Nuclear Cleanup of Rocky Flats
DOE Can Use Lessons Learned to Improve Oversight of Other Sites' Cleanup Activities Gao ID: GAO-06-352 July 10, 2006In 2001, when GAO reported on the cleanup of the Department of Energy's (DOE) Rocky Flats site, a former nuclear weapons production facility, the cleanup was behind schedule and over cost. In October 2005, the contractor declared that it had completed the cleanup much earlier and at less cost than DOE and the contractor had anticipated 5 years earlier. GAO was asked to determine the (1) factors that contributed to the cleanup's early completion, (2) remaining work and total costs, (3) measures to assess whether the cleanup achieved a level of protection of public health and environment consistent with the cleanup agreement, and (4) lessons the Rocky Flats cleanup may offer for other DOE cleanup projects.
Four factors contributed to the early completion of Rocky Flats' cleanup: (1) DOE's and the contractor's ability to overcome numerous challenges, (2) the use of an accelerated cleanup process, (3) site-specific characteristics that limited the scope of the contamination, and (4) the contractor's financial incentive to finish the work quickly and safely. Although the cleanup is complete, its sufficiency has not yet been ascertained; key steps remain before the planned Rocky Flats National Wildlife Refuge that will occupy the site can open to the public. For example, in about November 2006, the regulatory agencies--the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment--plan to issue their joint final decision on the sufficiency of the cleanup and any risk posed by residual contaminants. The total cost of the cleanup, since 1995, is about $10 billion in constant 2005 dollars. This cost includes contract costs of about $7.7 billion (including contractor fees of about $630 million), long-term stewardship and pension liabilities estimated at about $1.3 billion, and other costs of nearly $1 billion. Although numerous measures in place to assess the cleanup appear adequate to judge the sufficiency of the cleanup, DOE did not effectively carry out some aspects of its oversight responsibilities. Among the assessment measures are completion of the regulatory process, activities undertaken to verify remedial actions, and reviews by independent and federal entities. The regulatory agencies have approved the cleanup of 360 areas of known or suspected contamination at the site. Data supporting the cleanup of these areas form the basis of regulatory decisions regarding the cleanup's sufficiency. Accordingly, we reviewed the contractor's controls intended to ensure the quality of these data and found them to be robust. However, DOE lacked assurance that the controls were working as intended because it did not independently assess the quality of these key data. One official told us that DOE was involved daily in reviewing documents and discussed with the contractor any data quality issues that arose. DOE has identified and implemented at other sites some lessons from Rocky Flats, but DOE has not systematically tracked lessons learned at all of its cleanup sites, thus potentially losing the benefits of such lessons.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-06-352, Nuclear Cleanup of Rocky Flats: DOE Can Use Lessons Learned to Improve Oversight of Other Sites' Cleanup Activities
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Report to Congressional Requesters:
July 2006:
Nuclear Cleanup Of Rocky Flats:
DOE Can Use Lessons Learned to Improve Oversight of Other Sites'
Cleanup Activities:
GAO-06-352:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-06-352, a report to congressional requesters
Why GAO Did This Study:
In 2001, when GAO reported on the cleanup of the Department of Energy‘s
(DOE) Rocky Flats site, a former nuclear weapons production facility,
the cleanup was behind schedule and over cost. In October 2005, the
contractor declared that it had completed the cleanup much earlier and
at less cost than DOE and the contractor had anticipated 5 years
earlier. GAO was asked to determine the (1) factors that contributed to
the cleanup‘s early completion, (2) remaining work and total costs, (3)
measures to assess whether the cleanup achieved a level of protection
of public health and environment consistent with the cleanup agreement,
and (4) lessons the Rocky Flats cleanup may offer for other DOE cleanup
projects.
What GAO Found:
Four factors contributed to the early completion of Rocky Flats‘
cleanup: (1) DOE‘s and the contractor‘s ability to overcome numerous
challenges, (2) the use of an accelerated cleanup process, (3) site-
specific characteristics that limited the scope of the contamination,
and (4) the contractor‘s financial incentive to finish the work quickly
and safely.
Although the cleanup is complete, its sufficiency has not yet been
ascertained; key steps remain before the planned Rocky Flats National
Wildlife Refuge that will occupy the site can open to the public. For
example, in about November 2006, the regulatory agencies”the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Colorado Department of
Public Health and Environment”plan to issue their joint final decision
on the sufficiency of the cleanup and any risk posed by residual
contaminants.
The total cost of the cleanup, since 1995, is about $10 billion in
constant 2005 dollars. This cost includes contract costs of about $7.7
billion (including contractor fees of about $630 million), long-term
stewardship and pension liabilities estimated at about $1.3 billion,
and other costs of nearly $1 billion.
Although numerous measures in place to assess the cleanup appear
adequate to judge the sufficiency of the cleanup, DOE did not
effectively carry out some aspects of its oversight responsibilities.
Among the assessment measures are completion of the regulatory process,
activities undertaken to verify remedial actions, and reviews by
independent and federal entities. The regulatory agencies have approved
the cleanup of 360 areas of known or suspected contamination at the
site. Data supporting the cleanup of these areas form the basis of
regulatory decisions regarding the cleanup‘s sufficiency. Accordingly,
we reviewed the contractor‘s controls intended to ensure the quality of
these data and found them to be robust. However, DOE lacked assurance
that the controls were working as intended because it did not
independently assess the quality of these key data. One official told
us that DOE was involved daily in reviewing documents and discussed
with the contractor any data quality issues that arose.
DOE has identified and implemented at other sites some lessons from
Rocky Flats, but DOE has not systematically tracked lessons learned at
all of its cleanup sites, thus potentially losing the benefits of such
lessons.
Figure: Rocky Flats in 1995 and Rocky Flats in 2005:
[See PDF for Image]
Source: DOE.
[End of Figure]
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommendations include that the Secretary of Energy ensure
appropriate oversight of contractors‘ controls over data quality and
assess the costs and benefits of tracking lessons learned across the
DOE complex. DOE, Interior, Colorado, and Kaiser-Hill provided written
comments, and generally agreed with the contents of the report. EPA did
not provide official written comments but did provide editorial and
technical suggestions, as did the other agencies, that we incorporated,
as appropriate. DOE concurred with our recommendation about tracking
lessons learned but did not state whether it concurred with the other
two.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-352].
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Gene Aloise at (202) 512-
3841 or aloisee@gao.gov.
[End of Section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Four Key Factors Contributed to Early Cleanup:
Cleanup of Rocky Flats Is Complete at a Cost of about $10 Billion, but
Key Steps Remain Before the Planned Wildlife Refuge Will Open:
Numerous Measures Were Taken to Assess the Cleanup's Sufficiency, but
DOE Could Improve Its Oversight of Data Quality and Clarify Its
Verification Policy:
DOE Implemented Some Lessons Learned at Rocky Flats but Has No
Requirement to Ensure That Lessons Learned Are Implemented at Other
Sites:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendixes:
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Appendix II: GAO Survey Methodology, Response Rates, and Summary
Responses:
Survey Methodology:
Survey Response Rates:
Summary Responses:
Appendix III: Additional Information on Decontamination and Demolition
Activities at Rocky Flats:
Appendix IV: Additional Information on the Quality of Remediation Data
at Rocky Flats and on DOE's Planned and Actual Verification:
Information on Controls over Data Quality:
Additional Information on DOE's Planned and Actual Verification
Activities:
Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Energy:
Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of the Interior:
Appendix VII: Comments from the Colorado Department of Public Health
and Environment:
Appendix VIII: Comments from Kaiser-Hill Company L.L.C.:
Appendix IX: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Table:
Table 1: Survey Response Rates, by Subgroup:
Figures:
Figure 1: Workers in Protective Suits Cut Plutonium-Contaminated
Equipment :
Figure 2: Workers Use Cerium Nitrate to Decontaminate a Glovebox;
Workers Load a Dismantled Glovebox into a Shipping Container:
Figure 3: Use of Explosives in the Demolition of Rocky Flats' Building
881:
Figure 4: Transuranic Waste Packaged for Shipment to the Waste
Isolation Pilot Plant:
Figure 5: GAO Staff Being Briefed on the Prepackaging of Wet
Combustibles, July 2002 and October 2000:
Figure 6: Waste Removed and Contaminated Water Treated at Rocky Flats:
Figure 7: Rocky Flats, before Cleanup, in 1995, and after Cleanup (in
2005:
Figure 8: Key Steps in Rocky Flats' Transition to a Wildlife Refuge:
Figure 9: The Lindsay Ranch:
Figure 10: Plan for Public Access Trails and Facilities at the Rocky
Flats National Wildlife Refuge:
Figure 11: Four-Step Remediation Process for Individual Areas of Known
or Suspected Contamination:
Figure 12: Treatment of Contaminated Soils by Thermal Desorption;
Installation of a Passive Treatment System at the Mound Storage Site,
Rocky Flats:
Figure 13: Terminal Pond in the B Series of Ponds:
Figure 14: Super-Compacter without and with InstaCote:
Figure 15: Hydrolase System at Work Removing Contaminated Paint and
Underlying Surface Contamination:
Figure 16: Workers Cut Contaminated Concrete from Building 771's
'Infinity Room':
Figure 17: A High-Purity Germanium Detector Can Detect Certain
Radionuclides:
Figure 18: Felled Electrical Poles Allow Lower Flight; Helicopter Scans
Rocky Flats for Residual Plutonium in Surface Soil:
Figure 19: Confirmation and Independent Verification Samples Taken at
the 903 Lip Area:
Abbreviations:
Advisory Board: Rocky Flats Citizens Advisory Board:
ATSDR: Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry:
CERCLA: Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act:
Coalition: Rocky Flats Coalition of Local Governments:
Colorado: Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment:
DOE: Department of Energy:
EPA: Environmental Protection Agency:
FWS: Fish and Wildlife Service:
HPGe: high-purity germanium:
MARSSIM: Multi-Agency Radiation Survey and Site Investigation
Manual:
ORISE : Oak Ridge Institute for Science and Education:
PARCC: precision, accuracy, representativeness, completeness,
and comparability:
pCi/g: picocuries per gram:
RCRA: Resource Conservation and Recovery Act:
Refuge Act: Rocky Flats National Wildlife Refuge Act:
RI/FS: remedial investigation/feasibility study:
TRC: total recordable cases:
VOC: volatile organic compound:
WIPP: Waste Isolation Pilot Plant:
July 10, 2006:
The Honorable Jeff Sessions:
Chairman:
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Wayne Allard:
United States Senate:
Once a bustling nuclear weapons production complex employing thousands
of workers, the Department of Energy's (DOE) Rocky Flats site, near
Denver, Colorado, is being transformed into a wildlife refuge that will
be managed by the Department of the Interior's Fish and Wildlife
Service (FWS). For about 40 years, the Rocky Flats plant produced
plutonium triggers, or "pits," for nuclear weapons. That activity
resulted in radiological and chemical contamination of some of the
site's buildings, soil, and water. Cleanup of the site began in 1995
under a contract between DOE and Kaiser-Hill Company L.L.C.,[Footnote
1] and included decontaminating and demolishing several plutonium-
processing buildings, one of which had been labeled "the most dangerous
building in America," along with hundreds of other contaminated
buildings and structures. The cleanup required the contractor to remove
large volumes of nuclear material and radioactive debris, and
investigate and remediate as necessary contamination at 360 individual
hazardous substance sites that were identified through historical
records and extensive sampling and analysis at the site in the early
1990s. In total, according to GAO's calculations, the amount of cleanup
waste that had to be removed from the site was equivalent to a 65-story
building the length and width of a football field.
Cleanup of the site was conducted under the Rocky Flats Cleanup
Agreement, the legally binding agreement that provided the framework
for the cleanup effort. The cleanup agreement implements the provisions
of the applicable statutes, including the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, as amended
(CERCLA);[Footnote 2] the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of
1976, as amended (RCRA); and the Colorado Hazardous Waste Act. The
cleanup agreement specified the roles of DOE and the two regulatory
agencies for the site: the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and
the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment (Colorado).
Pursuant to the cleanup agreement, EPA had lead regulatory authority
over the cleanup of the site's buffer zone, which includes about 5,900
acres of undeveloped land around the center of the site, while Colorado
had lead regulatory authority over the cleanup of the core industrial
area--which includes about 385 acres in the center of the site, where
the plutonium-processing activities occurred.
When GAO reported on the cleanup effort in February 2001, the project
was behind schedule and over cost.[Footnote 3] However, in October
2005, the contractor declared that it had finished the physical cleanup
of the site, as defined in the contract (e.g., demolishing buildings
and shipping contaminated waste and soil off site), much earlier and at
less cost than DOE and the contractor had anticipated 5 years earlier.
Although the cleanup is complete, its sufficiency has not yet been
ascertained. EPA's and Colorado's joint final decision on the
sufficiency of the cleanup and the final remedy for the site is
expected to be published around November 2006.[Footnote 4] With the
exception of one pedestrian trail, most of the planned wildlife refuge
will not open until at least 5 years after the refuge is established
(depending on the availability of funding).
In this context, we determined the (1) factors that contributed to the
physical cleanup's early completion; (2) work remaining to be done as
well as total project costs, including long-term costs; (3) measures in
place to assess whether the cleanup achieved a level of protection of
public health and environment consistent with the Rocky Flats Cleanup
Agreement; and (4) lessons the Rocky Flats project may hold for other
DOE cleanup projects.
In conducting our work, we visited the Rocky Flats site several times
and reviewed documents and data prepared by DOE, EPA, Colorado, FWS,
the contractor, and various scientific organizations. We reviewed and
analyzed agency and contractor documents on decontamination and
demolition accomplishments and techniques. We also analyzed documents
related to the cost-plus-incentive-fee contract, including contract
negotiation documents, the contract cost and fee structure, and
contract modifications, although we did not evaluate the cost-
effectiveness of the contract. We reviewed and analyzed cleanup
verification strategies and results, and reviewed the content of
scientific analyses, including a study of how actinides[Footnote 5]
migrate through soil and water and an assessment of the public health
risk posed by contaminants remaining at the site, but did not evaluate
the science underlying them. In addition, because decisions about the
sufficiency of the cleanup have been and will be based on remediation
data, we assessed the soundness of the agencies' and contractor's
processes and procedures for ensuring the quality of these data. We
also reviewed the results of audits of the key laboratories used by the
contractor to analyze samples of radioactively contaminated soil.
For further review, we selected a nonprobability sample of four of
Rocky Flats' 360 cleanup areas (including areas referred to as
individual hazardous substance sites, potential areas of concern, and
under-building contamination sites), using criteria such as the
location of the cleanup area and the severity of its
contamination.[Footnote 6] For these four individual cleanup areas--
building 771, the 903 pad, the 903 lip area, and trench T-7--we
assessed the closeout reports and the data supporting them to determine
the extent to which the data collection and laboratory analyses adhered
to data quality standards and procedures. For example, we reviewed
records of laboratory analyses of contaminated soil samples from the
areas, and documents showing the extent to which the projects adhered
to stated data quality objectives. We did not evaluate the remedial
data or laboratory analyses themselves.
Further, to obtain citizen and local government views about community
input to the cleanup and the effect of various cleanup verification
activities, we surveyed 58 current and past members of the two local
community groups that served in an advisory capacity to DOE: the Rocky
Flats Citizens Advisory Board and the Rocky Flats Coalition of Local
Governments. We also attended monthly meetings of these two groups. We
interviewed officials of DOE, EPA, Colorado, FWS, the contractor, and
various scientific organizations. We conducted our work in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards from March 2005
through May 2006. In September 2005, we briefed you and your staff and
reported on the preliminary results of our review.[Footnote 7] Details
on our objectives, scope, and methodology are in appendix I; summary
survey results are in appendix II.
Results in Brief:
Officials of DOE, EPA, Colorado, and the contractor identified four key
factors that contributed to Rocky Flats' early cleanup:
* DOE and the contractor overcame significant challenges that we
identified in our 2001 report, such as decontaminating and demolishing
hundreds of structures and packaging and shipping vast quantities of
radioactive and hazardous wastes. For example, innovative techniques,
such as the use of cerium nitrate to decontaminate gloveboxes so they
could be shipped whole rather than cut into pieces, enabled the
contractor to proceed with cleanup much faster and at less expense than
anticipated.
* An accelerated cleanup process allowed cleanup actions to proceed
much more quickly and collaboratively than a traditional cleanup
process would have allowed. As the cleanup progressed, DOE, the
contractor, EPA, and Colorado staff often worked side by side in the
field, participating in or observing soil removal actions and sampling
procedures.
* Site-specific characteristics (e.g., climate, geography, the robust
construction of the buildings, and the chemical nature of the key
contaminants) physically limited the extent of the contamination. For
example, the dry Colorado climate and the alluvial fan[Footnote 8] on
which the site is situated helped minimize erosion, thereby inhibiting
off-site migration of contaminants. Also, the thick shale and claystone
that underlie the site prevented contaminants from seeping into the
deep drinking-water aquifer.
* The contractor had a large financial incentive, shared throughout the
contractor workforce, to complete the work economically, quickly, and
safely. The earlier the contractor finished its work, and the lower its
cost in doing so, the more the contractor stood to earn--as much as
$560 million in incentive fees. This financial incentive drove site
workers to seek creative cleanup solutions.
Although DOE's contractor completed the physical cleanup of the site in
October 2005, several additional actions need to be completed before
the site can open to the public as a wildlife refuge. In July 2006, DOE
expects to issue for public comment its proposed plan, which will
include a summary of the three proposed future monitoring and
remediation alternatives for the site and will identify the preferred
alternative. After public comments on the proposed plan have been
received and considered, EPA and Colorado will jointly determine
whether any further cleanup is needed at the site or whether the
cleanup actions already taken are sufficient to render the site safe
for its intended purpose. A final decision by EPA and Colorado is
expected in late 2006. If the joint decision is that no further action
is required, and EPA certifies that the cleanup and closure of Rocky
Flats is complete, DOE will transfer primary administrative
jurisdiction over the majority of the site to the Department of the
Interior for use as a wildlife refuge. If funds are available, FWS
plans to open one pedestrian trail in the first year after the transfer
and to open the remainder of the public trails and facilities between
the fifth and 15TH years following transfer. DOE expects to retain
possession of the former industrial area, which will contain shallow
groundwater treatment systems and monitoring wells, and will be
responsible for the long-term stewardship of these systems. To protect
these systems, DOE will restrict public access to this portion of the
site.
The total cost of the cleanup since 1995 is about $10 billion.[Footnote
9] This cost includes DOE's 1995 and 2000 contracts with Kaiser-Hill,
which total nearly $8 billion; the cost of DOE's Rocky Flats Field
Office, which totals about $760 million; and the cost of other DOE
sites' support of the Rocky Flats project, which totals about $138
million; estimated future costs such as pension and benefits
liabilities, estimated at approximately $1 billion over 60 years; long-
term stewardship of the site, projected to cost $303 million through
2080; and the potential acquisition of some private mineral rights at
Rocky Flats, for which the Congress authorized $10 million in January
2006.[Footnote 10]
Numerous measures have been and are being taken to assess the cleanup.
Although these measures appear adequate to judge the sufficiency of the
cleanup, DOE did not effectively carry out some aspects of its
oversight responsibilities. The three key cleanup assessment measures
are (1) completion of the regulatory process--EPA's and Colorado's
review and approval of the cleanup actions already taken and the
results of other ongoing assessments under CERCLA and RCRA; (2) a DOE-
initiated verification of the contractor's cleanup actions; and (3)
reviews conducted by other federal agencies and by consultants hired by
local community groups:
* Completion of the CERCLA and RCRA process will culminate in EPA's and
Colorado's final decision on the cleanup's sufficiency and the
selection of a final remedy. The contractor's procedures to ensure the
quality of the data supporting the accelerated cleanup actions appeared
sound and comprehensive. However, DOE did not assess the contractor's
data quality assurance process, as required by the protocols agreed to
with the regulatory agencies.[Footnote 11] A DOE official explained
that DOE officials' day-to-day review of data enabled them to detect
data issues as they arose.
* A DOE-initiated verification of the contractor's cleanup was
inconsistent with the verification plan. DOE did not complete an
independent review of the accuracy of contractor-conducted scans for
remaining radiological contamination. DOE officials said they had
decided that these activities would not provide sufficient additional
information to justify their completion, but had no documentation to
support this decision. Further, existing DOE policy and guidance lack
clarity about how they apply to the Rocky Flats cleanup and what the
verification goals are.
* Federal agency reviews and community-driven independent reviews
assessed aspects of the cleanup. For example, a CERCLA-required public
health assessment concluded that no public health hazard exists for the
communities surrounding Rocky Flats.
Although DOE has identified and implemented at other cleanup sites some
lessons learned at Rocky Flats, DOE does not require that lessons
learned at one cleanup site be implemented at other sites, even though
they may be applicable. In 2002, DOE identified a number of lessons
from the Rocky Flats cleanup, including implementing a performance-
based contracting strategy and encouraging the innovative application
of technology. DOE then assessed the applicability of these lessons at
some DOE sites and directed these sites to implement applicable
lessons. Although DOE conducted follow-up reviews at the sites through
2005, these reviews were focused on other aspects of the cleanup
program and did not assess whether the sites had implemented the
lessons learned from Rocky Flats. During our review, we noted
additional lessons that could also be useful for other DOE sites
planning or undergoing cleanup, such as involving the future site
manager in remedial decisions and taking a consultative approach with
the regulatory agencies on cleanup decisions. However, DOE has no
process for ensuring that all lessons are captured and implemented as
appropriate at other DOE sites. As a result, DOE may be losing the
chance to save both time and money in its planned or ongoing site
cleanup efforts.
We are making a number of recommendations aimed at strengthening DOE's
oversight of data quality, its cleanup assessments, and its process for
ensuring that lessons learned at cleanup sites are analyzed and
implemented as appropriate at other DOE sites.
We provided a draft of this report to DOE, Interior, EPA, Colorado, and
Kaiser-Hill for their review and comment. DOE, Interior, Colorado, and
Kaiser-Hill provided written comments (see apps. V, VI, VII, and VIII,
respectively), and generally agreed with the contents of the report.
EPA did not provide official written comments but did provide editorial
and technical suggestions, as did the other agencies, that we
incorporated, as appropriate. DOE concurred with one of our
recommendations but did not state whether it concurred with the other
two.
Background:
For nearly 40 years, the Rocky Flats plant, located about 16 miles
northwest of downtown Denver, served as a nuclear weapons production
facility. Afterward, the site bore the scars of that role: soil,
groundwater, surface water, and many of the buildings at the site were
contaminated with radioactive materials, such as plutonium and uranium;
toxic metals, such as beryllium; and hazardous chemicals, such as
cleaning solvents and degreasers. Accordingly, the site became one of
DOE's priorities for environmental cleanup. While most of the
approximately 6,300 acres that make up the Rocky Flats site served
through the years as an undeveloped buffer zone, about one-half of a
square mile (385 acres) in the center of the site constituted the
industrial area, where for decades, plutonium was shaped into plutonium
triggers or "pits" for use in nuclear weapons. About one-fourth of the
site's more than 800 original structures (e.g., buildings and storage
tanks) were radiologically or chemically contaminated--some severely
so--by site operations over the years.
The site was cleaned up under the terms of a contract between DOE and
Kaiser-Hill. The first contract took effect July 1, 1995. In late 1999,
DOE and Kaiser-Hill negotiated a new contract, which took effect on
February 1, 2000. The cleanup work was done predominantly by
subcontractors, under the contractor's management.
The 2000 contract specified both the contractor's and DOE's
responsibilities. The contractor was responsible for processing,
packaging, and shipping off site all of Rocky Flats' nuclear materials
and radioactive and hazardous wastes;[Footnote 12] cleaning up and
demolishing more than 700 structures that remained on site in February
2000; and cleaning up the site's contaminated soil and groundwater. DOE
was required to provide a variety of services and items to support the
project. Essentially, the contract required DOE to arrange receiver
sites for all the materials and wastes and obtain the necessary
certifications for the containers in which the materials and wastes had
to be packed and shipped. Many DOE sites played a significant role in
Rocky Flats' cleanup and closure, especially those sites that received
materials or wastes from Rocky Flats, such as the Savannah River Site
in South Carolina, the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in New
Mexico,[Footnote 13] the Nevada Test Site, and the Hanford Site in
Washington.
Much of the cleanup work at Rocky Flats was labor intensive and
tedious. Plutonium is dangerous to human health, even in minute
quantities, especially if inhaled or ingested. Accordingly, workers
handling plutonium-contaminated materials and equipment had to wear
cumbersome protective suits with enclosed respiratory systems, and
sometimes had to wield heavy and ungainly tools. Also, the equipment
being worked on had to be enclosed within plastic or glass to prevent
airborne contaminants from reaching unprotected workers or surfaces.
Figure 1 shows workers in protective clothing cutting contaminated
materials to fit shipping containers.
