Air Traffic Control
FAA's Modernization Efforts--Past, Present, and Future Gao ID: GAO-04-227T October 30, 2003The Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) air traffic control modernization (ATC) efforts are designed to enhance the safety, capacity, and efficiency of the national airspace system through the acquisition of a vast network of radar, navigation, communications, and information processing systems, as well as new air traffic control facilities. Since 1981, when these efforts began, FAA's ATC modernization projects have consistently experienced cost, schedule, and performance problems that GAO and others have attributed to systemic management issues. As a result, FAA's cost estimates have grown and planned improvements have been delayed. Initially FAA estimated that its ATC modernization efforts would cost $12 billion and could be completed over 10 years. Now, two decades and $35 billion later, FAA expects to need another $16 billion through 2007 to complete key projects, for a total cost of $51 billion. This testimony (1) provides an overview of the systemic management issues that GAO and others have identified in FAA's ATC modernization efforts over time, (2) discusses key actions that FAA and others have taken to address these issues, and (3) identifies the challenges that lie ahead for FAA.
Over the years, systemic management issues, including inadequate management controls and human capital issues, have contributed to the cost overruns, schedule delays, and performance shortfalls that FAA's major ATC projects have consistently experienced. These problems occurred, in large part, because FAA lacked the information technology and financial management systems that would have helped it reliably determine the projects' technical requirements and estimate and control their costs and schedules. In addition, organizational culture issues discouraged collaboration among technical experts and users, and frequent changes in FAA's leadership--seven different Administrators and Acting Administrators in the first 10 years--hampered the modernization efforts. FAA has taken steps to improve the management of its ATC modernization efforts and has made progress. For example, it implemented a cost-effective, incremental development approach that avoided costly late-stage changes. In addition, it has fully or partially implemented over 30 GAO recommendations designed to improve its management controls and address human capital issues. The Congress also extended the term of the FAA Administrator to 5 years, providing for greater continuity and stability, and enacted legislation designed to bring the benefits of performance management to ATC modernization. FAA faces a number of challenges in fully implementing recommendations that GAO and others have made to improve its management controls and address human capital issues. FAA also faces the challenge of becoming a more efficient and accountable performance-based air traffic organization. Finally, FAA has an opportunity to review its current 10-year plan for modernizing the National Airspace System and to assess the relative importance and feasibility of the plan's priorities in light of current federal and private sector economic constraints, new aviation security requirements, and other issues.
GAO-04-227T, Air Traffic Control: FAA's Modernization Efforts--Past, Present, and Future
This is the accessible text file for GAO report number GAO-04-227T
entitled 'Air Traffic Control: FAA's Modernization Efforts--Past,
Present, and Future' which was released on October 30, 2003.
This text file was formatted by the U.S. General Accounting Office
(GAO) to be accessible to users with visual impairments, as part of a
longer term project to improve GAO products' accessibility. Every
attempt has been made to maintain the structural and data integrity of
the original printed product. Accessibility features, such as text
descriptions of tables, consecutively numbered footnotes placed at the
end of the file, and the text of agency comment letters, are provided
but may not exactly duplicate the presentation or format of the printed
version. The portable document format (PDF) file is an exact electronic
replica of the printed version. We welcome your feedback. Please E-mail
your comments regarding the contents or accessibility features of this
document to Webmaster@gao.gov.
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed
in its entirety without further permission from GAO. Because this work
may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this
material separately.
Testimony:
Before the Subcommittee on Aviation, Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure, House of Representatives:
United States General Accounting Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery Expected at 10:00 a.m. EST:
Thursday, October 30, 2003:
Air Traffic Control:
FAA's Modernization Efforts--Past, Present, and Future:
Statement of Gerald L. Dillingham, Director, Physical Infrastructure
Issues:
GAO-04-227T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-04-227T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on
Aviation, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, House of
Representatives
Why GAO Did This Study:
The Federal Aviation Administration‘s (FAA) air traffic control
modernization (ATC) efforts are designed to enhance the safety,
capacity, and efficiency of the national airspace system through the
acquisition of a vast network of radar, navigation, communications,
and information processing systems, as well as new air traffic control
facilities. Since 1981, when these efforts began, FAA‘s ATC
modernization projects have consistently experienced cost, schedule,
and performance problems that GAO and others have attributed to
systemic management issues. As a result, FAA‘s cost estimates have
grown and planned improvements have been delayed. Initially FAA
estimated that its ATC modernization efforts would cost $12 billion
and could be completed over 10 years. Now, two decades and $35 billion
later, FAA expects to need another $16 billion through 2007 to
complete key projects, for a total cost of $51 billion.
This testimony (1) provides an overview of the systemic management
issues that GAO and others have identified in FAA‘s ATC modernization
efforts over time, (2) discusses key actions that FAA and others have
taken to address these issues, and (3) identifies the challenges that
lie ahead for FAA.
