Drug Testing
Undercover Tests Reveal Significant Vulnerabilities in DOT's Drug Testing Program Gao ID: GAO-08-225T November 1, 2007To help prevent accidents resulting from drug use by individuals in safety-sensitive positions, the Department of Transportation (DOT) requires motor carriers to conduct drug testing of their employees. These drug tests involve collecting a urine specimen from employees. To ensure the integrity of the urine specimen and the collection process, DOT regulations provide numerous protocols that outline collection procedures and identify controls to prevent employees from defeating a drug test. Recent media accounts indicate that some sites performing DOT drug test collections may not be adhering to the collection protocols. Moreover, given the different techniques a drug user may employ in an attempt to defeat a drug test, it is possible that a commercial truck driver could defeat a drug test by diluting, substituting, or adulterating a urine specimen in order to obtain a passing result. GAO was asked to perform an undercover operation to determine whether (1) urine collectors followed DOT protocols at selected collection sites and (2) commercially available products could be used to defeat drug tests. To perform this undercover operation, GAO created two fictitious trucking companies and produced bogus driver's licenses. GAO investigators then posed as truck drivers to test 24 collection sites throughout the United States. GAO briefed DOT officials on its results and they agreed with the findings.
DOT's drug testing program is vulnerable to manipulation by drug users, especially given the wide availability of products designed to defeat drug tests. While all urine collection sites followed DOT protocols by asking GAO undercover investigators to provide identification, investigators successfully used bogus driver's licenses to gain access to all 24 sites--demonstrating that a drug user could send someone to take a drug test in their place using fake identification. In addition, 22 of the 24 selected urine collection sites did not adequately follow the remaining protocols GAO tested. For example, 75 percent of the urine collection sites GAO tested failed to restrict access to items that could be used to adulterate or dilute the specimen, meaning that running water, soap, or air freshener was available in the bathroom during the test. The table below provides information about the high failure of selected protocols for the 24 collection sites tested. GAO also found that drug masking products such as adulterants, dilutants, and substitutes were widely available on the Internet. After purchasing drug masking products from Web sites, GAO investigators used adulterants at four of the collection sites and substitute synthetic urine at another four sites without being caught by site collectors--demonstrating that these products could easily be brought into a collection site and used during a test. Even in one case where a collection site followed all DOT collection protocols regarding administration of the test, investigators were still able to substitute synthetic urine for their sample. Every drug masking product went undetected by the drug screening labs. Provided the adulterant GAO used would be able to mask drug use as advertised, a drug user would likely be able to use the substances GAO tested to obtain a passing result on his or her test. According to officials GAO interviewed at the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA), companies that make drug-masking products are aware of government test standards and devise products that prevent laboratories from detecting them. SAMHSA is required to provide information to laboratories on how to test the validity of the urine specimens, publicly providing detailed information on lab testing procedures on its Web site.
GAO-08-225T, Drug Testing: Undercover Tests Reveal Significant Vulnerabilities in DOT's Drug Testing Program
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Testimony:
Before the Subcommittee on Highways and Transit, Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure, House of Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT:
Thursday, November 1, 2007:
Drug Testing:
Undercover Tests Reveal Significant Vulnerabilities in DOT's Drug
Testing Program:
Statement of Gregory D. Kutz, Managing Director:
Forensic Audits and Special Investigations:
GAO-08-225T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-08-225T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on
Highways and Transit, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,
House of Representatives
Why GAO Did This Study:
To help prevent accidents resulting from drug use by individuals in
safety-sensitive positions, the Department of Transportation (DOT)
requires motor carriers to conduct drug testing of their employees.
These drug tests involve collecting a urine specimen from employees. To
ensure the integrity of the urine specimen and the collection process,
DOT regulations provide numerous protocols that outline collection
procedures and identify controls to prevent employees from defeating a
drug test.
Recent media accounts indicate that some sites performing DOT drug test
collections may not be adhering to the collection protocols. Moreover,
given the different techniques a drug user may employ in an attempt to
defeat a drug test, it is possible that a commercial truck driver could
defeat a drug test by diluting, substituting, or adulterating a urine
specimen in order to obtain a passing result. GAO was asked to perform
an undercover operation to determine whether (1) urine collectors
followed DOT protocols at selected collection sites and (2)
commercially available products could be used to defeat drug tests.
To perform this undercover operation, GAO created two fictitious
trucking companies and produced bogus driver‘s licenses. GAO
investigators then posed as truck drivers to test 24 collection sites
throughout the United States. GAO briefed DOT officials on its results
and they agreed with the findings.
What GAO Found:
DOT‘s drug testing program is vulnerable to manipulation by drug users,
especially given the wide availability of products designed to defeat
drug tests. While all urine collection sites followed DOT protocols by
asking GAO undercover investigators to provide identification,
investigators successfully used bogus driver‘s licenses to gain access
to all 24 sites”demonstrating that a drug user could send someone to
take a drug test in their place using fake identification. In addition,
22 of the 24 selected urine collection sites did not adequately follow
the remaining protocols GAO tested. For example, 75 percent of the
urine collection sites GAO tested failed to restrict access to items
that could be used to adulterate or dilute the specimen, meaning that
running water, soap, or air freshener was available in the bathroom
during the test. The table below provides information about the high
failure of selected protocols for the 24 collection sites tested.
Table: Failure Rates for Selected DOT Protocols GAO Tested:
Selected DOT urine specimen collection protocol: Secure the facility
from all substances that could be used to adulterate or dilute the
specimen;
Selected DOT urine specimen collection protocol: 75.
Selected DOT urine specimen collection protocol: Secure all sources of
water in the restroom;
Selected DOT urine specimen collection protocol: 67 .
Selected DOT urine specimen collection protocol: Ask the employee to
empty his/her pockets and display items to ensure no items are present
that could be used to adulterate the specimen;
Selected DOT urine specimen collection protocol: 42.
Selected DOT urine specimen collection protocol: Check the temperature
of the specimen;
Selected DOT urine specimen collection protocol: 19.
Selected DOT urine specimen collection protocol: Place a bluing agent
in the toilet or secure it with tape;
Selected DOT urine specimen collection protocol: 17.
Source: GAO.