Figure 1: Workers in Protective Suits Cut Plutonium-Contaminated
Equipment:
[See PDF for image]
Source: DOE.
[End of figure]
Four Key Factors Contributed to Early Cleanup:
Four key factors contributed to the early completion of the physical
cleanup of Rocky Flats: (1) DOE and the contractor overcame several
major challenges identified in GAO's 2001 report on the Rocky Flats
cleanup, (2) DOE and the site's regulatory agencies agreed to use an
accelerated process to clean up the site, (3) a number of site-specific
characteristics combined to limit the scope and complexity of the
cleanup effort, and (4) DOE offered the contractor $560 million in
total incentive fees to finish the cleanup ahead of schedule and under
cost.
DOE and Contractor Overcame Previously Identified Cleanup Challenges:
The first key factor that contributed to the early completion of the
physical cleanup of Rocky Flats was that DOE and the contractor
resolved four of the five major challenges we identified in our 2001
report. These challenges included (1) completing the decontamination
and demolition of the site's structures; (2) overcoming limitations on
the available number of transportation casks and on the loading
capability for transuranic waste; (3) identifying the overall scope of
the cleanup project--specifically, the extent of contamination, the
eventual use of the site, and the level of cleanup that eventual use
would require; (4) getting the automated plutonium-packaging system to
reliably perform at the rate needed for timely completion; and (5)
preventing safety problems, which can result in work shutdowns and
delay cleanup work.
Completing Decontamination and Demolition of Structures:
One major challenge DOE and the contractor overcame was completing the
decontamination and demolition of hundreds of structures at the site.
At the end of fiscal year 2000, the contractor had completed only about
10 percent of the predemolition work, which included activities such as
removing plutonium and other nuclear materials from furnaces, pipes,
and other locations within buildings; draining and removing plutonium-
or uranium-laden liquids or residues from process pipes and tanks;
dismantling plutonium-processing furnaces; stripping out contaminated
process pipelines; and cutting up and removing hundreds of contaminated
gloveboxes.[Footnote 14] Further, at the time of our 2001 report, the
contractor had demolished only 81 of the 802 structures that existed at
the site when cleanup began. That accomplishment equated to about 10
percent of the total number of structures and only about 5 percent of
the total square footage. Remaining to be demolished at the end of
fiscal year 2000 were 721 structures, encompassing about 3.4 million
square feet.
DOE and the contractor overcame challenges to decontamination and
demolition primarily through innovation, as workers continuously sought
innovative cleanup technologies that would accomplish tasks more
safely, quickly, and cheaply. For example, the contractor found that it
could chemically decontaminate large pieces of equipment, such as tanks
and gloveboxes, by wiping their surfaces with a liquid cerium nitrate
solution.[Footnote 15] By doing so, the contractor could reduce the
contamination enough that the contaminated object could be shipped as
low-level radioactive waste rather than transuranic waste, which
requires a more costly shipping and disposal process. The Rocky Flats
buildings contained approximately 1,475 gloveboxes, ranging from shoe
box size to the size of an entire room. By reducing the level of
contamination, the contractor could ship even large gloveboxes whole,
rather than having to cut them into pieces small enough to fit into
standard waste boxes used for shipping transuranic waste. Figure 2
shows workers using cerium nitrate to decontaminate a glovebox and
loading a dismantled, decontaminated glovebox into a container for
shipping.
Figure 2: Workers Use Cerium Nitrate to Decontaminate a Glovebox;
Workers Load a Dismantled Glovebox into a Shipping Container:
[See PDF for image]
Source: DOE.
[End of figure]
The use of explosives in building demolition was another important time-
saving demolition technique. Contractor officials said they had learned
lessons from another DOE site at which DOE had doubted the demolitions
experts and reduced the amount of explosives used, resulting in an
explosion that failed to bring the structure down. At Rocky Flats,
accordingly, the contractor and DOE brought in demolitions experts and,
while closely reviewing the demolition plans and overseeing the work,
let the experts' opinions prevail. As a result, the use of explosives
saved time and money for the contractor and DOE. For example, in
bringing down building 881, one of the four original manufacturing
facilities at Rocky Flats, a contractor official estimated that the use
of explosives saved about 4 months, and reduced risks to workers by
removing hazards associated with heavy equipment and the falling debris
that typically results from their use in lieu of explosives. After
being completely decontaminated, building 881 was wired with explosives
and, as shown in figure 3, collapsed into its basement.
Figure 3: Use of Explosives in the Demolition of Rocky Flats' Building
881:
[See PDF for image]
Source: DOE.
[End of figure]
In addition to building 881, the contractor used explosives to bring
down smaller facilities, such as the guard and water towers, and to
separate the concrete from the rebar (the steel reinforcing bar) on the
walls of building 886.
Additional information on decontamination and demolition activities at
Rocky Flats is contained in appendix III.
Overcoming Limitations on Shipping and Transportation Capabilities:
A second challenge DOE and the contractor overcame was limitations on
the available number of transportation casks and on the loading
capability for transuranic waste. At the time of our 2001 report, the
contractor's ability to ship the total volume of waste off site to
DOE's WIPP facility by the target closure date was in doubt because of
uncertainties about whether DOE could obtain and provide the number of
transportation casks necessary to meet the contractor's projected
shipping schedule, especially for fiscal years 2002 and 2003, and
because of uncertainties about whether the three loading facilities
(two of which were still under construction at the time of our 2000
review) would be able to meet the shipping schedule for the site's peak
shipping years. That shipping schedule had been compressed by various
events, including delays in the opening of WIPP.
DOE and the contractor overcame this challenge primarily through
cooperation and perseverance. Whenever a DOE site could not use a
shipping container as scheduled, WIPP would send the container to Rocky
Flats instead. Also, DOE headquarters maintained a high priority on
Rocky Flats throughout the cleanup and made sure that it received the
government-furnished services and items it needed. Figure 4 shows
special transportation casks used to transport transuranic waste.
Figure 4: Transuranic Waste Packaged for Shipment to the Waste
Isolation Pilot Plant:
[See PDF for image]
Source: DOE.
[End of figure]
Also, while buildings at Rocky Flats were being demolished, the
contractor built the two additional loading facilities, as previously
mentioned, to ensure that loading and shipping schedules could be
supported. The new facilities resolved the challenge of inadequate
loading capability and allowed the contractor to increase its
transuranic waste-shipping capability to 15 shipments a week.
Identifying the Overall Scope of the Cleanup:
A third major challenge DOE and the contractor overcame was identifying
the overall scope of the cleanup--specifically, the extent of
contamination, the eventual use of the site, and the level of cleanup
that eventual use would require. At the time of our 2001 report, the
postcleanup use of the site--and, therefore, the level of cleanup
required--was uncertain. Moreover, the extent of soil contamination on
the site and the depth and degree of contamination under many of the
former production buildings was not fully understood, particularly in
the former industrial area, because parts of the site had not been
fully sampled. Finally, at the time of our 2001 report, DOE, the
regulatory agencies, and the community stakeholders had not yet reached
agreement on an appropriate level of soil cleanup, although various
studies were under way. These challenges were resolved through
congressional intervention and community collaboration.
Congressional action ended the uncertainty about the end use of the
site with passage of the Rocky Flats National Wildlife Refuge Act of
2001 (Refuge Act).[Footnote 16] Knowing the site's end use enabled DOE
and the regulatory agencies to then make assumptions about site users
and their risk of exposure to residual contamination. The risk posed to
a person by exposure to a contaminant is measured by a combination of
the contaminant's toxicity, together with the frequency, pathway, and
duration of exposure. Thus, a more stringent cleanup level is required
for a site that will be used constantly, such as for residential
purposes, than for a site that will be used sporadically, such as for
recreational purposes. Once the Refuge Act was passed, DOE and the
regulatory agencies assumed that the principal site users would be
wildlife refuge workers, who would spend about 8 hours a day at the
site (4 hours indoors and 4 hours outdoors), 250 days a year, for 18.7
years; and refuge visitors, who would spend about 2.5 hours a day at
the site, 100 days a year, for 30 years (6 years as a child and 24
years as an adult). Soil cleanup levels could then be set at a level
that would protect both types of users.
DOE collaborated with the community in determining the level of
remediation the cleanup would achieve. Before passage of the Refuge
Act, the Rocky Flats Cleanup Agreement had specified an interim soil
cleanup level (action level) of 651 picocuries of plutonium per gram
(pCi/g) of soil,[Footnote 17] meaning that a soil cleanup
action[Footnote 18] would be triggered by a soil sample indicating the
existence of plutonium in excess of 651 pCi/g.[Footnote 19] This action
level was considered unacceptable by the two stakeholder community
groups: the Rocky Flats Citizens Advisory Board and the Rocky Flats
Coalition of Local Governments; these groups argued for a much more
stringent action level. DOE funded a community- directed, independent
scientific assessment of soil action levels. This independent
assessment was overseen by a panel of community representatives. DOE
also funded a workshop, organized by the Rocky Flats Citizens Advisory
Board, featuring experts who provided presentations on radiological
assessments, risk analyses, and various computer-modeling scenarios and
assumptions. Working with local governments and members of the public,
DOE and the regulatory agencies ultimately agreed on a soil action
level of 50 picocuries of plutonium per gram (pCi/g) of surface soil
(i.e., the top 3 feet of soil), meaning that a remedial action would be
triggered by a soil sample indicating the existence of plutonium in
excess of 50 pCi/g. A plutonium level of 50 pCi/g translates to a risk
level of 1 in 500,000 (that is, this level of contamination could
result in one more case of cancer than otherwise would have been
expected in every 500,000 persons).[Footnote 20] DOE and the regulatory
agencies decided that, with a surface soil action level of 50 pCi/g,
higher concentrations of plutonium in soil could remain at greater
depth. Accordingly, DOE and the regulatory agencies agreed to set an
action level of 3,000 pCi/g for depths of 3 to 6 feet below the
surface, depending on the extent of the contamination. Once a remedial
action was triggered, cleanup would continue until contamination
greater than 1,000 pCi/g had been removed.
In addition to collaborating on decisions about soil cleanup levels,
community groups provided comments and advice on many other aspects of
the cleanup that influenced DOE's decisions in some cases. Our survey
of the Rocky Flats Citizens Advisory Board and the Rocky Flats
Coalition of Local Governments found that 21 of the 25 respondents were
very or somewhat satisfied with how DOE engaged the group in the
cleanup process. Also, 19 of the 25 respondents said they were very or
somewhat satisfied with how DOE used the group's input. Nearly all (23
of 25) said they believed the groups' input had a very or somewhat
positive effect on the cleanup process.
Problems with Automated Plutonium-Packaging System:
The unreliable functioning of the automated plutonium-packaging system
is the only one of the five challenges we identified in 2001 that DOE
and the contractor never fully resolved. It was only through
persistence and "brute force" that the packaging was finally completed
in July 2003, more than a year late and at least $50 million over
budget. The system never worked reliably, and many of the processes
that were designed to be automated had to be done manually. It required
continuous maintenance and modification, and broke down as many as two
or three times a day, requiring a "triage" repair team on call 24 hours
a day. Nevertheless, according to DOE officials, the pursuit of any
alternative to the system would probably have resulted in even greater
cost and schedule delays. Figure 5 shows GAO officials and staff being
briefed on the glovebox line behind the automated plutonium-packaging
system; this glovebox line handled the prepackaging of wet
combustibles.
Figure 5: GAO Staff Being Briefed on the Prepackaging of Wet
Combustibles, July 2002 and October 2000:
[See PDF for image]
Source: DOE.
[End of figure]
Preventing Safety Problems:
The final challenge that DOE and the contractor overcame was safety
problems, which can result in shutdowns and delay cleanup work. At the
time of our 2001 report, DOE was concerned about the number and
severity of safety violations that had occurred since the inception of
the 2000 contract. In response to those concerns, the contractor
developed a comprehensive plan to improve its safety and compliance
performance.
Although some safety incidents occurred after our 2001 report, the
contractor's overall safety performance improved. In two key measures
of safety, for example, Rocky Flats' performance was considerably
better than the average performance in the construction industry. One
of these measures is total recordable cases (TRC). Recordable cases, in
general, are any that require "more than a Band-Aid,TM" according to a
contractor safety official--for example, an injury that requires
stitches, prescription medication, or 1 or more days away from work. At
Rocky Flats, the 12-month TRC rolling average at the end of 2004 was
0.9 per 100 full-time workers. This was a significant improvement over
the 7.6 rate that existed at the site in July 1995, when Kaiser-Hill
took over from the previous contractor. By comparison, the TRC average
in the construction industry for calendar year 2004 was 6.4 per 100
full-time workers. The contractually established limit for TRCs at
Rocky Flats was a 12-month rolling average of 3.5 per 100 full-time
workers. Using the other key measure of safety, lost workdays, Rocky
Flats also performed well. At the end of 2004, the site's 12-month
rolling average rate for lost workday cases was 0.2, much lower than
the site's July 1995 rate of 4.6 and well below the construction
industry rate of 2.4 for calendar year 2004. The contractually
established limit for lost workdays at Rocky Flats was a 12-month
rolling average rate of 2.0.
The contractor's safety director reported that these safety
improvements were achieved through a combination of actions, including
getting the Chief Executive Officer, Chief Operating Officer, and other
top management officials involved; improving the work-planning process
to incorporate job-hazards analyses; involving the workers early in
safety-planning and job-hazards analyses; holding first-line
supervisors (i.e., foremen) responsible for informing workers of top
management's emphasis on safety; and improving the training provided to
workers. The site developed a course, commonly known as Rocky Flats
101, that contained a hands-on, simulated work environment in which
workers learned how to use ladders and various other tools in
contaminated spaces. The course was very effective, according to the
safety director.
Accelerated Cleanup Process Allowed Faster, More Collaborative Work:
The second key factor that contributed to the early completion of the
physical cleanup of Rocky Flats was the use of an accelerated cleanup
process. The Rocky Flats cleanup began in the late 1980s and early
1990s with extensive characterization (sampling of soil, groundwater,
surface water, and air). But after several years of characterization,
public frustration was building at the lack of visible progress in
cleaning up the contamination at the site. According to DOE officials,
the extensive sampling that was done at the site in the late 1980s and
early 1990s, together with historical documents about the use and
disposal of materials and wastes, facilitated use of the accelerated
process.[Footnote 21] Instead of proceeding under the full CERCLA/RCRA
process, the Rocky Flats Cleanup Agreement authorized DOE to perform
most of the cleanup through removal actions. In a 1996 report, we
recommended that DOE make greater use of removal actions to increase
the efficiency and cost-effectiveness of cleanups.[Footnote 22] Under
the accelerated process, cleanup actions, including soil removal, occur
early and throughout the process rather than at the end, with
confirmation sampling at each cleanup area to ensure that the
remediation was sufficient.[Footnote 23] DOE officials report that the
accelerated process allowed more timely removal of contaminants from
the site.
The pace of work in reviewing and approving cleanup documents was
"frantic," according to Colorado officials. Colorado, DOE, and the
contractor agreed on a "review template" of documents Colorado needed
to see for each building and area; the template allowed Colorado
officials to provide immediate review by working closely with the
contractor. Although the cleanup agreement specified that Colorado had
14 days (30 days in some cases) to review and provide comments on
cleanup-related documents, use of the review template shortened the
review time considerably. For example, the contractor would send draft
documents to Colorado officials, who would provide comments directly to
the contractor; the contractor then would respond by making
corrections, providing additional data or documents, or doing more work
if necessary. By working closely with the contractor along the way to
resolve questions or concerns, Colorado was able to respond quickly--
sometimes on the same day--to DOE's faxed requests for official
approval of cleanup-related documents. Colorado officials pointed out
that had they not been willing to work in this way with the contractor,
but had instead taken the 14 or 30 days provided for review and
approval under the cleanup agreement, the contractor would not have
been able to complete the cleanup as early as it did. (DOE noted that
Colorado's work with the contractor was not done without DOE's
involvement; as mentioned throughout the report, the entire process was
collaborative.)
DOE, EPA, and Colorado agreed that the accelerated process and the
collaboration it fostered were essential to the cleanup's early
completion. According to EPA and Colorado officials, their agencies had
staff on site "continuously," working in the field with DOE and
contractor staff to discuss and observe cleanup operations, and
requiring "real time" changes as necessary. Throughout the process, the
regulatory agencies were intimately involved in reviewing data and
otherwise contributing to the development of studies, plans, and
decision documents. As a result, the "back end" of the review process
was very streamlined, according to contractor officials.
While the accelerated cleanup actions were under way, and as data from
the completed cleanup actions became available, DOE concurrently
conducted the remedial investigation and feasibility study (RI/
FS),[Footnote 24] which summarizes site conditions at closure and
evaluates necessary long-term remedies, such as site monitoring. Based
on all of the data collected at the site, including the results of the
individual accelerated cleanup actions and the RI/FS, DOE will identify
its preferred final remedy in the proposed plan, which will be released
for formal public comment once the final RI/FS has been approved by EPA
and Colorado. DOE shared the draft RI/FS with the public and obtained
EPA's and Colorado's comments on it; these comments were considered
during preparation of the final RI/FS. After considering comments
received on the proposed plan during a 60-day public comment period,
DOE will select and document its preferred remedy in the final decision
document. Once EPA and Colorado approve the final decision document, it
will serve as both the corrective action decision (under RCRA) and the
record of decision (under CERCLA).
Site-Specific Characteristics Aided Cleanup Effort:
The third key factor that contributed to the early completion of the
physical cleanup of Rocky Flats was a confluence of circumstances--
climatic, geologic, chemical, structural and economic--that confined
the scope and complexity of the cleanup effort. Climatically and
geologically, the semiarid climate and the alluvial fan upon which the
site is located contributed to slow erosion of soils over time, thus
inhibiting the off-site migration of contaminants. The site also
benefited from layers of shale and claystone--hundreds of feet thick in
places--that prevented contamination from seeping into the deep
drinking-water aquifer that underlies part of the site.
Chemically, the cleanup was aided by the nature of the two key
contaminants--plutonium and americium, which are essentially insoluble
in water and, instead, tend to bind to soil and sediment particles,
according to a study undertaken in the late 1990s.[Footnote 25] At
Rocky Flats, there is little groundwater movement, and no groundwater
was contaminated with plutonium and americium.[Footnote 26] Instead,
soil was the predominant environmental medium requiring cleanup.
Remediation of contaminated soil generally consists of digging it up
and shipping it to a disposal site, a simpler task than remediating
groundwater. The contaminants move around the site, and potentially off
site, by surface-soil erosion, wind, or surface water. For example,
westerly winds spread contaminated soil to off-site lands east of Rocky
Flats. In a 1997 combined corrective action decision/record of decision
about these lands,[Footnote 27] EPA and Colorado determined that the
lands did not pose an unacceptable or significant risk to human health
or the environment, notwithstanding the low levels of plutonium and
americium that existed in the soil--in portions of the lands--from
Rocky Flats activities.[Footnote 28]
Structurally, the robust construction of the plutonium-processing
buildings, with their thick concrete floors and walls, contained many
leaks and spills of radioactive and hazardous materials, thereby
limiting the extent and severity of contamination under the buildings.
Building 371, for example, was a complex, extremely strong, and rigid
structure that was built to withstand accidents such as earthquakes,
tornadoes, winds, and fires. The building was a partially buried
structure of reinforced concrete with an extensive foundation of
concrete caissons up to 6 feet in diameter, drilled into bedrock, and
concrete wall and slab thicknesses beyond typical industrial use and
code requirements. Similarly, building 771 featured concrete
thicknesses ranging from 6.5 inches to more than 2 feet.
Finally, the local economy was a factor in the success of the cleanup,
according to Colorado officials. The local economy was not heavily
dependent on the cleanup project to provide jobs, so closing the site
did not meet large-scale community opposition.
DOE Provided the Contractor with a Financial Incentive to Finish Early
and Under Cost:
The fourth key factor that contributed to the early completion of the
physical cleanup of Rocky Flats involved certain features of the
cleanup contract, including a substantial financial incentive for the
contractor to finish the cleanup work ahead of schedule and below
budget. The contract provided for an incentive fee tied partly to
schedule but predominantly to cost. The contractor would earn the
target fee of $340 million if it completed its work between December
16, 2006, and March 31, 2007, at a cost between $4 billion and $4.2
billion.[Footnote 29] If the contractor completed the cleanup outside
of these schedule and cost ranges, the fee would rise or fall
accordingly--to as much as $460 million for less costly, earlier
completion, or as little as $130 million for more costly, later
completion. In 2003, when officials saw that the contractor was
confident of earning the maximum fee and was no longer working
aggressively to further shorten the completion timeline or reduce
costs, DOE approved a $100 million increase in the maximum incentive
fee. In the end, DOE awarded the contractor $49 million of the
additional available fee, based on a reduction in the total project
cost of an additional $129 million.
DOE also encouraged the contractor to continue its practice of sharing
incentive fees among its workforce by offering employees financial
incentives to continue to work safely and generate ideas for ways to
save costs and time. In its initial contract bid for the 1995 contract
for the Rocky Flats cleanup, Kaiser-Hill committed to share 20 percent
of its profits with employees. The contractor's president explained
that incentives were offered across the workforce, although the
incentive type varied by work group. Salaried employees were
individually evaluated based on their project and safety performance;
the value of their incentive pay was based on the final total project
cost. For hourly employees, incentive pay was determined though
collective bargaining but was primarily based on schedule performance.
Steelworkers received an annual incentive bonus, based on schedule
performance; workers in the building trades received an annual hourly
increase, also based on schedule performance. The contractor also had a
safety incentive program that included spot cash awards. Over the life
of the project, the contractor distributed approximately $100 million
of company earnings (about 20 percent of its $510 million incentive
fee) to its workers, and DOE contributed an additional $30 million that
was used for incentive pay.[Footnote 30]
According to the contractor, financial incentives for early or under-
budget completion of a project are a powerful motivator; however, it is
important to note that the financial incentive offered at Rocky Flats
was only one of many factors contributing to the early completion of
the cleanup. In GAO's experience, such incentives are not always this
successful. As we reported in December 2005, the Department of Defense
has not fared well at using incentive-fee contracts to improve cost-
control behavior or meet program goals.[Footnote 31] Specifically,
about half of the 27 incentive-fee contracts included in GAO's review
failed or were projected to fail to meet a key measure of program
success--completing the objective (i.e., delivering the product or
service specified by the contract) at or below the target price.
Research on incentive fees by GAO, Harvard University, and the RAND
Corporation going back decades has concluded that incentive fees do not
consistently motivate contractors to control cost.
Additionally, according to the contractor, enhanced workforce
transition benefits could be considered important to worker motivation
and productivity. Enhanced benefits included pension and post-
retirement medical benefits and outplacement services such as
relocation and education benefits.
Another unusual and critically important feature of the Rocky Flats
contract was consistent funding. An underlying premise of the
contractor's ability to finish the job early and under budget was that
a stable source of funding would be provided throughout the cleanup. As
part of the contract negotiation process, DOE and the contractor
assumed an annual funding level of $657 million per year. Both DOE
headquarters and Congress helped each year to ensure that the site
received a consistent funding level. The contract also stipulated the
services and items that the government would provide, including making
a number of shipping containers available and arranging treatment and
disposal sites for radioactive waste at the site. If DOE did not meet
its contractual obligation, it would be grounds for changing the
contract. In that way, DOE bore the liability for any role it had in
increasing contract costs.
Cleanup of Rocky Flats Is Complete at a Cost of about $10 Billion, but
Key Steps Remain Before the Planned Wildlife Refuge Will Open:
The physical cleanup at Rocky Flats is complete, at a total cost
(including long-term costs) of about $10 billion;[Footnote 32] however,
several regulatory steps remain before land can be transferred to the
Department of the Interior for establishment of the wildlife refuge
planned for the site. After DOE issues and considers public comments on
its proposed plan, identifying its preferred alternative for the site's
future monitoring and remediation, EPA and Colorado will jointly
determine whether any further cleanup is needed at the site or whether
the cleanup actions already taken are sufficient to render the site
safe for its intended purpose. A final decision by EPA and Colorado is
expected in late 2006. If they decide that no further action is needed
to remediate the site, EPA will delete portions of the site from the
CERCLA National Priorities List[Footnote 33] and certify that the
cleanup and closure of Rocky Flats has been completed; the Secretary of
the Interior can then accept administrative jurisdiction of designated
lands and establish the refuge, in accordance with the Rocky Flats
National Wildlife Refuge Act of 2001.
