Customs Service

Internal Control Weaknesses Over Deletion of Certain Law Enforcement Records Gao ID: GGD-98-187 August 21, 1998

The U.S. Customs Service lacked adequate controls over the deletion of lookout records, which identify persons and vehicles known or suspected of illegal activity, in the Treasury Enforcement Communications System. The system is designed to enable Customs inspectors to compare records containing lookout data with persons and vehicles entering the United States during primary screening inspections at ports of entry. Standards issued by the Comptroller General require that (1) key duties and responsibilities in authorizing, processing, recording, and reviewing transactions should be separated among individuals; (2) internal control systems and all transactions and other significant events should be clearly documented, and the documentation should be readily available for examination; and (3) supervisors should continuously review and approve the assigned work of their staffs. However, Customs guidance on the Treasury Enforcement Communications System does not require these safeguards, and Customs officials at the three ports GAO visited had not implemented these controls. As a result, Customs employees could inappropriately remove lookout records from the System. GAO recommends that Customs develop and implement guidance and standards to help ensure adequate internal controls over the deletion of lookout records.

GAO noted that: (1) Customs did not have adequate internal controls over the deletion of TECS lookout records; (2) standards issued by the Comptroller General require that: (a) key duties and responsibilities in authorizing, processing, recording, and reviewing transactions should be separated among individuals; (b) internal control systems and all transactions and other significant events should be clearly documented; and (c) supervisors should continuously review and approve the assigned work of their staffs; (3) however, guidance on TECS does not require these safeguards and Customs officials at the three ports GAO visited had not implemented these controls; (4) as a result, Customs employees could inappropriately remove lookout records from TECS; and (5) although GAO's review was limited to Customs headquarters, three Customs Management Centers, and three ports of entry, because of the lack of adequate systemwide internal control standards over deletion authority, it is possible that TECS lookout records may not be adequately safeguarded in other ports of entry as well.

Recommendations

Our recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.

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