[End of table]
GAO also found that drug masking products such as adulterants,
dilutants, and substitutes were widely available on the Internet. After
purchasing drug masking products from Web sites, GAO investigators used
adulterants at four of the collection sites and substitute synthetic
urine at another four sites without being caught by site
collectors”demonstrating that these products could easily be brought
into a collection site and used during a test. Even in one case where a
collection site followed all DOT collection protocols regarding
administration of the test, investigators were still able to substitute
synthetic urine for their sample. Every drug masking product went
undetected by the drug screening labs. Provided the adulterant GAO used
would be able to mask drug use as advertised, a drug user would likely
be able to use the substances GAO tested to obtain a passing result on
his or her test. According to officials GAO interviewed at the
Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA),
companies that make drug-masking products are aware of government test
standards and devise products that prevent laboratories from detecting
them. SAMHSA is required to provide information to laboratories on how
to test the validity of the urine specimens, publicly providing
detailed information on lab testing procedures on its Web site.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
[hyperlink, http://www.GAO-08-225T]. For more information, contact
Gregory Kutz at (202) 512-6722 or kutzg@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
Thank you for the opportunity to discuss our undercover operation to
test Department of Transportation (DOT) drug testing regulations as
they relate to commercial truck drivers. According to DOT, its
regulations implement the world's largest drug and alcohol testing
program covering six DOT operating administrations and over 12.1
million employees in the United States, including school bus drivers,
commercial truck drivers transporting hazardous materials, and airline
pilots. We focused our efforts on the DOT drug testing program for
commercial truck drivers, which DOT considers to be a safety-sensitive
transportation position. If an employee in a safety-sensitive
transportation position were using controlled substances such as
marijuana, cocaine, or phencydidine (PCP), a clear public safety risk
would exist.
To help prevent accidents resulting from drug use by individuals
holding safety-sensitive positions, federal law requires motor carriers
to drug test their employees.[Footnote 1] Motor carriers in the United
States are responsible for conducting the drug testing of their
employees and can use third-party administrators to help them
coordinate the drug tests. Drug tests involve collecting a urine
specimen from the employee at a collection site. As long as the
collection site meets the requirements of DOT's regulations, urine
collection can be performed at sites across the nation, in addition to
being performed onsite at an employer's facilities. DOT regulations
contain numerous control measures intended to ensure the integrity of
the urine specimen and the collection process during these tests.
However, a drug using employee may attempt to defeat a drug test using
techniques commonly known as substitution, dilution, and adulteration.
To prevent an employee from defeating the drug test, DOT regulations
mandate that collection sites follow certain protocols, for instance:
* DOT protocols require collectors to validate that an employee is
carrying photo identification before the test. This is designed to
prevent an employee from having somebody else take the test for him or
her, which is one form of substitution.
* DOT protocols require collectors at drug testing sites to ensure that
no clear water source is available in the collection area, among other
measures, to prevent an employee from using water in the bathroom to
dilute their urine specimen.
* DOT protocols specify that employees should not be able to access
soap, air freshener, or other chemicals to prevent them from using
these products to adulterate a urine specimen. Other DOT protocols
designed to prevent adulteration require employees to empty their
pockets and wash their hands before providing the specimen.
Recent media accounts indicate that some private sector collection
sites performing DOT drug test collections may not be adhering to
established collection protocols. Moreover, given the different
techniques a drug user may employ in an attempt to defeat a drug test,
it is possible that a commercial truck driver could defeat a drug test
by diluting, substituting, or adulterating a urine specimen in order to
obtain a passing result. You asked us to perform an undercover
operation to determine whether (1) urine collectors followed DOT
protocols at selected collection sites and (2) commercially available
products could be used to defeat drug tests.
To determine whether urine collectors followed DOT protocols at
selected publicly advertised urine collection sites, we created two
fictitious trucking companies. Since our focus was on commercial truck
drivers, we produced bogus commercial driver's licenses using computer
software and hardware available to the public. Our investigators then
posed as commercial truck drivers employed at the fictitious companies.
We also used the fictitious company names to hire third-party
administrators (TPA) to help us coordinate the drug tests by
recommending collection sites and processing the required paperwork.
Our undercover investigators then reported to urine collection sites
pretending they had been selected by their company to receive a drug
test and submitted urine specimens. The specimens were sent to the drug
testing laboratories by the collection sites, and through our TPA we
were able to access the laboratory results of our drug tests. We
selected 24 publicly advertised urine collection sites to test four
major geographic areas throughout the United States, including 6 urine
collection sites in the Washington, D.C., metropolitan area and 6 in
each of the following three areas--Los Angeles, New York/Northern New
Jersey, and Dallas/Fort Worth. We chose the Washington, D.C., area
because of its size and for reasons of convenience and economy, and the
other three areas due to the large number of truck drivers residing
within each area.[Footnote 2] At each urine collection site we tested
16 specific DOT protocols which we determined, based on our research,
to be the most critical in preventing an employee from defeating a drug
test. Investigators brought mobile phones with photographic capability
into the collection sites to photograph any breaches of protocol they
observed.
To determine whether commercially available products could be used to
defeat drug tests, we researched products available to mask drug use by
conducting Internet searches, reviewing prior GAO reports, and
interviewing knowledgeable government officials.[Footnote 3] We then
purchased adulterants and substitute synthetic urine over the Internet
and used them in an attempt to defeat 8 out of the 24 drug tests. We
did not test any commercially available dilutants or use dilutants we
found in the collection area (e.g., tap water). While synthetic urine
requires complete substitution, adulterants were mixed with the urine
specimen our investigators provided. It is therefore important to note
that since our investigators' urine specimens did not contain traces of
drug use, we cannot report on whether the adulterants we used were able
to mask drug use--only on whether the laboratories could detect the
presence of the adulterant. We assumed that a drug user could receive a
passing result as long as the laboratories did not detect the presence
of the synthetic urine. It is not possible to generalize the results of
our undercover testing to apply to all collection sites or to all drug-
masking products.
We conducted this investigation from May to September 2007 in
accordance with standards prescribed by the President's Council on
Integrity and Efficiency.
Summary:
While all urine collection sites followed DOT protocols by asking our
undercover investigators to provide identification, we successfully
used bogus driver's licenses to gain access to all 24 sites--
demonstrating that a drug user could send someone to take a drug test
in their place using fake identification. In addition, 22 of the 24
selected urine collection sites did not adequately follow the remaining
protocols we tested. For example, 75 percent of the 24 urine collection
sites we tested failed to restrict access to items that could be used
to adulterate or dilute the specimen, meaning that running water, soap,
or air freshener was available in the bathroom during the test. Table 1
provides information about the high failure of selected protocols for
the 24 collection sites tested.
Table 1: Failure Rates for Selected DOT Protocols GAO Tested:
Selected DOT collection protocol: Secure the facility from all
substances that could be used to adulterate or dilute the specimen;
Percentage of the 24 collection sites that failed: 75.
Selected DOT collection protocol: Secure all sources of water in the
restroom;
Percentage of the 24 collection sites that failed: 67.
Selected DOT collection protocol: Ask the employee to empty his/her
pockets and display items to ensure no items are present that could be
used to adulterate the specimen;
Percentage of the 24 collection sites that failed: 42.
Selected DOT collection protocol: Check the temperature of the
specimen;
Percentage of the 24 collection sites that failed: 19.
Selected DOT collection protocol: Place a bluing agent in the toilet or
secure it with tape;
Percentage of the 24 collection sites that failed: 17.
Source: GAO.
[End of table]
We also determined that drug-masking products, such as adulterants,
dilutants, and substitutes, were widely available on the Internet.