What GAO Found:
Over the years, systemic management issues, including inadequate
management controls and human capital issues, have contributed to the
cost overruns, schedule delays, and performance shortfalls that FAA‘s
major ATC projects have consistently experienced. These problems
occurred, in large part, because FAA lacked the information technology
and financial management systems that would have helped it reliably
determine the projects‘ technical requirements and estimate and
control their costs and schedules. In addition, organizational culture
issues discouraged collaboration among technical experts and users,
and frequent changes in FAA‘s leadership”seven different
Administrators and Acting Administrators in the first 10 years”
hampered the modernization efforts.
FAA has taken steps to improve the management of its ATC modernization
efforts and has made progress. For example, it implemented a cost-
effective, incremental development approach that avoided costly late-
stage changes. In addition, it has fully or partially implemented over
30 GAO recommendations designed to improve its management controls and
address human capital issues. The Congress also extended the term of
the FAA Administrator to 5 years, providing for greater continuity and
stability, and enacted legislation designed to bring the benefits of
performance management to ATC modernization.
FAA faces a number of challenges in fully implementing recommendations
that GAO and others have made to improve its management controls and
address human capital issues. FAA also faces the challenge of becoming
a more efficient and accountable performance-based air traffic
organization. Finally, FAA has an opportunity to review its current
10-year plan for modernizing the National Airspace System and to
assess the relative importance and feasibility of the plan‘s
priorities in light of current federal and private sector economic
constraints, new aviation security requirements, and other issues.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-227T.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click
on the link above. For more information, contact Gerald L. Dillingham
at (202) 512-2834 or dillinghamg@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
We appreciate the opportunity to participate in today's hearing to
discuss our work on FAA's air traffic control modernization (ATC)
efforts, which are designed to enhance the safety, capacity, and
efficiency of the national airspace system, primarily through software-
intensive technology improvements. As you know, these efforts involve
acquiring a vast network of radar, navigation, communications, and
information processing systems, as well as new air traffic control
facilities. Since 1981, when these efforts began, FAA's ATC
modernization projects have consistently experienced cost, schedule,
and performance problems that we and others have attributed to systemic
management issues. As a result, FAA's cost estimates have grown and
planned improvements have been delayed. Initially FAA estimated that
its ATC modernization efforts would cost $12 billion and could be
completed over 10 years. Now, two decades and $35 billion later, FAA
expects to need another $16 billion through 2007 to complete key
projects, for a total cost of $51 billion.
By the summer of 2000, the ATC system no longer had the capacity to
manage demand efficiently, and flight delays produced near-gridlock
conditions at many U.S. airports. The events of September 11 and the
subsequent economic downturn severely reduced the demand for air travel
for a time, but the aviation industry is gradually recovering, and FAA
forecasts a return to pre-9/11 demand levels in about 2005 or 2006.
This current period of reduced but growing demand for air travel has
created a narrow window of opportunity to address the management issues
underlying FAA's ATC modernization problems and to prepare the ATC
system for managing a growing volume of air traffic more safely and
efficiently than in the past.
My statement today (1) provides an overview of the systemic management
issues that we and others have identified in FAA's ATC modernization
efforts over time, (2) discusses key actions that FAA and others have
taken to address these issues, and (3) identifies the challenges that
lie ahead for FAA. The statement is based on our past reports on ATC
modernization (see Related GAO Products)--updated to reflect important
milestones--and recent interviews with key stakeholders in the aviation
community, including the Air Transport Association, National Air
Traffic Controllers Association, and Professional Airways Systems
Specialists. We performed our work in accordance with generally
accepted government auditing standards.
In summary:
* Over the years, systemic management issues, including inadequate
management controls and human capital issues, have contributed to the
cost overruns, schedule delays, and performance shortfalls that FAA's
major ATC projects have consistently experienced. These systemic
management issues have kept FAA's ATC modernization efforts on our
watch list of high-risk federal programs since 1995. Both the Wide Area
Augmentation System (WAAS)--designed to provide satellite-based
navigation for airspace users--and the Standard Terminal Automation
Replacement System (STARS)--designed to replace aging displays and
processing systems used by air traffic controllers--have missed cost,
schedule, and performance targets because of such issues. For both
projects, FAA initially underestimated the costs and time needed to
meet complex technical requirements and for STARS, it failed to involve
stakeholders sufficiently in determining the project's requirements.
Consequently, when the projects failed to meet requirements, FAA had to
contract for costly, time-consuming modifications and revise its cost
and schedule estimates. These problems occurred, in large part, because
FAA lacked the information technology and financial management controls
that would have helped it reliably determine the projects' technical
requirements and estimate and control their costs and schedules. In
addition, organizational culture issues discouraged collaboration
among technical experts and users, and frequent changes in FAA's
leadership--seven different Administrators and Acting Administrators
in the first 10 years--hampered the modernization effort. In numerous
reports and testimonies, we, the Department of Transportation's
Inspector General, and others have made recommendations to address
these issues.
* FAA has taken steps to improve the management of its ATC
modernization efforts and has made progress in a number of areas. For
example, it implemented an incremental, "build a little, test a little"
approach that improved its management by providing for mid-course
corrections and thus helping FAA to avoid costly late-stage changes.
