;
Percent of plans: 100.0; Cost: $118.5; Percent of cost: 100.0.
Source: Interior.
Notes: GAO analysis of Interior data.
[End of table]
Interior's plans include both emergency stabilization and
rehabilitation treatments.
Most of the funds Interior approved were used for seeding and fencing,
primarily because most of the fires occurred on rangelands BLM manages
in Idaho, Nevada, and Utah. About $67.2 million, or 70 percent, of the
$96.1 million were for these two treatments. Table 4 provides data on
the treatments Interior used most frequently and the cost of these
treatments.
Table 4: Costs of Different Interior Emergency Stabilization and
Rehabilitation Treatments, 2000 and 2001:
[See PDF for image]
[End of table]
Of the four Interior agencies, BLM accounted for the largest share of
treatment costs and included some type of seeding as a treatment in
about 190, or 90 percent, of its 210 plans. Similarly, BLM accounted
for about $50 million of the $57.5 million that Interior approved for
seeding. Much of the lands managed by BLM consist of rangelands that
produce forage for wild and domestic animals, such as cattle and deer,
as well as many other forms of wildlife; its lands include grasslands
and deserts--both arid and semiarid land. Seeding was done to prevent
soil erosion and to restore forage used by cattle, mule deer, or elk;
habitat used by other species such as sage grouse; or reduce the
potential for the invasion of undesirable or noxious plants or weeds.
According to BLM officials, the method used to seed--whether by air or
by drilling--depends primarily on the terrain, soil, and seed or seed
mixture used. This is illustrated by the following examples:
* Aerial seeding. One of the largest seeding treatments occurred to
aerially seed about 40,000 acres in Nevada burned by the Twin Peaks
Fire in 2000, at a cost of $5.4 million. For seeding the entire burnt
area with a native seed mixture of wheat grasses, sagebrush, and
wildrye, the local office decided that aerially seeding would be the
most appropriate method. The seeded area was hilly to mountainous and
because of this, the use of a helicopter or fixed-wing aircraft was
proposed to spread seed across the burnt area. The seeding was intended
to reduce the invasion and establishment of undesirable or invasive
species of vegetation, particularly noxious weeds. In addition, the
seeding--if successful--would provide mule deer and livestock with
critical forage.
* Drilling. According to BLM officials, BLM frequently uses rangeland
drills to seed. For example, following the Flat Top, Coffee Point, and
Tin Cup wildfires, which burned about 117,000 acres of the Big Desert
in Idaho, BLM approved $1.5 million to drill and aerially seed the
burnt acreage. For seeding a mixture of wheatgrass, ricegrass,
needlegrass, wildrye, and rice hulls, the local office decided to use a
rangeland drill because the terrain was relatively flat and could be
easily drilled. According to BLM, if BLM had not seeded, the lack of
remaining seed could have impaired the land's recovery and, in the long
term, reduced species diversity and degraded habitat conditions for all
wildlife species that used the Big Desert. Figure 1 depicts BLM seeding
with a rangeland drill.
Figure 1: Rangeland Drill Seeding in Idaho:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Interior agencies also frequently repaired or installed fencing
following wildland fire, primarily to protect burnt rangelands from
cattle grazing to allow for regeneration. Under Interior policy, BLM
can exclude burnt lands from grazing that are recovering from wildfire
for a minimum of 2 years. Of Interior's 266 plans, 171 included fencing
at a cost of $9.7 million. Most of this cost--about $8.1 million--was
for fencing on BLM lands. This is illustrated by the following
examples:
* After the West Mona Fire burned more than 22,500 acres in Utah, BLM
approved a $1.7 million plan, which included about $241,000 to remove
about 28 miles of fencing that was destroyed by the fire, construct 34
miles of new protective fence, repair 11 miles of existing fence, and
install 6 cattleguards. The new fencing was to be installed after the
area was seeded. The fencing was to protect the burnt and seeded areas
from livestock grazing for 2 years.
* After the Abert Fire burned 10,000 acres in Oregon, BLM approved a
$61,000 plan that included about $10,500 for fencing. Much of the burnt
acreage, before the fire, consisted mainly of sagebrush and native
bunch grasses. BLM concluded that the majority of the burnt area
retained sufficient native seeds and plant material in the soil for it
to recover naturally. However, to help ensure natural vegetative
recovery, BLM concluded that the burnt area needed to be protected from
livestock grazing for at least 2 years.
Figure 2 shows BLM grazing lands that were burnt and will require new
fencing to exclude cattle.
Figure 2: Burnt BLM Lands Needing Fencing to Exclude Grazing:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Reforestation, while not frequently used, was fairly costly.
Reforestation was used in 24 of the 266 plans, for a cost of $6.6
million, or an average of about $275,000 per treatment. The only other
treatment that was comparable in cost was seeding, which averaged about
$248,000 per treatment. Reforestation was generally approved for
funding to control the spread of invasive species or to reduce wind and
water erosion. For example, the Fish and Wildlife Service developed a
$181,500 plan to treat the Ash Meadows National Wildlife Refuge in
Nevada following a fire that burned about 658 acres. The assessment
team recommended that staff from the local land unit collect seeds from
mesquite and ash trees, contract with nurseries to grow seedlings, and
plant seedlings and cuttings primarily to control the spread of
invasive species and reduce erosion.
In addition, the Bureau of Indian Affairs used reforestation to replace
commercial timber trees that were lost as a result of wildfires.
Beginning in 1998, the Bureau of Indian Affairs began to allow a
limited amount of this treatment to help ensure that Indian forest land
continued to be perpetually productive--a management objective
established by the National Indian Forest Resources Management Act.
According to bureau officials, catastrophic wildland fires can destroy
viable seed necessary for regrowth and the additional funding provided
by the National Fire Plan allowed the bureau to better meet
reforestation needs after such wildfires. For example, following the
Clear Creek Divide Fire in 2000 on the Salish and Kootenai Indian
Reservation, the bureau approved $2 million to collect ponderosa and
lodgepole pine and western larch tree seeds on the reservation, grow
2.5 million seedlings, and plant them on about 8,000 acres.
In conjunction with seeding and fencing, Interior agencies frequently
included monitoring burnt areas to see if noxious or invasive plants or
weeds had regenerated or moved into the area and treating them as
necessary. Of Interior's 266 plans, 166, or more than 60 percent,
included monitoring and/or treating noxious or invasive plants or weeds
as a treatment, for a total cost of $6.9 million. BLM accounted for
most of these treatments. According to BLM officials, noxious or
invasive weeds, particularly cheatgrass, are one of the factors that
has caused an increase in the number and size of wildland
fires.[Footnote 17] Such noxious or invasive weeds, which grow
vigorously in the early spring, can crowd out native grasses and,
during the arid summer months, can dry and provide excessive fine fuels
for wildland fires to spread over large expanses of land. Because fire
does not destroy some noxious or invasive plant seeds, the plants can
resprout and grow with even greater vigor following a wildland fire.