After purchasing drug-masking products from Web sites, we used
adulterants at four of the collection sites and substitute synthetic
urine at another four sites without being caught by site collectors--
demonstrating that these products could easily be brought into a
collection site and used during a test. Even in one case where a
collection site followed all DOT collection protocols regarding
administration of the test, we were still able to substitute synthetic
urine for our specimen. Every drug-masking product went undetected by
the drug screening labs. Provided the adulterant we used would be able
to mask drug use as advertised, a drug user would likely be able to use
the substances we tested to obtain a passing result on his or her test.
According to officials we interviewed at the Substance Abuse and Mental
Health Services Administration (SAMHSA), companies that make drug-
masking products are aware of government test standards and devise
products that prevent laboratories from detecting them.
We briefed DOT officials on the results of our work and they agreed
with our findings. We will provide DOT with a referral letter that
specifies the geographic areas and collection site names for those
sites that we determined had failures in protocols.
Background:
Six operating administrations under DOT have issued regulations
requiring antidrug programs in the aviation, highway, railroad, mass
transit, pipeline, and maritime industries. Antidrug programs for
commercial truck drivers are regulated by the Federal Motor Carrier
Safety Administration (FMCSA), which is the operating administration
responsible for enforcing FMCSA regulations and establishing who is
tested and when they are tested.[Footnote 4] FMCSA antidrug regulations
require that employers of commercial motor carriers, including those
who are owner-operators, conduct drug testing according to the DOT
"Procedures for Transportation Workplace Drug Testing
Programs."[Footnote 5] These DOT regulations mandate that motor
carriers must conduct pre-employment, reasonable suspicion, random, and
post-accident drug testing on their employees. While these scenarios
are all different, DOT requires collectors and collection sites to
follow uniform collection protocols regardless of the reason for the
test. Collection sites are privately run facilities, where the
collectors at the sites do not have to be certified by DOT, but must
meet DOT regulations by completing the required training and following
DOT protocols. Because collection sites are spread throughout the
nation, it is easy for an employee in any of the drug testing
scenarios, from pre-employment to post-accident drug testing, to get to
a collection site within the given time frame.[Footnote 6] According to
DOT regulations, collection sites must promote privacy, incorporate the
scientific and technical guidelines of the Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS), utilize a scientifically recognized testing
method, and require that specimens be labeled and secured in the
presence of the tested employee to prevent tampering. To help
collection sites comply with these regulations, DOT's Office of Drug
and Alcohol Policy and Compliance issued revised protocols in December
2006.[Footnote 7] The protocols indicate that the collector has a major
role in the success of the DOT drug testing program because he or she
is the one individual in the testing process with which all employees
have direct, face-to-face contact. The protocols also state that the
test may lose validity if the collector does not ensure the integrity
of the specimen and collection process.
DOT protocols have specific requirements that collection sites must
meet, including procedures to (1) prevent unauthorized access to the
urine collection site; (2) prevent the tested employee or anyone else
from gaining unauthorized access to the collection materials/supplies;
(3) ensure that the tested employee does not have access to items that
could be used to adulterate or dilute the specimen such as soap,
disinfectants, cleaning supplies, and water; and (4) ensure that the
tested employee is under the supervision of a collector or appropriate
site personnel at all times when permitted into the site.
To document the collection of the specimen, DOT requires that urine
collection sites correctly complete the Federal Drug Testing Custody
and Control Form (CCF) for every collection under the DOT drug testing
program. This form is also used to document the transfer of the
specimen to the HHS-approved, private sector laboratories, where the
urine specimen is sent to be tested for marijuana, cocaine,
amphetamines, opiates, and phencydidine (PCP) as identified by HHS
regulations. It is important to note that the laboratories that test
the specimen are separate entities than the urine collection sites. The
collection sites must follow DOT protocols and their role is to collect
the urine specimen, while the laboratories must be certified by HHS and
their role is to perform the drug testing of the specimen. The
laboratories are authorized to also conduct validity testing to
determine if the specimen is consistent with normal human urine,
whether adulterants or foreign substances are present, or if the
specimen was diluted or substituted. The HHS organization, Substance
Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA), administers
the Federal Workplace Drug Testing Program and revised the guidelines
in 2004 to require that specimen validity tests be conducted on all
urine specimens of federal employees due to the increase in the number
of chemical adulterants that were marketed on the Internet and in
certain magazines. DOT did not adopt this update in their regulations-
-so currently drug testing laboratories are only authorized, not
required, to perform validity testing for all DOT required commercial
motor carrier drug tests.
As an additional quality control check, DOT requires that a Medical
Review Officer (MRO) serve as an independent, impartial authority to
verify the lab results. After the results are verified, the MRO, who is
a licensed physician, informs the designated company official whether
the employee passed or failed the drug test. The MRO may also designate
test results as cancelled in the case of an invalid test. An invalid
test results when a drug screening lab identifies an unidentified
adulterant, substitute, or abnormal physical characteristic in the
specimen that prevents the lab from obtaining a valid test result. In
the case of a cancelled test, the MRO conducts an interview with the
employee to determine if there is a legitimate medical reason for the
result. If the MRO determines there is a legitimate medical reason, no
further action is required.[Footnote 8] However, if the MRO determines
there is no legitimate medical reason, the employee is required to take
another drug test under direct observation--effectively getting another
opportunity to take the test, but without the privacy afforded
previously.[Footnote 9] In the case of a positive result, which is
defined as a failed drug test, a supervisor or company official is
required to immediately remove the employee from the job. Employees who
test positive and continue to perform safety-sensitive functions and
employers who permit them to do so are both subject to criminal and
civil fines.
Most Collection Sites Failed to Comply with All DOT Protocols:
In our tests of the selected 24 urine collection sites in four major
geographic areas throughout the United States, we determined that 22 of
the 24 sites showed varying degrees of failure in complying with the
protocols that we tested. While all urine collection sites followed DOT
protocols by asking our undercover investigators to provide
identification, we successfully used bogus driver's licenses to gain
access to all 24 sites--demonstrating that a drug user could send
someone else to take a drug test in their place. This fact in and of
itself shows that in 100 percent of our tests we successfully used a
form of substitution. However, we did not count these instances as a
failure of protocol because the collectors are not required to validate
the identity of the employee--they are only required to ensure that an
employee presents identification.
Twenty-two of the 24 tested collection sites failed to comply with many
of the remaining DOT protocols we tested. In table 2, we provide a
summary of the results of our testing of the 16 protocols by geographic
area in the order that we tested them. The table identifies the number
of protocols with which each site failed to comply.
Table 2: Results of Testing the 16 Protocols by Geographic Area:
Geographic area: Washington, D.C;
Number of protocols failed: Site 1: 2;
Number of protocols failed: Site 2: 2;
Number of protocols failed: Site 3: 0;
Number of protocols failed: Site 4: 2;
Number of protocols failed: Site 5: 12;
Number of protocols failed: Site 6: 2.