Furthermore, since 1995, FAA has fully or partially implemented over 30
of our recommendations, including recommendations to improve its
management controls and address human capital issues. In the area of
management controls, it has (1) developed a blueprint for modernization
(systems architecture) to manage the development of ATC systems; (2)
established processes for selecting and controlling information
technology investments, (3) introduced an integrated framework for
improving software and system acquisition processes, and (4) improved
its cost-estimating and cost-accounting practices. In addition, it has
taken steps to identify and address its information systems security
needs. In the human capital area, FAA has attempted to improve
collaboration among technical experts and system users by establishing
integrated teams to serve as vehicles for identifying needs, pooling
expertise, and reconciling priorities. Additionally, in 1994, the
Congress extended the term of the FAA Administrator to 5 years,
providing for greater continuity and stability; in 1995, the Congress
exempted FAA, at its request, from certain federal human capital
requirements; and in 2000, the Congress and the administration together
provided for a new oversight and management structure and a new air
traffic organization to bring the benefits of performance management to
ATC modernization. To date, one FAA Administrator has completed a 5-
year term; FAA has fully or partially implemented the personnel reforms
that the Congress authorized; and the Air Traffic Services
Subcommittee, which provides oversight, has recently appointed a chief
operating officer to manage the new air traffic organization, which has
yet to be formed. It is still too early to assess the results of some
of these initiatives, and some challenges remain.
* While FAA has taken steps to improve its management controls and
resolve human capital issues, it still faces challenges in fully
implementing recommendations that we and others have made. For example,
it still needs to (1) complete and make better use of its information
technology blueprint to manage change; (2) put processes in place for
evaluating projects after implementation to strengthen the investment
management process, (3) ensure that systems achieve a minimum level of
software capability before being funded; and (4) incorporate actual
costs from related system development efforts in its processes for
estimating the costs of new projects. Efforts to secure FAA's air
traffic control systems from cyber threats also remain a critical
challenge. In the human capital area, FAA needs to do more to foster
collaboration among technical experts and users, as well as fully
implement the personnel reforms that the Congress authorized. FAA also
faces the challenge of becoming a more efficient and accountable
performance-based air traffic organization under the leadership of the
Air Traffic Services Subcommittee and the recently hired chief
operating officer. Finally, during the remaining lull in the demand for
air travel, FAA has an opportunity to review its 10-year plan for
modernizing the National Airspace System and to assess the relative
importance and feasibility of the plan's priorities in light of current
federal and private sector economic constraints, new security
requirements, and other issues.
Background:
Commercial aviation is a critical component of our nation's
transportation infrastructure and a significant contributor to our
nation's economy. For example, in 2000, there were over half a billion
passenger boardings of commercial airline flights and the airline
industry contributed $800 billion to Gross Domestic Product (8 percent)
and employed nearly 10 million people (7 percent).[Footnote 1]
Automated information processing and display, communication,
navigation, surveillance, and weather resources permit air traffic
controllers to view key information, such as aircraft location,
aircraft flight plans, and prevailing weather conditions and to
communicate with pilots. These resources reside at, or are associated
with, several ATC facilities--flight service stations, air traffic
control towers, terminal radar approach control (TRACON) facilities,
and air route traffic control centers (en route centers). These
facilities are depicted in figure 1.
Figure 1: Overview of U.S. Air Traffic Control System:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO:
Notes:
[A] The Standard Terminal Automation Replacement System (STARS) is
designed to allow controllers at TRACONs to separate and sequence
aircraft.
[B] The Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS), when fully developed,
will comprise a network of up to 76 ground stations (not depicted in
graphic) and three to four geostationary communications satellites.
[C] The Next-Generation Air/Ground Communications System (NEXCOM), is
an integrated voice and data system that will be in aircraft avionics,
with the ground network infrastructure to support data link services to
be deployed, as appropriate, for operation in en route centers.
[End of figure]
Systemic Issues Have Contributed to ATC Modernization Projects' Cost,
Schedule, and Performance Problems:
Over the years, systemic management issues, including inadequate
management controls and human capital issues, have contributed to the
cost overruns, schedule delays, and performance shortfalls that FAA's
major ATC projects have consistently experienced.
These problems were of such magnitude that we designated ATC
modernization as high risk in 1995. Table 1 summarizes the types of
problems experienced by five major air traffic control projects.
Table 1: Cost, Schedule, and Performance Information for Selected ATC
Modernization Efforts:
Project: Standard Terminal Automation Replacement System (STARS);
Purpose: To replace aging displays and processing systems used by air
traffic controllers; Cost overruns: Yes; Schedule slips: Yes;
Performance issues: Yes.
Project: Next-Generation Air/Ground Communications (NEXCOM); Purpose:
To replace existing communications systems and provide additional voice
channels; Cost overruns: No; Schedule slips: Yes; Performance issues:
Test pending.
Project: Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS); Purpose: To provide
satellite-based navigation for airspace users; Cost overruns: Yes;
Schedule slips: Yes[A]; Performance issues: Yes.
Project: Integrated Terminal Weather System (ITWS[B]); Purpose: To
provide air traffic managers with enhanced weather information that
does not require meteorological interpretation; Cost overruns: Yes;
Schedule slips: Yes; Performance issues: Yes.