According to BLM officials, many local land units had completed the
necessary environmental assessments to use selected herbicides on
specified noxious or invasive weeds on its lands. As a result, the
local land units could include noxious or invasive weed treatments in
their emergency stabilization and rehabilitation plans. Figure 3 shows
dried, flammable noxious or invasive weeds prone to wildfire.
Figure 3: Burnt and Unburnt Flammable Noxious or Invasive Weeds:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Interior agencies also included cultural resource surveys in many plans
and treatments for known artifacts damaged or threatened by wildfire.
Over half of the plans included cultural resource surveys, for a total
of $5.2 million. Although cultural surveys are not treatments, but
activities, they were included as treatment costs. According to BLM,
which conducted many of these surveys, it routinely conducts cultural
surveys before conducting ground-disturbing activities that have the
potential to affect sites or objects that could be or are eligible for
the National Register of Historic Places. When BLM anticipated any
ground-disturbing treatment, such as rangeland drill seeding or
installing new fencing, it included cultural resource surveys.
Most Forest Service Funds Were Used for Rehabilitation:
Most of the funds the Forest Service approved for emergency
stabilization or rehabilitation were for longer-term rehabilitation. Of
the $192 million that the Forest Service approved, $139 million was for
longer-term rehabilitation while $53 million was for short-term
emergency stabilization. As noted previously, the Forest Service did
not use all of its fiscal year 2002 appropriation of $63 million on
longer-term rehabilitation because it needed to spend some of these
funds on suppressing wildfires.
Table 5 provides information on treatments and their costs in the
Forest Service's 113 emergency stabilization plans and its 42
rehabilitation plans.
Table 5: Costs of Different Forest Service Emergency Stabilization and
Rehabilitation Treatments, 2000 and 2001:
[See PDF for image]
[End of table]
According to Forest Service officials, for short-term emergency
stabilization, the agency relies on treatments that are intended to
reduce soil erosion in watersheds that have the greatest potential to
create further damage to people, property, or other valued resources if
the agency does not act before the first major storm event after a
wildfire. For example, some watersheds are used as sources of drinking
water supplies for municipalities. Because much of its lands are
steeply sloped, the agency relies on check dams, straw wattles (tubes
of straw wrapped in netting), and other similar structures, such as
logs, to retain soil, as well as seeding with fast-growing grasses. In
contrast, for longer-term rehabilitation, the agency repairs resource
damage caused by the fire through treatments, such as road or trail
work to reduce erosion in other watersheds, reforestation to replace
timber growth, and monitoring for or treating noxious or invasive
weeds.
As shown in table 5, for stabilization treatments, the agency approved
about 31.5 percent of its 2001 and 2002 funds for erosion treatments
such as building check dams with rocks, logs, or straw, which are then
placed in stream beds or in steeply sloped channels on hillsides in
order to slow runoff from storm events and help prevent soil erosion.
This runoff can consist of water, soil, rocks, branches, and trees. To
trap sediment, the Forest Service uses felled logs or log terraces
placed perpendicular to sloped hillsides. It may specify the use of
straw wattles placed perpendicular to slopes to trap sedimentation when
the number of logs is insufficient to trap erosion effectively. Straw
mulch or branches cut from trees may also be placed on slopes to retard
soil erosion. For example, following the Trail Creek Fire, which burned
about 32,000 acres on the Boise National Forest in Idaho, the Forest
Service approved an emergency stabilization plan that included about $3
million for straw wattles, $344,000 for cutting down burnt trees and
positioning them along slopes, $203,000 for mulch, and $203,000 for
straw bales and other soil erosion control structures. The Forest
Service plan included multiple soil erosion treatments because the
property at risk from soil erosion included homes, community centers,
and businesses. Figures 4 and 5 show slope stabilization treatments on
Forest Service lands, including straw wattles and mulch.
Figure 4: Straw Wattles Used to Help Retain Soils and Reduce Erosion:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Figure 5: Mulching Used to Stabilize Soils:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
As table 5 also shows, the Forest Service used more than 25 percent of
both its stabilization and rehabilitation funds for road and trail
treatments because, according to Forest Service officials, it has an
extensive network of roads and trails on its forests that required
treatment after the 2000 and 2001 fires. Road work includes installing
and enlarging culverts so that additional runoff anticipated from burnt
lands can pass under roadways, and regrading roads so that storm runoff
will be less likely to erode road surfaces. Similarly, trail work
includes regrading or repairing trails to reduce erosion and protect
public safety. If the roads or trails pose a public health or safety
risk, and if the treatments need to be implemented before a major storm
event occurs, then short-term stabilization funds are used. In
contrast, if the roads or trails do not pose a health or safety
concern, then the Forest Service uses longer-term rehabilitation funds.
For example, following the Bitterroot Complex of five fires or fire
complexes that burned about 185,000 Forest Service acres, the Forest
Service recommended about $4 million in emergency road and trail
treatments, to prevent damage by debris torrents and runoff. Treatments
included installing larger culverts, cleaning ditches and culverts,
recontouring roads, and repairing trails. If these treatments were not
taken, the Forest Service anticipated that (1) fish habitat could be
degraded and (2) private residences, a recreational development, and an
irrigation system that were downstream from the burnt area could be
harmed. In contrast, the rehabilitation plan included about $11 million
for road and trail treatments. This funding is for roadwork along 400
miles of roads within the areas that burned with moderate to high
intensity. Because vegetation no longer existed to stabilize road
surfaces and slopes, the Forest Service stated it needed to perform
work to reduce erosion from them. Similarly, 150 miles of trail were
located in intensely burnt areas, which rendered some trails unsafe.
Figure 6 shows a culvert installed to handle anticipated increased
storm runoff.
Figure 6: Upgraded Culvert to Withstand Increased Storm Runoff:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Seeding was another widely used stabilization treatment. This treatment
accounted for more than 25 percent of the stabilization costs for 2000
and 2001 fires. Seeding was generally used to reduce erosion and
thereby better protect watersheds. Forest Service plans included
treatments such as seeding with fast-growing grasses--such as barley
and winter wheat--that would be more likely to grow quickly or would be
less likely to compete with the longer-term recovery of natural
vegetation. For example, the Forest Service approved about $7 million
for the Cerro Grande Fire for seeding to help stabilize soils. The
assessment team concluded that natural regrowth of vegetation would be
too slow to prevent significant runoff and soil erosion. It recommended
grass seeding with annual ryegrass, barley, mountain brome, and slender
wheatgrass, to quickly restore vegetation and reduce soil erosion,
protect soil productivity, and reduce runoff.