Geographic area: Los Angeles;
Number of protocols failed: Site 1: 8;
Number of protocols failed: Site 2: 5;
Number of protocols failed: Site 3: 6;
Number of protocols failed: Site 4: 2;
Number of protocols failed: Site 5: 2;
Number of protocols failed: Site 6: 3.
Geographic area: New York/Northern New Jersey;
Number of protocols failed: Site 1: 6;
Number of protocols failed: Site 2: 4;
Number of protocols failed: Site 3: 5;
Number of protocols failed: Site 4: 3;
Number of protocols failed: Site 5: 6;
Number of protocols failed: Site 6: 5.
Geographic area: Dallas/Fort Worth;
Number of protocols failed: Site 1: 2;
Number of protocols failed: Site 2: 5;
Number of protocols failed: Site 3: 2;
Number of protocols failed: Site 4: 4;
Number of protocols failed: Site 5: 0;
Number of protocols failed: Site 6: 2.
Source: GAO.
[End of table]
For a summary of the protocols we tested and their rationale, see
figure 1.
Figure 1: Key Collection Protocols Tested by GAO Undercover
Investigators:
This figure is a chart showing key collection protocols tested by GAO
undercover investigators.
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO.
Note: We selected these protocols from 49 CFR Part 40, "Procedures for
Transportation Workplace Drug Testing Programs."
[End of figure]
Some of the criteria above relate to preventing the employee from
having access to items at the collection site, such as water or
cleaning products, which could be used to adulterate or dilute the
specimen. These types of products might be detected by drug testing
laboratories, however, we did not test this. We provide detail on our
findings of the tested urine collection sites by area in the order of
our testing below.
Washington, D.C., Metropolitan Area:
In our testing of the Washington, D.C., metropolitan area we determined
that, in five of the six sites tested, there were varying degrees of
failure in complying with the 16 protocols. Most of the sites failed
only two protocols, while site 3 did not fail any of the protocols and
site 5 performed poorly by failing 12 protocols--75 percent of the
protocols tested. In the case of site 5, we determined that although
this collection site failed to comply with most of the protocols, the
drug screening lab identified errors and cancelled the test due to the
inappropriate collection process. We provide additional detail below on
our experiences at three of the Washington, D.C., metropolitan area
collection sites.
* Washington D.C., Area, Site 3: This collection site did not fail any
of the protocols that we tested. However, our investigator used
substitute synthetic urine he brought with him to contaminate the urine
specimen during the test and the laboratory did not detect the presence
of the synthetic urine.
* Washington D.C., Area, Site 4: At this collection site, the
investigator had access to water which could be used to dilute a
specimen. In addition, the investigator brought in and used an
adulterant at this site and the laboratory did not detect the presence
of the adulterant.
* Washington D.C., Area, Site 5: This site failed to comply with 12 of
the 16 protocols that we tested. Although it was not one of the
protocols we tested at other facilities, one of our investigators
exhibited a "shy bladder" at this site and could not provide a full
urine specimen of 45 mL. The collector permitted our investigator to
provide half of the specimen, leave the facility, and return
approximately 1 hour later--a violation of DOT protocols, which state
that the employee should not be allowed to leave the collection site
and should be monitored during the waiting time. When completing the
collection process, the collector used half of the specimen from the
original collection and half from what the investigator provided later.
The drug screening lab identified this error and cancelled the test due
to the inappropriate collection process.
See appendix I for a site-specific breakdown, by protocol, of the
results of our testing in the Washington, D.C., metro area.
Los Angeles Area:
In our testing of the Los Angeles area we determined that, of the six
sites tested, there were varying degrees of failure in complying with
the 16 protocols--including one site that failed 8 of the 16 protocols.
Other selected sites in the Los Angeles area failed up to 5 and 6
protocols while the remaining sites failed 3 protocols or less. We
provide additional detail below on our experiences at four of the Los
Angeles area collection sites.
* Los Angeles, Site 1: The investigator was not instructed to wash his
hands before providing the specimen. This could have allowed a tested
employee to hide a drug-masking product in his hand when taking the
test. In addition, there was no bluing agent in the toilet. That means
a tested employee could have used the clear water in the toilet to
dilute his or her specimen. The collector did not perform the split
specimen correctly by only filling one specimen bottle.[Footnote 10]
The results were still valid despite the incorrect split specimen
because the lab result was passing for the first specimen bottle, so
according to DOT protocols a second bottle is not needed to validate a
passing result.
* Los Angeles, Site 3: The collector did not tell our investigator that
the toilet should not be flushed, allowing the employee to potentially
use the clear un-blued water in the flushed toilet to dilute the
specimen. In addition, the collector did not instruct the investigator
to return with the specimen as soon as possible after voiding--the
temperature of the specimen needs to be taken within 4 minutes in an
attempt to determine whether the specimen was substituted, diluted, or
adulterated. Our investigator used synthetic urine in this drug test
and the laboratory was not able to detect the presence of the synthetic
urine.
* Los Angeles, Site 4: The collector at this site asked our
investigator to empty his pockets. However, he did not have to empty
all of his pockets--this enabled our investigator to bring an
adulterant into the collection area by hiding it in his back pocket.
The laboratory did not detect the presence of the adulterant.
* Los Angeles, Site 6: The collector failed to instruct our
investigator to empty his pockets before providing a specimen at this
site. In addition, our investigator had access to running water in the
sink--this could potentially be used to dilute the specimen. The
collector did not perform the split specimen correctly and only filled
one specimen bottle. The results were still valid despite the incorrect
split specimen because the lab result was passing for the first
specimen bottle, so according to DOT protocols a second bottle is not
needed to validate a passing result.
See appendix I for site-specific breakdown, by protocol, of the results
of our testing in the Los Angeles area.
New York/Northern New Jersey Area:
In our testing of the New York/Northern New Jersey area we determined
that, of the six sites tested, collection sites failed to comply with a
large number of the 16 protocols--sites 1 and 5 failed to comply with
six protocols, sites 3 and 6 failed to comply with five protocols, and
sites 2 and 4 failed to comply with four and three protocols,
respectively. We provide additional detail below on our experiences at
five of the New York/Northern New Jersey area collection sites,
including photographs of the collection areas taken with mobile phone
cameras.
* New York/Northern New Jersey, Site 1: In addition to failing to
comply with five other protocols, this collection site had an
adulterant (bleach) located on top of the toilet (see fig. 2).
Figure 2: Bleach Located in Collection Area in Violation of DOT
Protocols:
This figure is a photograph of bleach located in a collection area in
violation of DOT protocols.
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
* New York/Northern New Jersey, Site 2: The collector failed to
instruct our investigator to empty his pockets before providing a
specimen at this site, making it easy for our investigator to bring an
adulterant into the collection room. Moreover, the collector did not
watch our investigator to see whether he washed his hands before
providing the specimen. The bathroom had liquid soap and liquid
cleaning products available in the collection area. Our investigator
used an adulterant he brought with him to contaminate the urine
specimen during the test. The laboratory did not detect the presence of
the adulterant.