Project: Weather and Radar Processor (WARP[B]); Purpose: To provide
controllers, traffic managers, and meteorologists with accurate and
reliable weather information; Cost overruns: Yes; Schedule slips: Yes;
Performance issues: Yes.
Sources: GAO and Department of Transportation, Office of Inspector
General.
[A] While WAAS was deployed in July 2003, historically, the project has
had schedule slips.
[B] Information for WARP reported by the Department of Transportation,
Office of Inspector General.
[End of table]
Two Projects Illustrate the Effects of Systemic Management Issues on
Costs, Schedules, and Performance:
Two projects, WAAS and STARS, illustrate the effects of inadequate
management controls and human capital issues on the costs, schedules,
and performance of major ATC modernization projects. More specifically,
FAA lacked adequate information technology and financial management
controls to comprehensively identify these projects' requirements,
reliably estimate their costs and schedules, and hold contractors
accountable for meeting cost, schedule, and performance targets. In
addition, FAA lacked effective processes for fostering collaboration
among technical experts and users, as well as sustained leadership to
provide direction and follow-through. As a result, these projects cost
more, took longer, and met fewer requirements than planned.
WAAS is designed to provide satellite-based navigation for airspace
users. As we reported in June 2000,[Footnote 2] FAA underestimated the
complexity of developing WAAS. FAA originally planned to start
deploying WAAS in 1998 and finish in 2001; however, the agency could
not deliver on this promise because an aggressive schedule contributed
to software development problems, and the project was unable to meet a
key integrity requirement--that WAAS would virtually never fail to warn
pilots of potential navigation hazards. In January 2003, we reported in
our high-risk series that the cost for WAAS had grown from an original
estimate of $892 million to $2.9 billion.[Footnote 3],[Footnote 4] In
July 2003, FAA commissioned WAAS for instrument flight use.
STARS is designed to replace the outdated computer equipment that air
traffic controllers currently use at some facilities to control air
traffic within 5 to 50 nautical miles of an airport. In 1996, FAA
anticipated very little software development, planned to install STARS
in 172 facilities at a cost of $940 million, and expected
implementation to begin in 1998 and end in 2005. In 1999, FAA modified
its acquisition approach (from off-the-shelf software to a combination
of customized and off-the-shelf software) and then concluded that it
did not have adequate funding to deploy STARS as widely as planned. In
March 2002, FAA estimated that the project's development costs would
total $1.33 billion, and it received approval to deploy STARS at 74
facilities. FAA does not yet know to what extent its development cost
estimate is reliable because, as we reported in January 2003,[Footnote
5] it lacks accurate, valid, current data on the STARS project's
remaining costs and progress. FAA commissioned STARS at Philadelphia
International Airport in June 2003. Figure 2 shows a STARS display.
Figure 2: STARS Display with Air Traffic:
[See PDF for image]
Source: FAA.
[End of figure]
Inadequate Management Controls Have Hampered ATC Modernization Efforts:
Our work has shown that several types of information technology and
financial management controls are important to manage large ATC
projects efficiently and effectively. These include a blueprint for
planning, a system for managing information technology investments, and
an integrated framework for improving system and software processes, as
well as systems for estimating and accounting for costs. Efforts to
ensure the security of ATC systems are also critical. As we have
reported over the years, inadequate information technology and
financial management controls made it difficult for FAA to ensure,
among other things, the integrity, efficiency, and security of ATC
modernization projects.
* Incomplete blueprint for modernization (system architecture): This
blueprint would define and constrain the development and maintenance of
the many interrelated systems comprising the ATC infrastructure. In
1997, we reported that FAA lacked a complete blueprint. The agency's
lack of a complete and enforced systems architecture had permitted
incompatibilities among existing ATC systems.[Footnote 6]
* Ineffective information technology investment management: FAA lacked
a complete framework for selecting, controlling, and evaluating a
portfolio of investments. Investments in information technology can
have a dramatic impact on an organization's performance. If managed
effectively, these investments can vastly improve government
performance and accountability.[Footnote 7] If not, however, they can
result in wasteful spending and lost opportunities for improving
delivery of services to the public.
* Immature software acquisition processes: FAA lacked a structured
process for improving its capabilities in acquiring and developing
software-intensive systems. As a result, we found that its processes
for acquiring software were ad hoc.
* Inadequate cost estimating and cost accounting systems: In our 1997
high risk series,[Footnote 8] we reported that FAA's cost estimating
processes and cost accounting practices were not adequate to
effectively manage its billion dollar information technology
investments for ATC modernization.[Footnote 9] Among other things, we
recommended that FAA institutionalize defined processes for estimating
projects' costs.
* Poor information security: Since September 1996, we have reported
that poor information security is a high-risk area across the federal
government with potentially devastating consequences.[Footnote 10] One
serious issue is protecting the information systems that support the
nation's critical infrastructure, including segments of the air traffic
control system. Security at our nation's airports alone does not ensure
safe air travel. It is also critical to secure FAA's air traffic
control computer systems, which provide information to air traffic
controllers and aircraft flight crews to help ensure the safe and
expeditious movement of aircraft. Failure to adequately protect these
systems, as well as the facilities that house them, could cause a
nationwide disruption of air traffic or even a loss of life due to
collisions. Between May 1998 and December 2000, we made 39
recommendations to FAA to address pervasive weaknesses in the agency's
facilities' physical and information systems security--both for
currently operational and future air traffic control systems, security
management, and personnel security.