Reforestation treatments were almost entirely done as a longer-term
rehabilitation treatment and accounted for about 25 percent of the
rehabilitation costs for the 2000 and 2001 wildfires. The Forest
Service uses reforestation treatments sparingly and restricts their use
as a stabilization treatment because (1) replanting commercial species
burned by wildfire is viewed as the responsibility of the forest
management program, as opposed to an emergency measure to be funded by
the wildland fire program, and (2) planting trees does not meet the
emergency stabilization objective of preventing additional damage to
resources. Rather, replanting trees is generally considered as
repairing resource damage caused by wildfire and therefore not a large
part of the rehabilitation program. In keeping with its interpretation
of the need to restrict emergency stabilization treatments as those
necessary to prevent additional resource damage, the Forest Service
generally restricts the use of reforestation to no more than $25,000
per treatment. However, once it received funding under the National
Fire Plan for longer-term rehabilitation, the Forest Service used this
funding to develop reforestation proposals for 21 national forests
burned by wildland fire.
Similarly, the percentage of funding the Forest Service used for
noxious or invasive weed monitoring or treatment varied depending on
whether the treatment was for emergency stabilization or
rehabilitation. According to Forest Service officials, noxious or
invasive weed monitoring or treatment is not generally viewed as an
emergency treatment. For example, the Forest Service proposed spending
$1.3 million for noxious or invasive weed monitoring or treatment as an
emergency stabilization measure; however, it proposed spending $25.1
million for such monitoring and treatment as a rehabilitation measure.
Similarly, in its rehabilitation plan for the Salmon Challis National
Forest in Idaho, the Forest Service proposed spending $9.5 million on
noxious or invasive weed treatments because of known infestations of
noxious weeds where several fires occurred in 2000. The weeds were
expected to spread rapidly through the burnt areas, especially where
fire suppression activities, such as bulldozing, exposed bare soils.
The Forest Service also proposed to conduct a National Environmental
Policy Act analysis for treating noxious or invasive weeds in another
portion of the forest that had also been burnt in 2000 and which had
not yet had an environmental analysis completed for such a treatment.
Interior and the Forest Service Cannot Determine Overall Treatment
Effectiveness:
Neither we nor the Forest Service or Interior know the overall
effectiveness of emergency stabilization and rehabilitation treatments
because local land units do not routinely document monitoring results,
collect comparable monitoring information, and disseminate the results
of their monitoring to other land units or to the agencies' regional or
national offices. As a result, it is difficult to compile information
from land units to make overall assessments about the extent to which
treatments are effective or about the conditions in which treatments
are most effective. Furthermore, the departments have not developed an
interagency system to collect, store, and disseminate monitoring
results. Consequently, it is difficult for agency officials to learn
from the results of treatments applied on other sites in order to most
efficiently and effectively protect resources at risk.
Lack of Comparable Monitoring Data at the Local Land Unit Makes It
Difficult to Comprehensively Assess Treatment Effectiveness:
As noted previously, both Interior and the USDA's Forest Service
require local land units to install treatments that are effective. In
addition, Interior requires, and the Forest Service strongly
encourages, local land units to monitor for treatment effectiveness.
However, neither department specifies how land units should conduct
such monitoring or how they should document monitoring results. Both
our and the departments' own internal reviews found that
inconsistencies in monitoring methods prevent a comprehensive
assessment of treatment effectiveness.
Local Land Units We Reviewed Do Not Use Comparable Methods to Monitor
and Document the Effectiveness of Identical Treatments:
To determine the methods local land units use to monitor and document
the effectiveness of their treatments, we reviewed 18 emergency
stabilization and rehabilitation plans that were implemented on 12
local land units--6 of Interior's and 6 of the Forest Service's. We
selected these 12 local land units because they obligated the most
funds for emergency stabilization and rehabilitation treatments within
their regions in 2000, the most recent year since the establishment of
the National Fire Plan in which local land units could have
accomplished significant monitoring at the time of our review.[Footnote
18] For each of the 18 plans, we reviewed up to 3 of the most costly
treatments, for a total of 48 treatments.[Footnote 19] These 48
treatments are not a representative sample of all emergency
stabilization and rehabilitation treatments implemented by the
departments, and therefore our findings cannot be projected. However,
the data do represent monitoring practices for a significant proportion
of departmental outlays for treatments, since the total cost of the
treatments we reviewed was $84 million, or 30 percent of the total
funds obligated by Interior and the Forest Service for emergency
stabilization and rehabilitation treatments undertaken for wildfires
that occurred in 2000 and 2001.
Local land units monitored all of the 48 treatments we reviewed, but
documented conclusions about treatment effectiveness for only half of
the 48 treatments. Land units monitored some treatments through visual
inspection alone and other treatments through both visual inspection
and data collection. For treatments that entail building or repairing
infrastructure--such as roadwork, trail repair, and fencing--local land
units typically monitored treatment effectiveness solely through visual
observation. Of the 19 such treatments, local land units visually
observed all and collected monitoring data for only 1. For example,
national forests often resurface roads and install drainage systems,
such as culverts, to prevent storm runoff from concentrating into
torrents, eroding road surfaces and depositing sediment into streams.
To monitor the effectiveness of such treatments, according to local
national forest officials, staff typically drive along repaired road
segments and visually observe road surfaces for gullies or other signs
of erosion. In contrast, for treatments designed to restore natural
conditions--such as seeding, reforestation, weed treatment, and erosion
barriers--staff often collect monitoring data, in addition to visually
observing treatment sites. Of the 30 such treatments, local land units
collected monitoring data on treatment effectiveness for 22 and
visually observed all 30. For example, one BLM district office used two
methods to monitor their seeding treatment: (1) they visually observed
the seeded acreage and estimated the proportion of the burnt area
covered by native plants, weeds, and bare soil; and (2) they collected
data on the most abundant plant species, precipitation levels, soil
types, and terrain within a selected number of small, delineated
sections within the seeded acreage. Local land units documented
conclusions about treatment effectiveness for 24 of the 48 treatments
we reviewed. In documenting these results, land units used a wide
variety of different formats, including summaries of visual
observations, tables of data analyses, and presentations for academic
conferences.
Even though the 12 local land units we reviewed generally monitored the
effectiveness of treatments, each used a different method to do so.
According to local land unit officials, departmental guidance does not
identify the methods they should use to visually inspect different
types of treatments, when they should collect and analyze monitoring
data, the types of data they should collect, or the techniques they
should use to collect and analyze monitoring data. In some instances,
local land unit officials said they used monitoring methods prescribed
for programs other than emergency stabilization and rehabilitation. For
example, on three national forests, Forest Service officials said that
they used monitoring methods specified by the agency's forestry, or
silviculture, program to monitor reforestation treatments. In another
instance, an interagency technical reference describes 12 procedures
for monitoring vegetation, but the departments do not indicate which of
these methods should be used to monitor the seeding applied to burnt
lands.