* New York/Northern New Jersey, Site 4: The collector failed to
instruct our investigator to empty his pockets before providing a
specimen at this site, making it easy for our investigator to bring
synthetic urine into the collection room. In addition, the bathroom had
water and disinfectant spray available in the collection area. The
laboratory did not detect the presence of the synthetic urine.
* New York/Northern New Jersey, Site 5: The collector did not supervise
our investigator in the collection site. While the collector remained
in one room, he told our investigator to use a bathroom located down an
adjoining hallway. According to DOT protocols, a tested employee should
be supervised at all times during the collection process.
* New York/Northern New Jersey, Site 6: Our investigator was
unsupervised at the collection site, allowing him to identify cleaning
products outside the collection room that could be used as adulterants,
pick up a large can of disinfectant, and bring it with him into the
collection room. Our investigator took pictures of this violation using
a mobile phone camera. Figure 3 shows the disinfectant spray and other
adulterants outside the collection room.
Figure 3: Adulterants Located Outside a Collection Room in Violation of
DOT Protocols:
This figure is a photograph of adulterants located outside a collection
room in violation of DOT protocols.
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
In figure 4, the investigator has brought the disinfectant with him
into the collection room and placed it next to his urine specimen on
the toilet.
Figure 4: Adulterant Moved into Collection Room:
This figure is a photograph of an adulterant moved into a collection
room.
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
See appendix I for a site-specific breakdown, by protocol, of the
results of our testing in the New York/Northern New Jersey area.
Dallas/Fort Worth Area:
In our testing of the Dallas/Fort Worth area we determined that, in
five of the six sites tested, there were varying degrees of failure in
complying with the 16 protocols. Many of the sites failed 2 protocols,
while site 2 failed 5, site 4 failed 4, and site 5 did not fail any of
the protocols. We provide additional detail below on our experiences at
five of the Dallas/Fort Worth area collection sites, including
photographs of the collection areas taken with mobile phone cameras.
* Dallas/Fort Worth, Site 2: Our investigator was able to bring an
adulterant into the collection site and used it to adulterate his urine
specimen. While in the collection area, the investigator noticed that
running water was available--in violation of DOT protocols. See figure
5.
Figure 5: Running Water in the Collection Room in Violation of DOT
Protocols:
This figure is a photograph of a sink turned on in the collection room
in violation of DOT protocols.
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
After providing his urine specimen to the collector, the investigator
observed that the collector only filled one specimen bottle rather than
the two required under DOT's split specimen protocols. The collector
threw out the remaining specimen. The laboratory did not detect the
presence of the adulterant. The results were still valid despite the
incorrect split specimen because the lab result was passing on the
first specimen bottle, so according to DOT protocols a second bottle is
not needed to validate a passing result.
* Dallas/Fort Worth, Site 4: The collector failed to instruct our
investigator to empty his pockets before providing a specimen at this
site, making it easy for our investigator to bring synthetic urine into
the collection room. Once he was in the collection room, the collector
instructed our investigator to leave the door completely open while
providing the specimen. The collector waited outside the collection
room and did not directly observe the collection; nevertheless, our
investigator was able to pour synthetic urine into the provided
specimen cup. The laboratory did not detect the synthetic urine.
* Dallas/Fort Worth, Site 5: This collection site performed well in
meeting all of the DOT protocols. This site had a 15-item checklist
outlining DOT protocols hanging on the wall. Our investigator observed
the technician using the checklist while conducting the collection of
the urine specimen.
* Dallas/Fort Worth, Site 6: This collection site allowed the employee
access to water by not securing the toilet lid in the collection room-
-leaving the employee an opportunity to use the clear un-blued water to
potentially dilute the specimen. Also in the collection room was an
automatic spray disinfectant on the wall. A tested employee could have
used this spray to dilute or adulterate his or her specimen.
See appendix I for a site-specific breakdown, by protocol, of the
results of our testing in the New York/Northern New Jersey area.
Commercially Available Products Can Defeat Drug Tests at Selected
Sites:
We determined that drug-masking products were widely available for
purchase over the Internet and used this method to purchase adulterants
and synthetic urine for our tests. As discussed above, we submitted
specimens containing adulterants at four of the collection sites and at
another four sites we used synthetic urine without being caught by site
collectors, demonstrating that these products could easily be brought
in and used during a test. In every case that investigators used
adulterants or substitutes during the drug test, the drug-masking
products went undetected during lab testing, lab validation, and MRO
review of the labs' results. We also determined that publicly available
regulations provide details on how drug testing labs test and validate
urine specimens. Companies that sell drug-masking products can access
this information and update their products to prevent them from being
detected by the laboratory.
Products to Defeat Drug Tests Are Widely Available:
In performing Internet searches, we found drug-masking products that
the public can easily obtain and that are marketed as products that can
be used to pass urine drug tests. A simple Internet search using a
phrase such as "pass drug test" resulted in over 2 million Web site
hits. We determined that these types of Web sites contained various
adulterants and urine substitutes available for purchase, including
accessories that would allow an employee to conceal the product on
their body when taking a test. We used these types of Web sites to
purchase drug-masking products for our testing of selected urine
collection sites. SAMHSA is aware of these products and revised the
Mandatory Guidelines for Federal Workplace Drug Testing Programs in
2004 to require that specimen validity tests be conducted on all urine
specimens, noting that there was a recent increase in the number of
chemical adulterants that are marketed on the Internet and in certain
magazines. DOT did not adopt this update in their regulations--so
currently drug testing laboratories are only authorized, not required,
to perform validity testing for all DOT required commercial motor
carrier drug tests. According to SAMHSA, approximately 400 different
products are available to defeat urine drug tests.
Adulterants and Synthetic Urine Used at 8 of 24 Collection Sites:
We were able to easily bring drug-masking products into a collection
room at every one of the eight collection sites we tested with these
products. Even in cases where the collector followed DOT protocol and
asked our investigator to empty his pockets, our investigators simply
hid these products in their pockets and elsewhere in their clothing. At
one Dallas/Fort Worth collection site discussed above, the collector
instructed our investigator to leave the bathroom door completely open
when providing the specimen. The collector waited outside the bathroom;
nevertheless, the investigator was able to pour synthetic urine into
the specimen cup undetected. Investigators determined that there is
information on the Internet about concealing drug-masking products. For
example, one Web site noted that "although most testing sites will
require you to remove items from your pockets, it is still possible to
sneak in another specimen." Even a knowledgeable government official
with SAMHSA stated that, because collection protocols do not allow
collectors to directly observe urination unless they are suspicious,
the opportunity to substitute or adulterate a urine specimen exists.