Human Capital Issues Also Impeded ATC Modernization:
Our work has also shown that, to avoid costly changes to ATC system
contracts, it is important to bring technical experts and users
together to design and test the systems to ensure that they will meet
users' needs and work as intended. We found that FAA's organizational
culture discouraged such collaboration. In addition, a lack of
sustained leadership slowed the progress of ATC modernization.
* FAA's "stovepiped" organizational culture, as we reported in
1996,[Footnote 11] created barriers to collaboration and encouraged a
focus on the goals of individual program offices, rather than on the
goals of projects as a whole. As a result, employees sometimes acted in
ways that did not reflect a strong enough commitment to mission focus,
accountability, coordination, and adaptability, and the conflicting
priorities led to project delays.
* The lack of sustained leadership at FAA was problematic throughout
the first decade of ATC modernization and beyond. During the first 10
years, the agency had seven different Administrators and Acting
Administrators, whose average tenure was less than 2 years. In
addition, five people held the position of senior acquisition executive
between 1990 and 1995. As we reported in 1995,[Footnote 12] such
frequent turnover at the top contributed to an agency culture that
focused on short-term initiatives, avoided accountability, and resisted
fundamental improvements in the acquisition process.
In addition, according to FAA, burdensome governmentwide human capital
rules impeded its ability to hire, train, and deploy personnel, thereby
hampering its ability to manage ATC modernization projects efficiently.
FAA Has Taken Steps to Address Systemic Management Issues:
FAA has taken a number of steps to improve the management of its ATC
modernization efforts and has made progress. First, it has implemented
an incremental approach to project development, under which it "builds
a little, tests a little" to better estimate the time and costs needed
to complete modernization projects. In addition, it has fully or
partially implemented over 30 recommendations that we have made, as
well as recommendations made by the Department of Transportation's
Inspector General and others. Our recommendations focused on two key
areas--(1) strengthening management controls for major ATC
modernization systems (e.g., improving estimates of the time and cost
to develop and implement projects) and (2) better managing FAA's human
capital resources (e.g., improving FAA's organizational culture to
better leverage its human capital resources to effectively support ATC
modernization). The Congress has also taken actions designed to address
some of FAA's human capital issues.
A New Development Approach and Better Management Controls Have Given
FAA Stronger Tools for Managing ATC Projects:
* "Build a little, test a little" approach to system development:
During its implementation of Free Flight Phase 1, FAA adopted a more
incremental approach to acquiring its ATC modernization systems than it
had for previous systems. FAA refers to this as the "build a little,
test a little" or spiral development approach. Some aviation
stakeholders applaud this approach because, although they have found
that its use can increase costs initially, money can be saved in the
long run by avoiding mistakes that are very costly to fix once a system
has been developed. This approach helps to ensure that the necessary
building blocks of a system are tested along the way through the early
and ongoing involvement of key stakeholders, such as those who will use
and maintain the system. These stakeholders are key to identifying
critical omissions and "no go" items that could prevent a system from
operating as intended.
* Blueprint for modernization (system architecture): FAA has developed
a systems architecture, or overall blueprint, that clarifies
interdependencies and interrelationships among national airspace
systems and the technical standards to which systems must comply for
information technology. In November 2002, the Office of Management and
Budget instructed agencies to base investments in information
technology on enterprise architectures, which define (in both business
and technology terms) how an entity operates today and how it wants to
operate in the future, including a roadmap for transitioning to this
future operational state. In April 2003, GAO issued guidance on
developing enterprise architectures.[Footnote 13]
* Improved information technology investments management: In response
to our recommendations, FAA has improved its process for managing
information technology investments (e.g., the software-intensive
systems under ATC modernization) by overseeing investment risks and
capturing key information from the investment selection process in a
management information system. Also, FAA has developed and implemented
guidance for validating costs, benefits, and risks.
* Improved software acquisition processes: In response to shortcomings
that we identified in FAA's process for acquiring software, FAA
developed an integrated framework for improving its software
acquisition, software development, and systems engineering processes.
FAA has also continued to expand the number of system development
projects that use this integrated framework.
* Cost-estimating and cost-accounting systems: To improve cost
estimates, FAA developed a standard work breakdown structure and
established an historical database for tracking ATC systems' estimated
costs and other information. As we reported in January 2003,[Footnote
14] FAA has made significant progress in implementing its cost
accounting system since our last high-risk series.
* Information security: FAA has initiated numerous activities in
response to our recommendations about pervasive weakness in its
facilities' physical and information security system. For example, in
recent years, the Chief Information Officer's information systems
security office has developed an information systems security strategy,
security architecture (i.e, overall blueprint), security policies and
directives, and a security awareness training campaign. The security
office also implemented a certification and accreditation process to
ensure that vulnerabilities in current and future ATC systems are
identified and weaknesses are addressed.