Regulatory Steps Remain Before the Site Can Open as a Wildlife Refuge:
Although the contractor has finished the cleanup at Rocky Flats, DOE,
EPA, and Colorado must complete the remaining steps of the regulatory
process before Rocky Flats can be removed from the National Priorities
List. On October 13, 2005, the contractor declared that it had
successfully completed the Rocky Flats cleanup--more than 1 year before
the target cleanup completion date cited in the contract and more than
3 years before the completion date the contractor thought likely in our
2001 report.[Footnote 34]
In declaring the cleanup complete in October 2005, the contractor
stated that it had met all of the cleanup requirements in the contract,
which included: (1) demolishing all buildings; (2) investigating and
remediating as necessary 360 individual cleanup areas; (3) removing
wastes as specified in the cleanup agreement; (4) installing closure
caps for two landfills; (5) covering appropriate areas such as building
foundations, utilities, paved roads, and parking lots with a minimum of
3 feet of fill (e.g., Rocky Flats alluvium) after final grade; (6)
ensuring that on-site surface water meets health-based standards for
open-space use; and (7) ensuring that water leaving the site via two
creeks will meet Colorado water quality standards. The contractor
reported its major cleanup accomplishments in an October 2005
report.[Footnote 35] Among these accomplishments were that the
contractor:
* deactivated, decontaminated, removed, and cut up 1,475 gloveboxes,
and disposed of them off site;
* cleaned up and removed more than 800 structures, including more than
1 million square feet associated with five major plutonium facilities
and two major uranium facilities;
* shipped to other DOE facilities 21 tons of special nuclear materials
(plutonium and highly enriched uranium), including metals, oxides, and
over 100 tons of plutonium residues;
* deactivated, decontaminated, removed, and cut up 690 tanks, and
disposed of them off site;
* installed covers at two landfills;
* investigated and remediated, as necessary, 421 areas of known or
suspected contamination, including 360 cleanup areas such as individual
hazardous substance sites and contamination located under buildings;
and:
* installed three barriers and a seep collection system to treat
contaminated groundwater plumes; installed passive treatment systems to
protect surface water quality.
Figure 6 illustrates the equivalent amounts of waste removed and
contaminated water treated at Rocky Flats during the cleanup.
Figure 6: Waste Removed and Contaminated Water Treated at Rocky Flats:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO>
[End of figure]
Figure 7 shows the site as it was in 1995, when the contractor began
its cleanup job, and on October 13, 2005, when the contractor declared
its job done.
Figure 7: Rocky Flats, before Cleanup, in 1995 (left), and after
Cleanup (in 2005):
[See PDF for image]
Source: DOE.
[End of figure]
The contract provided that when the contractor declared the cleanup
finished, DOE would have 90 days to either accept the project as
complete or provide the contractor with a list of items to address. In
November 2005, DOE provided the contractor with the final list. In
December 2005, after reviewing cleanup documentation, doing a final
walk-through of the site, and ensuring that the contractor had
completed the remaining items, DOE agreed that the contractor had
fulfilled all of the cleanup actions specified in the contract and the
cleanup was complete.
The next steps include the review, revision, and final approval of the
remaining regulatory documents. Figure 8 shows the key steps in Rocky
Flats' transition from a cleanup site to a wildlife refuge.
Figure 8: Key Steps in Rocky Flats' Transition to a Wildlife Refuge:
[See PDF for image]
Sources: GAO, based on information provided by DOE, EPA, and FWS.
[End of figure]
Those steps are as follows:
* July 2006: DOE expects to issue its proposed plan, specifying its
preference for future monitoring and remediation of the site from among
the following alternatives outlined in an RI/FS: (1) no further action,
with monitoring; (2) monitoring plus both institutional and physical
controls; and (3) monitoring and both institutional and physical
controls, plus additional targeted removal of plutonium-contaminated
soil in an isolated area to reduce the excess cancer risk for wildlife
refuge workers from 1 in 500,000 to 1 in 1,000,000. The proposed plan
will also specify the area to be retained by DOE rather than
transferred to FWS. As agreed between DOE and the regulatory agencies,
the plan will be issued for a 60-day public comment period, which will
include a public hearing.
* November 2006: After considering public comments on the proposed
plan, EPA and Colorado expect to finalize and issue the final joint
decision document.[Footnote 36] The final decision document will
specify what additional cleanup, if any, is necessary at the site and
what monitoring and institutional and physical controls, if any, will
be necessary. The document will also include a "responsiveness summary"
that responds to questions from the public and other stakeholders on
the proposed plan.
* December 2006: EPA expects to certify that the cleanup is complete.
It may then remove portions of the site from the National Priorities
List.[Footnote 37]
* Early 2007: DOE expects to transfer jurisdiction of the majority of
the site (approximately 5,400 acres) to FWS. The specific acreage to be
transferred will be specified in the final decision document and will
be contingent upon DOE's purchasing privately owned "essential mineral
rights" (i.e., the right to mine sand and gravel) affecting about 700
acres. Under the legislation authorizing DOE to purchase these
essential mineral rights, the refuge will not include land that is
subject to sand and gravel mining or is being actively mined by private
parties.[Footnote 38]
* 2012 through 2022: FWS expects to open public access trails and
facilities in the wildlife refuge, as described in the agency's Final
Comprehensive Conservation Plan.[Footnote 39] FWS's ability to
implement its conservation plan is contingent on funding availability.
In the first year following land transfer and refuge establishment, if
funds are available, FWS will open one 1.75-mile pedestrian trail,
which will follow the existing road to the Lindsay Ranch homestead
site, which dates from the early 1940s (see fig. 9).
Figure 9: The Lindsay Ranch:
[See PDF for image]
Source: DOE.
[End of figure]
Before opening other trails, FWS officials said they will concentrate
on restoring wildlife and plant habitat, controlling noxious weeds,
removing roads and culverts, and restoring the prairie grasslands. As
funding permits, between 2012 and 2022, they plan to phase in the
remaining 15 miles of trail as well as other public-use facilities,
such as parking lots, a visitors' kiosk, wildlife-viewing blinds, and
scenic overlooks. Figure 10 depicts FWS's plan for visitor use at the
refuge, including about 16 miles of trails, parking, and developed
overlooks.
Figure 10: Plan for Public Access Trails and Facilities at the Rocky
Flats National Wildlife Refuge:
[See PDF for image]
Source: U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service.
[End of figure]
Even after the wildlife refuge opens, some stewardship activities will
likely continue at the site for an indeterminate time. For example, DOE
will maintain groundwater monitoring wells and treatment facilities as
long as necessary, subject to approval of the regulatory agencies.
Additionally, as required by CERCLA,[Footnote 40] DOE will review the
site at least every 5 years to determine whether remedies continue to
be fully protective of human health and the environment. DOE, EPA, and
Colorado reviewed parts of the site in 2002; the next review is
scheduled for 2007.
Further, DOE negotiated an environmental covenant with Colorado for one
of the landfills at the site, called the Present Landfill. The purpose
of this covenant is to ensure protection of human health and the
environment by preventing intrusions into the landfill or damage to the
various engineered structures on adjoining lands and preventing
exposure to hazardous wastes. The covenant, which runs with the land in
perpetuity, is binding on DOE and all other interested parties
(including persons using the land), as well as their heirs and
successors. Activities prohibited by the covenant include digging,
drilling, tilling, grading, and excavating, as well as any activities
that could damage or impair the proper functioning of the landfill cap
and runoff controls, the passive seep intercept and treatment system,
or the groundwater monitoring wells. According to a DOE official, DOE
and the state anticipate that the covenant for the Present Landfill
will be supplanted by a broader covenant for the DOE-retained lands;
this broader covenant will become effective with execution of the final
decision document (the combined corrective action decision/record of
decision).
The long-term care of the site is a subject of continuing debate and,
for some, concern. The long-term condition and care of the site were
the concerns most mentioned by community group survey respondents. Of
the 17 (of 25) survey respondents who said they had remaining concerns
about the cleanup, 15 mentioned concerns about what would happen at the
site in the future.
Rocky Flats Cleanup Cost about $10 Billion, Including Long-Term Costs:
The total cost of the cleanup--about $10 billion--comprises costs
incurred from 1995 through 2005 and estimated long-term costs through
about 2080. Costs incurred to date include the following:
* The 2000 closure contract cost DOE over $4.1 billion through October
2005--nearly half the total cost of cleanup through closure. This cost
includes the $510 million incentive fee that DOE paid the contractor.
* The 1995 cleanup contract cost DOE nearly $3.6 billion through early
2000, including a $120 million fee to the contractor.
* The cost of DOE's Rocky Flats Field Office from fiscal year 1995
through October 2005 was nearly $760 million. This cost included staff
salaries, site utilities, litigation support, regulatory oversight, and
other expenses.
* The cost incurred by other DOE sites in support of the Rocky Flats
closure was approximately $138 million, for such activities as
certifying shipping containers, providing transportation for nuclear
materials and wastes, and receiving and storing Rocky Flats' materials
and wastes.
In addition, in January 2006, Congress authorized DOE to spend up to
$10 million on the purchase of designated "essential mineral rights" at
the Rocky Flats site.[Footnote 41] The law provided that these mineral
rights at the site can be purchased only from willing sellers and that
the cost must not exceed fair market value. In January 2006, DOE shared
the results of an appraisal of the mineral rights with the three
ownership groups at Rocky Flats. DOE will meet with various natural
resources trustees, including the Department of the Interior, to
determine how to facilitate the sale of the designated essential
mineral rights.
DOE anticipates that long-term costs will exceed $1.3 billion. The bulk
of these costs will be the cost to DOE for pensions and postretirement
benefits (primarily medical and life insurance coverage) for the
contractor's Rocky Flats employees. These costs will likely exceed $1
billion, including about $822 million in medical benefits alone. DOE is
liable for such costs under the provisions of not only the 2000
contract, but also previous site management contracts with Kaiser-Hill
and its predecessors. Postretirement benefits and pensions are part of
the total allowable compensation for DOE contractor employees, and DOE
considers them to be necessary to attract the most qualified employees.
DOE Order 350.1 provides that when operations at a DOE facility are
terminated and no other work is to occur under the contract (as in the
case of Rocky Flats), pension and postretirement health benefit
continuation will be provided by DOE for those contractor employees who
earned retirement benefits in these plans. According to actuarial
estimates prepared for DOE by a consultant, payments for contractor
employees at Rocky Flats will continue until about 2064.
At Rocky Flats, 2,815 (43 percent) of 6,616 contractor employees were
eligible for postretirement benefits.[Footnote 42] These employees
worked for either the prime contractor (Kaiser-Hill) or one of its
major subcontractors, and retired between January 1, 1995, and December
31, 2005. The estimated cost of over $1 billion does not include
pensions and postretirement benefits for employees who would have
become eligible if the site had closed on its original target closure
date of December 31, 2006. When the site closed more than a year ahead
of schedule, the early closure date preceded the eligibility date for
full pensions and postretirement benefits of 34 employees, according to
a contractor official.
Costs for the long-term stewardship of the site are estimated at $303
million. Long-term stewardship includes site surveillance and
maintenance, as well as management of site records and information
systems. For many decades to come, DOE will need to monitor
environmental conditions at the site and maintain the systems and
structures that remain there (e.g., groundwater treatment systems,
ponds and surface water control features, and landfills). According to
draft DOE guidance, surveillance and maintenance refers to "all
activities necessary to ensure protection of human health and the
environment following cleanup at a site, in perpetuity." Thus, while
long-term stewardship costs are estimated through about 2080, some
costs will continue beyond that, depending on the extent of stewardship
needed.
Our 2001 report noted that the total cost could rise if any claims for
monetary damages were brought against DOE to compensate for injuries to
natural resources. Under CERCLA, federal, state, and Indian tribal
officials who have been designated as trustees can file claims for
monetary damages for injuries to natural resources (including wildlife,
fish, and lakes) resulting from releases of hazardous substances.
Damages are usually for injuries that were not rectified by the cleanup
and are to be used to restore, replace, or acquire equivalent
resources. In a November 2005 report,[Footnote 43] DOE's Inspector
General said that DOE had not yet conducted the required Natural
Resource Damage Assessment at Rocky Flats and that only the completion
of that assessment would determine whether additional costs will be
ultimately incurred.
But speculation about the potential cost of natural resource damage
claims at the site was laid to rest with passage of the 2006 National
Defense Authorization Act. Under the act, a natural resource damage
liability claim would be considered to be satisfied by the purchase of
mineral rights for $10 million, as authorized by the act, or the
payment of the authorized $10 million to the natural resource trustees,
or a combination of the two, for a total payment of $10
million.[Footnote 44] Although DOE had agreed with the Inspector
General's recommendation to immediately initiate the damage assessment,
the subsequent provisions of the Defense Authorization Act rendered the
damage assessment requirement moot.
Numerous Measures Were Taken to Assess the Cleanup's Sufficiency, but
DOE Could Improve Its Oversight of Data Quality and Clarify Its
Verification Policy:
Numerous measures were and are being taken to assess the sufficiency of
the cleanup; although these measures appear adequate, DOE did not carry
out some aspects of its oversight responsibilities. Cleanup assessment
measures include (1) the completion of the CERCLA and RCRA regulatory
process, (2) DOE's verification of the contractor's remediation of
radiologically contaminated soil, and (3) other reviews by federal
agencies and independent consultants. The first assessment measure--
completion of the CERCLA and RCRA regulatory review and approval
process--relies on remediation data collected throughout the cleanup.
Our review showed that the contractor appeared to have comprehensive
quality controls for data. Nevertheless, DOE did not independently
review the quality of these data. A DOE official said that, while he
had no explanation for DOE's not conducting the required reviews, DOE
officials' day-to-day review of data did enable them to detect data
issues as they arose. The second assessment measure--DOE's verification
of the contractor's actions to remediate radiologically contaminated
surface soil--was not completed. DOE decided to eliminate parts of the
planned independent review of the accuracy of contractor-conducted
scans for remaining radiological contamination because DOE officials
decided that the likely results would not justify the completion of an
independent review. The third assessment measure--outside reviews--
included a consultant review that convinced DOE to revise a key water
management strategy at the site, and a federal review that found no
public health hazard for the communities surrounding Rocky Flats.
DOE Did Not Independently Review the Quality of Cleanup Data Crucial to
the Regulatory Process:
DOE did not independently review the quality of the data obtained
throughout the cleanup--data crucial to the first assessment of the
cleanup's sufficiency, the CERCLA and RCRA process. As discussed
earlier, the final steps of this regulatory process are still in
progress,[Footnote 45] but much of the process is complete. Key data
were obtained through a four-step process of remediating 360 individual
areas at Rocky Flats, and EPA and Colorado documented their approval of
these cleanups in closeout reports, giving DOE officials confidence
that the site will meet the final cleanup requirements. The closeout
reports also include data on residual contamination (i.e., the
contamination that remains following completion of the cleanup action).
The residual contamination data were analyzed in a draft comprehensive
risk assessment that was part of the remedial investigation/feasibility
study, which determined that the site's overall risk falls within EPA's
acceptable risk range. Because the data from the accelerated actions
are crucial to the regulatory agencies' final decision on the
sufficiency of the cleanup, we reviewed the controls in place to ensure
the quality of these data. We discussed these data quality policies and
procedures with DOE, EPA, Colorado, and contractor and subcontractor
officials and determined that, although the contractor's data quality
controls appeared robust and comprehensive, DOE could improve its
oversight of them. Further, our review of several closeout documents
revealed that the policies and procedures were generally followed.
Soil Cleanup Actions Followed a Four-Step Process:
At Rocky Flats, accelerated soil cleanup actions were generally
completed and approved through a four-step process.[Footnote 46] As of
May 2006, EPA and Colorado officials said they had approved the
closeout reports on all 360 areas of known or suspected contamination
at Rocky Flats and had concluded that no further accelerated cleanup
actions were necessary for those areas.[Footnote 47] Closeout reports
are the last step of a regulatory approach that documented the
accelerated cleanup actions taken, quantified contaminants remaining
after the cleanup actions were completed, and documented whether the
project goals had been met. The remediation of each area of soil
contamination at Rocky Flats followed a four-step process:
characterization, contaminant remediation, confirmation sampling, and
clean fill and project documentation.
The first step--characterization--identified whether contamination had
occurred. The contractor had to design a sampling and analysis approach
for each specific cleanup area and receive DOE's approval before
submitting the approach to the regulatory agencies for their review and
approval.[Footnote 48] Once a potentially contaminated area was
identified, the contractor would propose one of several approaches to
collect the necessary samples. For example, the contractor might choose
a standard statistical sampling approach, which entails designing a
sample grid capable of identifying an elevated area of contamination
with 90 percent confidence, then applying that grid to the actual
cleanup area. Sample collection involved taking small scoops of dirt,
which were analyzed in a laboratory for a variety of contaminants such
as metals, volatile organic compounds, and radionuclides.
The second step--contaminant remediation--cleans up any contaminants
that characterization found to exceed acceptable levels. Again, the
contractor would prepare a remediation plan, based on a standardized
approach for removing soil,[Footnote 49] in consultation with EPA,
Colorado, and members of the public, for EPA and Colorado to approve.
Once approval was granted, the contractor could proceed with the actual
cleanup. Cleanup typically involved digging out the contaminated soil,
packaging it, and shipping it to a licensed treatment or disposal
facility. The depth to which soil was removed varied depending on the
type and severity of contamination. In some areas, less than a foot of
soil needed to be removed; in other areas, 20 feet of soil needed to be
removed. The contractor took samples throughout the remediation to
identify when the remediation goal had been met and could then move on
to the third step. According to officials of both EPA and Colorado,
they frequently directed their staff to observe the cleanup actions to
ensure they were being implemented as agreed. Colorado officials said
that, while the frequency and duration of their oversight varied by
project, daily interaction and observation by Colorado staff was
typical.
The third step--confirmation sampling--required taking small scoops of
dirt from areas where the contractor believed remediation was complete,
and having them analyzed for the presence of previously identified
contaminants. The samples could be analyzed at an on-site laboratory or
sent off site, depending on the types of contaminants. If the
laboratory confirmed that the contaminants had been removed to an
acceptable level, the contractor could move on to the next step. If the
laboratory results showed an unacceptable level of contaminants, then
additional soil would be removed, followed by additional confirmation
sampling. Additional soil removal and sampling rarely occurred,
however, because field measurements and analyses were used to guide the
remediation work before the final confirmation samples were taken.
The fourth and final step--clean fill and project documentation--
included filling the excavated area and preparing a closeout report
that documented that the cleanup had met the stated goals and
quantified any residual contamination. The contractor generally filled
the excavated area with Rocky Flats alluvium, a mixture of sand, dirt,
and gravel. Documentation of residual contamination was important to
the regulatory process because these data were instrumental in
completing the remedial investigation and feasibility study, including
the comprehensive risk assessment.[Footnote 50] After DOE approved the
closeout report, it was delivered to the regulatory agencies for final
approval. The regulatory agencies' approval meant that the cleanup was
sufficient and that no further accelerated action was needed. This four-
step remediation process is illustrated in figure 11.
Figure 11: Four-Step Remediation Process for Individual Areas of Known
or Suspected Contamination:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
Although soil remediation was the primary cleanup focus at Rocky Flats,
some groundwater required remediation for elevated levels of uranium,
nitrates, and volatile organic compounds. Three passive systems were
installed to treat the contaminants in the groundwater. At one former
waste-drum storage area, for example, remediation of a carbon
tetrachloride plume, along with other volatile organic compounds,
involved excavating about 700 cubic yards of contaminated soils,
treating them through thermal desorption,[Footnote 51] and then
constructing a passive treatment system that uses iron filings to
cleanse contaminants from the groundwater. Figure 12 shows the cleanup
of a plume of carbon tetrachloride and other volatile organic compounds
(VOC) that originated from a waste-drum storage area at Rocky Flats.
Figure 12: Treatment of Contaminated Soils by Thermal Desorption;
Installation of a Passive Treatment System at the Mound Storage Site,
Rocky Flats:
[See PDF for image]
Source: DOE.
[End of figure]
Because of the tendency of plutonium and americium particles to cling
to soil, a primary concern among stakeholders was the potential off-
site transport of soil contaminated with plutonium and americium via
surface water. Contaminated soil washes into ditches and streams when
it rains or snows. Accordingly, cleanup efforts have focused on the
surface soils to reduce the source of radionuclides that could be
susceptible to erosion and eventual transport off site via Walnut and
Woman Creeks. Also, surface water is managed and monitored both on
site--through a series of holding ponds--and at the points where it
leaves the site. The ponds, which DOE constructed decades ago to retain
any major release during operations, are used to ensure that water
leaving the site meets all applicable water quality standards.[Footnote
52] DOE operates the final pond in each series as a "batch and release"
system; that is, releases from those ponds occur only after water
sampling has confirmed that the water meets water quality standards.
The efficacy of the accelerated cleanup actions taken to protect water
quality will be evaluated in the remedial investigation/feasibility
study. Figure 13 shows the terminal pond in one series.
Figure 13: Terminal Pond in the B Series of Ponds:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
Draft Comprehensive Risk Assessment Concluded That Residual Risk Is
Acceptable:
The draft sitewide comprehensive risk assessment, one of several
documents that will contribute to the final regulatory decision on the
sufficiency of the Rocky Flats cleanup, concluded that the cumulative
remaining risk to human health and the environment at Rocky Flats is
acceptable. The draft comprehensive risk assessment--part of the larger
remedial investigation and feasibility study--concluded that the
cumulative risk to human health, after completion of the accelerated
cleanup actions, falls at the more protective end of EPA's "excess
cancer rate" risk range of between 1 in 10,000 and 1 in
1,000,000.[Footnote 53] This is the range that EPA considers to be
adequately protective of human health.
As discussed previously, the Rocky Flats cleanup was designed so that
any residual contamination after completion of the accelerated cleanup
actions would be documented in closeout reports and subsequently
analyzed in accordance with the exposure assumptions in the sitewide
comprehensive risk assessment. The comprehensive risk assessment
incorporated approximately 2 million data records and examined both
human and ecological risk. Specific tasks included:
* identifying remaining contamination at Rocky Flats and determining
whether it can adversely affect humans, animals, or plants;
* determining whether pathways exist whereby human or ecological
receptors may come into contact with these contaminants, for example,
through inhalation or ingestion of surface water;
* assessing the contaminants' potential effects, including cancer, on
the human and ecological receptors, where complete pathways exist; and:
* calculating the potential risk to the human and ecological receptors,
based on the pathways and the levels and toxicity of the contaminants.
The human health risk assessment calculated the risk that residual
contaminants posed to wildlife refuge workers and visitors. The
assessment identified five residual contaminants at the site that could
affect human health, including plutonium located adjacent to the most
contaminated precleanup areas of the site. The risk model assumed that
the primary pathways for plutonium were either through inhalation or
through skin contact. Based on assumptions about how frequently a
wildlife refuge worker would be exposed to residual plutonium at the
site, the model calculated an EPA acceptable risk of 1 in 500,000
excess cancers, and an even lesser risk for a refuge visitor.
The ecological risk assessment estimated the risk that exposure to any
residual contaminants would pose to species of concern, including the
Preble's Meadow jumping mouse, a protected species. After modeling
risks to selected terrestrial and aquatic species, the risk assessment
concluded that the residual contaminants at Rocky Flats do not
represent a significant risk of adverse ecological effects to these
species.
Nearly all respondents to our community group survey expressed
confidence in the cleanup's outcome. Specifically, 11 of 25 respondents
said they were very or extremely confident that the cleanup will be
protective of public health and the environment, and another 12 said
they were somewhat confident.
Rocky Flats Cleanup Data Quality Procedures Comprehensive, but DOE's
Oversight Was Lacking:
One of the most important aspects of the cleanup process was ensuring
the validity of the data used to determine whether the site had been
remediated to the agreed-upon levels. However, DOE did not complete the
independent and management assessments required by the cleanup
agreement to ensure that these data quality controls were working as
intended. We identified four key data quality controls: establishing
data quality objectives, using data quality parameters, verifying and
validating data, and auditing laboratories that analyzed samples for
Rocky Flats. Our review showed that the contractor generally followed
these data quality controls and documented its compliance with them.
Appendix IV contains additional information on the four data quality
controls and our review of the contractor's compliance with them.
Although the data quality controls the contractor had in place appeared
to be robust and comprehensive, DOE did not conduct independent
assessments to ensure that this was the case. Specifically, DOE did not
conduct the management and independent assessments called for by the
quality assurance project plan.[Footnote 54] A quality assurance
project plan describes the planning, implementation, and assessment
procedures for a particular project, as well as any specific quality
assurance and quality control activities.[Footnote 55] These
independent assessments, according to DOE's Management Assessment and
Independent Assessment Guide, are intended to measure the adequacy of
work performance, among other things. Among the essential areas that
should be assessed, according to the guide, are data quality controls
such as calibration controls, computer software controls, and
environmental management systems.
DOE's failure to conduct independent assessments is particularly
troubling because of the importance of the cleanup and residual
contamination data. These data were not only the basis for EPA's and
Colorado's approvals of the accelerated cleanup actions, but also the
foundation for EPA's and Colorado's pending decisions about the overall
sufficiency of the site's cleanup. Without independent assessments of
the contractor's data quality control measures, DOE had no assurance
that the controls were working as intended. Also troubling was that EPA
and Colorado--the regulatory agencies that jointly approved the site's
quality assurance project plan and are responsible for ensuring its
implementation--were unfamiliar with these assessment requirements.