As a result of the lack of clarity, the 12 local land units differed
significantly in the methods they used to monitor the 30 treatments
designed to restore natural conditions. Of these 30 treatments, local
land units collected data to monitor the effectiveness of 22 of the
treatments, in addition to making visual observations, and relied
solely on visual observations to monitor the remaining 8 treatments.
Likewise, local land units monitored untreated sites for comparison
with treated sites in 17 instances, while they monitored just the
treated sites in the remaining 13 instances. Furthermore, in judging
whether a treatment was effective, local land units established
measurable standards of effectiveness for 9 of the 30 treatments and
relied purely on the knowledge of local land officials to make this
judgment for the other 21. As one local land unit official said, each
staff member has his or her "own definition of success." Overall, local
land unit officials judged most of the treatments as effective.
However, because local land units (1) collected different monitoring
data, (2) used different methods to collect monitoring data, and (3)
developed their own definitions of treatment effectiveness, the results
of monitoring treatments we reviewed for these 18 emergency
stabilization and rehabilitation plans cannot be compared to determine
if the treatments were effective.
For example, three national forests we reviewed spent more than $5
million to install erosion barriers on severely burnt slopes to protect
homes and streams from flooding and sedimentation after catastrophic
wildfires in 2000. Although all three forests installed the same
treatment to accomplish the same objective, the forests' monitoring
methods differed in the extent to which they collected monitoring data,
type of monitoring data they collected, methods used to collect and
analyze monitoring data, and standards for judging treatment success.
This situation is illustrated by the following examples:
* In one forest, local land unit officials observed treated slopes for
evidence of erosion but did not collect monitoring data or document
their findings. Because the officials observed that only small amounts
of sediment washed to the bottom of slopes after a rainstorm, they
concluded that the treatments had been effective. Without collecting
monitoring data, however, these officials could not accurately estimate
the amount of erosion prevented by the barriers placed on the slope or
the level of precipitation that would render the barriers ineffective.
* In another forest, local land unit officials worked with Forest
Service researchers to collect data on precipitation levels and soil
erosion from both treated and untreated slopes, in addition to
conducting visual observations. The researchers used a computerized
hydrological model to analyze the monitoring data and concluded that
the erosion barriers decreased the risk of erosion by 19 percent--from
an 86 percent risk on untreated slopes to a 67 percent risk on treated
slopes--and documented these results in a presentation to a
professional conference. However, during visual observations, local
land unit officials disagreed on whether the presence of sediment
trapped behind the erosion barriers constituted treatment success: some
believed that the barriers were effective because they had trapped
erosion from washing further down the slope, while others concluded
that the barriers were ineffective because they had not prevented soil
from eroding at the top of the slope.
* In a third forest, local land unit officials collected monitoring
data and visually observed the erosion barriers. However, they said it
was difficult to accurately measure soil erosion and water quality in
order to determine treatment effectiveness. They therefore did not
report on their data collection and analysis and relied on visual
observations to judge treatment effectiveness: after observing
significant amounts of erosion, they concluded that the treatments were
not effective.
Because these national forests used different methods to judge
treatment effectiveness, we could not draw overall conclusions about
the effectiveness of erosion barriers in protecting resources at risk
at these three forests. We found similar inconsistencies in monitoring
data, monitoring methods, documentation, and standards for treatment
effectiveness among other Forest Service land units as well as
Interior's. For example, at two BLM district offices, we reviewed how
local land unit officials monitored seeding of burnt areas that was
intended to establish native species and prevent the spread of noxious
weeds. One district collected data from both seeded and unseeded plots,
while the other only collected data from seeded plots. In addition, one
district used a measurable standard to judge treatment success, while
the other relied on the professional judgment of land managers.
Departments' Studies Could Not Determine Overall Treatment
Effectiveness:
Similarly, a 2000 USDA Forest Service study and a 2002 Interior study
found that it is difficult to determine overall treatment effectiveness
because land units use different methods to monitor identical
treatments and rarely document monitoring results.[Footnote 20] For
example, as part of its study, Forest Service officials reviewed more
than 150 monitoring reports for emergency stabilization and
rehabilitation treatments undertaken at national forests. As part of
its study, Interior reviewed techniques that BLM field offices in
Idaho, Nevada, Oregon, and Utah used to monitor seeding treatments.
Both of these studies concluded that local land units often did not
collect or record data important to interpreting treatment
effectiveness, including data on site conditions and treatment
outcomes. In addition, both studies found that only approximately one
third of local land units collected monitoring data, and among these
local land units, few collected the same type of data or used the same
data collection methods. Because of the lack of documentation and the
differences in monitoring methods, neither study was able to determine
the validity of monitoring results, to calculate the extent to which
treatments were effective, or to compare the effectiveness of
treatments in different regions or land units. According to Interior
and Forest Service officials, including the authors of these studies,
the departments know little about the extent to which emergency
stabilization and rehabilitation treatments prevent erosion, protect
water quality, restore native vegetation, reduce invasive weeds, or
protect wildlife.In a separate 2001 study of its emergency
stabilization program in the Northern and Intermountain regions, the
Forest Service concluded that the agency is "often . . . uncertain that
[treatments] actually work. There is a concern that treatments may look
good, but their functional effectiveness is unknown."[Footnote 21]
Improved monitoring would provide critical information to departmental
officials making decisions about emergency stabilization and
rehabilitation treatments, according to the Interior and Forest Service
studies. According to the Forest Service study, knowing the
effectiveness of particular treatments would help local land units
select the most appropriate treatments for installation and could
assist them in defending and explaining their decisions. For example,
knowing the likelihood that erosion barriers will effectively prevent
erosion on a certain soil type could help land unit officials determine
whether installing such barriers is worthwhile, according to the lead
author of the study. Likewise, the Interior study noted that a
synthesis of monitoring data could assist BLM in restoring native
plants and reducing invasive weeds in the Intermountain West.
In order to gather such information, these studies recommended that the
agencies improve monitoring. The Forest Service study of treatment
effectiveness recommended that national forests "increase monitoring
efforts" to determine the effectiveness of treatments under various
conditions, while the agency's review of the emergency stabilization
program recommended "a quick format for minimal quantitative
monitoring." Similarly, the Interior study recommended that BLM
districts adopt a common monitoring technique and report whether
treatments meet their objectives.
The departments have not implemented these recommendations, however.