Adulterants and Substitutes Were Not Detected by Laboratories:
SAMHSA officials stated that validity tests are intended to produce
accurate, reliable, and correctly interpreted test results and to
decrease or eliminate opportunities to defeat drug tests. We found that
none of the adulterants or synthetic urine we used were identified by
the laboratories, however, we cannot confirm if the laboratories
performed validity testing because under DOT regulations they are only
authorized, not required, to do so. SAMHSA is required to provide
information to laboratories on how to test the validity of the urine
specimen and publicly provide detailed information on lab testing
procedures.[Footnote 11] According to a SAMHSA official with whom we
spoke, companies that market masking substances periodically offer new
formulations of their products to avoid detection. In fact, one Web
site we located appeared to verify this claim by advertising that its
product was "continuously updated and adjusted to keep up with changing
technologies." Despite their sophistication and ease of use, there is
no regulation prohibiting the sale of these products. Under 21 U.S.C.
Section 863 it may be illegal to sell drug-masking products if the
products are determined to be "drug paraphernalia." However, we have
not found any reported federal cases in which an individual has been
prosecuted for selling drug-masking products under this statute.
Corrective Action Briefing:
We briefed DOT on the results of our investigation on October 1, 2007.
DOT officials agreed with our findings and indicated that they were not
surprised by the results of our work, stating that they have performed
similar tests themselves in prior years with similar results. We agreed
with DOT that we would provide a referral letter that specifies the
areas and collection site names for those sites that we determined had
failures in protocols. DOT added that it has already taken steps to
improve the collection facilities' performance in the drug testing
program. For example, officials said they have developed posters with
10 key DOT protocols to be distributed at urine collection sites. These
posters are intended to help collectors follow the appropriate
protocols while conducting drug tests under the DOT drug screening
program.[Footnote 12] DOT officials also stated that the Real ID Act
could close the vulnerability we identified of using fake drivers'
licenses to take the drug tests, but that, because implementation of
this act is years away, there should be an interim solution.[Footnote
13] Finally, regarding drug-masking products, DOT officials stated that
they have continually supported legislation to ban the sale and
marketing of drug-masking products.
Conclusion:
Our work shows that a drug user could easily pass a DOT drug test and
continue to work in his or her safety-sensitive commercial
transportation job--driving children to school or transporting
hazardous materials, for example. To fully address the vulnerabilities
we identified, improvements will need to be made in both the design of
the entire process and the ability of collection site employees to
adhere to current protocols. In ongoing work, expected to be complete
in May 2008, GAO is examining options to deal with these and related
drug testing issues.[Footnote 14]
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, this concludes my
statement. I would be pleased to answer any questions that you may have
at this time.
Contacts and Acknowledgments:
For further information about this testimony, please contact Gregory D.
Kutz at (202) 512-6722 or kutzg@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices
of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last
page of this testimony. In addition to the individual named above, the
individuals who made major contributions to this testimony were John
Ryan Assistant, Director; Verginie Amirkhanian; Shafee Carnegie; Paul
Desaulniers; Matthew Harris; Jason Kelly; Jeffrey McDermott; and Andrew
McIntosh.
[End of section]
Appendix I: Results of Undercover Testing in Four Metropolitan Areas of
the United States:
The following four tables present a site-specific breakdown, by
protocol, of our undercover test results. We provide these tables in
the order of our testing. Our investigators used a data collection
instrument to track the compliance of collectors at each site. An
"unknown" result means that investigators could not determine whether
the collection site failed to comply with the particular protocol
because it was not observed.
Washington, D.C., Metropolitan Area:
Table 3 provides our findings for the Washington, D.C., metropolitan
area, which is the first area where we tested the 16 key collection
protocols.
Table 3: Washington, D.C., Undercover Test Results:
Protocol: Did the collector require the employee to provide appropriate
identification?;
Site 1: [Check];
Site 2: Check;
Site 3: Check;
Site 4: Check;
Site 5: Check;
Site 6: Check.
Protocol: Did the collector ask the employee to empty his/her pockets
and display items to ensure no items are present that could be used to
defeat the test?;
Site 1: Check;
Site 2: Check;
Site 3: Check;
Site 4: Check;
Site 5: Fail;
Site 6: Check.
Protocol: Did the collector instruct the employee to wash his/her hands
under the collector's supervision?;
Site 1: Check;
Site 2: Check;
Site 3: Check;
Site 4: Check;
Site 5: Fail;
Site 6: Check.
Protocol: Did the collector direct the employee to provide a specimen
of at least 45 mL?;
Site 1: Check;
Site 2: Check;
Site 3: Check;
Site 4: Check;
Site 5: Check;
Site 6: Check.
Protocol: Did the collector direct the employee to not flush the
toilet?;
Site 1: Check;
Site 2: Check;
Site 3: Check;
Site 4: Check;
Site 5: Fail;
Site 6: Check.
Protocol: Did the collector direct the employee to return with the
specimen as soon as possible after voiding?;
Site 1: Check;
Site 2: Check;
Site 3: Check;
Site 4: Check;
Site 5: Fail;
Site 6: Check.
Protocol: Were all sources of water in the restroom secured?;
Site 1: Fail;
Site 2: Fail;
Site 3: Check;
Site 4: Fail;
Site 5: Fail;
Site 6: Fail.
Protocol: Was bluing agent placed in the toilet or was it secured with
tape?;
Site 1: Check;
Site 2: Check;
Site 3: Check;
Site 4: Check;
Site 5: Fail;
Site 6: Check.
Protocol: Did the collector check the temperature of the specimen?;
Site 1: Unknown;
Site 2: Unknown;
Site 3: Check;
Site 4: Check;
Site 5: Fail;
Site 6: Unknown.
Protocol: Was the employee allowed to place the tamper-evident seals
from the CCF onto the specimen bottles?;
Site 1: Check;
Site 2: Check;
Site 3: Check;
Site 4: Check;
Site 5: Check;
Site 6: Check.
Protocol: Did the collector seal and date the specimen?;
Site 1: Check;
Site 2: Check;
Site 3: Check;
Site 4: Check;
Site 5: Fail;
Site 6: Fail.
Protocol: Did the collector have the employee initial the specimen
bottle seals after placing them on the bottles?;
Site 1: Check;
Site 2: Check;
Site 3: Check;
Site 4: Check;
Site 5: Fail;
Site 6: Check.
Protocol: Did unauthorized people have access to the collection site?;
Site 1: Check;
Site 2: Check;
Site 3: Check;
Site 4: Check;
Site 5: Check;
Site 6: Check.
Protocol: Did the employee have access to the collection materials or
supplies?;
Site 1: Check;
Site 2: Check;
Site 3: Check;
Site 4: Check;
Site 5: Fail;
Site 6: Check.
Protocol: Did the employee have access to items that could be used to
adulterate or dilute the specimen?;
Site 1: Fail;
Site 2: Fail;
Site 3: Check;
Site 4: Fail;
Site 5: Fail;
Site 6: Check.