When we discussed with EPA officials DOE's failure to conduct
independent or management assessments, they acknowledged that their
confidence in the data quality would have been increased had DOE
completed these assessments. A DOE official said he had no explanation
for DOE's not conducting the required assessments, other than that DOE
officials had reviewed sampling and analysis plans, remediation plans,
and closeout reports, and discussed with the contractor any data
quality issues that arose.
Colorado officials said they reviewed the data and the controls
provided by the contractor, which is the state's standard procedure for
determining the usability of data provided it, and that DOE's failure
to conduct assessments of the data does not affect the decisions made
by the state. Colorado noted that it did not have significant issues
with the data provided, and that any data issues were resolved using
the consultative process, including bringing in experts to discuss and
resolve specific issues. In addition, Colorado said, it performed
routine independent sampling and analysis of water samples, as well as
occasional building samples, which confirmed the data results provided
to the state. Accordingly, although DOE assessments might have provided
another check on data quality and adequacy, the lack of these
assessments had little adverse effect on the quality or usability of
the data and does not cloud the results or appropriateness of the
site's cleanup.
DOE's Planned Cleanup Verification Not Completed:
The second assessment of the cleanup's sufficiency--DOE's planned
verification of the contractor's remediation of radiologically
contaminated soil--was inconsistent and not completed as planned. DOE
policy currently requires radiological cleanup to be verified, but the
policy is unclear about how and why verification should be done. DOE's
planned verification for the cleanup at Rocky Flats was twofold: First,
DOE asked the contractor to develop a final scanning and sampling plan,
and second, DOE asked its Oak Ridge Institute for Science and Education
(ORISE) to develop a separate verification plan that included a review
of contractor-conducted scans for remaining radiological
contamination.[Footnote 56] However, DOE chose not to complete several
of the plan's objectives, including part of ORISE's review. A DOE
official said they had decided that these activities would not provide
sufficient additional information to justify their completion, but he
had no documentation to support this decision. As a result, DOE lost
the opportunity to independently verify the sufficiency of several
aspects of the cleanup.
The respondents to our community group survey had mixed views on the
degree to which the verification activities--in the aggregate--affected
their confidence in the site's cleanup. Of the 21 (of 25) who provided
responses, 13 said that the verification activities greatly or somewhat
increased their confidence in the site's cleanup. Another 8 said the
verification activities had no effect or a negative effect on their
confidence. The remaining four said they either did not know or had no
basis to judge.
DOE Policy Unclear on Application and Purpose of Verification:
Although DOE has a general policy on radiological cleanup verification,
its guidance is unclear on how the policy applies and what the
verification goals are. In January 2001, the Secretary of Energy issued
a memorandum that contained guidance on the release of radiological
property and directed DOE field offices to "establish independent
verification programs" that "should be commensurate with the potential
for contamination, as well as the complexity and hazard."[Footnote 57]
Additional DOE guidance on verification is found in other documents,
including draft guidance called "Control and Release of Property with
Residual Radioactive Material;" this document implements guidance for
DOE Order 5400.5, which includes requirements for the release of
radiologically contaminated property.[Footnote 58] The draft guidance,
which was approved for interim use, includes a section on verification
that states that "the DOE organization responsible for the release of
property should verify or provide for independent verification of the
radiological condition of the property before release." However, the
draft neither contains specific guidance about verification techniques
nor specifies the goals of verification. Accordingly, it was little
help to Rocky Flats officials and may have contributed to the
inconsistent implementation of the verification plan.
Lacking clear guidance, DOE's project manager at Rocky Flats said he
took a common sense approach that, in his view, fulfills the intent of
DOE's policy by cleaning the site up through the CERCLA and RCRA
process. That is, he believes that the regulatory agencies' approvals
of the radiological cleanup actions at the site constitute independent
verification. However, the official acknowledged that there is room for
interpretation and disagreement on this issue. Another area of
confusion was what the goals of the independent verification should be.
At Rocky Flats, DOE officials commissioned a cleanup verification plan
that used a different methodology than the one used to implement the
cleanup. The result was that while the cleanup verification confirmed
that an area had met the standards of the cleanup agreement, it also
identified "hot spots" that caused alarm among the public at the end of
the 10-year cleanup. The Rocky Flats manager stated that clear guidance
on independent verification would have been helpful, especially as to
how it related to CERCLA cleanups.
DOE Did Not Fully Implement Its Planned Verification or Explain Its
Reasons for Not Doing So:
Although DOE agreed to ORISE's final verification plan, DOE did not
fully implement it and did not offer a public explanation for its
decision. Specifically, ORISE never completed two of its objectives--an
assessment of the aerial and ground-based scanning and an assessment of
the contractor's investigations of the results of the aerial and
targeted ground-based scans. According to a DOE official, DOE decided
in mid-September 2005 that it needed to re-evaluate the need for
ORISE's work. DOE decided that because the contractor's aerial survey
had failed to find any anomalies, ORISE's remaining work was
unnecessary. DOE remained unsure about the final outcome of the ground-
based scanning but still decided not to ask ORISE to complete the
remaining objectives. A DOE official explained that completing the work
was not warranted, given the results of the aerial and ground-based
scanning. According to an ORISE official, DOE's Rocky Flats Project
Office notified ORISE on November 11, 2005, that it would not be asked
to complete the remaining objectives. Additional information on DOE's
independent verification is contained in appendix IV.
Independent Consultants and Other Federal Agencies Conducted Additional
Cleanup Reviews, and Some Influenced DOE's Final Cleanup Strategy:
Reviews conducted by independent consultants and other federal agencies
commented on cleanup actions, and some reviews influenced the final
cleanup strategy, thereby providing additional assurance to DOE and the
regulatory agencies that their remedial decisions were correct.
Independent consultants, hired by local stakeholder organizations,
commented on several cleanup remedies, including surface and
groundwater cleanup actions and landfill remediation. Some of these
influenced the final cleanup; for example, a study on surface water
management called for a specific pond discharge strategy, with which
DOE concurred. On the other hand, DOE did not incorporate all comments
and suggestions made by independent contractors, such as
recommendations on how to close a landfill. Other federal agencies,
including the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry and FWS,
also conducted studies, one of which concluded that no health hazard
existed for surrounding communities. Another study is still under way.
Several Recommendations from Independent Consultants Were Incorporated
into Site Remedies, but Disagreements and Concerns Remain:
Independent consultants, hired by local communities or through the
Rocky Flats Coalition of Local Governments, conducted technical reviews
of cleanup actions and provided recommendations, some of which DOE
incorporated into its cleanup plan. The Rocky Flats Coalition of Local
Governments sponsored these independent reviews to assure the local
governments and the public that the cleanup would meet the regulatory
guidelines. Overall, members of the Coalition initiated four technical
reviews, which examined groundwater, surface water and pond management,
and landfill remediation. The Coalition hired a consultant to comment
on DOE's independent verification process.
One instance in which DOE incorporated a recommendation from a
consultant involved surface water management. During Rocky Flats'
operational days, a series of ponds was constructed as part of a
surface water management system to ensure that no contaminated surface
water left the site.[Footnote 59] As a safeguard to ensure that all
water leaving the site meets the state's water quality standards, the
water is tested prior to its release. An independent consultant's study
raised the concern that DOE was allowing one of the terminal ponds to
fill to a high level, thereby diminishing its ability to store large
quantities of water should a heavy rainfall occur. Such an event could
result in water being released without being tested. The independent
review recommended that DOE maintain the pond at a lower capacity as a
precautionary strategy, and DOE concurred. Another example was DOE's
concurrence with the Coalition consultant's recommendation that ORISE
include in its verification plan a 100 percent scan of certain areas to
detect any residual contamination that might exceed established cleanup
levels.
However, several of the independent consultants' reviews identified
points of contention with DOE's ultimate cleanup approach. One area of
contention involved the landfill that had been used at Rocky Flats in
the 1950s and 1960s. DOE's characterization of the landfill suggested
that uranium and volatile organic compounds were present.[Footnote 60]
DOE and the regulatory agencies subsequently agreed to implement an
accelerated cleanup action that included buttressing the landfill to
prevent the waste from slumping into Woman Creek; regrading parts of
the landfill, which is located on a hillside, to prevent erosion;
placing 2 feet of soil atop the surface to isolate the contaminants;
installing storm water management berms to divert surface flows to
perimeter channels; and seeding the entire cover, buttress, and
channels with native grass species. An independent review disagreed
with several aspects of this accelerated action, including that it did
not include a biointrusion layer; these layers inhibit the ability of
burrowing animals like mice and prairie dogs to bring contaminants up
to the surface, where people at the site might be exposed to them. DOE
and Colorado felt that a biointrusion layer was unnecessary because the
accelerated cleanup action met the legal requirements for landfill
closure, and the observed environmental conditions indicated that the
landfill posed only a minimal risk. EPA added that the issue of
biointrusion was examined during the remedy's design, with the
conclusion that the steep slope (18 percent), combined with the native
grass cover, would not be attractive habitat for burrowing animals. In
the end, a biointrusion layer was not included in the landfill cover.
Monitoring of Woman Creek and wells will continue at locations both
upgradient and downgradient of the landfill to ensure that no
contaminants are escaping from the landfill.
Other Federal Reviews Concluded Minimal Risk or Are Still Under Way:
The Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR), part of
the Department of Health and Human Services, conducted a public health
assessment that concluded that Rocky Flats poses no health
hazard.[Footnote 61] Specifically, ATSDR concluded that the Rocky Flats
data present a consistent picture that local residents' current and
future exposures to contaminants from Rocky Flats are below levels
associated with adverse health effects. ATSDR officials conducted their
own data reliability tests on the site's data and concluded that the
data were adequate to make public health decisions. The officials then
assessed the contaminant pathways at Rocky Flats, including soil, air,
and surface water and groundwater and concluded that environmental
contamination at Rocky Flats posed no apparent public health hazard to
surrounding communities. (However, ATSDR did not evaluate the health
implications for people within the boundaries of Rocky Flats.) ATSDR
offered several recommendations on how to ensure that the site's
contamination will not pose a future risk to residents of surrounding
communities, including continued monitoring of surface water along the
eastern boundary of the site and groundwater wells. DOE is not required
to officially respond to the ATSDR recommendations, but reported that
the recommendations had already been included, or were under discussion
with the regulatory agencies for inclusion, in the postclosure
monitoring and maintenance plans.
Additionally, as discussed previously, the 5-year reviews required by
CERCLA will continue to compile information about whether remedies at
the site continue to fully protect human health and the environment.
The first 5-year review, completed in 2002,[Footnote 62] included areas
of the site for which final decision documents (i.e., corrective action
decisions/records of decision) had been completed, as well as areas
where accelerated cleanup actions had been completed as of September
30, 2001. At that time, final decision documents had been completed for
two areas (the 881 hillside and the off-site areas), and accelerated
cleanup actions had been completed at several areas. Among the
completed accelerated actions were the removal and, as necessary,
treatment of contaminated debris and soil at several trenches; the
installation of three groundwater treatment systems; the removal of
contaminated sludge from solar evaporation ponds; and emptying and
treating the contents of six underground storage tanks. The review
concluded that the remedies for these two areas were protective and
that the accelerated actions had addressed immediate hazards and were
generally functioning as intended. The review of the off-site areas,
though not required under EPA guidance,[Footnote 63] was nonetheless
conducted because of the substantial public interest in those areas.
The off-site areas did not have a defined boundary, but rather referred
to off-site contamination emanating from Rocky Flats in general,
including surface contamination of lands to the east of the site, along
with the Great Western Reservoir, Standley Lake, and Mower Reservoir.
The review concluded that all calculated excess cancer risks in the
entire unit were well within or below EPA's acceptable risk range of 1
in 10,000 to 1 in 1,000,000.
Also, FWS sampled areas at Rocky Flats that are likely to become part
of the future wildlife refuge. Prior to any transfer of land management
authority to FWS, FWS typically surveys the property to identify any
potential hazardous substances that pose a threat to fish and wildlife.
In May 2006, consistent with its survey plan, FWS took 45 soil samples
(including four duplicate samples), mostly along proposed trails as
indicated in the Comprehensive Conservation Plan for the refuge. The
samples will be examined for a range of potential contaminants,
including metals, radionuclides, organics, and polychlorinated
biphenyls, commonly referred to as PCBs. FWS took an additional 12
vegetation samples (including one duplicate sample), principally to
ensure that any future prescribed burns will be safe. An FWS official
said that the results of the laboratory analyses of the samples are due
in early July, at an estimated cost of $70,000. If the results identify
contaminants that concern them, FWS officials will notify DOE, EPA, and
Colorado; the agencies will then determine what steps would need to be
taken.
DOE Implemented Some Lessons Learned at Rocky Flats but Has No
Requirement to Ensure That Lessons Learned Are Implemented at Other
Sites:
Although DOE has identified and implemented at other cleanup sites some
lessons learned at Rocky Flats, DOE does not require applicable lessons
learned at one cleanup site to be implemented at others. The Rocky
Flats project offers many lessons about innovative techniques, risk-and
cost-sharing contract provisions, accelerated cleanup processes,
involvement of community groups, oversight of contractor controls over
data quality, and cleanup verification processes. However, DOE has not
developed a system to ensure that all lessons are captured and
implemented as appropriate at other DOE sites. As a result, DOE may be
missing valuable time-and cost-saving opportunities at other sites that
are planning or undergoing cleanup.
DOE Identified Lessons from Rocky Flats and Assessed Their
Applicability to Other Sites:
DOE has gathered and disseminated to some other DOE sites numerous
lessons learned at Rocky Flats. These lessons included the following:
* Clearly define government oversight of the contractor, and limit the
number of DOE personnel providing direction.
* Conduct external reviews of the project baselines to build
credibility and provide objective recommendations for project
improvement.
* Use employee incentives to reward high-performing individuals.
* Use a flexible project management approach that allows the contractor
to complete the project in the safest and most cost-effective manner.
* Establish a clear "end state" vision and risk-based cleanup defined
in conjunction with specific future land/site use.
* Develop and use an integrated project baseline schedule and budget.
* Use government-furnished services and items to integrate and manage
the delivery of items not within the contractor's control.
* Implement new technology that significantly accelerates the schedule
and reduces total costs, such as techniques for reducing the number of
radioactive waste shipments off site for disposal.
In October 2002, DOE authorized a corporate review team to determine
the effectiveness of DOE cleanup efforts. In 2003, the team reviewed
work activities, management processes, and contract administration
practices at selected sites, and used a checklist of more than 50
lessons learned at Rocky Flats to assess their applicability and
potential benefits to each site. The review team issued nine reports
with findings and recommendations. With the exception of one report,
which was part of the preliminary review effort, each report also
included the team's determination of whether the lessons on the
checklist applied to the sites, and the progress the sites had made
toward implementing applicable lessons learned.
DOE Lacks a System for Ensuring Continued Collection and Implementation
of Lessons Learned at Its Cleanup Sites:
During 2004 and 2005, DOE's Office of Performance Assessment conducted
follow-up reviews of many of the sites the corporate review team had
reviewed earlier. These follow-up reviews, however, did not assess
whether the sites had implemented the lessons learned from Rocky Flats.
According to the DOE official responsible for tracking the status of
these reviews, DOE does not require sites to implement applicable
lessons from Rocky Flats (or from other cleanup sites). Instead, he
said, each site is responsible for tracking its implementation of these
lessons. Although he said he believes the sites are taking steps to
implement those lessons and are continuing to improve their systems for
managing cleanup, he had no documentation to support his conclusions.
DOE's Office of Performance Assessment reviewed lessons learned at
Rocky Flats in the March 2004 and June 2005 Rocky Flats baseline
performance review reports. In the 2004 report, DOE noted that valuable
information and processes from Rocky Flats should be available to other
sites that are beginning the cleanup process. The report noted that
DOE's Rocky Flats office had begun a program to archive project cost
information that could be used to prepare cost estimates for future
contracts at other sites, and recommended that the office develop a
database that identifies the number of personnel and time durations
required to perform specific cleanup tasks. According to the Rocky
Flats DOE manager, the cost-archiving program continued to provide
periodic information updates, and provided the final download of
project data to DOE's Office of Engineering and Construction Management
in December 2005. The 2005 Rocky Flats baseline performance review
report included 30 additional lessons learned at Rocky Flats. Among
these were improved contract language that established a close working
relationship between DOE and the contractor, made measurement of
progress easier, and reduced the need for contract changes; improved
safety processes at the site; consolidated procurement functions; and
streamlined methods for handling and shipping radioactive waste and
disposing of excess property. One of the lessons identified in the 2005
report actually resulted from a request from another cleanup site. A
DOE official in the Office of Performance Assessment told us that
officials at DOE's Office of Environmental Management visited Rocky
Flats in 2005 to document lessons learned from the demolition of a
plutonium-processing building. They visited Rocky Flats at the request
of DOE officials at the Savannah River site who were designing a
similar facility and sought information from the Rocky Flats demolition
that might improve the design of their building.
Although DOE has a database of environmental safety and health lessons,
it does not have a database of broader lessons learned across the DOE
complex. DOE has a nationwide database managed by the Society for
Effective Lessons Learned Sharing, a volunteer DOE organization
dedicated to identifying, sharing, and using lessons learned in order
to improve the safety, efficiency, and effectiveness of DOE work
processes. These lessons focus primarily on individual safety incidents
and how to prevent their recurrence. However, the database generally
does not capture lessons dealing with broader issues such as contract
management, pricing, and working with regulatory agencies.
Consequently, DOE may not be maximizing the use of valuable information
that could save time and money.
DOE's Office of Engineering and Construction Management commissioned a
study in the fall of 2003 to correlate components of project
performance with project success, and identify best practices to
improve DOE project performance. The July 2004 report on the study's
findings identified many factors that influenced the success of DOE
projects, including the importance of an effective lessons learned
program. The report did not examine the effectiveness of DOE's lessons
learned programs, but it noted examples at DOE where lessons were
effectively transferred from one project to another. It concluded that:
"DOE Headquarters has a responsibility to assure that such lessons are
being transferred across sites with similar facilities. Sharing lessons
learned needs aggressive attention; without it valuable savings are
lost and frustrations compounded. Lessons learned are useful for
mitigating risk and providing training material for project directors/
managers.[Footnote 64]
The report also recommended that DOE proactively encourage the sharing
of lessons learned. According to a DOE headquarters official, a
national database of lessons learned from closure sites would allow DOE
to proactively share experiences that would benefit future closure
operations.
Rocky Flats Offers Additional Lessons That May Be Applicable to Other
DOE Sites:
During our review, we gathered additional lessons learned at Rocky
Flats that could be useful for other DOE sites. These lessons include
the following:
* Safety is a priority. According to DOE officials, this lesson was
reinforced throughout Rocky Flats' cleanup. Early in the cleanup, DOE
officials recognized that a significant investment in hazard
identification, safety planning, and safety implementation (i.e., the
integrated safety management system) during the actual work would
ensure that the work was performed without unacceptable risks or
unnecessary delays. Later, DOE officials said they came to understand
that this focus on safety not only helped work progress, but also
facilitated efficiency by building trust and engaging the workforce.
Safety was both consistent with, and essential to, effective project
execution.
* Performance-based contract incentives improve results. According to
DOE officials, the first contract they had with Kaiser-Hill
demonstrated that attaching incentives to clearly defined performance
measures vastly improved actual results. The 2000 contract took the
concept to the next level, providing large incentives to the contractor
and the workers to safely and compliantly complete the cleanup within
the target schedule and cost. The additional incentives for schedule
and cost savings resulted in closure more than a year ahead of schedule
and $530 million under budget. However, as previously noted, such
incentives are not always this successful, and the financial incentive
offered at Rocky Flats was only one of many factors contributing to the
cleanup's early completion.
* Take a consultative approach to cleanup decisions. As previously
discussed, the collaborative process was essential to the cleanup's
early completion. According to DOE officials, the cleanup was
successful because all of the stakeholders were engaged in the process
and supportive of the ultimate goal. The input of numerous key figures,
including members of Congress, senior DOE managers, state and local
elected officials, and officials of federal and state regulatory
agencies, was actively solicited and ultimately met with the
convergence of the cleanup agreement, the contract, and the desired end
state. DOE officials said they communicated openly and often with
stakeholders to seek the best solutions, and they came to value input
from formerly dogmatic opponents. Moreover, Colorado, EPA, DOE, and the
contractor worked closely together on cleanup decisions from the
beginning through the end. As cleanup proceeded on an area, Colorado
had access to meetings and detailed information about the cleanup. In
the event that Colorado or EPA considered a particular activity to be
unsafe, the Rocky Flats cleanup agreement granted them the authority to
stop work.
* Don't let unresolved issues delay progress. DOE officials said that
if they had focused on what they could not do or delayed work until all
questions were answered, the project would not have been completed and
the target completion date would probably still be in question.
Colorado officials emphasized, however, that this does not mean that
work progressed without the appropriate approvals from Colorado and
EPA. It is Colorado's understanding that the consultative process, with
all of its oversight and meetings to discuss activities and issues,
ensured that all issues were addressed and resolved in a timely manner
before activities occurred.
* Obtain stable project funding. As discussed earlier, consistent
project funding was a key factor in the cleanup's early completion.
According to DOE and EPA officials, congressional and departmental
commitment to stable funding over the life of the project aided
tremendously in project planning and execution. Also, the stable
funding helped in regulatory interactions and credibility with the
general public.
* Involve the future site manager in remedial decisions. According to
FWS, when a former DOE site is considered for conversion to a wildlife
refuge, it is "vastly preferable" for FWS to be involved early in the
cleanup process and have a decision-making role. DOE officials agreed
and said they have actively involved FWS since passage of the Refuge
Act. According to DOE officials, FWS substantially influenced cleanup
decisions, even in areas of the site that will not become part of the
future refuge. For example, they said, FWS's input effected a major
change in the cover design for the present landfill. Additionally, FWS
influenced the composition of the revegetation seed mixes sitewide and
the methods of protecting sensitive habitat and endangered species. But
DOE did not incorporate all of FWS's suggestions, such as
characterizing and disposing of waste in the original landfill,
incorporating barriers around landfills to discourage intrusion by
burrowing animals, and using irrigation and soil amendment to enhance
the success of seeded native vegetation. According to DOE officials,
the two agencies' different perspectives on cleanup methods highlight
the difficulty of coordination between two federal agencies that have
different missions. These difficulties can persist even when staff of
the two agencies are collocated and interact daily, as was the case at
Rocky Flats. In retrospect, DOE officials said, it would have been
better to recognize that difficulty early and obtain an executive-level
consensus on the vision for the outcome.
* Be aware of potential beryllium contamination. According to a senior
contractor official, beryllium was "ubiquitous" at the site; it was
found even in containers of metals and oxides. In terms of worker
safety, beryllium was more of a predemolition challenge than other
contaminants because there is no effective way to monitor beryllium on
a real-time basis.
* Question accepted technologies. The contractor was able to save
substantial money and time at Rocky Flats by questioning the usual
disposal and remediation processes. For example, the accepted practice
was that a glovebox or any part of one was, by definition, transuranic
waste. However, the contractor found a way to decontaminate gloveboxes
and dispose of them much more easily and less expensively as low-level
waste. According to a senior contractor official, this particular
technical lesson learned at Rocky Flats may be applicable to DOE's
cleanup work at the Hanford site.
* Contain contaminated water. According to an official with the
Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment, lessons learned
at Rocky Flats included the importance of ensuring that there are no
underground drainage systems or conduits when large amounts of water
are used during a cleanup. This lesson stemmed from an unfortunate
experience in the cleanup of building 771, when water used in
decontamination efforts seeped into underground conduits that had not
been adequately plugged. The water flushed contaminants through the
conduits, resulting in elevated levels of americium in one series of
ponds at the site. This turned out to be an expensive lesson, as the
contractor had to bring in equipment and treat about 26 million gallons
of americium-contaminated water.
Although DOE captured and implemented at other sites some of the
lessons it learned at Rocky Flats, others risk being lost. For example,
contractor and DOE officials said that at Rocky Flats, and at other
cleanup sites, many lessons that could be gleaned from records and data
will be lost if not recorded, summarized, or otherwise captured and
shared. According to the Rocky Flats manager, an effort termed the
"Legacy Project" was begun in 2001 to start collecting the project
knowledge and lessons before the institutional memory was lost. This
effort continued intermittently through the summer of 2005, drawing
upon record documents, working papers, and personal experience. Also,
DOE Rocky Flats officials said that officials of DOE's Legacy
Management office in Grand Junction, Colorado, had shared with them
lessons learned from the Grand Junction office's experience working
with the long-term management of sites formerly contaminated by uranium
mill tailings. According to the Rocky Flats manager, these lessons will
be brought to Rocky Flats as Legacy Management executes its
responsibilities for site management and maintenance. As the mission
scope of Legacy Management expands, it will continue to carry
experience from Rocky Flats to other sites that are transferred to it
for long-term care. Also, although DOE officials told us in March 2005
that they were planning a workshop on lessons learned at Rocky Flats in
decontamination and demolition, that workshop has not been held.