According to departmental officials responsible for overseeing their
emergency stabilization and rehabilitation efforts, implementation has
not occurred because of the difficulty associated with the development
of standardized monitoring and data collection methods and the
collection of such data. At the local level, even though land units
typically conduct some type of monitoring and view monitoring as
valuable, agency officials consider extensive monitoring to be a less
important use of their time than other immediate wildland fire duties,
such as serving on emergency stabilization and rehabilitation
assessment teams and overseeing the installation of treatments. These
wildland fire duties are in addition to their normal duties they must
carry out on a routine basis. Furthermore, departmental officials said
that because land characteristics and treatment objectives vary
significantly from land unit to land unit and from agency to agency, it
is difficult to establish standard monitoring or data collection
methods that would apply in all circumstances. At the same time,
however, they acknowledged that there are enough commonalities among
land units, agencies, and treatments, that some aspects of monitoring
and data collection could be standardized, such as consistently
collecting and documenting data on precipitation, soil type, and
terrain. BLM officials added that they have recently begun to discuss
the development of standardized monitoring methods and possible
criteria for treatment success. Departmental officials commented,
however, that if monitoring methods were standardized and data were
routinely collected and analyzed, it might be more appropriate for an
independent organization such as the department's science agency--the
U.S. Geological Survey--to conduct this work and assess the relative
success and failure of treatments.
The Departments Do Not Routinely Collect, Archive, and Disseminate
Monitoring Results Collected by Local Land Units:
Interagency and departmental policies direct the departments to
collect, archive, and disseminate monitoring results collected by local
land units so that the departments can make more informed decisions on
the effectiveness of the treatments being used. According to Interior,
for example, "Priority should be given to developing a simple
interagency electronic mechanism for archiving and broadly
disseminating the treatment and technique results." Similarly, the
Forest Service cited the need for the agency to develop a clearinghouse
of monitoring plans and a system for sharing monitoring results.
Nevertheless, neither Interior nor the Forest Service developed an
interagency system to collect, store, and disseminate monitoring
results of emergency stabilization and rehabilitation treatments.
Based on our review of treatments for 18 emergency stabilization and
rehabilitation plans at 12 local land units, we found that local land
units did not routinely share monitoring results with other land units
or with program management, even in instances when they learned
valuable lessons about treatment effectiveness. For example, according
to local land unit officials, they shared information with their peers
through informal means such as phone calls to neighboring land units
and conversations at regional meetings for only 24 of the 48 treatments
we reviewed. Similarly, these officials said that they submitted their
monitoring results to their agency's state or regional offices for only
19 of the 48 treatments. At the same time, local land unit officials
said they learned lessons while monitoring that would be worth sharing
with other land units in 37 of the 48 cases.
Currently, the departments do not have an interagency database that
local land units can submit monitoring data and then use to determine
the relative success of different treatments, according to Forest
Service and Interior emergency stabilization and rehabilitation
officials. Several local land unit officials said that if such
information were accessible, they would be better able to select the
most appropriate treatment to meet certain objectives in specific
conditions. Officials in one BLM Nevada land unit said that the BLM
state office was developing a database to collect, store, and
disseminate monitoring results. BLM Nevada officials said that the
database would be used to collect and store the specifications and
results of seeding treatments that have been applied on BLM lands in
the entire state. When BLM officials in Nevada then consider using a
seeding treatment following a wildfire, they would be able to search
the BLM Nevada database to identify the results of prior seeding
treatments that were applied in similar terrain, on similar soil types,
at similar elevations, and with similar precipitation levels, according
to these officials. Local land unit officials could use this
information to make treatment decisions, such as whether to seed a
burnt area or whether to allow it to recover naturally. BLM Nevada
officials said that such a database would be "worth its weight in gold"
because of the difficulty in identifying the most appropriate plant
species and seed application techniques that will be effective in
Nevada's arid rangelands.
According to Interior and Forest Service officials responsible for
their emergency stabilization and rehabilitation programs, the
departments had not developed an interagency monitoring database for
the same reasons that they have not standardized monitoring and data
collection methods: coordinating such a task with multiple agencies
would require a substantial amount of work and monitoring has
historically been considered a lower priority than other more pressing
tasks. Departmental officials said that it would be time-consuming to
develop a database to meet the needs of multiple agencies, each of
which manages different types of land. Other departmental officials
said that the departments typically respond well to emergencies, such
as fire suppression, but have placed less emphasis on monitoring. These
officials acknowledged, however, that a monitoring database would be
valuable and said that they had scheduled interagency meetings in early
2003 to discuss developing such a database.
While the Forest Service has already begun work on a database of
monitoring results, the database is limited in scope and application.
The database includes information that the Forest Service collected as
part of its 2000 study of the effectiveness of emergency stabilization
treatments, according to the agency official who led that study.
Beginning in 2003, this official said that local Forest Service land
unit officials will be able to access information collected during the
course of that study, including any monitoring information, to help
inform their treatment decisions. This official noted, however, that
because of differences and shortcomings in the ways that national
forests collected and retained monitoring information for the emergency
stabilization plans that were reviewed for that study, the database has
several limitations: it will (1) not provide quantitative data on the
extent of treatment effectiveness; (2) not provide information
necessary to determine the conditions--such as soil characteristics or
vegetation types--under which treatments are most effective; (3) not
provide a means by which local Forest Service land unit officials could
report their current monitoring results to other local land units or to
Forest Service regional or national offices.
Conclusions:
Most lands burned by catastrophic wildfires will recover naturally,
without posing a threat to public safety or ecosystems. However, in
those relatively few instances where burnt lands threaten safety,
ecosystems, or cultural resources, emergency stabilization and
rehabilitation treatments can play a critical role--a role that is
emphasized by the appropriations Congress has dedicated to postwildfire
treatments.
The treatments Interior and the Forest Service use to protect and
restore burnt lands--slope stabilization measures such as mulching to
prevent soil from eroding into rivers and streams, seeding to
regenerate important grasses and shrubs, and noxious or invasive weed
monitoring and control--appear, on the face of it, to be reasonable.
For the most part, however, Interior and the Forest Service are
approving treatment plans without comprehensive information on the
extent to which a treatment is likely to be effective given the
severity of the wildfire, the weather, soil, and terrain. Such
information could help ensure that the agencies, including the local
land units, are using resources effectively to protect public safety,
ecosystems, and cultural resources.