FAA Is Implementing Human Capital Initiatives:
* Organizational culture framework: In response to recommendations we
made about the need for FAA to address the organizational barriers that
had impaired its ATC acquisition process, the agency issued an
organizational culture framework in 1997 and is working to implement
it. For example, it has used integrated project teams to improve
collaboration among technical experts and users.
* Personnel reform: In response to FAA's request, the Congress exempted
FAA from many federal laws governing human capital, and the agency
began implementing sweeping human capital reforms in 1996. These
reforms addressed (1) compensation and performance management, (2)
workforce management, and (3) labor and employee relations. In our
February 2003 report on FAA's implementation of personnel
reform,[Footnote 15] we found that the agency had fully or partially
implemented initiatives in each of these areas.
* Actions to sustain leadership: To provide FAA's ATC modernization
efforts with needed direction and stability, the Congress established a
5-year term for the FAA Administrator in 1994. Former Administrator
Garvey was the first to complete a term of this length in 2002. In
addition, the three individuals who served as FAA's senior acquisition
executive--the Associate Administrator for Research and Acquisitions--
between 1996 and 2003 held this position longer than their
predecessors.
* Chief operating officer and Air Traffic Organization: To accelerate
ATC modernization and improve the performance of the air traffic
control system, the Congress enacted legislation in 2000 that
established a five-member board (the Air Traffic Services Subcommittee)
to oversee, and a chief operating officer to manage, a new performance-
based organization, the Air Traffic Organization, which was created
through an executive order to operate the ATC system. Under the act,
the Subcommittee provides oversight by, among other things, reviewing
and approving strategic plans, large contracts, and budget requests for
the air traffic control system. The Subcommittee has been meeting since
January 2001, and a chief operating officer was appointed in June 2003.
While awaiting the appointment of a chief operating officer, the
Subcommittee focused on bringing performance management,
accountability, and a more businesslike structure to the ATC system,
and it took some specific actions, including reviewing and approving
performance metrics, a budget, and three large procurements that FAA
initiated.
Key Challenges Lie Ahead:
FAA faces a number of challenges in fully implementing management
controls for major ATC projects and marshalling the human capital
resources to deliver on these controls. Additionally, during this lull
in the demand for air travel, it has an opportunity to review its long-
term ATC modernization priorities to assess their relative importance
and feasibility in light of current economic constraints, security
requirements, and other issues.
Continuing to Improve Management Controls and Use Human Capital
Resources More Effectively Poses Ongoing Challenges:
Despite the progress FAA has made in improving its management controls
and human capital management for ATC modernization, systemic management
issues persist and warrant sustained attention. In our 2003 review of
federal high-risk areas,[Footnote 16] we considered these issues of
sufficient magnitude to continue placing ATC modernization on our high-
risk list.
* Need for complete and enforced enterprise architecture: FAA has
developed a systems architecture, or overall blueprint, which clarifies
interdependencies and interrelationships among national airspace
systems and the technical standards to which systems must comply.
However, in February 2002, we reported that while FAA's enterprise
architecture is at a moderate level of maturity--that is, the agency
has begun developing architecture products such as policies and
concepts--it has not yet completed the architecture products or
leveraged the architecture for managing change.[Footnote 17]
* Need to strengthen information technology investment management
processes: Although FAA has developed guidance for validating costs,
benefits, and risks, the agency has not yet implemented processes for
evaluating projects after implementation in order to identify lessons
learned and improve the investment management process. Our work has
also identified the need for sustained attention to managing ATC
systems over their entire lifecycles--from the cradle to the grave.
* Need to improve software acquisition processes: Since our last high-
risk update, FAA has continued to expand the number of system
development projects that use an integrated framework. However, FAA
still does not require all systems to achieve a minimum level of
progress within the framework before being funded.
* Need to improve cost-estimating practices: FAA has not yet fully
instituted rigorous cost-estimating practices. That is, it is not yet
incorporating actual costs from related system development efforts in
its processes for estimating the costs of new projects. Cost estimation
was problematic for both STARS and WAAS. As we reported in January
2003,[Footnote 18] FAA lacks accurate, valid, and current data on the
remaining costs and progress of STARS. Without such data, FAA is
limited in its ability to effectively oversee the contractor's
performance and reliably estimate future costs. Given FAA's chronic
difficulty in meeting cost, schedule, and performance targets, some
members of the aviation community have suggested that more rigor needs
to be built into these estimates when projects are started and that
this could best be done by having an independent group of experts
review FAA's initial estimates for ATC projects. The accuracy of these
estimates is particularly important as FAA embarks on two relatively
new and costly ATC modernization projects--NEXCOM, which is expected to
cost nearly $1 billion, and the En Route Automation Replacement
Modernization (ERAM), which will provide new hardware and software to
facilities responsible for directing high-altitude air traffic and is
expected to cost over $2 billion.
* Need to improve cost-accounting system: In January 2003, we reported
that FAA had made significant progress in implementing its cost-
accounting system since we issued our last high-risk report. However,
in June 2003, the Department of Transportation's Inspector General
issued an assessment of FAA's cost-accounting system and found that the
system was still not effective.[Footnote 19] According to the Inspector
General, FAA could not credibly claim to be a performance-based
organization, or function as one, without a cost-accounting system that
is compliant with federal cost-accounting standards.