Protocol: Was the employee under the supervision of the collector or
appropriate site personnel at all times?;
Site 1: Check;
Site 2: Check;
Site 3: Check;
Site 4: Check;
Site 5: Fail;
Site 6: Check.
Protocol: Number of protocols failed;
Site 1: 2;
Site 2: 2;
Site 3: 0;
Site 4: 2;
Site 5: 12;
Site 6: 2.
Source: GAO.
[End of table]
Los Angeles Metropolitan Area:
Table 4 provides our findings for the Los Angeles metropolitan area,
which is the second area where we tested the 16 key collection
protocols.
Table 4: Los Angeles Undercover Test Results:
Requirement: Did the collector require the employee to provide
appropriate identification?;
Site 1: Check;
Site 2: Check;
Site 3: Check;
Site 4: Check;
Site 5: Check;
Site 6: Check.
Requirement: Did the collector ask the employee to empty his/her
pockets and display items to ensure no items are present that could be
used to defeat the test?;
Site 1: Fail;
Site 2: Check;
Site 3: Check;
Site 4: Check;
Site 5: Check;
Site 6: Fail.
Requirement: Did the collector instruct the employee to wash his/her
hands under the collector's supervision?;
Site 1: Fail;
Site 2: Fail;
Site 3: Fail;
Site 4: Fail;
Site 5: Fail;
Site 6: Check.
Requirement: Did the collector direct the employee to provide a
specimen of at least 45 mL?;
Site 1: Check;
Site 2: Check;
Site 3: Check;
Site 4: Check;
Site 5: Check;
Site 6: Check.
Requirement: Did the collector direct the employee to not flush the
toilet?;
Site 1: Fail;
Site 2: Check;
Site 3: Fail;
Site 4: Check;
Site 5: Check;
Site 6: Check.
Requirement: Did the collector direct the employee to return with the
specimen as soon as possible after voiding?;
Site 1: Fail;
Site 2: Fail;
Site 3: Fail;
Site 4: Check;
Site 5: Check;
Site 6: Check.
Requirement: Were all sources of water in the restroom secured?;
Site 1: Fail;
Site 2: Fail;
Site 3: Check;
Site 4: Check;
Site 5: Check;
Site 6: Fail.
Requirement: Was bluing agent placed in the toilet or was it secured
with tape?;
Site 1: Fail;
Site 2: Fail;
Site 3: Fail;
Site 4: Check;
Site 5: Check;
Site 6: Check.
Requirement: Did the collector check the temperature of the specimen?;
Site 1: Check;
Site 2: Check;
Site 3: Check;
Site 4: Check;
Site 5: Fail;
Site 6: Check.
Requirement: Was the employee allowed to place the tamper-evident seals
from the CCF onto the specimen bottles?;
Site 1: Check;
Site 2: Check;
Site 3: Check;
Site 4: Check;
Site 5: Check;
Site 6: Check.
Requirement: Did the collector seal and date the specimen?;
Site 1: Check;
Site 2: Check;
Site 3: Check;
Site 4: Check;
Site 5: Check;
Site 6: Check.
Requirement: Did the collector have the employee initial the specimen
bottle seals after placing them on the bottles?;
Site 1: Fail;
Site 2: Check;
Site 3: Fail;
Site 4: Fail;
Site 5: Check;
Site 6: Check.
Requirement: Did unauthorized people have access to the collection
site?;
Site 1: Check;
Site 2: Check;
Site 3: Check;
Site 4: Check;
Site 5: Check;
Site 6: Check.
Requirement: Did the employee have access to the collection materials
or supplies?;
Site 1: Check;
Site 2: Check;
Site 3: Check;
Site 4: Check;
Site 5: Check;
Site 6: Check.
Requirement: Did the employee have access to items that could be used
to adulterate or dilute the specimen?;
Site 1: Fail;
Site 2: Fail;
Site 3: Fail;
Site 4: Check;
Site 5: Check;
Site 6: Fail.
Requirement: Was the employee under the supervision of the collector or
appropriate site personnel at all times?;
Site 1: Check;
Site 2: Check;
Site 3: Check;
Site 4: Check;
Site 5: Check;
Site 6: Check.
Requirement: Number of protocols failed;
Site 1: 8;
Site 2: 5;
Site 3: 6;
Site 4: 2;
Site 5: 2;
Site 6: 3.
Source: GAO.
[End of table]
New York/Northern New Jersey Metropolitan Area:
Table 5 provides our findings for the New York/Northern New Jersey
metropolitan area, which is the third area where we tested the 16 key
collection protocols.
Table 5: New York/Northern New Jersey Undercover Test Results:
Requirement: Did the collector require the employee to provide
appropriate identification?;
Site 1: Check;
Site 2: Check;
Site 3: Check;
Site 4: Check;
Site 5: Check;
Site 6: Check.
Requirement: Did the collector ask the employee to empty his/her
pockets and display items to ensure no items are present that could be
used to defeat the test?;
Site 1: Fail;
Site 2: Fail;
Site 3: Fail;
Site 4: Fail;
Site 5: Fail;
Site 6: Fail.
Requirement: Did the collector instruct the employee to wash his/her
hands under the collector's supervision?;
Site 1: Fail;
Site 2: Fail;
Site 3: Fail;
Site 4: Check;
Site 5: Check;
Site 6: Check.
Requirement: Did the collector direct the employee to provide a
specimen of at least 45 mL?;
Site 1: Check;
Site 2: Check;
Site 3: Fail;
Site 4: Check;
Site 5: Check;
Site 6: Check.
Requirement: Did the collector direct the employee to not flush the
toilet?;
Site 1: Check;
Site 2: Check;
Site 3: Check;
Site 4: Check;
Site 5: Check;
Site 6: Check.
Requirement: Did the collector direct the employee to return with the
specimen as soon as possible after voiding?;
Site 1: Check;
Site 2: Check;
Site 3: Fail;
Site 4: Check;
Site 5: Fail;
Site 6: Fail.
Requirement: Were all sources of water in the restroom secured?;
Site 1: Fail;
Site 2: Fail;
Site 3: Check;
Site 4: Fail;
Site 5: Check;
Site 6: Check.
Requirement: Was bluing agent placed in the toilet or was it secured
with tape?;
Site 1: Check;
Site 2: Check;
Site 3: Check;
Site 4: Check;
Site 5: Check;
Site 6: Check.
Requirement: Did the collector check the temperature of the specimen?;
Site 1: Fail;
Site 2: Check;
Site 3: Unknown;
Site 4: Check;
Site 5: Unknown;
Site 6: Check.
Requirement: Was the employee allowed to place the tamper-evident seals
from the CCF onto the specimen bottles?;
Site 1: Unknown;
Site 2: Check;
Site 3: Check;
Site 4: Check;
Site 5: Check;
Site 6: Check.
Requirement: Did the collector seal and date the specimen?;
Site 1: Check;
Site 2: Check;
Site 3: Check;
Site 4: Check;
Site 5: Check;
Site 6: Check.