According to the Rocky Flats manager, several technical assist visits
occurred with contractor and DOE personnel from sites in Idaho, Ohio,
and Washington. These visits were believed to be more focused and
efficient than a workshop format. At this time, a general workshop is
not planned; however, technical assist and assessment visits to
facilitate the sharing of lessons are continuing.
DOE officials at Rocky Flats have drafted the Rocky Flats Closure
Legacy report, a lengthy document that captures the 4-year effort of
the Legacy Project. It is currently at DOE headquarters for review and
comment and is expected to be released in June 2006.
Conclusions:
Strong DOE oversight of data quality is important because accurate and
complete data are paramount to DOE's, EPA's, and Colorado's decisions
about the sufficiency of the Rocky Flats cleanup. At Rocky Flats, DOE
placed undue reliance on the contractor to have appropriate data
quality controls, and did not complete the required management and
independent assessments of the data's quality. Our review showed that
the contractor at Rocky Flats appeared to have comprehensive data
quality controls, but this does not negate DOE's responsibility to
independently monitor and assess those controls throughout the cleanup.
Also, although DOE policies call for independent verification of
cleanup results, the applicability of the policies to cleanups
conducted under CERCLA or RCRA is unclear. Lacking clear and specific
guidance on cleanup verification, DOE officials at Rocky Flats
undertook what they thought was a reasonable approach. However, DOE did
not complete all of the cleanup verification activities it had planned;
it also did not publicly explain its rationale for not doing so. As a
result, DOE lost a valuable opportunity to increase public awareness
of, and confidence in, the verification results. Ironically, although
the verification activities were undertaken to increase public
confidence in the cleanup, the results sparked additional questions
from the public. Finally, although DOE has implemented at other cleanup
sites some of the lessons learned at Rocky Flats, DOE does not require
that lessons learned at one site be implemented, where applicable, at
other sites. As a result, DOE stands to lose the benefits that such
lessons have to offer.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To improve DOE's oversight of cleanup activities, its conduct of
cleanup verification activities, and its monitoring of lessons learned
at DOE cleanup sites, we recommend that the Secretary of Energy take
the following three actions:
* Ensure that DOE independently assesses contractors' controls over
data quality.
* Clarify guidance on whether and how to conduct cleanup verification
activities.
* Assess the costs and benefits of developing a method to track the
lessons learned from cleanup activities at DOE sites across the nation,
including methods for determining whether lessons are being applied at
applicable locations.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We provided a draft of this report to DOE, Interior, EPA, Colorado, and
Kaiser-Hill for their review and comment. DOE, Interior, Colorado, and
Kaiser-Hill provided written comments (see apps. V, VI, VII, and VIII,
respectively). EPA did not provide official written comments but did
provide editorial and technical suggestions, as did the other agencies,
that we incorporated, as appropriate.
DOE commented that it found the report to be comprehensive, generally
thorough, clear, and well structured. DOE agreed that a robust and
effective lessons learned program would be beneficial and said it
intends to follow through and revitalize such a program within DOE's
Office of Environmental Management. DOE reiterated the importance of
teamwork and agency support in accelerating the cleanup of the Rocky
Flats site, noting that the regulatory agencies, community groups, and
local government organizations worked tirelessly along with DOE and
contractor organizations to overcome obstacles. DOE also emphasized
that the high priority given the Rocky Flats cleanup within the DOE
complex and at the congressional level, together with the provision of
level annual funding, was critical to the success of the project.
DOE did not agree or disagree with our recommendations that it ensure
independent assessments of data quality and clarify its guidance on
cleanup verification. In its specific comments, however, DOE noted that
there is direction and guidance on independent verification and other
independent assessments, and referenced several documents that provide
such guidance. We were aware of these documents and had discussed
several of them with DOE officials at the Rocky Flats Project Office,
who said the documents were not helpful in guiding their decisions
about whether to conduct verification activities or how to ensure
compatibility between available verification strategies and the cleanup
strategies undertaken at the site.
In its specific comments, DOE also stated that there is an additional
regulatory step DOE must take before releasing the site to the
Department of the Interior, pursuant to the requirements of DOE Order
5400.5 governing the release of real property with residual radioactive
material. DOE suggested that we reference this regulatory requirement
in the report section dealing with additional steps to be taken. We did
not adopt this suggestion because our report's discussion of regulatory
steps focused on those that remain to be taken by EPA and Colorado, the
regulatory agencies at the site. We do, however, reference DOE Order
5400.5 and its draft implementing guidance in our discussion of cleanup
verification activities. We noted that the draft implementing guidance
neither contains specific guidance about verification techniques nor
specifies the goals of verification and, consequently, was little help
to Rocky Flats officials and may have contributed to the inconsistent
implementation of the verification plan.
The Department of the Interior generally agreed with the information
that pertains to the Fish and Wildlife Service. The department said
that at this point, it is unable to determine when Rocky Flats will be
open to the public, due to the uncertainty of the completion of the
transfer of the site. We incorporated the department's suggestion that
we focus on the transfer of administrative jurisdiction from DOE to the
department rather than focusing on when the public may access the Rocky
Flats National Wildlife Refuge. Also, as the department suggested, we
clarified the discussions of actions EPA must take to facilitate the
transfer and the acquisition of privately owned mineral rights.
Colorado commented that the report provides an appropriate recognition
of issues and actions occurring during the remedial activities at Rocky
Flats. Colorado emphasized that it has been an integral participant in
Rocky Flats' cleanup and closure; it provided continual in-depth
regulatory oversight of the investigative and remedial activities for
both building decontamination and demolition and environmental
restoration. Colorado cited the dedicated efforts of its staff, along
with the consultative process, as expediting completion of an
accelerated cleanup that resulted in significant cost savings for DOE
and for U.S. taxpayers.
Kaiser-Hill commented that the report was thorough, well-written, and
accurate in its description of Kaiser-Hill's role in the cleanup of
Rocky Flats. Kaiser-Hill agreed with the report's focus on the
contribution of Kaiser-Hill's workforce, and stated that the incentive
contract played an important role in the success of the cleanup
project. Kaiser-Hill noted that the success of the project was also due
to the cooperative decision-making process that evolved among DOE,
Kaiser-Hill, EPA, Colorado, and local communities, aided by a firm
political commitment to accelerate the cleanup.
Kaiser-Hill said it believes that the report's calculation of the total
cost of the cleanup is misleading because it includes tangential costs
such as health and pension benefits, which alone add about $1 billion
to the cost reported. Kaiser-Hill noted that a significant portion of
these benefit costs were accrued by previous contractors. Kaiser-Hill
acknowledged, however, that such costs represent financial obligations
to the taxpayer. For our purposes, inclusion of these costs was
necessary to report total costs of the cleanup since 1995, including
long-term costs.
Additionally, Kaiser-Hill commented that because the final disposition
of trench T-7 (the fourth individual cleanup project we reviewed in
depth) required only minimal cleanup, it was completed through the
standard "no further accelerated action" justification process.
According to the contractor, the justification documentation for such
areas (those requiring minimal cleanup) should include information on
data quality and adequacy, but not at the same level of detail as was
required for other cleanup areas. We recognize that areas closed out
through the "no further accelerated action" process may not necessitate
the same level of data quality documentation as other areas.
Nevertheless, the Rocky Flats Cleanup Agreement requires that the
justification documentation for "no further accelerated action" areas
include information on data quality and usability. The documentation we
reviewed for trench T-7 did not include such information.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of Energy and
the Interior, the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency,
the Executive Director of the Colorado Department of Public Health and
Environment, the President and Chief Executive Officer of Kaiser-Hill
Company, interested congressional committees, and other interested
parties. We will also make copies available to others upon request. In
addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site
at [Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov.]
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-3841 or a [Hyperlink, aloisee@gao.gov]
loisee@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional
Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this
report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are
listed in appendix IX.
Signed by:
Gene Aloise:
Director, Natural Resources and Environment:
[End of section]
Appendixes:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Our review objectives were to determine the (1) factors that
contributed to the early completion of the physical cleanup at Rocky
Flats; (2) work remaining as well as total project costs, including
long-term costs; (3) measures in place to assess whether the cleanup
achieved a level of protection of public health and environment
consistent with the Rocky Flats Cleanup Agreement; and (4) lessons the
Rocky Flats project may hold for other Department of Energy (DOE)
cleanup projects.
In conducting our work, we visited the Rocky Flats site and reviewed
documents and data prepared by DOE, the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA), the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment
(Colorado), the Department of the Interior's Fish and Wildlife Service
(FWS), the contractor, and various scientific organizations. We also
interviewed officials of these entities.
To determine the factors that contributed to the physical cleanup's
early completion, we interviewed DOE, EPA, Colorado, and contractor
officials and reviewed agency and contractor documents on cleanup
accomplishments and techniques, project activity reports, and
decontamination and demolition accomplishments. Information on
innovative cleanup techniques is presented in appendix III.
To determine the work remaining as well as total project costs,
including long-term costs, we reviewed documents and data prepared by
DOE, EPA, Colorado, FWS, and the contractor, and interviewed officials
of these entities. We reviewed documents and discussed issues
pertaining to the cleanup requirements of the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, as
amended (CERCLA), and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of
1976, as amended (RCRA). We also reviewed documents and discussed
issues pertaining to the plans for the Rocky Flats National Wildlife
Refuge, cost records and estimates, and pension plan provisions. We
also analyzed documents related to the cost-plus-incentive-fee
contract, including contract negotiation documents, the contract cost
and fee structure, and contract modifications, but we did not evaluate
the cost-effectiveness of the contract.
To determine the measures in place to assess whether the cleanup would
achieve a level of protection of public health and environment
consistent with the Rocky Flats Cleanup Agreement, we reviewed
documents and discussed issues pertaining to cleanup verification
strategies and results. We also reviewed scientific analyses, such as a
study of how contaminants migrate through soil and water and an
assessment of the public health risk posed by contaminants remaining at
the site. We reviewed the general content of these analyses but did not
evaluate the science underlying them.
In addition, because decisions about the sufficiency of the cleanup
have been and will be based on remediation data, we assessed the
soundness of the agencies' and contractor's processes and procedures
for ensuring data quality. We visited the subcontractor that performed
data verification and validation activities, and we reviewed the
results of audits of the key laboratories used by the contractor to
analyze samples of radioactively contaminated soil.
We also selected a nonprobability sample of four accelerated cleanup
actions, based on several criteria, including whether EPA or Colorado
was the lead regulatory agency and whether the contamination was in the
surface soil or under contaminated buildings.[Footnote 65] Because
radionuclide contamination was the primary concern at the site, we
selected cleanup actions of plutonium-contaminated soil. For each
selected cleanup action, we reviewed data quality controls pertaining
to data quality objectives, data quality parameters, and data
verification and validation. We did not evaluate the remedial data or
analyses themselves. Information on our data quality review results and
details of DOE's verification activities are presented in appendix IV.
To determine the lessons the Rocky Flats project may hold for other DOE
cleanup projects, we reviewed information and interviewed officials of
DOE, EPA, FWS, Colorado, and the contractor about lessons learned at
Rocky Flats and other sites. We reviewed documents related to and
reports from DOE's Society for Effective Lessons Learned Sharing
database, and we interviewed DOE officials involved in various efforts
to capture and disseminate lessons learned (from Rocky Flats and
elsewhere throughout the DOE complex).
Further, to obtain citizen views about issues such as community input
to the cleanup and the effect of various cleanup verification
activities, we attended monthly meetings of the two local community
groups that served in an advisory capacity to DOE: the Rocky Flats
Citizens Advisory Board and the Rocky Flats Coalition of Local
Governments. We also surveyed current and past members (and current
staff) of these two groups to obtain their opinions on questions such
as how DOE engaged the groups in the cleanup process, how DOE used the
groups' input, how satisfied or dissatisfied they were with the
cleanup's results, and the degree to which DOE's cleanup verification
activities affected their confidence in the cleanup. We pretested the
survey twice and revised the questions accordingly. We documented the
responses and verified 100 percent of the documentation. Response rates
and summary responses are presented in appendix II.
We conducted our work in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards from March 2005 through May 2006.
[End of section]
Appendix II: GAO Survey Methodology, Response Rates, and Summary
Responses:
To obtain citizen and local government views on the Rocky Flats
cleanup, we surveyed current (as of December 2005) and past members and
current staff of the two local community groups that served in an
advisory capacity to DOE: the Rocky Flats Citizens Advisory Board and
the Rocky Flats Coalition of Local Governments.[Footnote 66] The survey
included questions about how DOE engaged the groups in the cleanup
process, how DOE used the groups' input, what level of confidence group
members had in the cleanup's results, the degree to which DOE's cleanup
verification activities affected their confidence in the cleanup, and
any remaining concerns they might have.
Survey Methodology:
We designed the survey questions to elicit clear and unbiased
responses. We pretested the survey twice and revised questions
accordingly. We transferred the survey responses into a spreadsheet and
the comments into a narrative document; we then verified that 100
percent of the information was transferred accurately from the
individual surveys.
In total, we sent surveys to 58 members (current and past).[Footnote
67] We obtained group members' e-mail addresses (or mailing addresses,
when e-mail addresses were not available) from the directors of the
Rocky Flats Citizens Advisory Board (Advisory Board) and the Rocky
Flats Coalition of Local Governments (Coalition). After e-mailing the
survey, we e-mailed two reminder notices to encourage members to
respond. Additionally, we attended both groups' January 2006 meetings
and personally encouraged members to submit their surveys.
Survey Response Rates:
We received a total of 25 responses, or 43 percent of the total surveys
sent. By subgroup, however (e.g., current members of one group, past
members of one group), response rates varied widely. For example, the
response rate for current members of the Advisory Board was 71 percent,
whereas the response rate for current members of the Coalition was 35
percent. Table 1 shows the response rates by subgroup and in total.
Table 1: Survey Response Rates, by Subgroup:
Subgroup: Current Advisory Board;
Number of surveys sent: 14;
Number of responses received: 10;
Response rate (percent): 71.
Subgroup: Current Coalition;
Number of surveys sent: 23;
Number of responses received: 8;
Response rate (percent): 35.
Subtotal, current members:
Number of surveys sent: 37;
Number of responses received: 18;
Response rate (percent): 49.
Subgroup: Past Advisory Board;
Number of surveys sent: 14;
Number of responses received: 6;
Response rate (percent): 43.
Subgroup: Past Coalition;
Number of surveys sent: 7;
Number of responses received: 1;
Response rate (percent): 14.
Subtotal, past members;
Number of surveys sent: 21;
Number of responses received: 7;
Response rate (percent): 33.
Total;
Number of surveys sent: 58;
Number of responses received: 25;
Response rate (percent): 42.
Source: GAO.
[End of table]
Summary Responses:
Following is a summary of the survey responses, by question, along with
selected illustrative comments by respondents. Narrative responses are
not provided in their entirety because we did not wish to introduce a
perceptual bias. For some questions, that is, a majority of respondents
offered positive and concise comments, but one or two respondents
provided negative and lengthy comments. To present all of the comments
in their entirety would thus give an unfair perception of emphasis, at
least by sheer volume of narrative, to the negative minority and would
diminish (again by volume) the positive majority. Accordingly, we
summarized the comments to reflect the preponderance of responses,
whether positive or negative.
The summary responses begin with question 5, as questions 1 through 4
sought information about whether the respondent was a current or former
member of either the Advisory Board or the Coalition and about the
length of time the respondent had served as a member of the group.
5. How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with how DOE engaged the
[group--the Board or the Coalition] in the cleanup process?
Very satisfied; 8.
Somewhat satisfied ; 13.
Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied ; 1.
Somewhat dissatisfied ; 2.
Very dissatisfied ; 1.
Don't know/no basis to judge; 0.
6. Please explain or provide examples of how DOE engaged the [group] in
the cleanup process.
Comments from 6 of the 21 respondents who reported being "very
satisfied" or "somewhat satisfied" (in response to question 5) included
the following:
* "DOE actively engaged the Coalition and local communities in a
variety of ways. . . [DOE] provided opportunities for the Coalition to
participate in certain decision-making processes, provided [a] regular
series of technical meetings keeping Coalition staff informed on
various remediation activities, [and] . . . basically interacted with
the Coalition on an almost daily basis during the course of the site's
cleanup."
* DOE's engagement "varied from one manager to another but was
generally good. More important, the CDPHE [i.e., Colorado], EPA and
Kaiser-Hill consistently solicited the advice of the Board. In
particular, the Board was given access to draft documents and decisions
while they [were] still being discussed. This permitted the Board to
actively participate in the decision process and influence the decision
instead of simply responding to a done deal."
* The "most important three items [were] board makeup, board decision-
making process, and board meeting time. The members include a couple of
ex-nuclear submarine personnel, a couple of college professors, a
groundwater expert, a mining expert, peace activists, etc; in addition,
the attendance and participation of DOE, regulators, cleanup
contractors, FWS, and the general public provides technical, emotional,
and general interest review on items. Board decisions require that all
agree on all formal Board decisions, which forces constructive give and
take in the decision making process. Meeting in the evening not only
permits the general public to attend, it also permits regulators, DOE,
contractors, FWS, etc., etc., to all attend and discuss items--[it] may
be the only time they all get together and discuss some of the items.
DOE attends all [Board] meetings, presents data on requested topics,
answers questions, and provides follow-up data as requested. We may not
always agree but at least we get the data out there and discuss the
issues. Operating as [a] federal board is very important."
* "I believe that the DOE did a good job in answering reasonable
requests from Board members. [DOE] did not always jump through every
hoop presented nor should they have. Some requests were unreasonable;
some would have been impossible, e.g., cleaning up soil to levels that
technology couldn't accomplish."
* DOE "seemed to listen to the Board and take their recommendations
seriously, when it fit their plan. . . ."
* "For the most part, DOE provided copies of documents for review and
comment and provided presentations on cleanup and closure issues and
decisions. But, the closer to completion the site became, the harder it
was to get documents in a timely fashion. As an example, we were
usually provided documents at the same time as the regulators, but at
the end we received them much later than the regulators. Legacy
Management [LM] completely ignored the city's input to LM's Public
Involvement Plan."
7. How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with how the [group's] input
was used by DOE?
Very satisfied; 3.
Somewhat satisfied ; 16.
Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied; 2.
Somewhat dissatisfied; 2.
Very dissatisfied; 2.
Don't know/no basis to judge; 0.
8. Please explain or provide examples of how the [group's] input was
used by DOE.
Comments from 5 of the 16 respondents who reported being "somewhat
satisfied" (in response to question 7) included the following:
* "The RSAL [radionuclide soil action level] issue was one on which the
DOE listened to the [Advisory Board] and other public groups."
* "In some cases DOE added information to documents or adjusted
processes based on the Board's input."
* "The Board's concerns about the original soil action levels were met
with DOE's agreement to fund the independent review."
* "Our input was used on a number of fronts--pond management, ensuring
[that] the site would not be a disposal site, and [the] strategy for
remediating the original landfill, to name [a] few. Most important is
[DOE's] revising the RFCA [Rocky Flats Cleanup Agreement] to better
reflect community priorities. The reason I checked 'somewhat satisfied'
instead of 'very satisfied' is that we could never get DOE to
incorporate stewardship planning into the cleanup process in a
substantive manner. For DOE and the regulators, stewardship was an
afterthought that got bucked to the end of the project and into
regulatory closure space. We are now at the end of the project and we
are still left wondering how DOE will address key questions concerning
institutional controls."
* "In the Independent Verification process, the Coalition pushed, and
the DOE made some changes to their original proposal."
9. Overall, what kind of effect, if any, do you believe the [group's]
input had on the cleanup process?
Very positive effect; 6.
Somewhat positive effect ; 17.
Neither negative nor positive effect; 1.
Somewhat negative effect; 0.
Very negative effect; 0.
Don't know/no basis to judge; 1.
10. Please explain or provide examples of how the [group's] input
affected the cleanup process.
Comments from 7 of the 23 respondents who believed that their group's
input had a "very positive" or "somewhat positive" effect (in response
to question 9) included the following:
* "Opposition of the [Board] and other entities to the 651 pCi/g RSAL
for plutonium adopted for [Rocky Flats] in the 1996 [cleanup agreement]
resulted in DOE funding a citizen oversight panel to hire independent
scientific specialists to calculate radionuclide soil action levels
(RSALs) for the site. Out of this study came the recommendation that
the plutonium RSAL be reduced by 95% from 651 pCi/g to 35 pCi/g. While
DOE did not accept this recommendation, it did work with the regulators
to reduce the action level for [plutonium] in surface soil (top 3 feet)
from 651 to 50 pCi/g. DOE and the regulators, however, pushed a
tradeoff, in that in exchange for this better surface cleanup (top 3
feet) the public would have to accept having larger quantities of
plutonium left in the subsurface environment--between 1000 and 7000
pCi/g at a depth of 3 to 6 feet below the surface, with no limit on the
concentration allowed below 6 feet."
* "The Board has had an impact on all areas of the cleanup process . .
. from how the landfill caps were constructed, to the overall level of
cleanup, to how buildings were safely removed. . . ."
* "I understand that in the beginning the Board had a tremendous impact
on the cleanup. Because of the Board and community members, the surface
soil cleanup levels were changed to be more conservative, from 651 pCi/
g to 50 pCi/g. I feel [that] the Board had less of an influence later
in the process. However, because of the Board, DOE was aware that the
community was watching, and I believe the community got a better
cleanup because of that."
* "DOE solicited a large amount of input from the Coalition over the
course of the site's cleanup. Although not all of the Coalition's input
was incorporated into cleanup plans, a substantial amount of Coalition
positions were incorporated into the cleanup. As a result, local
community buy-in into the process was enhanced. DOE, Kaiser-Hill, the
regulators, and the Coalition were successful partners in the site's
closure."
* "We were able to influence the level of cleanup. We were also able to
get more cleanup in areas like the 903 pad in exchange for leaving
building foundations in place--771 & 371."
* "By the Coalition engaging in depth on matters of technical
feasibility, schedule, cost, worker safety, D&D [decontamination and
demolition] design and implementation, contaminant control and
monitoring, it forced the DOE, regulators and Kaiser-Hill to focus and
impart progress and planning to the Coalition board and public."
* "The Coalition affected the cleanup on a number of levels. We were
the best supporters and the most effective critic. We helped maintain
congressional support for the project and held DOE, Kaiser-Hill and the
regulators accountable. We were central to determining the future use
of the site and to revising the cleanup priorities to better match the
needs of the community. We brought DOE to the table in a public forum
which, along principally with the [Citizens Advisory Board], was
central to ensuring the dialogue remained open. We pushed for a free
flow of information."
11. Please explain or provide examples of what, if anything, DOE might
have done differently to change the effect of the [group's] input on
the cleanup process.
Respondents offered a number of suggestions and comments, including the
following:
* "The only change would be on the future monitoring of the site i.e.,
LSO [the Local Stakeholder Organization] which has been completely
controlled by politics and not by DOE and the board. . . ."
* "I always believed that if DOE had approached it more as a
partnership with their end customer the cleanup process would have been
done better."
* "[DOE] did continue with a very active public participation process
to address [the soil action levels] and all aspects of the cleanup.
However, rather than doing this process via the [Board, which was]
established in 1993 to advise DOE on the cleanup, DOE created a new
body, the RFCA [Rocky Flats Cleanup Agreement] Focus Group . . . The
value of the Focus Group was that it allowed more intense discussion of
details than was usually possible in a [Board] meeting. But shifting
the principal discussion of the cleanup to the Focus Group . . . had
the effect of undermining and marginalizing the [Board]."
* "DOE could have engaged the Board better in terms of budgeting. We
were never asked to partner with the site in requesting funds for our
participation through the federal budget process. . . . We also will
not be funded for what we saw as a valuable project to develop risk
communication tools to help alleviate concerns about the residual
contamination at the site. We have heard from citizens who live near
the site that they are concerned that contamination has been left
behind. There is no way that these citizens are going to read and
understand the immense multi-volume Remedial Investigation study and
Comprehensive Risk Assessment. If there are any further water quality
exceedences, even if they are not life threatening, they are going to
call into question the protectiveness of the cleanup. DOE had better
hope this doesn't happen, because they appear to have no plan or the
tools to address concerns that might be raised by the less
knowledgeable in the community."
* "DOE at times declined to allow members of the Board to observe
internal meetings between DOE, [Kaiser-Hill], and the regulators. This
made it more difficult for the Board to thoroughly understand the
technical details of a cleanup decision and respond in an educated
way."
* "One recurring Coalition theme was the lack of long-term stewardship
considerations in remedial action planning and documents. Instead of
incorporating the long-term stewardship considerations into the
documents, it was left to post-physical closure documents. . . . The
Coalition position has always been that long-term stewardship planning
should be an integral part of the remedial activities and not relegated
to post-closure status."