* Need to improve information security: Despite improvements by FAA,
the agency faces continued challenges in improving its intrusion
detection capabilities, obtaining accreditation for systems that are
already operational, and managing information systems security
throughout the agency.
* Need to change organizational culture: Although FAA issued an
organizational culture framework in 1997 and established integrated
teams to implement it, the Department of Transportation's Inspector
General reported in 2000 that FAA's culture remains a barrier to
successful acquisition projects and that integrated teams are not
working well because FAA's culture continues to operate in vertical
"stovepipes" that conflict with the horizontal structure of team
operations. Our 2000 report on WAAS confirmed that the integrated teams
were not working as intended.[Footnote 20] We found that competing
priorities between two key organizations that are part of WAAS'
integrated team negated the effectiveness of the team's approach for
meeting the agency's goals for the system.
* Need to fully implement personnel reforms: In our February 2003
report on FAA's implementation of personnel reforms, we found that the
agency had not fully incorporated elements that are important to
effective human capital management into its overall reform effort,
including data collection and analysis, performance goals and measures,
and links between reform goals and program goals. In turn, we
recommended that FAA develop a more strategic approach to its reform
effort, to better position itself to evaluate the effects of its reform
initiatives, use the evaluations as a basis for any strategic
improvements to its human capital management approach, and hold its
leaders accountable for the results of its human capital management
efforts. FAA generally agreed with our recommendations.
* Implement the new Air Traffic Organization: The new Air Traffic
Organization remains to be formed by joining FAA's Air Traffic Services
and Research and Acquisition offices. In addition, some issues that we
identified in our May 2003 report pose potential challenges to this
restructuring effort. For example, certain lines of authority between
the Subcommittee and the FAA Administrator remain to be clarified.
Other Challenges Lie Ahead:
FAA faces a variety of other challenges as it attempts to balance its
modernization investments. These include working effectively in the
post-9/11 environment to determine how best to move forward with ATC
modernization. In addition, FAA must contend with a number of economic
constraints, including the current economic downturn, poor financial
condition of the airline industry, competing demands for agency
resources (e.g. safety, security, infrastructure, and operations), and
the need for airlines to voluntarily equip their fleets with
technologies needed to participate in a modernized National Airspace
System. As we, the Department of Transportation's Inspector General,
and others have noted, to work effectively within these constraints, it
is important for FAA to determine how it can best maximize the ATC
system's current capabilities by (1) identifying the initiatives that
hold the most promise for increasing capacity and efficiency in the
near-term and (2) determining the extent to which the airline industry
will be financially able to equip with new technologies in the near and
mid-term. A review of FAA's 10-year plan to increase the capacity and
efficiency of the National Airspace System called the called the
Operational Evolution Plan, could ultimately result in a reordering of
some ATC modernization priorities because the plan, though issued in
2002, is based on analyses that precede the important changes in
aviation security and the nation's economy that have taken place during
the past 2 years. A fresh view of this plan could put FAA in a better
position to target its resources toward projects that will maximize the
system's capacity and efficiency and identify those ATC projects that
should be kept in the pipeline to meet critical future needs.
In summary, we are at a critical juncture for reassessing FAA's ATC
modernization efforts. Given over two decades of experience with ATC
modernization, it is time to take advantage of the lessons learned to
date and the relative lull in air traffic demand resulting from the
events of 9/11 to make inroads in improving the capacity and efficiency
of the National Airspace System. The systemic issues that have plagued
FAA's ATC modernization efforts for over two decades also provide us
with critical lessons learned as we navigate our way around past
mistakes and into this new century of aviation.
This concludes my statement. I would be pleased to respond to any
questions that you or other Members of the Subcommittee may have at
this time.
Contact Information:
For further information on this testimony, please contact Gerald
Dillingham at (202) 512-2834 or by e-mail at dillinghamg@gao.gov, or
David Powner at (202) 512-9286 or by e-mail at pownerd@gao.gov.
Individuals making key contributions to this testimony include
Elizabeth Eisenstadt, Samantha Goodman, Maren McAvoy, Beverly Norwood,
Colleen Phillips, and Richard Scott.
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
Aviation Safety: Information on FAA's Data on Operational Errors at Air
Traffic Control Towers. GAO-03-1175R. Washington, D.C.: September 23,
2003.
National Airspace System: Current Efforts and Proposed Changes to
Improve Performance of FAA's Air Traffic Control System. GAO-03-542.
Washington, D.C.: May 30, 2003.
National Airspace System: Reauthorizing FAA Provides Opportunities and
Options to Address Challenges. GAO-03-473T. Washington, D.C.: February
12, 2003.
Human Capital Management: FAA's Reform Effort Requires a More Strategic
Approach. GAO-03-156. Washington, D.C.: February 3, 2003.
National Airspace System: Better Cost Data Could Improve FAA's
Management of the Standard Terminal Automation Replacement System. GAO-
03-343. Washington, D.C.: January 31, 2003.
High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-03-119. Washington, D.C.: January
2003.