Requirement: Did the collector have the employee initial the specimen
bottle seals after placing them on the bottles?;
Site 1: Check;
Site 2: Check;
Site 3: Fail;
Site 4: Check;
Site 5: Check;
Site 6: Check.
Requirement: Did unauthorized people have access to the collection
site?;
Site 1: Check;
Site 2: Check;
Site 3: Check;
Site 4: Check;
Site 5: Fail;
Site 6: Check.
Requirement: Did the employee have access to the collection materials
or supplies?;
Site 1: Fail;
Site 2: Check;
Site 3: Check;
Site 4: Check;
Site 5: Fail;
Site 6: Fail.
Requirement: Did the employee have access to items that could be used
to adulterate or dilute the specimen?;
Site 1: Fail;
Site 2: Fail;
Site 3: Check;
Site 4: Fail;
Site 5: Fail;
Site 6: Fail.
Requirement: Was the employee under the supervision of the collector or
appropriate site personnel at all times?;
Site 1: Check;
Site 2: Check;
Site 3: Check;
Site 4: Check;
Site 5: Fail;
Site 6: Fail.
Requirement: Number of protocols failed;
Site 1: 6;
Site 2: 4;
Site 3: 5;
Site 4: 3;
Site 5: 6;
Site 6: 5.
Source: GAO.
[End of table]
Dallas/Fort Worth Metropolitan Area Undercover Testing:
Table 6 provides our findings for the Dallas/Fort Worth metropolitan
area, which is the fourth area where we tested the 16 key collection
protocols.
Table 6: Dallas/Fort Worth Undercover Test Results:
Requirement: Did the collector require the employee to provide
appropriate identification?;
Site 1: Check;
Site 2: Check;
Site 3: Check;
Site 4: Check;
Site 5: Check;
Site 6: Check.
Requirement: Did the collector ask the employee to empty his/her
pockets and display items to ensure no items are present that could be
used to defeat the test?;
Site 1: Check;
Site 2: Check;
Site 3: Check;
Site 4: Fail;
Site 5: Check;
Site 6: Check.
Requirement: Did the collector instruct the employee to wash his/her
hands under the collector's supervision?;
Site 1: Check;
Site 2: Fail;
Site 3: Check;
Site 4: Fail;
Site 5: Check;
Site 6: Check.
Requirement: Did the collector direct the employee to provide a
specimen of at least 45 mL?;
Site 1: Check;
Site 2: Fail;
Site 3: Check;
Site 4: Check;
Site 5: Check;
Site 6: Check.
Requirement: Did the collector direct the employee to not flush the
toilet?;
Site 1: Check;
Site 2: Check;
Site 3: Check;
Site 4: Check;
Site 5: Check;
Site 6: Check.
Requirement: Did the collector direct the employee to return with the
specimen as soon as possible after voiding?;
Site 1: Check;
Site 2: Fail;
Site 3: Check;
Site 4: Check;
Site 5: Check;
Site 6: Check.
Requirement: Were all sources of water in the restroom secured?;
Site 1: Fail;
Site 2: Fail;
Site 3: Fail;
Site 4: Fail;
Site 5: Check;
Site 6: Fail.
Requirement: Was bluing agent placed in the toilet or was it secured
with tape?;
Site 1: Check;
Site 2: Check;
Site 3: Check;
Site 4: Check;
Site 5: Check;
Site 6: Check.
Requirement: Did the collector check the temperature of the specimen?;
Site 1: Unknown;
Site 2: Unknown;
Site 3: Check;
Site 4: Unknown;
Site 5: Check;
Site 6: Check.
Requirement: Was the employee allowed to place the tamper-evident seals
from the CCF onto the specimen bottles?;
Site 1: Check;
Site 2: Check;
Site 3: Check;
Site 4: Check;
Site 5: Check;
Site 6: Check.
Requirement: Did the collector seal and date the specimen?;
Site 1: Check;
Site 2: Check;
Site 3: Check;
Site 4: Check;
Site 5: Check;
Site 6: Check.
Requirement: Did the collector have the employee initial the specimen
bottle seals after placing them on the bottles?;
Site 1: Check;
Site 2: Check;
Site 3: Check;
Site 4: Check;
Site 5: Check;
Site 6: Check.
Requirement: Did unauthorized people have access to the collection
site?;
Site 1: Check;
Site 2: Check;
Site 3: Check;
Site 4: Check;
Site 5: Check;
Site 6: Check.
Requirement: Did the employee have access to the collection materials
or supplies?;
Site 1: Check;
Site 2: Check;
Site 3: Check;
Site 4: Check;
Site 5: Check;
Site 6: Check.
Requirement: Did the employee have access to items that could be used
to adulterate or dilute the specimen?;
Site 1: Fail;
Site 2: Fail;
Site 3: Fail;
Site 4: Fail;
Site 5: Check;
Site 6: Fail.
Requirement: Was the employee under the supervision of the collector or
appropriate site personnel at all times?;
Site 1: Check;
Site 2: Check;
Site 3: Check;
Site 4: Check;
Site 5: Check;
Site 6: Check.
Requirement: Number of protocols failed;
Site 1: 2;
Site 2: 5;
Site 3: 2;
Site 4: 4;
Site 5: 0;
Site 6: 2.
Source: GAO.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] 49 U.S.C. § 31306.
[2] According to the U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor
Statistics.
[3] GAO, Products to Defeat Drug Use Screening Tests Are Widely
Available, GAO-05-653T (Washington, D.C.: May 17, 2005).
[4] These regulations apply to those who operate commercial motor
vehicles in any state and are subject to commercial drivers' license
requirements under 49 CFR 382, Licencia Federal de Conductor (Mexico)
requirements, or the requirements of Canadian National Safety Code.
[5] 49 CFR Part 40.
[6] Post-accident drug tests must be conducted as soon as practicable,
but within 32 hours of the crash, while employees required to take a
random drug test must report immediately once he or she is notified.
[7] Urine Specimen Collection Guidelines for the U.S. Department of
Transportation Workplace.
[8] In the case of pre-employment, return-to-duty, or follow-up tests,
a negative result is required.
[9] A directly observed collection procedure is the same as a routine
collection with the additional requirement that an observer physically
watch the employee urinate into the collection container.
[10] DOT regulations require a split specimen, which entails splitting
the urine specimen into two vials. The collector pours the primary
specimen of at least 30 mL of urine in the first vial, and then pours
at least 15 mL in the second vial. The second vial is not tested unless
there is a positive result and it is needed to confirm the positive
result.
[11] Under P.L. 100-71, Section 503 (July 11, 1987).
[12] 49 CFR Part 40.
[13] Real ID Act of 2005, P.L. No. 109-13, div. B (May 11, 2005).
[14] GAO, Preliminary Information on Challenges to Ensure the Integrity
of Drug Testing Programs, GAO-08-220T (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 1, 2007).
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