* "As the clean up was underway in early 2005, DOE seemed to agree that
ORISE should conduct a [Multi-Agency Radiation Survey and Site
Investigation Manual, or MARSSIM]-based final clean up verification.
Since this approach was apparently not specified in the contract,
Kaiser-Hill balked and DOE was left to fund an over-flight survey by a
low flying helicopter to, for PR [public relations] purposes, attempt
to pick up (detect) major hot spots. The overflight technology was not
sufficiently sensitive to detect exceedences of the clean up level. In
addition due to soil moisture and shielding in the industrial area, the
overflight detection approach was of little credible value. By omitting
this final verification Kaiser-Hill was able to 'complete' physical
closure early and collect an added 100 million dollar award."
We now have a few questions about the results of the cleanup. As you
know, since 1995, when it was awarded the Rocky Flats cleanup contract,
Kaiser-Hill has decontaminated and demolished hundreds of structures,
installed groundwater treatment systems, and removed contaminated soil,
among other cleanup tasks specified by the contract and the Rocky Flats
Cleanup Agreement.
12. How confident, if at all, are you that the cleanup will be
protective of public health and the environment?
Extremely confident ; 5.
Very confident; 6.
Somewhat confident; 12.
Not very confident; 1.
Not at all confident; 1.
Don't know/no basis to judge; 0.
13. Please explain or provide examples that illustrate your view.
Comments from 4 of the 11 respondents who were "extremely confident" or
"very confident" (in response to question 12) in the protective nature
of the cleanup included the following:
* "I believe that phenomenal effort was very effective in cleaning up
those sites that needed remediation, e.g., the 903 Pad and uranium
trenches."
* "I am personally confident that the government will retain possession
of the land and keep up the controls now in place so that visitors are
safe and protected. I am convinced we got the best cleanup possible for
the conditions, political climate, and money spent."
* "This process has been open and has benefited from intense public
oversight, talented and committed regulators (especially at CDPHE
[Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment]), and
independent reviews of key assumptions and decisions such as the
Actinide Migration Panel and the soil action level review. Further, the
surface water quality standards are extremely stringent and with rare
exception they are getting met. That increases my confidence."
* "The main reason I am extremely confident that the cleanup will be
protective of public health and the environment is because of the
tremendous amount of excellent oversight work provided by the
regulators (CDPHE and EPA). I can't say enough of how impressed I am
with the technical staff of the regulatory agencies. They were
everywhere during the course of the cleanup, ensuring that the remedial
actions performed at the site were properly planned, implemented, and
executed."
Comments from 4 of the 12 respondents who were "somewhat confident" (in
response to question 12) in the protective nature of the cleanup
included the following:
* "We don't know everything that is underground (e.g., landfills) and
might seep out--cleanup is probably the most cost-effective that could
be done . . ."
* "I think most of the contamination has been removed. However, I am
concerned about isolated hot spots."
* "We were very disappointed that DOE changed course on the
verification of cleanup. We were led to believe that the verification
would be a MARSSIM based approach; what we really received was a
process that had never been used for verification purposes (the aerial
flyover); an ORISE review that was constrained by DOE and a limited
scope review."
* "I believe the majority of the buffer area will be very low risk to
the public. The ponds, the industrial area, the 903 pad, 903 lip and
903 wind blown area could expose the unsuspecting public to a higher
risk depending on individual sensitivities even though the residual Pu
[plutonium] level is at or below 50 pCi/g."
One of the 2 respondents who were "not very" or "not at all" confident
(in response to question 12) about the cleanup's protectiveness said,
* "I don't believe that the cleanup was done to be protective of public
health and the environment. Otherwise, DOE would not have pursued the
wildlife preserve aspect. Basically, the wildlife preserve is an
"administrative" control to limit the future land use, limit public
exposure to the existing contamination at the site, and allowed DOE to
leave behind a lot of contamination."
14. What, if anything, might have been done differently during the
cleanup that would have increased your confidence?
Respondents offered a number of suggestions and comments, including the
following:
* "If the original landfill and the deep basements had been removed, my
confidence would be greatly increased. I do understand the reasons for
this not occurring."
* "A 100 percent scan of the DOE-retained lands would give me a
complete idea of what is out there. . . ."
* "The implementation of our consultants' recommendations and a "TRUE"
MARSSIM based final survey."
* "Only after the Focus Group had been meeting for a full year was it
finally made clear that the better cleanup sought by some participants
was not in the cards because decisions placing a cap on what could be
spent had already been made. To some of us involved in this enormously
time consuming process, this announcement revealed that the public
participation process was in large measure a sham. Some DOE personnel
insist that DOE had been open about the fiscal cap, but the DOE
official who made the announcement at the Focus Group later said that
its effect on the meeting was 'like throwing a dead rat on the table.'"
* "I really do not have any concern about the site per se. I am
concerned that the legal folderol . . . will continue forever."
* "Really we are relying on the best science known and so I am not sure
that anything could have been done better."
* "The verification could have been performed earlier so that it could
have been used as a tool in the cleanup."
* "With unlimited funds a total cleanup could have been accomplished--
in our real world we have better than could have been expected. FWS now
needs the resources to convert the site."
* "DOE and the regulators should have required independent [MARSSIM]
based protocols to verify complete and comprehensive surface soil clean
up levels site wide. This should have been done by an independent
contractor."
15. At this point in time, do you have any remaining concerns about the
cleanup?
Yes 17:
No 8:
16. Please provide examples or details of your remaining concerns.
Respondents offered a number of concerns, including the following:
* "The underground "stuff"--landfills and basements. Who knows what,
when and how it might affect us in the future."
* "I am not certain how we will maintain control of [the] area for the
centuries needed given that we did not know for certain that all
contaminants were removed."
* "DOE needs to continue water quality monitoring on Woman Creek
permanently!"
* "My remaining concerns with the cleanup have to do with how well the
revegetation and erosion control measures function in the next few
years. The site needs several good growing seasons to help re-establish
vegetation covering the remediated portions of the DOE-retained land.
Without adequate vegetative cover, erosion problems can arise which
could ultimately result in the mobilization of actinides from the
surface soil into surface water."
* "My concerns now lie in the importance of creating a robust
stewardship plan and assuring that monitoring will continue well into
the future as well as knowing that if we find that a remedy has failed
the DOE will do what it takes to address this failure."
* "I worry about the magnitude of the long-time stewardship
responsibilities. There are numerous examples at other sites of where
controls fail because governments forget that there are institutional
controls which carry with them use restrictions. How we will protect
Rocky Flats over the long-term remains somewhat of a mystery for me."
* "What will be done in the coming years, and by whom, to keep the
public out of the contaminated areas?"
* "Plutonium and uranium take hundreds of thousands of years to decay.
Even in 100 years, the site can change sufficiently so that subsurface
contamination is exposed. Also, physical controls may well decay into
dust by the time the next century rolls around and institutional
controls could be forgotten. In the future, the site could be used for
subsistence farming. Who knows what will happen? The uncertainty of the
future contributes the largest concern I have about the cleanup."
In the summer of 2005, DOE arranged for a number of cleanup
verification activities, including Kaiser-Hill's ground-based scans
along the boundaries of previously remediated areas where contamination
was once known to exist; Bechtel Nevada's[Footnote 68] aerial scan of
the site; and the Oak Ridge Institute of Science and Education's
(ORISE) sampling and ground-based scanning of the 903 pad and lip area.
We would like your views on the overall verification process, as well
as your views on each of these three specific verification activities.
17. How, if at all, did the overall verification process affect your
confidence in the site's cleanup?
Greatly increased my confidence ; 3.
Somewhat increased my confidence; 10.
Neither increased nor diminished my confidence ; 5.
Somewhat diminished my confidence ; 2.
Greatly diminished my confidence; 1.
Don't know/no basis to judge ; 4.
18. Please explain or provide examples that illustrate how the overall
verification process affected your confidence in the site's cleanup.
Comments from 5 of the 13 respondents who believed that the overall
verification process "greatly increased" or "somewhat increased" their
confidence (in response to question 17) included the following:
* "Although I felt there was a low probability of contamination being
in the buffer zone, given the level of suspicion and the recent
publication of several false and misleading books and articles I felt
it was important. This is a good time to state that although almost all
the public fear involved radiologic contamination, it is not the most
hazardous."
* "Additional testing always adds to the vote of confidence."
* "The aerial scan was the most effective. The other parts of the
verification were too confusing for the majority of the community to
understand. When the hot spots were discovered in the 903 Pad Lip Area,
those of us more familiar with statistical sampling methodology could
understand that it was not that grave of a situation, but those who
read newspapers I am sure were not comforted."
* "ORISE, although paid by DOE, is an independent [entity]. As such, I
trust their results."
* "The targeted independent verification areas helped to assure my
confidence level but did not greatly increase it. I do think the
verification process was important to other board members and most of
all to the general public. It probably did very little or nothing to
assure already skeptical critics of the site cleanup."
Comments from 2 of the 5 respondents who said the activities "neither
increased nor diminished" their confidence (in response to question 17)
included the following:
* "I feel what was done was a waste of time and money and did not tell
us anything new."
* "Was glad it was in place, but didn't give me 100% confidence."
And of the 3 respondents who said the activities "somewhat diminished"
or "greatly diminished" their confidence in the cleanup (in response to
question 17), 1 said,
* "It is by no means clear that the full site has ever been well
characterized. Former workers are known to say that unknown areas of
random dumping were never found by the characterizing methods used,
especially the . . . method that took a very limited number of samples
in relatively large areas and estimated the contamination in that area
based on this very limited sampling. Further, . . . the verification
methods used could not detect all hot spots or areas of unknown
subsurface contamination."
19. How, if at all, did Kaiser-Hill's targeted ground-based scanning
activities (using a high-purity germanium, or HPGe, detector mounted on
a tripod) affect your confidence in the site's cleanup?
Greatly increased my confidence ; 4.
Somewhat increased my confidence; 7.
Neither increased nor diminished my confidence; 7.
Somewhat diminished my confidence; 3.
Greatly diminished my confidence; 0.
Don't know/no basis to judge; 4.
20. Please explain or provide examples that illustrate how Kaiser-
Hill's targeted ground-based scanning activities affected your
confidence in the site's cleanup.
Comments from 4 of the 11 respondents who said that Kaiser-Hill's
targeted ground-based scanning activities "greatly increased" or
"somewhat increased" their confidence in the cleanup (in response to
question 19) included the following:
* "It showed that there was basically no contamination above the
cleanup levels left on the site."
* "I felt that the areas surveyed had a low risk of contamination.
While it only somewhat increased my personal confidence I feel it was
critical in increasing the public confidence."
* "They targeted areas of concern and proved through testing that
cleanup levels had been achieved."
* "Showed that the area 'covered' by the scan met cleanup criteria."
Comments from 2 of the 7 respondents who said the activities "neither
increased nor diminished" their confidence (in response to question 19)
included the following:
* "There wasn't enough sampling conducted, and the sampling should have
been conducted in more areas after remediation was done and before
backfill took place."
* "Kaiser-Hill's scanning activities were part of the cleanup, not part
of an independent review. So, I have confidence in what they did, but
the question suggests that their scans would increase my confidence in
their work. Independent review would have increased my confidence."
And of the 3 respondents who said the activities "somewhat diminished"
their confidence in the cleanup (in response to question 19), 1 said,
* "DOE and [the contractor] have continued to approach the cleanup
using methods designed to not find problems. An approach designed to
verify that no problem exists cannot be used to discover problems."
21. How, if at all, did Bechtel Nevada's aerial scan of the site (using
a helicopter-mounted array of sodium iodide detectors) affect your
confidence in the site's cleanup?
Greatly increased my confidence; 3.
Somewhat increased my confidence ; 6.
Neither increased nor diminished my confidence; 8.
Somewhat diminished my confidence ; 3.
Greatly diminished my confidence; 1.
Don't know/no basis to judge; 4.
[End of table]
22. Please explain or provide examples that illustrate how Bechtel
Nevada's aerial scan of the site affected your confidence in the site's
cleanup.
Comments from 3 of the 9 respondents who said that Bechtel Nevada's
aerial scan of the site "greatly increased" or "somewhat increased"
their confidence in the cleanup (in response to question 21) included
the following:
* "The [aerial scan] addressed the entire site, not just where one
anticipated that contamination could exist."
* "The aerial scan just confirmed what DOE had been telling us all
along."
* "Detection capabilities of aircraft scanners was not as sensitive as
I would have liked. System was designed to detect higher concentrations
of radionuclides than were expected at Rocky Flats."
Comments from 2 of the 8 respondents who said the activities "neither
increased nor diminished" their confidence (in response to question 21)
included the following:
* "While the technology, if properly applied, might have been
sufficient, the results were less than reliable because of ground
moisture, shielding in the industrial area by equipment, debris, etc.,
and over-lot grading, which would have buried contamination. If
properly applied, the aerial scan could detect major hot spots but is
not designed to detect small hot spots that exceed the cleanup level.
The aerial scan was more a public relations ploy than a good science
valid verification of site safety and reliable cleanup."
* [The aerial scan was] "a method that is suited for determining what
has happened in a Three Mile Island [or] Chernobyl type event, not to
verify [that] an action did what it was supposed to do."
And of the 4 respondents who said the activities "somewhat diminished"
or "greatly diminished" their confidence in the cleanup (in response to
question 21), 1 said,
* "The [remedial soil action levels] established for Rocky Flats set
standards for plutonium and other materials that may remain in place
according to depth. The aerial scan can only detect what is present on
the surface (not surface defined as the top three feet, but surface as
limited to a small fraction of this amount). Further, the aerial scan
detects hot spots only if they are quite large in extent and relatively
high in concentration. The aerial scan is a very valuable tool but also
a very limited one."
23. How, if at all, did ORISE's verification activities (e.g., soil
sampling and surface scans using sodium iodide "FIDLER" scintillation
detectors) affect your confidence in the site's cleanup?
Greatly increased my confidence; 5.
Somewhat increased my confidence; 1.
Neither increased nor diminished my confidence; 2.
Somewhat diminished my confidence; 2.
Greatly diminished my confidence; 0.
Don't know/no basis to judge; 5.
24. Please explain or provide examples that illustrate how ORISE's
verification activities affected your confidence in the site's cleanup.
Comments from 6 of the 16 respondents who said that ORISE's
verification activities "greatly increased" or "somewhat increased"
their confidence in the cleanup (in response to question 23) included
the following:
* "Unlike the two [other verification activities], the ORISE
verification was essential in verifying that [Kaiser-Hill] did in fact
perform the work they were being paid to do."
* [ORISE] "did find some hot spots that [Kaiser-Hill] then addressed,
so a second check did help to increase belief in [the] cleanup."
* "This is the verification activity that turned up the 'hot spots'
which were eventually remediated. I understand that according to the
risk assessment formulas that were developed and the averaging nature
of these formulas these 'hot spots' technically did not have to be
remediated. The decision to remediate these, however, was important to
help assure public confidence in the site cleanup."
* "The ORISE work ended up raising more questions and concerns by the
public. Also, we are left with the impression at the end that their
work is incomplete because DOE did not provide them with funding to do
the final review of the aerial survey. Also, trying to make MARSSIM fit
into what was needed to verify the cleanup at the site was just too
difficult to follow. . . . The ORISE work started out with great
expectations, but things just got too confusing at the end. For the
average citizen, I don't think the verification made any difference at
all."
* "The ORISE budget was very limited--about $250,000--and was not
sufficient to do an adequate job of site verification because the
protocol they had to follow was disjointed."
* "ORISE'S work showed that for the area they reviewed, the statistical
approach Kaiser-Hill used was valid. However, given that DOE limited
ORISE's work it is hard to extrapolate their findings over a larger
area of the site. So, their work was of a limited value."
Of the 2 respondents who said that the activities "neither increased
nor diminished" their confidence (in response to question 23), 1 said:
* "The review became less and less than promised as time went by: from
a MARSSIM-based approach, to an approach greatly restrained by DOE as
to what would be reviewed and how the review would be conducted."
And of the 2 respondents who said that the activities "somewhat
diminished" their confidence in the cleanup (in response to question
23), 1 said,
* "I believe the FIDLER device is a very good way to detect
contamination in the surface soil. But its use by ORISE again was
limited to areas of known contamination rather than to characterize
portions of the site that have not been adequately characterized."
25. Do you have any additional comments you would like to provide?
Among the respondents' additional comments were the following:
* "[The Board] provides the only forum that has provided for the
public, regulators, DOE, and contractor to discuss the issues and for
everyone to have an equal voice. Hope there is someplace in the future
(for a couple of years) for such activities to continue. The proposed
LSO [long-term stewardship organization] appears to be a waste of
government funds--too large of a staff, restricted membership, and too
little technical expertise. . . ."
* "I believe the lessons learned at Rocky Flats could be put to good
use at other sites, especially Hanford."
* "In the future on any similar rad[iologically] contaminated sites,
DOE should require as a contractual condition that an independent
verification of the clean up be implemented using [MARSSIM] principles.
In the 903 pad area where a [MARSSIM] sampling verification was
implemented--hot spots substantially exceeding 50 pCi/g were found and
picked up. It would seem reasonable to conclude that other areas of the
903 pad and the industrial area would have similar exceedences."
* "DOE, other state agencies, and communities should study what we did
at Rocky Flats because we were on the cutting edge of how to work
within the regulations but allow great latitude in engaging the
community and for remediating a complex nuclear site."
* "Standley Lake Cities still have serious concerns about Woman Creek's
risk from [the original landfill and the fact that] Woman Creek has no
terminal testing control pond!"
* "ORISE should have been allowed to survey more of the area and to do
some surveying of the Buffer Zone."
[End of section]
Appendix III: Additional Information on Decontamination and Demolition
Activities at Rocky Flats:
The contractor used a number of innovative techniques to accomplish
decontamination and demolition tasks at Rocky Flats. One of these, as
discussed in the report, was the use of a cerium nitrate solution to
decontaminate large pieces of equipment. Another innovative
decontaminating technique was the contractor's use of InstaCoteTM to
encapsulate large surface-contaminated tanks and other equipment.
InstaCote is a polyurea plastic coating that was sprayed on equipment.
The InstaCotenot only sealed in the contamination, but also served as
the shipping conveyance and disposal package. According to DOE
officials, use of the InstaCote saved "easily thousands of hours" and
increased worker safety, as it eliminated the difficult and dangerous
job of cutting contaminated equipment and packaging it for shipment.
The InstaCote could be used even with extremely large pieces of
contaminated equipment, such as a super-compacter used to reduce waste
volume by crushing drums containing radioactive waste and drums that
were empty but had formerly contained radioactive waste. Figure 14
shows the super-compacter before InstaCote was applied and with the
InstaCote awaiting transport to a disposal facility.
Figure 14: Super-Compacter without (Left) and with InstaCote:
[See PDF for image]
Source: DOE.
[End of figure]
One of the most difficult decontaminating challenges DOE and the
contractor overcame was decontaminating concrete. When concrete became
contaminated with liquid radioactive waste (e.g., by spills during
nuclear material processing or waste disposal), the past practice was
to fix the contamination in place using sometimes several layers of an
epoxy paint. Before a building containing contaminated concrete could
be demolished, this paint had to be removed down to the base material,
and the base material had to be decontaminated. The contractor removed
the contaminated paint using various methods such as scabbling,
shaving, or hydolasing. Scabbling chipped away the first layer of the
surface with a pneumatic hammer; however, this option created dust and
increased the potential for the release of contaminants into the air.
Shaving removed layers of concrete with a machine, and was considered
more efficient and less hazardous than hydrolasing for decontaminating
concrete surfaces with deeper contamination. Hydrolasing, the preferred
method for removing paint and shallow surface contamination, involved
blasting away paint and the initial layer of the surface material with
water, then self-containing the water and resulting debris. Figure 15
shows the hydrolase system in use in building 886 at Rocky Flats, a
former nuclear laboratory known to have light contamination under
painted surfaces.
Figure 15: Hydrolase System at Work Removing Contaminated Paint and
Underlying Surface Contamination:
[See PDF for image]
Source: DOE.
[End of figure]
But in some cases, according to a senior contractor official,
contaminated liquid had seeped so deeply into the concrete that it
could not be removed using any of these three methods. This was the
case, for example, in the "infinity room" (so called because the level
of radioactive contamination in the room was greater than instruments
could measure) of building 771, which had often been referred to as
"the most dangerous building in America." When concrete was
contaminated to the core, the only option was to cut it out and remove
it. The entire "infinity room" floor had to be cut out and shipped as
transuranic waste, as shown in figure 16.
Figure 16: Workers Cut Contaminated Concrete from Building 771's
'Infinity Room':
[See PDF for image]
Source: DOE.
[End of figure]
In other cases, when the contaminated concrete was far underground
(i.e., in building foundations), it was decontaminated to the lowest
levels reasonably achievable and left in place. DOE and the regulatory
agencies agreed to decontaminate and leave in place the foundations of
buildings 371 and 771/774, and cover them with clean fill dirt.
According to DOE and contractor officials, leaving the foundations in
place poses little risk to human health and safety because the
foundations and the soil around them were decontaminated to specified
levels before being covered.[Footnote 69] Also, they said, leaving the
foundations in place was safer for the workers at the site than
removing them, which would have required workers wearing respiratory
protection systems that constrain movement and visibility to winch up
massive, multiton pieces of concrete from a confined space. A Colorado
official said he had agreed to the decision to leave the foundations in
place after carefully considering the balance between the potential
future risk of exposure with the real and immediate risk of worker
safety. In lieu of removal, the contractor treated the foundations with
a fixative to prevent contaminants from migrating during demolition
activities, then covered them with a cushion of sand and a layer of
clean fill dirt. According to DOE and contractor officials, plutonium
should not migrate out of the foundations, and if it does, it should
not migrate beyond the surrounding soil. This contention is supported
by the results of the actinide migration study, which concluded that
fixed actinide contamination does not readily move in the environment.
Also, neither humans nor wildlife would be exposed unless a future
major excavation activity were to take place. However slight it may be,
the potential risk to human health and safety posed by leaving the
foundations in place is the reason that controls such as groundwater
monitoring wells and treatment systems will remain in place, according
to Colorado officials.
Another innovative decontaminating and demolition strategy the
contractor developed in conjunction with DOE and the regulatory
agencies involved dividing the site into areas and completing most or
all of the work in one area--from building decontamination to
demolition--so that environmental remediation could begin in that area
while decontamination and demolition work was being done in the next
area. This strategy enabled the cleanup to proceed more quickly by
allowing the earlier start of environmental restoration work and by
allowing workers more time to address any unforeseen circumstances. The
strategy also achieved economies of scale, as site services--such as
water, steam, and power--could be eliminated throughout an entire area,
rather than on a building-by-building basis.
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Additional Information on the Quality of Remediation Data
at Rocky Flats and on DOE's Planned and Actual Verification:
This appendix presents additional information on our review of the
processes and procedures in place at Rocky Flats to evaluate the
quality of remediation data. It also presents additional information on
DOE's planned and actual verification of the contractor's cleanup work.
Information on Controls over Data Quality:
A critical aspect of the cleanup process was ensuring the validity of
the data used to assess whether the site had been remediated to the
agreed-upon levels. Accordingly, we reviewed the processes and
procedures in place to ensure data quality, and we identified four key
controls: (1) establishing data quality objectives, (2) using data
quality parameters, (3) verifying and validating data, and (4) auditing
laboratories that analyzed samples for Rocky Flats. Our review showed
that, overall, the contractor generally followed these data quality
controls and clearly documented its compliance with them for the four
accelerated cleanup actions we reviewed in depth. For these four
cleanup actions--at building 771, the 903 pad, the 903 lip area, and
trench T-7--we assessed the closeout reports and the data supporting
them to determine the extent to which the data collection and
laboratory analyses adhered to data quality standards and procedures.
We did not, however, evaluate the remedial data or laboratory analyses
themselves.
To assess the use of the first key control--establishing data quality
objectives--we identified the criteria documented in the Industrial
Area and Buffer Zone Sampling and Analysis Plan. We then reviewed the
cleanup project sampling plan addenda, remedial action plans, and
cleanup project closeout reports for each of the four projects to
determine whether the data quality objectives had been established and
were considered during the projects' cleanup. To assess the use of the
second control, we reviewed the four projects' closeout reports to
verify that the data had been checked against the data quality
parameters in accordance with the criteria located in both the Rocky
Flats Implementation Guidance Document and the Industrial Area and
Buffer Zone Sampling and Analysis Plan. These documents establish the
guidelines for evaluating analytical data and address the overall
quality of the data quality control. We examined the closeout reports
for each of the four projects to ensure that the projects met the
criteria for the third control--data verification and validation. And
finally, to assess the use of the fourth control, we reviewed reports
on audits of laboratories that analyzed data for the site's cleanup.