Interior and USDA's Forest Service have also done studies that
recognize the need for information on treatment effectiveness, but they
have not emphasized the importance of collecting, storing, analyzing,
and disseminating such data. Nor can they reasonably take action to
collect, store, analyze, or disseminate such data until the departments
have comparable monitoring data from their local land units. Interior
and the Forest Service have yet to set standards for data collection,
develop reporting procedures, or establish criteria for judging
treatment effectiveness, which makes it possible to assess treatment
effectiveness. As their and our own analyses have shown, this situation
has resulted in local land units using different monitoring methods,
even when similar treatments are being used under similar conditions,
and a lack of consistency in judging whether treatments have been
effective.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
In order to better ensure that funds for emergency stabilization and
rehabilitation treatments on burnt lands are used as effectively as
possible, we recommend that the Secretaries of Agriculture and of the
Interior require the heads of their respective land management agencies
to:
* specify the type and extent of monitoring data that local land units
are to collect and methods for collecting these data, and:
* develop an interagency system for collecting, storing, analyzing, and
disseminating information on monitoring results for use in management
decisions.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We provided a draft of this report to the Secretaries of Agriculture
and of the Interior for review and comment. The departments provided a
consolidated response to our draft report, which is included in
appendix II of this report. They generally agreed that more can be done
to ensure that funds for emergency stabilization and rehabilitation on
burnt lands are used as effectively as possible and with our
recommendations that they obtain and disseminate better data for
determining treatment effectiveness. In commenting on our
recommendation that the departments obtain better data on treatment
effectiveness, the departments said that they were aware that some of
their own studies had previously identified the need to obtain and
disseminate better data for determining treatment effectiveness. They
cited several examples where they have or are trying to accomplish
this, including an effort to determine the effectiveness of log erosion
barriers, which is cited in this report. The departments, in their
comments, said they recognize that many of the efforts are individual
agency initiated actions, as opposed to a systematic approach, to
collect data on treatment effectiveness. They said that they are
currently planning actions that would address data collection concerns
in a more collaborative manner by establishing an interdepartmental
committee of scientists and managers to identify the dominant postfire
stabilization and rehabilitation treatments for which monitoring
methods will be established. An interdepartmental approach is
essential, not only for identifying the amount and type of data that
local land units should collect, but also for developing an interagency
and interdepartmental system for routinely collecting, storing,
analyzing, and disseminating these data. The departments also provided
several technical changes that we incorporated into the report, as
appropriate.
:
As arranged with your offices, unless you publicly announce the
contents earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until
30 days after the date of this letter. At that time, we will send
copies of this report to the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member,
Subcommittee on Public Lands and Forests, Senate Committee on Energy
and Natural Resources; the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member, House
Committee on Resources; the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member,
Subcommittee on Forests and Forest Health, House Committee on
Resources; the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on
Interior and Related Agencies, House Committee on Appropriations; the
Ranking Minority Member, House Committee on Agriculture; the Ranking
Minority Member, Subcommittee on Department Operations, Oversight,
Nutrition and Forestry, House Committee on Agriculture; and other
interested congressional committees. We will also send copies of this
report to the Secretary of Agriculture; the Secretary of the Interior;
the Chief of the Forest Service; the Directors of BLM, the National
Park Service, and the Fish and Wildlife Service; the Deputy
Commissioner, Bureau of Indian Affairs; the Director, Office of
Management and Budget; and other interested parties. We will make
copies available at no charge to others upon request. This report will
also be available at no charge on GAO's home page at http://
www.gao.gov/.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-3841. Key contributors to this report are
listed in appendix III.
Sincerely yours,
Barry T. Hill
Director, Natural Resources and Environment:
Signed by Barry T. Hill
[End of section]
Appendixes:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To describe the Department of the Interior's and the U.S. Department of
Agriculture's Forest Service processes for implementing their emergency
stabilization and rehabilitation programs, we obtained departmental
manuals, handbooks, and other guidance that describe Interior's process
for implementing emergency stabilization and rehabilitation and the
Forest Service's emergency stabilization program. We also interviewed
Interior and Forest Service officials responsible for overseeing the
department's respective programs to obtain an overview of Interior's
and the Forest Service's processes for their programs. Because the
Forest Service's rehabilitation program is relatively new and has not
yet been incorporated into the Forest Service manual or handbook, we
obtained guidance developed by the Forest Service and provided to
Forest Service regional offices on the process used to implement that
program. We also obtained additional guidance and documentation from
the Forest Service's Northern, Southwestern, and Intermountain regions
(regions 1, 3, and 4, respectively)--the three regions that received
the largest share of Forest Service rehabilitation program funding in
fiscal year 2001--to determine what additional processes these regions
developed and used to implement the program. Further, we interviewed
Bureau of Land Management (BLM), Bureau of Indian Affairs, Fish and
Wildlife Service, National Park Service, and Forest Service officials
at regional, state, and local land management units that had
experienced wildland fires in 2000 or 2001 to discuss procedures used
in assessing burnt lands and identifying appropriate treatments.
To identify the costs and types of treatments the departments have
implemented, we obtained 266 emergency stabilization and rehabilitation
plans that Interior agencies prepared for wildfires that occurred in
calendar years 2000 and 2001 on:
* BLM managed lands in Idaho, Nevada, Oregon, and Utah;
* Bureau of Indian Affairs managed lands in its Northwest, Rocky
Mountain, Southwest, and Western regions;
* Fish and Wildlife Service managed lands in its Mountain Prairie,
Pacific, Southeast, and Southwest regions; and:
* National Park Service managed lands in its Intermountain and Pacific
West regions.
For the Forest Service, we requested and obtained 155 emergency
stabilization plans and rehabilitation plans for wildfires that
occurred in calendar years 2000 and 2001 on Forest Service lands
managed in its Intermountain, Northern, Pacific Northwest, Pacific
Southwest, and Southwestern regions (regions 4, 1, 6, 5, and 3,
respectively). We selected these Interior and Forest Service regions
because they accounted for about 90 percent of the plans that the
departments developed for treating wildfires that occurred in 2000 and
2001.
To identify the types of treatments implemented, we reviewed these 421
plans and identified treatments proposed and approved in the plans. To
identify the costs of the plans and the treatments, we obtained
estimated costs that the departments approved to carry out the plans
and implement the individual treatments. Because these costs are
estimates, they do not necessarily reflect actual costs that could be
incurred in carrying out the plans during the 3 years that may be
required to implement them. We did not obtain actual costs incurred, to
date, in carrying out these plans because this data are not readily
available.