Air Traffic Control: Impact of Revised Personnel Relocation Policies Is
Uncertain. GAO-03-141. Washington, D.C.: October 31, 2002.
National Airspace System: Status of FAA's Standard Terminal Automation
Replacement System. GAO-02-1071. Washington, D.C.: September 17, 2002.
Air Traffic Control: FAA Needs to Better Prepare for Impending Wave of
Controller Attrition. GAO-02-591. Washington, D.C.: June 14, 2002.
National Airspace System: Long-Term Capacity Planning Needed Despite
Recent Reduction in Flight Delays. GAO-02-185. Washington, D.C.:
December 14, 2001.
National Airspace System: Free Flight Tools Show Promise, but
Implementation Challenges Remain. GAO-01-932. Washington, D.C.: August
31, 2001.
Air Traffic Control: Role of FAA's Modernization Program in Reducing
Delays and Congestion. GAO-01-725T. Washington, D.C.: May 10, 2001.
National Airspace System: Problems Plaguing the Wide Area Augmentation
System and FAA's Actions to Address Them. GAO/TRCED-00-229. Washington,
D.C.: June 29, 2000.
National Airspace System: Persistent Problems in FAA's New Navigation
System Highlight Need for Periodic Reevaluation. GAO/RCED/AIMD-00-130.
Washington, D.C.: June 12, 2000.
Air Traffic Control: Status of FAA's Implementation of the Display
System Replacement Project. GAO/T-RCED-00-19. Washington, D.C.:
October 11, 1999.
Air Traffic Control: FAA's Modernization Investment Management Approach
Could Be Strengthened. GAO/RCED/AIMD-99-88. Washington, D.C.: April 30,
1999.
Air Traffic Control: Observations on FAA's Air Traffic Control
Modernization Program. GAO/T-RCED/AIMD-99-137. Washington, D.C.: March
25, 1999.
FOOTNOTES
[1] These 10 million people include those with jobs both directly and
indirectly related to aviation activities.
[2] U.S. General Accounting Office, National Airspace System: Problems
Plaguing the Wide Area Augmentation System and FAA's Actions to Address
Them, GAO/T-RCED-00-229 (Washington, D.C.: June 29, 2000).
[3] These dollars are nominal.
[4] U.S. General Accounting Office, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-
03-119 (Washington, D.C.: January 2003).
[5] U.S. General Accounting Office, National Airspace System: Better
Cost Data Could Improve FAA's Management of the Standard Terminal
Automation Replacement System, GAO-03-343 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 31,
2003).
[6] U.S. General Accounting Office, Complete and Enforced Architecture
Needed for FAA Systems Modernization GAO/AIMD-97-30 (Washington, D.C.:
Feb. 3, 1997).
[7] U.S. General Accounting Office, Information Technology Investment
Management: A Framework for Assessing and Improving Process Maturity,
Exposure Draft, GAO/AIMD-10.1.23 (Washington, D.C.: May 2000).
[8] U.S. General Accounting Office, High Risk Program: Information on
Selected High-Risk Areas, GAO/HR-97-30 (Washington, D.C.: May 16,
1997).
[9] U.S. General Accounting Office, Information Needed to Make Billion-
Dollar Modernization Investment Decisions, GAO/AIMD-97-20 (Washington,
D.C.: Jan. 22, 1997).
[10] U.S. General Accounting Office, Information Security:
Opportunities for Improved OMB Oversight of Agency Practices, GAO/AIMD-
96-110 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 24,1996).
[11] U.S. General Accounting Office, Aviation Acquisition: A
Comprehensive Strategy Is Needed for Cultural Change at FAA
(Washington, D.C.: Aug. 22, 1996).
[12] U.S. General Accounting Office, Exempting FAA From Procurement and
Personnel Rules, GAO/RCED-96-27R (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 27, 1995).
[13] U.S. General Accounting Office, Information Technology: A
Framework for Assessing and Improving Enterprise Architecture
Management (Version 1.1), GAO-03-584G (Washington, D.C.: April 2003).
[14] U.S. General Accounting Office, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-
03-119 (Washington, D.C.: January 2003).
[15] U.S. General Accounting Office, Human Capital Management: FAA's
Reform Effort Requires a More Strategic Approach, GAO-03-156
(Washington, D.C.: February 3, 2003).
[16] U.S. General Accounting Office, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-
03-119 (Washington, D.C.: January 2003).
[17] U.S. General Accounting Office, Information Technology: Enterprise
Architecture Use Across the Federal Government Can Be Improved, GAO-02-
6 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 19, 2002).
[18] U.S. General Accounting Office, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-
03-119 (Washington, D.C.: January 2003).
[19] U.S. Department of Transportation, Inspector General, 2002 Status
Assessment of Cost Accounting System and Practices, Federal Aviation
Administration, Report Number FI-2003-043 (Washington, D.C., June 3,
2003).
[20] U.S. General Accounting Office, National Airspace System:
Persistent Problems in FAA's New Navigation System Highlight Need for
Periodic Reevaluation, GAO/RCED/AIMD-00-130 (Washington, D.C.: June
12, 2000).