Specifically, we reviewed source documentation from audits conducted by
DOE's consolidated audit program and DOE's mixed analyte performance
evaluation program. We concentrated our review on laboratory audit
results relevant to detecting plutonium for the 3-year period during
which cleanup was under way for the four projects.
Establishing data quality objectives. DOE and the contractor
established data quality objectives to act as planning tools for
collecting data and for making decisions. The data quality objectives
process is specified in the site's quality assurance project
plan.[Footnote 70] The process is intended to provide a systematic
procedure for defining criteria for data collection, including when and
where to collect samples, what level of decision error is tolerable,
and how many samples to collect. In our review of the four selected
cleanup areas, we found general adherence to the data quality
objectives process. For three of the four projects we selected, we
verified that both the characterization and confirmation sampling were
planned according to the data quality objective process as defined in
the Industrial Area and Buffer Zone Sampling and Analysis Plan. Because
the fourth project required only minimal cleanup, it was completed
through the standard "no further accelerated action" justification
process. According to the contractor, the justification documentation
for such areas (those requiring minimal cleanup) should include
information on data adequacy, but not at the same level of detail as
was required for other cleanup areas. We recognize that areas closed
out through the "no further accelerated action" process may not
necessitate the same level of data quality documentation as other
areas. Nevertheless, the Rocky Flats Cleanup Agreement requires that
the justification documentation for "no further accelerated action"
areas include information on data quality and usability. The
documentation we reviewed for trench T-7 did not include such
information.
Applying PARCC parameters. EPA's policy requires it to apply data
quality parameters for precision, accuracy, representativeness,
completeness, and comparability--known as the PARCC parameters. Because
radionuclides were involved, an additional data quality parameter--
sensitivity--was used at Rocky Flats. These parameters provided
information to the contractor and the regulatory agencies about the
acceptability or utility of the data. For example, precision measures
whether using the same analytical technique will result in the same
results for a particular sample (i.e., analyzing the same sample twice
and comparing the results).[Footnote 71] According to the sampling and
analysis plan, assessments of the data according to the PARCC
parameters are documented in the closeout reports for the accelerated
cleanup actions and, according to EPA officials, are checked through
the verification and validation process discussed next. Our review of
the four selected cleanup areas indicated that the PARCC parameters
were consistently applied. For three of the four projects we selected,
we verified that the data were reviewed in accordance with each of the
data quality parameters. The fourth project required only minimal
cleanup and was completed through the standard "no further accelerated
action" justification process for which no formal data quality
discussion was required.
Verifying and validating laboratory data. Data verification was
required for 100 percent of the laboratory data at Rocky Flats. Data
validation was required for 25 percent of the data, but because this
requirement pertained to the Rocky Flats site as a whole, the
percentage of data validated could vary considerably from one cleanup
area to another. Data verification is a review of a laboratory's
electronic data package summary to evaluate the extent to which the
laboratory met specified quality control and reporting criteria. Data
validation is a more in-depth review that includes not only verifying
the data, but also examining the raw data and manually verifying
calculations done by the laboratory. After a laboratory analyzed
samples, it sent the results to a subcontractor that reviewed the data
according to either the verification or the validation criteria and
assigned codes indicating the data's quality. For example, one code
would be assigned to data for which no problems were observed, whereas
another code would be assigned to data that did not meet the quality
control requirements.
Our review of the closeout reports on the four cleanup projects we
selected indicated general adherence to the verification and validation
requirements. Specifically, for three of the four projects, at least 98
percent of the overall data had been verified, and between 23 percent
and 50 percent had been validated. The contractor provided several
explanations for why 100 percent of the data had not been verified. For
example, at the 903 lip area, because a number of samples were
collected close to the time that the closeout report was submitted,
verification and validation occurred after the report was completed.
Additionally, the large number of samples collected in September 2004
(from the 903 lip area and other areas around the site) overloaded the
verification and validation staff. Most of these records were verified
or validated in late November or early December 2004, and all had been
verified or validated by early 2005, according to the contractor.
Auditing laboratories. The 32 laboratories that analyzed samples
collected from Rocky Flats were required to undergo annual technical
audits to ensure the accuracy of their analytical results. Since 2000,
contractor officials said they have largely satisfied the audit
requirement by voluntarily participating in DOE's consolidated audit
program,[Footnote 72] with the exception of one on-site laboratory that
the contractor audited. A typical DOE laboratory audit, according to
the audit program manager, includes a 3-day visit to the laboratory by
a team of five to six people. DOE certifies laboratory auditors in
particular areas, including chemistry (e.g., radiochemistry or organic
chemistry), and uses a standardized checklist to verify that laboratory
practices meet DOE standards. When auditors identify problems, they can
provide comments or issue priority I or priority II findings. Priority
I findings are the most severe; they represent a serious breakdown in
management controls that could render the laboratory unacceptable for
use or unfit to perform services for DOE. Laboratories that receive
priority I and II findings are required to develop and implement
corrective action plans, and the contractor's policy stipulated that
laboratories receiving priority I findings could do no more work for
Rocky Flats until they had rectified the problem. Of the 118 audits
conducted of laboratories analyzing Rocky Flats cleanup samples, only
10 priority I findings were issued, according to the subcontractor
official responsible for laboratory audits at Rocky Flats.
We reviewed the performance of the two primary laboratories that
analyzed confirmatory samples for plutonium 239 for the four selected
cleanup areas and found no areas of concern with the laboratories'
quality. To limit our review, we focused on two performance criteria:
(1) laboratory audit findings from DOE's consolidated audit program
documents on alpha spectroscopy, which is used to analyze confirmatory
samples for plutonium; and (2) results from DOE's mixed analyte
performance evaluation program, which assesses a laboratory's
analytical abilities by sending the laboratory a sample of a known
quantity of a contaminant and comparing the laboratory's results with
the actual quantity. Our review showed that the audit findings for
alpha spectroscopy resulted in one audit observation.[Footnote 73] Our
review of the second performance criteria of the tests of the two
laboratories' analytic ability found that, from 2002 through 2004, the
two laboratories analyzed a combined total of 16 samples of plutonium
239, or alpha samples, and received acceptable test results in all but
3. Of those 3 samples, 2 samples were considered acceptable but were
off by 20 percent to 30 percent, and 1 sample was not acceptable.
Additional Information on DOE's Planned and Actual Verification
Activities:
DOE revised two of the planned verification activities at Rocky Flats.
First, due to time and cost constraints, DOE reduced the scope of the
contractor's planned scanning and sampling activities. Second, DOE
revised the Oak Ridge Institute for Science and Education's (ORISE)
planned assessment of the contractor's scans of the 903 lip area. The
revision incorporated an approach consistent with the Multi-Agency
Radiation Survey and Site Investigation Manual (MARSSIM). The actual
verification activities conducted by both the contractor and ORISE
identified "hot spots" of radionuclide-contaminated soil; these hot
spots were subsequently remediated.
DOE Reduced Size and Scope of Scanning and Sampling Portion of Planned
Verification:
The first part of DOE's cleanup verification effort--the contractor-
conducted scanning and sampling[Footnote 74]--was reduced in scope due
to time and cost constraints. In September 2004, the Rocky Flats site
manager requested that the contractor develop a sitewide surface
radiological survey using the Multi-Agency Radiation Survey and Site
Investigation Manual (MARSSIM). MARSSIM is the outcome of a joint
effort by DOE, EPA, the Department of Defense, and the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission to develop uniform guidance for conducting final
surveys to demonstrate compliance with specified radiological cleanup
levels. It recommends 100 percent scanning of areas most likely to be
contaminated with radionuclides.
Scanning can be conducted through use of devices known as high-purity
germanium (HPGe) detectors, as shown in figure 17, or sodium iodide
scintillation detectors, known as FIDLERs. These devices can scan
entire areas to determine whether certain radionuclides are present in
a given area.
Figure 17: A High-Purity Germanium Detector Can Detect Certain
Radionuclides:
[See PDF for image]
Source: DOE.
[End of figure]
This scanning approach had been used several times by ORISE at Rocky
Flats to demonstrate the sufficiency of radiological cleanup of
buildings prior to their demolition. However, according to the
contractor, DOE had limited experience using this approach to
characterize surface soil and sediment. In its October 2004 letter
responding to DOE, the contractor concluded that applying MARSSIM
across the site would cost approximately $7.5 million and would take 19
months after the site cleanup had been completed. Further, the
contractor said that implementing MARSSIM at the site could constitute
a "significant contract change," and could postpone completion of the
cleanup. In essence, the difficulty was that the MARSSIM approach was
inconsistent with the cleanup strategy. The approved site cleanup
strategy was to remove contamination to a 90 percent confidence level,
meaning confidence that at least 90 percent of the contamination had
been remediated to agreed-upon levels. In contrast, MARSSIM, which was
developed years after the Rocky Flats cleanup strategy had been
approved and begun, recommends applying a 100 percent verification
strategy--that is, scanning areas most likely to contain residual
radionuclide contamination. Accordingly, MARSSIM was sure to find "hot
spots"--particularly at the 903 pad and lip area, the extent and
severity of which would then require investigation and potentially
cleanup action. Not having anticipated the implications of applying
MARSSIM at the site, in terms of both cost and schedule, DOE
subsequently rejected that approach.
In March 2005, the contractor proposed a less expensive, less time-
consuming plan for demonstrating the cleanup's compliance with the
cleanup agreement. The plan's objectives were to verify, with
reasonable certainty, that no unknown areas of radiological
contamination remained at the site, that all remedial actions were
complete, and that existing sampling data remained valid. The
verification approach included scanning, sampling, and reviewing
historical and existing data. Through such activities, the contractor
intended to increase DOE's and the community groups' confidence that
the cleanup objectives had been achieved. The plan purported to exceed
the guidance laid out in MARSSIM, although an ORISE official refuted
this claim. Further comments provided by a contractor hired by the
Rocky Flats Coalition of Local Governments to provide input on the
process added to DOE's concerns and resulted in DOE's rejecting the
contractor's sampling methodology.
The contractor's final scanning and sampling plan, issued in May 2005,
included two actions to meet the verification objectives. First, the
entire site would be scanned with sodium iodide detectors affixed to a
helicopter. According to the contractor, the detectors would detect,
within the top several inches of surface soil, gamma rays indicating
the existence of any residual plutonium that exceeded 50 picocuries per
gram of soil, over a range of 80 square meters--roughly the size of a
two-car garage.[Footnote 75] Figure 18 shows electrical poles that were
felled to allow the helicopter to fly as low as possible over the site
and the aerial scan of the site for residual plutonium in surface soil.
Figure 18: Felled Electrical Poles Allow Lower Flight; Helicopter Scans
Rocky Flats for Residual Plutonium in Surface Soil:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO, DOE.
[End of figure]
Of the 21 community group survey respondents who expressed an opinion
on the aerial scan, 9 said the scan greatly or somewhat increased their
confidence in the site's cleanup. Another 8 said the scan neither
increased nor diminished their confidence, and the other 4 said the
aerial scan greatly or somewhat diminished their confidence in the
site's cleanup.
Another component of the contractor's final plan was targeted ground-
based scanning around the perimeter of previously remediated areas,
including the perimeter of the major plutonium buildings and the 903
lip area. These scans were conducted with a high-purity germanium
detector, as described earlier. Of the 21 community group survey
respondents who expressed an opinion on the contractor's ground-based
scans, 11 said these scans greatly or somewhat increased their
confidence in the site's cleanup. Another 7 said the scans neither
increased nor diminished their confidence, and the other 3 said the
ground-based scans greatly or somewhat diminished their confidence in
the site's cleanup.
DOE Revised ORISE's Portion of Planned Verification to Incorporate
MARSSIM:
The second part of DOE's cleanup verification effort--ORISE's review of
contractor-conducted scans for remaining radiological contamination--
was revised to apply MARSSIM to the 903 lip area. ORISE's initial plan
did not incorporate MARSSIM. However, the Rocky Flats Coalition of
Local Governments' contractor suggested using MARSSIM at the 903 lip
area because it had been one of the most contaminated areas. ORISE's
proposed final plan included assessing the performance of the
contractor's aerial and targeted ground-based scanning and the adequacy
and completeness of the contractor's closeout reports for the 903 lip
area using MARSSIM.
Results of the Contractor's Final Scanning and Sampling Cleanup
Verification Plan and ORISE's Independent Verification:
Both the contractor's and ORISE's verifications identified radionuclide-
contaminated soil. At a September 1, 2005, public meeting hosted by the
Rocky Flats Citizens Advisory Board, DOE and the contractor presented
the results of the contractor's and ORISE's verifications. DOE and the
contractor reported that the aerial scan had identified known areas of
radionuclide contamination, such as areas where contaminated soil was
stored pending its shipment off site. (The scan also identified an off-
site area, but subsequent investigation found no contamination there.)
However, the aerial scan did not achieve its projected sensitivity.
Whereas detection of 50 picocuries of plutonium per gram of soil over
80 square meters was the criterion for success, according to the
contractor's final plan, the scanner achieved this detection level for
only 25 percent of the site, owing to the moisture content in the
ground and the altitude of the helicopter's flyover. They also reported
that the contractor's ground-based scan found five areas on the
perimeter of the 903 lip area that contained contamination in excess of
50 picocuries per gram of soil, which were subsequently remediated.
In addition, DOE and the contractor reported that ORISE's MARSSIM
sampling had identified 13 "hot spots," or areas with contamination
above the cleanup agreement's action level of 50 picocuries of
plutonium per gram of soil. Contamination in these 13 hot spots ranged
from 65 to 425 picocuries of plutonium per gram of soil. However, a DOE
official said that DOE would not remediate those areas because the
regulatory agencies had already approved the accelerated cleanup
actions, and those actions had been conducted in accordance with the
cleanup methodology agreed to by DOE and the regulatory agencies. The
cleanup methodology required that at least 90 percent of any given area
be remediated to the required levels; accordingly, there was a 10
percent chance that areas of elevated contamination remained. Even
though the cleanup had been conducted in accordance with the approved
methodology (which allowed for the chance of such elevated
contamination remaining), DOE's initial refusal to remediate the hot
spots caused concern for the Rocky Flats Coalition of Local
Governments, according to the Coalition's executive director. Within 2
weeks, after consulting with EPA and Colorado, DOE agreed to have the
contractor remediate the hot spots.
Overall, hundreds of samples were taken at the 903 pad and lip area,
including initial and confirmatory samples. Figure 19 shows
postremediation (confirmatory) samples taken by the contractor, as well
as verification samples taken by ORISE.
Figure 19: Confirmation and Independent Verification Samples Taken at
the 903 Lip Area:
[See PDF for image]
Source: DOE.
Note: This figure does not show the samples taken on the pad itself
(the white square at the left). According to a contractor official, so
many samples were taken within the pad that a depiction of them would
appear as a solid mass.
[End of figure]
Although DOE had agreed to ORISE's final independent verification plan,
DOE did not have ORISE fully implement the plan, and it did not
publicly explain its reasoning. Specifically, DOE did not have ORISE
complete the planned assessment of the aerial and ground-based scanning
or the planned assessment of the contractor's investigations of the
results of the aerial and targeted ground-based scans. According to a
DOE official, DOE decided that the results of these remaining
assessments would not justify their completion, particularly because
the aerial survey had failed to find any anomalies.
Of the 20 community group survey respondents who expressed an opinion
on ORISE's soil sampling and surface scans (using a FIDLER--a sodium
iodide scintillation detector), 16 said the scan greatly or somewhat
increased their confidence in the site's cleanup. Another 2 said the
scan neither increased nor diminished their confidence, and the other 2
said the aerial scan greatly or somewhat diminished their confidence in
the site's cleanup.
[End of section]
Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Energy:
Department of Energy:
Washington, DC 20585:
June 9, 2006:
Mr. Gene Aloise:
Director:
Natural Resources and Environment:
U. S. Government Accountability Office:
Washington, D.C. 20585:
Dear Mr. Aloise:
Thank you for the opportunity to review the Government Accountability
Office (GAO) proposed report entitled, Nuclear Cleanup Of Rocky Flats:
DOE Can Use Lessons Learned To Improve Oversight Of Other Sites'
Cleanup Activities (Gao-06-352). The Department of Energy has reviewed
the report and our written comments are provided as an attachment to
this letter.
The Department's comments are primarily directed to specific references
in the report's text. We also offer some overall comments that pertain
to the report taken as a whole that may not affect specific aspects of
your final report.
We found the GAO proposed report to be comprehensive and generally
thorough. We compliment your approach on covering complex topics and
presenting important information in a manner that is clearly written
and well structured.
If you have any questions or comments please contact Mr. Jay Rhoderick
of my staff at (301) 903-7211.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
James A. Rispoli:
Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management:
Enclosure:
Comments on the:
Draft GAO Report "Nuclear Cleanup of Rocky Flats: DOE Can Use Lessons
Learned to Improve Oversight Of Other Sites' Activities"
Overall Comments:
1. We agree that a robust and effective lessons learned program would
be very beneficial for the Department and for other agencies. We
welcome the GAO's recommendation(s) on how to institutionalize an
effective lessons learned program across the complex. We intend to
follow through and revitalize such a program within the Department of
Energy (DOE) Environmental Management (EM). Any references that you
could provide other government agencies that have successful lessons
learned programs would be appreciated. EM has delayed a project plan to
execute an EM lessons learned program that we expect will be
operational by June 2006.
2. The GAO report recognizes the role that teamwork and agency support
had in accelerating cleanup of the Rocky Flats site. We agree, and in
fact believe the positive impact of these two factors can not be
overemphasized. The regulatory agencies, community groups, and local
government organizations worked tirelessly along with the DOE and
contractor organizations to ensure that obstacles were overcome. This
teamwork was imperative for timely completion of the project.
The high priority given the Rocky Flats cleanup within the DOE complex
and at the Congressional level was also a critical factor contributing
to the success of the project. The project was ensured level annual
funding to enable both DOE and the contractor to meet stated contract
goals and objectives. Appropriated funds were made available to the
site to allow the site to proceed in the most effective manner to
ensure safe, accelerated cleanup work. Many projects historically are
not guaranteed level funding due to competing priorities. The lesson
learned for the Department and Congress has been that giving this
cleanup project a high priority and providing it with the certainty of
funding allowed completion of the work as planned.
Specific Comments:
Page 9, Footnote 12: The text states, ". with half-lives greater than 5
years." Comment: This half life is not consistent with the definition
at 40 CFR 191.02 (i) in EPA's high level waste and transuranic waste
standards. There, the half life specified is 20 years. Recommend
replacing 5 with 20 and checking the remainder of the definition to be
certain it is consistent with the definition at 40 CFR 191.02 (i).
Page 19, in the first paragraph: The text states. "At the time of our
2001 report. DOE was concerned about the number and severity of safety
violations that had occurred." Comment: Reference could be made to the
DOE Rocky Flats Project Office Manager letter to the contractor of
January 5. 2001, which documented these concerns with safety
performance.
Page 27, in the Section entitled, "Regulatory Steps Remain before Site
can open as a Wildlife Refuge:" There is an additional regulatory step
DOE must take pursuant to its requirements. Specifically, DOE Order
5400.5 (Section II.5.a) states, "Release of real property (land and
structures) shall be in accordance with the guidelines and requirements
for residual radioactive material presented in Chapter IV." DOE Order
5400.5 (Section IV.4.d) states, "An authorized limit is a level of
residual radioactive material that shall not be exceeded if the
remedial action is to be considered completed and the property is to be
released without restrictions on use due to residual radioactive
material." Consequently, before real property is released to the
Department of the Interior, DOE must comply with its radiation
protection order. Recommend this regulatory requirement be referenced.
Page 31, last line: The text reads, "privately owned mineral rights.".
Recommend modification to read, "privately owned essential mineral
rights." The legislation referenced in footnote 37 discusses
"essential" mineral rights which is defined in Section 3112 (a)(1) and
(a)(4). There are other mineral rights at Rocky Flats that are owned by
private parties that are unaffected by the legislation and will not
affect the establishment of the refuge.
Page 32, first sentence: The text refers to mineral rights and as per
the explanation above for Page 31, the text should read "essential
mineral rights".
Page 49, in the first sentence beginning on the previous page: The text
states. ".but the policy is unclear about the how and why verification
should be done." Comment: There is direction and guidance on
independent verification and other independent assessments. The
following references set forth this direction and guidance: 10 CFR 830,
DOE 450.1, DOE 226.1, DOE P 450.5, DOE 5400.1, and Secretary
Richardson's letter referenced in footnote 56.
Page 50, on the third line. The text states, "The draft guidance
includes." Comment: The draft guidance, "Control and Release of
Property with Residual Radioactive Material," implementing guidance for
DOE Order 5400.5, was approved for interim use. Insert after the word
"guidance", the phrase "which was approved for interim use."
Page 70, footnote 65: The report states that the Rocky Flats Citizen's
Advisory Board (RFCAB) was dissolved at the end of 2005; however, the
RFCAB was funded this year. The RFCAB has continued to function in 2006
and the Board's last formal meeting is scheduled for June 1, 2006:
[End of section]
Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of the Interior:
United States Department of the Interior:
Office Of The Secretary:
Washington, D.C. 20240:
Jun 02 2006:
Mr. Gene Aloise:
Director, Natural Resources and Environment:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Dear Mr. Aloise:
Thank you for providing the Department of the Interior (DOI) the
opportunity to review and comment on the draft U.S. Government
Accountability Office report entitled, "Nuclear Cleanup of Rocky Flats:
DOE Can Use Lessons Learned to Improve Oversight of Other Sites'
Cleanup Activities," GAO-06-352, dated May 8, 2006. In general, we
agree with the information that pertains to the U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service.
At this point, we are unable to determine when Rocky Flats will be open
to the public, due to the uncertainty of the completion of the transfer
of the site. We recommend that the report focus on the transfer of
administrative jurisdiction from the Department of Energy to DOI,
establishing a National Wildlife Refuge, rather than focusing on when
the public may access it. We also recommend that GAO clarify the
actions that the Environmental Protection Agency must take to
facilitate that transfer of administrative jurisdiction as well as the
discussion of the acquisition of privately-owned mineral rights.
The enclosure provides comments from the U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service. We hope these comments will assist you in preparing the final
report.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Acting Assistant Secretary for Fish and Wildlife and Parks:
Enclosure:
U.S. Government Accountability Office Draft Report "Nuclear Cleanup of
Rocky Flats: DOE Can Use Lessons Learned to Improve Oversight of Other
Sites' Cleanup Activities" GAO-06-352:
Specific Comments:
1. Page 2, second paragraph: Please change the last sentence to: "With
the exception of one pedestrian trail, most of the planned wildlife
refuge will not be open to the public until at least five years after
the refuge is established." Based on the uncertainties of when
administrative jurisdiction will be transferred to DOI, and when
funding for refuge operations is available, we prefer this language
instead of indicating specific years when trails may be opened.
2. Page 6, first paragraph: Please change the third and fourth
sentences to: "If the joint decision is that no further action is
required, and EPA certifies that the cleanup and closure of Rocky Flats
is complete, DOE will transfer primary administrative jurisdiction over
the majority of the site to the Department of the Interior for use as a
wildlife refuge. If funds are available, FWS plans to open one
pedestrian trail in the first year after the transfer and to open the
remainder of the public trails and facilities between the 5th and 15th
years following transfer." EPA will not "turn over" the site to FWS.
EPA will certify that cleanup and closure are complete and DOE will
transfer primary administrative jurisdiction to the Department of the
Interior. The goals of the refuge Comprehensive Conservation Plan are
to complete all planned public use facilities within the 15-year life
of the plan.
3. Page 26, third paragraph: Please change the first sentence to: "The
physical cleanup at Rocky Flats is complete, at a total cost (including
long-term costs) of about $10 billion; however several regulatory steps
remain before land can be transferred to the Department of the Interior
for establishment of the wildlife refuge." The remaining regulatory
steps are related to land transfer and refuge establishment. Opening
the future refuge to the public is dependent on FWS funding, not
regulatory approvals.
4. Page 27, first paragraph: Please change the first complete sentence
to: "If they decide that no further action is needed to remediate the
site, EPA will delete portions of the site from the CERCLA National
Priorities List and certify that the cleanup and closure of Rocky Flats
has been completed; the Secretary of the Interior can then accept
administrative jurisdiction of designated lands and establish the
refuge in accordance with the Rocky Flats National Wildlife Refuge Act
of 2001." The Refuge Act requires "completion certification" by EPA.
EPA, DOE, and FWS have all agreed that certification should not precede
deletion of future refuge lands from the NPL.
5. Page 31, third bullet. We recommend that GAO review this bullet
statement with the EPA. The Refuge Act requires transfer of
administrative jurisdiction to DOI within 30 days of EPA certifying
completion of the cleanup and closure. EPA has agreed to follow the
precedent set at Rocky Mountain Arsenal and provide "completion
certification" at the time land is deleted from the NPL. The deletion
process is a rule-making process that takes longer than one month. If
the "final decision document" is issued in November 2006, we expect
that NPL deletion and certification of completion by EPA could not
occur in December 2006.
