Highway Emergency Relief
Reexamination Needed to Address Fiscal Imbalance and Long-term Sustainability Gao ID: GAO-07-245 February 23, 2007Since 1972, Congress has authorized $100 million a year for highway disaster recovery needs through the Federal Highway Administration's (FHWA) Emergency Relief (ER) program. Increasingly, the program's actual costs have exceeded this amount, and Congress has provided additional funding. Because of this fiscal imbalance between program funding and program needs, we reviewed ER under the Comptroller General's authority to determine the (1) total funding, distribution of funds among the states, and disaster events funded; (2) sources of funding provided and financial challenges facing the program; and (3) scope of activities eligible for funding and how the scope of eligible activities has changed in recent years. GAO's study is based on financial data, document analysis, stakeholder interviews, and site visits, among other methods.
During the 10-year period of 1997 to 2006, ER provided about $8 billion to states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, American territories, and federal agencies, a total of 56 states and other jurisdictions. About 70 percent of these funds has gone to 5 states--California, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, and New York--that have been especially affected by major disaster events, such as Hurricane Katrina. Since 1990, 86 percent of the ER program has been funded through supplemental appropriations as the program's annual demands have exceeded the $100 million annual authorization. Even excluding extraordinary disasters, those exceeding $100 million in eligible damage per event, the program still needed $271 million per year for smaller eligible events. Meanwhile, the program has been authorized at a constant $100 million level since 1972, resulting in the current authorization being worth about one-fourth the authorization level of 1972. Until Hurricane Katrina, Congress funded extraordinary disasters through the Highway Trust Fund, but with Trust Fund balances dwindling, in 2005, Congress designated the General Fund as the source of future ER supplemental funding. But the nation faces a pending fiscal crisis, raising concerns about future use of the General Fund and financial sustainability of the ER program. Despite funding concerns, FHWA does not routinely recapture unused program funds by reviewing the program's state balances to identify potentially unneeded funds. GAO also identified $62 million in potentially unneeded statutory allocations from past disasters that could be recaptured. Activities eligible for ER funding include the repair or reconstruction of highways and roads that are supported by the Federal-aid Highway program, and of roads on federal lands that have suffered serious damage from natural disasters or catastrophic failures due to external causes. ER funds are not intended to replace other federal-aid, state, or local funds to increase capacity, correct nondisaster-related deficiencies, or make other improvements. However, contributing to future financial sustainability concerns is the fact that the scope of eligible activities funded by the ER program has expanded in recent years with congressional or FHWA waivers of eligibility criteria or changes in definitions. As a result, some projects have been funded that go beyond repairing or restoring highways to predisaster conditions--such as the $441 million Devil's Slide project and $811 million I-880 project in California--projects that grew in scope and cost to address environmental and community concerns. Also, Congress and FHWA have expanded eligibility to allow additional types of work, such as a gradual flooding of a lake basin, to be funded. Congress has also directed that in some cases the program fully fund projects rather than requiring a state match. Finally, varying interpretations of what constitutes a damage site have led to inconsistencies across states in FHWA's application of ER eligibility standards.
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Director: Team: Phone:GAO-07-245, Highway Emergency Relief: Reexamination Needed to Address Fiscal Imbalance and Long-term Sustainability
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Report to Congressional Addressees:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
February 2007:
Highway Emergency Relief:
Reexamination Needed to Address Fiscal Imbalance and Long-term
Sustainability:
GAO-07-245:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-07-245, a report to congressional addressees
Why GAO Did This Study:
Since 1972, Congress has authorized $100 million a year for highway
disaster recovery needs through the Federal Highway Administration‘s
(FHWA) Emergency Relief (ER) program. Increasingly, the program‘s
actual costs have exceeded this amount, and Congress has provided
additional funding. Because of this fiscal imbalance between program
funding and program needs, we reviewed ER under the Comptroller
General‘s authority to determine the (1) total funding, distribution of
funds among the states, and disaster events funded; (2) sources of
funding provided and financial challenges facing the program; and (3)
scope of activities eligible for funding and how the scope of eligible
activities has changed in recent years. GAO‘s study is based on
financial data, document analysis, stakeholder interviews, and site
visits, among other methods.
What GAO Found:
During the 10-year period of 1997 to 2006, ER provided about $8 billion
to states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, American territories,
and federal agencies, a total of 56 states and other jurisdictions.
About 70 percent of these funds has gone to 5 states”California,
Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, and New York”that have been especially
affected by major disaster events, such as Hurricane Katrina.