To determine whether emergency stabilization and rehabilitation
treatments are achieving their intended results, we reviewed 18
emergency stabilization and rehabilitation plans that were implemented
on 12 land units--6 of Interior's and 6 of the Forest Service's. We
selected these 12 land units because they obligated the most funds for
emergency stabilization and rehabilitation treatments within their
regions in 2000, the most recent year since the establishment of the
National Fire Plan in which local land units could have accomplished
significant monitoring at the time of our review. We did not select
emergency stabilization and rehabilitation plans for wildland fires
that occurred in 2001 because, at the time of our review, local land
units would have had little time to monitor treatments that had been
implemented. For each of the 18 plans, we reviewed up to 3 of the most
costly treatments. One of the 18 plans we selected had only 2
treatments, both of which we reviewed. In addition, we did not review
five treatments we initially selected either because the treatments had
not yet been fully implemented, or because we were unable to obtain
timely information on the treatment's status. Therefore, the total
number of treatments we reviewed was 48. For each of these treatments,
we interviewed the land manager responsible for monitoring and reviewed
associated documentation of monitoring results, when available. These
48 treatments are not a representative sample of all emergency
stabilization and rehabilitation treatments implemented by the
departments, and therefore our findings cannot be projected. However,
the data do represent monitoring practices for a significant proportion
of departmental outlays for treatments, since the total cost of the
treatments we reviewed was $84 million, or 30 percent of the total
funds obligated by Interior and the Forest Service for emergency
stabilization and rehabilitation treatments undertaken for wildfires
that occurred in 2000 and 2001.
In addition, we obtained program reviews or other studies conducted by
the Forest Service or Interior on their emergency stabilization and
rehabilitation reports to determine if the departments monitor
treatments and, if so, the type and quality of departmental monitoring
data. We also interviewed emergency stabilization and rehabilitation
officials at the departments' national, regional, or state levels, and
local land unit offices to determine what monitoring is being conducted
by local land unit offices, whether data are collected, and what use is
made of these data for assessing treatment effectiveness or sharing
lessons learned.
We conducted our review from August 2001 through February 2003 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Departments of the Interior and
Agriculture:
THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
THE DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
March 6, 2003:
Barry T. Hill, Director:
Natural Resources and Environment United States General Accounting
Office 441 G. Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Dear Director Hill:
Thank you for the opportunity to review GAO's Draft Report entitled,
"Wildfires: Better Information Needed on Effectiveness of Emergency
Stabilization and Rehabilitation Treatments" (GAO-03-430).
In general, we agree with the Results In Brief that 1) Interior and the
Forest Service: have differences in the way the emergency stabilization
and rehabilitation program has been administered in the two
departments, 2) there are differences as well as similarities in the
type and costs of treatments, and 3) to date effectiveness monitoring
of these treatments has been inconsistent. We believe, however, that
much has been accomplished in the relatively short time since the
Departments of the Interior and Agriculture received direction and
funding for these National Fire Plan activities.
A joint departmental committee has been established and is working to
address revisions in policies and procedures to incorporate decisions
made by the Wildland Fire Leadership Council in January 2003, which is
referenced in the report. This effort makes significant organizational
changes that will result in common program administration in both
Departments at the national and field levels.
In general, the Departments of the Interior and Agriculture agree with
the Recommendation for Executive Action that more can be done to ensure
that funds for emergency stabilization and rehabilitation treatment on
burnt lands are used as effectively as possible. The recommendation is
consistent with reviews of this topic previously completed by the
Forest Service in 2000 and the Department of the Interior in 2001.
Responding to the earlier reports, the Forest Service and Department of
the Interior have taken steps over the last three years aimed at
developing the means to perform effectiveness monitoring. Both agencies
view these efforts as only first steps and have plans to develop a more
structured monitoring program as part of an adaptive management
strategy to improve the Emergency Stabilization and Rehabilitation
program.
The Wildland Fire Leadership Council directed the agencies to adopt
standardized definitions for emergency stabilization, rehabilitation,
and restoration in January 2003. Agreement on the definitions is an
important first step in standardizing treatment practices across the
agencies. For example, Interior will begin to differentiate between
emergency stabilization and restoration. The agencies' budget and
accounting practices will also reflect this agreement. Interior has
included a proposal in the 2004 President's Budget to realign its
budget structure to correspond to that of the Forest Service. Emergency
stabilization after a fire will be grouped with emergency suppression
operations while burned area rehabilitation will be a separate budget
subactivity.
In response to the first recommendation to specify the type and extent
of monitoring data that local land units are to collect and methods for
collecting these data, the Departments previously identified this gap
and offer the following examples reflecting some of the efforts we have
initiated or accomplished.
* The Forest Service has implemented a program of effectiveness
monitoring of log erosion barriers, a widely used post-fire practice,
following a consistent protocol of treatments and quantitative
measurements. The study will provide data to test the effectiveness of
the treatments for controlling water and sediment runoff and also
develop and validate new monitoring techniques for both Departments.
* The National Park Service has prepared two reports on the effectiveness
of extensive treatments to protect cultural resources in severely
burned areas at Mesa Verde National Park. These reviews will be used to
help managers provide effective protection for cultural resources after
future severe wildland fires.
* The Forest Service, the U.S. Geological Survey and the Joint Fire
Science Program are conducting stabilization and rehabilitation
research on a variety of techniques in both forest and rangeland
ecosystems. Results of this research, when applied, will improve the
planning and delivery of emergency stabilization and rehabilitation
treatments.
We recognize that many of these actions to date have been individual
agency initiated actions, but the intent is to share the results with
all the agencies working on emergency stabilization and rehabilitation
efforts. We are currently planning actions that will address these
concerns in a more collaborative manner. An inter-departmental
committee of scientists and managers will identify the dominant post-
fire stabilization and rehabilitation treatments for which monitoring
protocols will be established. Technical experts will then develop the
monitoring protocols and identify research needs.
In response to the second recommendation to develop an interagency
system for collecting, storing and disseminating information on
monitoring results for use in management decisions, the Departments
also previously identified this need and have initiated several
efforts. Some of these efforts include:
* The National Fire Plan Operations and Reporting System (NFPORS), a
joint USDA-DOI data management system, will be the mechanism for
recording and reporting on projects for rehabilitation of burned areas.
NFPORS is currently under development, with implementation of the
rehabilitation component scheduled for late winter 2003.
* The Bureau of Land Management currently has a system for sharing
lessons learned with some state organizations. These lessons will be
distributed more widely to provide information to other states and
agencies. The Forest Service is in the process of developing a
comprehensive database for cataloging treatment effectiveness.
* Monitoring results are shared at interagency training sessions for
burned area emergency rehabilitation practitioners. Two sessions were
held in 2002 and another is planned in early 2004.
* The Fire Research Coordination Council, which includes broad
membership from the Forest Service, Joint Fire Science Program, U.S.
Geological Survey, National Association of Professional Forestry
Schools and Colleges, Environmental Protection Agency and others,
provides leadership in coordinating wildland fire science research. The
council is vigorously promoting a program to transfer research
knowledge on postfire rehabilitation to field managers to improve on-
the-land performance.
In closing, let us restate that much has been accomplished in the time
that the Agencies received funding for the National Fire Plan
Rehabilitation and Restoration program. Even though overall funding has
changed significantly from the $210 million obligated in FY 2001 and FY
2002 to the $27.1 million appropriated in FY 2003, the Agencies
continue to work seamlessly across departments to protect communities
from unnecessary damage after wildfires and to rehabilitate lands
unlikely to recover naturally.