6. Pages 31-32, fourth bullet: In the second sentence, please insert
the words "designated essential" before "mineral rights." In the last
sentence in the bullet on page 32, please replace the words "mineral
rights held" with "sand and gravel mining." The 2006 Defense
Authorization Act authorizes acquisition of designated "essential
mineral rights." DOI will accept some lands encumbered by privately
owned mineral rights (e.g., oil, gas, coal), but the designated areas
subject to surface gravel mining will not become part of the refuge
until those rights are acquired or the land is mined and reclaimed.
7. Page 32, second paragraph: Please change the last sentence to: "In
the first year following land transfer and refuge establishment, and if
funds are available, FWS will open one 1.75 mile pedestrian trail, that
will follow the existing road to the Lindsay Ranch homestead site,
which dates from the 1940's." The Lindsay Ranch actually dates from
after WWII. Although the Refuge Act requires that the Lindsay Ranch
"shall be permanently preserved and maintained in accordance with the
National Historic Preservation Act," the Lindsay Ranch is not included
on, nor is it eligible for inclusion on, the National Register of
Historic Places.
8. Page 33, first paragraph: Please change part of the second sentence
to ". 15 miles of trails ." Also in the second sentence, please change
"2011 and 2016" to "2012 and 2022." The FWS Comprehensive Conservation
Plan calls for the additional trails and facilities to be operational
between 5 and 15 years following refuge establishment, which is
anticipated not before 2007.
9. Page 34, first paragraph: In the first line, please insert "EPA and
the State" following "DOE." Although DOE will prepare the CERCLA Five-
Year Review, EPA and the State of Colorado have a significant role in
that process.
10. Page 35, last paragraph: Please insert the word "designated
essential" before "mineral rights" where "mineral rights" occurs
throughout the paragraph. DOE is authorized to acquire only specified
essential mineral rights at Rocky Flats.
[End of section]
Appendix VII: Comments from the Colorado Department of Public Health
and Environment:
State Of Colorado:
Bill Owens, Governor:
Dennis E. Ellis, Executive Director:
Dedicated to protecting and improving the health and environment of the
people of Colorado:
4300 Cherry Creek Dr. S.
Denver, Colorado 80246-1530
Phone (303) 692-2000
TDD Line (303) 691-7700
Located in Glendale, Colorado:
Laboratory Services Division:
8100 Lowry Blvd.
Denver, Colorado 80230-6928:
(303) 692-3090:
[Hyperlink, http://www.cdphe.state.co.usus]:
June 13, 2006:
Gene Aloise, Director:
Natural Resources and Environment:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street N.W.
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Aloise:
Thank you for the opportunity to comment on your agency's report,
"Nuclear Cleanup of Rocky Flats: DOE Can Use Lessons Learned to Improve
Oversight of Other Sites' Cleanup Activities (GAO-06-352)".
The Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment (the
department) has been an integral participant in the Cleanup and Closure
of Rocky Flats. We provided continual in-depth regulatory oversight of
the investigative and remedial activities for both Building
Decommissioning and Demolition, as well as for Environmental
Restoration. The accelerated completion of physical activities at Rocky
Flats was in large part expedited by the dedicated efforts of this
department to perform our required regulatory activities, work in a
consultative relationship, and provide rapid responses that allowed the
continuation of the accelerated cleanup. This was accomplished without
compromising our regulatory authority, clean-up objectives, or
personnel safety and resulted in significant cost savings for DOE and
the U.S. taxpayers.
The GAO Report provides an appropriate recognition of issues and
actions occurring during the remedial activities at Rocky Flats. With
the exception of technical comments my staff forwarded to you
previously, we have no further comments on the document. Thank you for
the diligence of your staff and for the opportunity to share our
comments.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Dennis E. Ellis:
Executive Director:
cc: Gary Baughman, Director, Hazardous Materials and Waste Management
Division:
Susan Chaki, Hazardous Materials and Waste Management Division:
David Kruchek, Hazardous Materials and Waste Management Division:
Carl Spreng, Hazardous Materials and Waste Management Division:
Joe Schieffelin, Hazardous Materials and Waste Management Division:
[End of section]
Appendix VIII: Comments from Kaiser-Hill Company L.L.C.
Kaiser-Hill Company:
May 25, 2006:
06-RF-00069:
Gene E. Aloise:
Government Accountability Office:
441 G. Street, NW:
Mailstop 2T23-A:
Washington, DC 20548:
Kaiser-Hill Comments To GAO Draft Report (GAO-06-352) - NRT-007-06:
Dear Mr. Aloise:
Thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on the Government
Accountability Office's (GAO's) draft report, Nuclear Cleanup of Rocky
Flats: DOE Can Use Lessons Learned to Improve Oversight of Other Sites'
Cleanup Activities (GAO-06-352). We believe that the report is thorough
and well written, and accurately describes Kaiser-Hill's role in the
cleanup of Rocky Flats. In addition to the technical comments we
provided to you under separate cover, there are only a few issues that
warrant additional comment from Kaiser-Hill.
We are particularly pleased with the focus on the contribution of our
hourly workforce to this project's success. From the beginning, with
DOE's strong encouragement, Kaiser-Hill was committed to empowerment of
individual workers and an emphasis on a positive, team-oriented
environment. While accomplishing some of the most challenging tasks
ever faced in a DOE closure project, our workers had among the best
safety record in the DOE complex. To achieve these positive results,
the workforce was backed by financial incentives, which ranged from
individual spot bonuses for unique contributions, to year-end incentive
payments tied to overall safety goals and project performance, to post-
employment workforce transition benefits.
Kaiser-Hill strongly agrees with GAO's conclusion regarding the role
the incentive contract played in the success of the project. We believe
the success of the financial incentives during the project was only
fully realized because of the commitment to share these incentives with
our workers, from senior management to union members performing the day-
to-day physical work. This organization-wide distribution of financial
incentives may explain the disparity between our incentive- based
closure contract and the varied success of other incentive contracts.
The success of the project was also due to the cooperative decision-
making process that evolved among DOE, Kaiser-Hill, EPA, the State of
Colorado, and local communities. Beginning with a firm political
commitment to accelerate and finish the cleanup of Rocky Flats, the
parties worked to resolve contentious issues and reach common goals,
ultimately developing a positive working relationship that is unique in
the DOE complex.
Kaiser-Hill would like to offer two clarifications to the report.
First, Kaiser-Hill believes the total calculation of the clean-up costs
detailed in the report is misleading. GAO used a calculation that
includes costs associated with physical work during the cleanup and
other tangential expenses such as health and pension benefits. This
latter item alone adds $1 billion to GAO's overall cost reporting. It
is important to note that a significant portion of these post-closure
benefit costs were accrued during management of the facility by other
contractors, including during weapons production, well before Kaiser-
Hill was hired to execute the finite scope of the cleanup contract.
While these costs represent real financial obligations to the taxpayer,
including the entire sum of Federal benefit obligations from the life-
cycle of the site does not accurately portray the value of the cleanup
work scope.
Second, Appendix IV characterizes the data quality review effort for
the final disposition of Trench T-7 (i.e., "the fourth project") as
being "completed through a separate process that had less stringent
requirements." In fact, the process followed was the standard one
approved by the regulatory agencies for a No Further Accelerated Action
(NFAA) justification, which was used to disposition many areas of the
site. The NFAA documentation required a thorough review and
presentation of data adequacy and quality information, but did not
require the same level of presentation as the PARCC (precision,
accuracy, representativeness, completeness, and comparability)
parameters detailed analysis. As a result, no formal presentation of
such information was included in the NFAA Addendum reviewed by GAO
staff.
Kaiser-Hill appreciates the opportunity to share these comments.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Nancy R. Tuor:
President and CEO Kaiser-Hill Company:
cc:
Frazer Lockhart - DOE, RFPO:
Pam Tumler, GAO, Denver Office:
[End of section]
Appendix IX: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Gene Aloise, (202) 512-3841 or a [Hyperlink, aloisee@gao.gov]
loisee@gao.gov:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, Dan Feehan, Assistant Director;
Keith Rhodes, GAO's Chief Technologist; Claire Cyrnak; Glenn Fischer;
Tom Kingham; and Pam Tumler made significant contributions to this
report. Others who made important contributions included Kevin Bailey,
Michael Derr, Doreen Eng, Tom Denomme, Tim DiNapoli, Alison O'Neill,
Judy Pagano, Kim Raheb, and Omari Norman. Also, Brandon Haller, Mehrzad
Nadji, and Judy Pagano made important contributions to the
methodologies used in this report.
(360559):
FOOTNOTES
[1] Kaiser-Hill Company L.L.C. is a joint venture between Kaiser Group
Holdings Inc. and CH2M Hill.
[2] Rocky Flats was added to CERCLA's National Priorities List in
October 1989. The National Priorities List is EPA's list of national
priorities among the known or threatened releases of hazardous
substances, pollutants, or contaminants throughout the United States
and its territories. As of April 2006, the final list comprised 1,244
sites, with another 59 sites proposed for listing. Another 309 sites
that were formerly on the final list have been deleted.
[3] GAO, Nuclear Cleanup: Progress Made at Rocky Flats, but Closure by
2006 Is Unlikely, and Costs May Increase, GAO-01-284 (Washington, D.C.:
Feb. 28, 2001).
[4] The final decision document will be a joint corrective action
decision under RCRA and record of decision under CERCLA.
[5] Actinides are a series of 15 radioactive chemical elements with
atomic numbers 89 (actinium) and greater.
[6] Results from nonprobability samples cannot be used to make
inferences about a population, because in a nonprobability sample some
elements of the population being studied have no chance or an unknown
chance of being selected as part of the sample.
[7] GAO, Nuclear Cleanup: Preliminary Results of the Review of the
Department of Energy's Rocky Flats Closure Project, GAO-05-1044R
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 22, 2005).
[8] An alluvial fan is a fan-shaped wedge of sediment that typically
accumulates in arid or semiarid climates on land where a stream emerges
from a steep canyon onto a flat area.
[9] Unless otherwise noted, all costs cited in this report have been
adjusted for inflation and are expressed in constant 2005 dollars.
[10] National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, Pub. L.
No. 109-163, § 3112, 119 Stat. 3136, 3540 (2006).
[11] The review requirement was specified in the industrial area and
buffer zone sampling and analysis plan, which contained the sampling,
analysis, and documentation protocols agreed to between DOE and the
regulatory agencies.
[12] These wastes--items such as clothing, gloves, equipment, rags,
paper, filters, and plastic--included low-level radioactive waste,
transuranic waste, and mixed waste. Low-level radioactive waste
contains radioactive constituents measuring 100 or fewer nanocuries of
transuranic isotopes (described below) per gram of waste (a nanocurie
is 1 billionth of a curie; a curie is the amount of radioactivity in 1
gram of radium). Transuranic waste is radioactive waste contaminated
with transuranic isotopes (i.e., isotopes of elements heavier than
uranium, such as plutonium), with half-lives greater than 20 years, in
concentrations above 100 nanocuries per gram of waste. Mixed waste is
radioactive waste--either low level or transuranic--that also contains
hazardous wastes such as toxic metals, cleaning solvents, degreasers,
and paint thinners.
[13] WIPP is DOE's deep geologic repository for transuranic and
transuranic mixed wastes, located in an underground salt formation near
Carlsbad, New Mexico.
[14] A glovebox is a closed glass, plastic, or metal chamber for
handling hazardous or radioactive material. The operator handles the
material through gloves sealed to the chamber's wall. Gloveboxes range
in size from a few square feet to thousands of square feet.
[15] After being used to decontaminate tanks and gloveboxes, the cerium
nitrate solution was processed and disposed of as low-level liquid
waste. According to Kaiser-Hill, cerium nitrate was one of several
decontamination solutions used at the site.
[16] Pub. L. No. 107-107 §§ 3171-3182, 115 Stat. 1012, 1379-1388. Prior
to enactment of the Refuge Act, DOE and the regulatory agencies
proceeded under the assumption that the land would be used in the
future for open space.
[17] A picocurie is a trillionth of a curie, which is the amount of
radioactivity in a gram of radium. The higher the soil action level,
the more plutonium can be left in the soil. A lower action level means
that less plutonium can be left, so more soil must be removed.
[18] Remediation of radioactively contaminated soil at Rocky Flats
generally meant removal. In general, it is more cost effective to
remove plutonium-contaminated soil than to treat and return it.
[19] According to Colorado officials, the action level (651 picocuries
per gram) that was specified in the 1996 cleanup agreement was based on
EPA's draft proposed rule, which at the time was a dose-based, rather
than the current risk-based, calculation.
[20] Initially, according to Colorado officials, cleanup action levels
for all contaminants at the site, including uranium and americium, were
set at a level equivalent to a risk level of 10-5(i.e., an excess
cancer risk of 1 in 100,000). For plutonium, that level would be about
116 pCi/g. However, through collaboration with the community
stakeholders, a more stringent level was set for plutonium: 50 pCi/g.
[21] The Rocky Flats cleanup implements both CERCLA and RCRA. Although
the terminology used by each program differs, the CERCLA and RCRA
processes are similar. The typical full remedial processes under CERCLA
and RCRA include (1) determining the nature and extent of
contamination; (2) assessing potential threats to human health and the
environment; (3) establishing risk-based action levels; (4) identifying
potential cleanup technologies and processes, and evaluating cleanup
alternatives and corrective measures; (5) identifying the preferred
remedy and obtaining public comment on it; (6) selecting and
implementing the final remedy; and (7) monitoring and maintaining the
remedy.
[22] GAO, Nuclear Waste: Greater Use of Removal Actions Could Cut Time
and Cost for Cleanups, GAO/RCED-96-124 (Washington, D.C.: May 23,
1996).
[23] The cleanup actions, called "accelerated actions," were planned
and executed to satisfy, among other things, the requirements of the
Environmental Restoration Rocky Flats Cleanup Agreement Standard
Operating Protocol for Routine Soil Remediation. Notification of the
planned activities was approved by EPA or Colorado, depending on where
the accelerated action was located. (EPA was the lead regulatory agency
for the buffer zone; Colorado, for the industrial area.)
[24] Throughout this report, our use of either a general descriptive
term or a CERCLA term for a specific regulatory document is intended to
include the RCRA equivalent as well. For example, if we refer to the
final decision document, we mean both the CERCLA record of decision and
the RCRA corrective action decision. Similarly, if we refer to the
feasibility study (a CERCLA term), we mean that to include the
corrective measures study (a RCRA term).
[25] Kaiser-Hill, Actinide Migration Evaluation Pathway Analysis
Summary Report, ER-108 (2002).
[26] Some contaminated groundwater seeps to the surface, particularly
during periods of rain or snow, and then trickles into ditches and
streams. The primary groundwater contaminants are volatile organic
compounds (e.g., degreasers and solvents such as trichloroethene,
carbon tetrachloride, and chloroform). These contaminants are largely
controlled by the groundwater treatment systems on site, which were
installed to protect surface water.
[27] EPA, Superfund Record of Decision: Rocky Flats Plant (USDOE), EPA
ID: CO7890010526, OU 3, Golden, CO, EPA/ROD/R08-97/196, 1997 (Golden,
Colo., June 3, 1997).
[28] In 1990 a class action suit was filed in federal court against two
corporations that formerly operated the Rocky Flats Plant under
contract to DOE. Among other things, the plaintiffs claimed that their
land was damaged by the release of hazardous substances from Rocky
Flats. In February 2006, a jury found for the plaintiffs and awarded
compensatory and punitive damages. However, the court has not yet
entered a judgment, and the litigation is ongoing. Cook v. Rockwell
International, No. Civ.A. 90-CV-181-JLK (D. Colo.)
[29] In this paragraph, the cost and fee amounts are those cited in the
contract and have not been adjusted to constant 2005 dollars; the
contract contains no provision for inflation.
[30] DOE's contribution was specified in the contract, as 4 percent of
salary cost.
[31] GAO, Defense Acquisitions: DOD Has Paid Billions in Award and
Incentive Fees Regardless of Acquisition Outcomes, GAO-06-66
(Washington, D.C.: Dec. 19, 2005).
[32] Unless otherwise noted, all costs cited in this section have been
adjusted for inflation and are expressed in constant 2005 dollars.
[33] Portions of the site being retained by DOE for long-term
stewardship may not be removed from the list.
[34] GAO-01-284.
[35] Kaiser-Hill Company L.L.C., Executive Summary, Draft RCRA Facility
Investigation--Remedial Investigation/Corrective Measures Study--
Feasibility Study Report for the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology
Site, prepared for the Department of Energy, October 2005.
[36] This final decision document will be a joint CERCLA record of
decision and RCRA corrective action decision.
[37] In the future, some part of the DOE-retained lands may also be
deleted from the National Priorities List. A site may be deleted from
the list even though operation and maintenance of a remedy continue.
Accordingly, at some point EPA may agree to delete the surface of the
DOE-retained lands but not the subsurface or the groundwater.
[38] Such lands are excluded from the refuge until the essential
mineral rights are purchased or the surface land is mined and reclaimed
by the mineral rights holder(s). National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-163, § 3112(b)(7)(B), 119 Stat. 3136,
3542.
[39] U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Rocky Flats National Wildlife
Refuge: FINAL Comprehensive Conservation Plan and Environmental Impact
Statement (Denver, Colo., Sept. 16, 2004).
[40] CERCLA § 121(c); 42 U.S.C. § 9261(c). EPA and Colorado also have a
significant role in the 5-year review process.
[41] National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, Pub. L.
No. 109-163, § 3112, 119 Stat. 3136, 3540 (2006).
[42] Plan benefits were different for the eligible salaried employees
(1,546 employees), hourly employees (1,187 employees), and security
policy officers (82 employees).
[43] DOE, Management Controls over Assessing Natural Resource Damage at
Rocky Flats, OAS-M-06-02 (Washington, D.C., Nov. 25, 2005).
[44] Pub. L. No. 109-163, § 3112(b)(4), 119 Stat. 3136, 3540-41. For
the Rocky Flats site, according to the cleanup agreement, the
designated natural resource trustees are the Secretary of Energy, the
Secretary of the Interior, the Executive Director of the Colorado
Department of Public Health and Environment, the Colorado Attorney
General, and the Deputy Director of the Colorado Department of Natural
Resources.
[45] As discussed earlier, the regulatory agencies anticipate issuing
the final decision document at the end of 2006.
[46] Much of the contamination at Rocky Flats was confined to the soil.
Hazardous and radioactive waste was buried in trenches, and soil in
areas where spills or leaks had occurred was contaminated with solvents
and other hazardous chemicals.
[47] Our references to closeout reports include data summary reports,
which were prepared and approved in lieu of closeout reports if no
cleanup was necessary at a cleanup area.
[48] The characterization approach is documented in a Sampling and
Analysis Plan Addendum. Occasionally, when schedule concerns existed
and the planned work was routine in nature, DOE allowed the contractor
to send draft documents to the regulatory agencies while DOE was
reviewing them.
[49] Depending on the complexity and the time required to complete the
remediation, the remediation plan was set forth in an interim measure/
interim remedial action, a proposed action memorandum, or a Rocky Flats
Cleanup Agreement standard operating protocol.
[50] The comprehensive risk assessment, prepared under CERCLA and
included in the draft remedial investigation and feasibility study, is
an evaluation of the potential adverse impacts to human health and the
environment that may exist from contaminated environmental media
associated with site-related activities. See 40 C.F.R. § 300.430(a)(2).
[51] Thermal desorption is a remedial technology that uses heat to
physically separate (desorb) volatile organic compounds (VOC) from
excavated soils. As the soils are subjected to high heat (e.g., 900
degrees Fahrenheit), the VOCs change into gas (vapors) and evaporate
out of the soil. Essentially, the process involves collecting the
vapors and further heating them (to as much as 1,800 degrees), which
causes oxygen to react with the hydrogen and carbon in the VOC vapors,
forming water and carbon dioxide. Hydrochloric acid is also formed from
the chlorine in the VOCs. The carbon dioxide, water, and hydrochloric
acid are then neutralized, forming water and salt. The treated soils
are tested to ensure that they meet cleanup objectives; the soils can
then be returned to the excavation area.
[52] The ponds were not constructed as a remedial action; rather, they
are historical features of the site that were left in place and serve
as insurance that contaminated surface water does not leave the site.
Further, they serve as excellent flood control mechanisms. One of the
objectives of the cleanup is for all surface water on site to meet
Colorado water quality standards. Rocky Flats currently has a waiver--
for nitrate, nitrite, and organic parameters--in one stream segment;
that waiver will expire in 2009.
[53] For example, an excess cancer rate of 1 in 1,000,000 means that,
given exposure to the residual contamination at Rocky Flats at the end
of the cleanup, one would expect only one additional (excess) cancer
than would normally be expected in a million people.
[54] The Rocky Flats Quality Assurance Project Plan is included in the
Industrial Area and Buffer Zone Sampling and Analysis Plan.
[55] The required assessments are based on DOE Order 414.1A on Quality
Assurance, which directs field managers to perform independent
assessments of their contractors to evaluate the adequacy and
implementation of their quality assurance plans.
[56] ORISE is a DOE facility operated by Oak Ridge Associated
Universities, a multiuniversity, nonprofit consortium established in
1946. Over the past 2 decades, ORISE has performed radiological surveys
and environmental assessments at sites contaminated with hazardous or
radioactive materials. ORISE staff include health physicists,
environmental specialists, radiochemists, and analytical chemists.
[57] Memorandum 2001-001288, January 19, 2001, Managing the Release of
Surplus and Scrap Materials.
[58] Draft DOE G 441.1-XX, Control and Release of Property with
Residual Radioactive Material, for use with DOE 5400.5, Radiation
Protection of the Public and the Environment.
[59] These ponds were not constructed as part of the CERCLA remedy.
[60] According to the contractor, four uranium hot spots were removed
in July 2004.
[61] ATSDR was established by CERCLA in 1980--CERCLA § 104(i); 42
U.S.C. § 9604--and, since 1986, has been required to conduct public
health assessments of sites on CERCLA's National Priorities List--
CERCLA § 104(i)(6); 42 U.S.C. § 9604(i)(6). In conducting a public
health assessment, ATSDR officials review environmental data and assess
pathways, or how individuals might come into contact with the
contaminants, and whether such contact would result in any health
effects.
[62] Department of Energy, Rocky Flats Field Office, First Five-Year
Review Report for Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site, Golden,
Colorado (Golden, Colo., July 2002).
[63] EPA's 2001 Comprehensive Five-Year Review Guidance requires 5-year
reviews of remedial actions resulting in any hazardous substances,
pollutants, or contaminants remaining above levels that allow for
unlimited use and unrestricted exposure. The contaminants remaining in
the off-site areas were at low enough levels to allow unlimited use and
unrestricted exposure.
[64] Civil Engineering Research Foundation, Independent Research
Assessment of Project Management Factors Affecting Department of Energy
Project Success (Reston, Va., July 12, 2004).
[65] Results from nonprobability samples cannot be used to make
inferences about a population, because in a nonprobability sample, some
elements of the population being studied have no chance or an unknown
chance of being selected as part of the sample.
[66] The Rocky Flats Citizens Advisory Board and the Rocky Flats
Coalition of Local Governments began phasing out their activities in
early 2006; as of March 2006, the Rocky Flats Stewardship Council took
over as the local oversight group.
[67] Our references to group members include the groups' staff (two per
group), whom we included in our survey because of their experience and
knowledge about the Rocky Flats cleanup.
[68] Bechtel Nevada conducted the aerial survey.
[69] Specifically, contamination on the surface of the foundations'
concrete had to be remediated to less than 100 nanocuries per gram, and
contamination by volume (measured through calculations of the
foundations' depth) had to be remediated to less than 7 nanocuries per
gram. If contaminated sections of the concrete could not be remediated
to these levels, those sections had to be removed.
[70] The Rocky Flats Quality Assurance Project Plan is included in the
Industrial Area and Buffer Zone Sampling and Analysis Plan.
[71] At Rocky Flats, the contractor was required to take duplicate
samples for 5 percent of all field samples.
[72] DOE created the consolidated audit program in response to mid-
1990s audit reports that cited inefficiency, redundancy, and
ineffectiveness regarding DOE audits of analytical laboratories.
[73] DOE was unable to provide source documentation for 1 year for one
of the two laboratories.
[74] Our use of the term "scanning" refers to both stationary in situ
measurements taken via high-purity germanium detectors and mobile scans
taken via sodium iodide scintillation detectors.
[75] The sodium iodide detectors on the helicopter can detect only
gamma radiation, which does not directly measure plutonium 239/240
concentrations. However, it does measure americium-241, which can be
multiplied by 5.7 to estimate plutonium 239/240. This conversion factor
is based on a Rocky Flats Cleanup Agreement Contact Record (an
agreement among DOE, EPA, and Colorado).
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