Mark Rey
Under Secretary
Natural Resources and the Environment
U.S. Department of Agriculture
P. Lynn Scarlett
Assistant Secretary:
Policy, Management and Budget:
U.S. Department of the Interior:
Signed by Mark Rey and P. Lynn Scarlett
[End of figure]
[End of section]
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Chester F. Janik (202) 512-6508:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition, Mark Braza, Marcia Brouns McWreath, Carol Herrnstadt
Shulman, and Katheryn Summers made key contributions to this report.
(360124):
FOOTNOTES
[1] Some Interior and Forest Service plans covered more than one fire.
In those instances, several fires on an agency's local land unit
occurred at about the same time, and local land unit officials decided
to include treatments for those fires under one plan.
[2] USDA, Forest Service, Rocky Mountain Research Station, Evaluating
the Effectiveness of Postfire Rehabilitation Treatments, General
Technical Report RMRS-GTR-63 (Fort Collins, Colo.: Sept. 2000).
[3] U.S. Geological Survey, Forest & Rangeland Ecosystem Science Center
and Oregon State University, Department of Rangeland Resources,
Emergency Fire Rehabilitation of BLM Lands in the Intermountain West:
Revegetation & Monitoring, Interim Report to the BLM (Corvallis, Oreg.:
Jan. 26, 2002).
[4] In addition to Interior and USDA, the Federal Emergency Management
Agency, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration participated in the review.
[5] In 2001, the federal agencies responsible for the Federal Wildland
Fire Policy updated the 1995 policy to clarify its purpose and intent
and to address issues not fully covered in 1995. The 2001 review and
update replaced the 1995 policy.
[6] National Academy of Public Administration, Managing Wildland Fire:
Enhancing Capacity to Implement the Federal Interagency Policy
(Washington, D.C.: Dec. 2001).
[7] Land or resource management plans serve as a basis for activities
that occur on lands managed by Interior agencies. The Forest Service is
required to develop similar plans for lands that it manages.
[8] The National Environmental Policy Act requires all federal agencies
to prepare detailed environmental impact statements for major federal
actions that may significantly affect the quality of the human
environment. Agencies may exclude categories of actions that do not
significantly affect the environment from the act's environmental
impact requirements. Some Interior agencies, such as the National Park
Service and the Bureau of Indian Affairs, have developed categorical
exclusions. Interior and USDA are currently proposing to categorically
exclude stabilization and rehabilitation of all lands and
infrastructure impacted by wildland fires or fire suppression. Other
relevant statutes include the Endangered Species Act, which requires
agencies to ensure that their actions are not likely to jeopardize the
continued existence of species listed as threatened or endangered or to
adversely modify habitat critical to their survival. In addition, the
National Historic Preservation Act requires federal agencies to take
into account the effects of their actions on sites or buildings on or
eligible for inclusion on the National Register of Historic Places.
[9] The Council on Environmental Quality, in its regulations
implementing the National Environmental Policy Act, states that there
are "emergency circumstances [that] make it necessary to take an action
with significant environmental impact without observing the provisions
of these regulations." In such circumstances, however, agencies "should
consult with the Council about alternative arrangements."
[10] The Forest Service is currently proposing to categorically exclude
stabilization and rehabilitation of lands and infrastructure damaged by
wildland fires or fire suppression from further analysis under an
environmental assessment or an impact statement.
[11] Of the 275,036 Forest Service acres that were severely burned in
2000, about 176,062 acres, or 64 percent, were located in regions 1 and
4.
[12] In 2001, USDA's Office of Inspector General reviewed controls over
the National Fire Plan funds in Forest Service region 1 and concluded
that the Washington office had not sufficiently overseen the selection
process to ensure that projects met National Fire Plan goals and
objectives. The Forest Service agreed to review selected projects as
part of its fiscal year 2002 management review of regional operations.
USDA, Office of Inspector General, Forest Service National Fire Plan
Implementation, Western Region Audit Report No. 08601-26-SF
(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 2001).
[13] Of the 275,036 Forest Service acres that were severely burned in
2000, about 41,800 acres, or 15 percent, were located in region 3.
[14] When fire suppression costs exceed annual fire suppression
appropriations, including emergency funds, the Forest Service can
transfer funds from any appropriation available to the agency to the
fire management appropriation. While Congress provided emergency
funding to the Forest Service in August 2002, the amounts provided were
not sufficient to cover that year's suppression costs. As a result, the
Forest Service was required to borrow funds from other programs,
including rehabilitation. According to Forest Service officials, the
agency's fiscal year 2003 appropriation was not sufficient to fully
reimburse all the programs from which it borrowed in fiscal year 2002,
and, as of March 2003, it was unclear how the rehabilitation program
would be affected.
[15] Interior uses both emergency and nonemergency funds for its
program, while the Forest Service limits its use of emergency funds to
its emergency stabilization program.
[16] Similarly, all five fires were covered by one emergency
stabilization plan.
[17] Cheatgrass is a winter annual plant introduced from Europe and
Asia. It grows during the fall and winter and sets its seed in the
early summer. Cheatgrass can take valuable mineral and water resources
from the soil, leaving native grasses, which are summer annuals, with
little nutrition. Because winter annuals set their seeds prior to the
wildfire season in the summer, they can quickly resprout in the fall.
However, because native grasses set their seeds in the fall, if they
are consumed by wildfire in the summer, they are unable to leave any
seed.
[18] We did not select emergency stabilization and rehabilitation plans
for wildland fires that occurred in 2001 because, at the time of our
review, local land units would have had little time to monitor
treatments that had been implemented.
[19] Of the 18 plans we selected for review, one included only two
treatments--both of which we reviewed. In addition, the most costly
treatments in some of the 18 plans had either not yet been fully
implemented, or we could not get timely information on the treatment's
status. We did not include these treatments in our analysis.
[20] USDA, Forest Service, Rocky Mountain Research Station, Evaluating
the Effectiveness of Postfire Rehabilitation Treatments, General
Technical Report RMRS-GTR-63 (Fort Collins, Colo.: Sept. 2000); and
U.S. Geological Survey, Forest & Rangeland Ecosystem Science Center and
Oregon State University, Department of Rangeland Resources, Emergency
Fire Rehabilitation of BLM Lands in the Intermountain West:
Revegetation & Monitoring, Interim Report to the BLM (Corvallis, Oreg.:
Jan. 26, 2002).
[21] USDA, Forest Service, Watershed, Fish, Wildlife, Air and Rare
Plants Staff, Burned Area Emergency Rehabilitation (BAER) Program
Review Report: Northern and Intermountain Regions. (Washington, D.C.:
June 2001).
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