Since 1990, 86 percent of the ER program has been funded through
supplemental appropriations as the program‘s annual demands have
exceeded the $100 million annual authorization. Even excluding
extraordinary disasters, those exceeding $100 million in eligible
damage per event, the program still needed $271 million per year for
smaller eligible events. Meanwhile, the program has been authorized at
a constant $100 million level since 1972, resulting in the current
authorization being worth about one-fourth the authorization level of
1972. Until Hurricane Katrina, Congress funded extraordinary disasters
through the Highway Trust Fund, but with Trust Fund balances dwindling,
in 2005, Congress designated the General Fund as the source of future
ER supplemental funding. But the nation faces a pending fiscal crisis,
raising concerns about future use of the General Fund and financial
sustainability of the ER program. Despite funding concerns, FHWA does
not routinely recapture unused program funds by reviewing the program‘s
state balances to identify potentially unneeded funds. GAO also
identified $62 million in potentially unneeded statutory allocations
from past disasters that could be recaptured.
Activities eligible for ER funding include the repair or reconstruction
of highways and roads that are supported by the Federal-aid Highway
program, and of roads on federal lands that have suffered serious
damage from natural disasters or catastrophic failures due to external
causes. ER funds are not intended to replace other federal-aid, state,
or local funds to increase capacity, correct nondisaster-related
deficiencies, or make other improvements. However, contributing to
future financial sustainability concerns is the fact that the scope of
eligible activities funded by the ER program has expanded in recent
years with congressional or FHWA waivers of eligibility criteria or
changes in definitions. As a result, some projects have been funded
that go beyond repairing or restoring highways to predisaster
conditions”such as the $441 million Devil‘s Slide project and $811
million I-880 project in California”projects that grew in scope and
cost to address environmental and community concerns. Also, Congress
and FHWA have expanded eligibility to allow additional types of work,
such as a gradual flooding of a lake basin, to be funded. Congress has
also directed that in some cases the program fully fund projects rather
than requiring a state match. Finally, varying interpretations of what
constitutes a damage site have led to inconsistencies across states in
FHWA‘s application of ER eligibility standards.
What GAO Recommends:
To place the ER program on a sustainable financial footing, Congress
should reexamine the level and source of funds for future demands and
consider tightening eligibility standards. FHWA should, within its
authority, tighten eligibility standards, recapture unused funds, and
seek rescission of unneeded funds. DOT generally agreed with the facts
presented and took no position on our recommendations.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-245].
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Kate Siggerud at (202)
512-2834 or siggerudk@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Extraordinary Events Determine Which States Receive Most Emergency
Relief Allocations:
Annual Emergency Relief Authorizations Do Not Reflect Total Program
Demands:
Changing Interpretations of Program Criteria and Congressional
Involvement Have Resulted in Expanded Emergency Relief Eligibility:
Conclusions:
Matters for Congressional Consideration:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Appendix II: Emergency Relief Allocations, by State, Fiscal Years 1997
through 2006:
Appendix III: Tables of Allocations by Event from Fiscal Years 1998
through 2006:
Appendix IV: Summary of Emergency Relief Program Supplemental
Appropriations:
Appendix V: Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: Annual State Allocations for Ordinary and Extraordinary
Events, 1998 to 2006:
Table 2: Allocations by Event for 1998:
Table 3: Allocations by Event for 1999:
Table 4: Allocations by Event for 2000:
Table 5: Allocations by Event for 2001:
Table 6: Allocations by Event for 2002:
Table 7: Allocations by Event for 2003:
Table 8: Allocations by Event for 2004:
Table 9: Allocations by Event for 2005:
Table 10: Allocations by Event for 2006:
Table 11: Summary Table of Annual Allocations:
Figures:
Figure 1: Total Emergency Relief Allocations, Fiscal Years 1997 through
2006:
Figure 2: Emergency Relief Program Events with Allocations of $100
Million or Greater Fiscal Years 1998 through 2006:
Figure 3: Annual Allocations for Ordinary and Extraordinary Events,
Fiscal Years 1998 through 2006:
Figure 4: Emergency Relief Annual Authorizations (Contract Authority),
Fiscal Year 1972 through 2005:
Figure 5: Total Emergency Relief Funding, Fiscal Years 1990 through
2006:
Figure 6: Total Emergency Relief Program Funding, Fiscal Years 1990
through 2006:
Figure 7: Rockslide at Devil's Slide, 1998:
Figure 8: Damage to U.S. 90 Biloxi Bay Bridge:
Figure 9: Map of Devils Lake, North Dakota, Expansion:
Abbreviations:
CBO: Congressional Budget Office:
CRS: Congressional Research Service:
DHS: Department of Homeland Security:
DOT: Department of Transportation:
EA: environmental assessment:
EIS: environmental impact statement:
ER: Emergency Relief:
FEMA: Federal Emergency Management Agency:
FHWA: Federal Highway Administration:
FMIS: Fiscal Management Information System:
GDP: gross domestic product:
NEPA: National Environmental Policy Act:
SAFETEA-LU: Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation
Equity Act: A Legacy for Users:
S.R.: State Route:
STAA: Surface Transportation Assistance Act:
TEA-21: Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
February 23, 2007:
Congressional Addressees:
Natural disasters can claim thousands of lives, cost billions of
dollars, cross state lines, and overwhelm the capacity of state and
local governments to respond and recover. Consequently, there is a
continuing need for a federal role in responding to and recovering from
natural disasters, including those affecting the nation's highway
system. The Federal Highway Administration's (FHWA) Emergency Relief
program provides funding for states to repair or reconstruct federal-
aid highways and roads on federal lands that have been damaged or
destroyed by natural disasters or catastrophic failures from an
external source.[Footnote 1] In addition, the program provides
emergency assistance to other federal agencies--such as the Bureau of
Land Management in the Department of the Interior--for damage to
roadways owned by the federal government. FHWA administers the program
through its 52 division offices located in each state, the District of
Columbia, and Puerto Rico.
The Emergency Relief program has been funded through the Highway Trust
Fund since the fund was created in 1956. The fund--which is financed
through motor fuel taxes and other user fees--has provided $100 million
annually in contract authority to the program each year since
1972.[Footnote 2] For many years the fund held substantial surplus
balances, but those balances are steadily declining, and current
estimates show that the Highway Trust Fund could have a negative
balance as early as 2009. Such a development would adversely affect not
only the Emergency Relief program, but also the broader Federal-aid
Highway program, which provides over $30 billion annually to state and
local governments to support the 1 million miles of federal-aid roads
and highways, including the 160,000-mile National Highway System, of
which the Interstate Highway System is a part. To address concerns
about the future solvency of the Highway Trust Fund, Congress has
created the National Surface Transportation Policy and Revenue
Commission. The commission is examining alternatives to replace or
supplement the motor fuel taxes as the principal revenue source to
support the Highway Trust Fund, and it plans on reporting in July 2007.
Disasters may cost FHWA significantly more than Congress provides
annually. When a series of hurricanes devastated the southeastern
United States in 2005, Congress responded by providing more than $2.7
billion in supplemental appropriations to the Emergency Relief program.
In past years supplemental appropriations were drawn from the Highway
Trust Fund, but given the financial condition of the fund, in August
2005 Congress passed the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient
Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU) authorizing
additional necessary funding for the Emergency Relief program to come
from the General Fund, in excess of the permanent $100 million that
comes from the Highway Trust Fund.[Footnote 3] Congress provided the
2005 supplemental appropriations for the Gulf hurricanes from the
General Fund. However, looking forward, the nation faces a long-term
funding crisis. As we have reported, this pending fiscal crisis is
affecting our economy and quality of life, and requires a fundamental
reexamination of all federal programs, to assess the relevance and
purpose of the federal role and the effectiveness of federal programs.
The reexamination should raise questions such as whether a federal role
is still needed, whether the current mission is fully consistent with
the initial or updated statutory mission, or whether significant
"mission creep" has occurred. It should also assess whether programs
encourage efficient and cost-effective decision making from state and
local governments. Finally, in light of the pending fiscal crisis, a
reexamination should ask whether a program is affordable and
financially sustainable over the long term, given known cost trends,
risks, and future fiscal imbalances.
We have prepared this report under the Comptroller General's authority
to conduct evaluations on his own initiative as part of a continued
effort to assist Congress in reviewing federal activities.
Specifically, we reviewed (1) the total amount of funding allocated to
the states in recent years for emergency relief, how this allocated
funding was distributed among the states, and the events for which
funding was allocated; (2) sources of funding used to finance these
Emergency Relief allocations and the financial challenges facing the
program; and (3) the scope of activities eligible for funding and how
the scope of eligible activities has changed in recent years.
To review the amounts of Emergency Relief funding allocated to states
in recent years, we obtained data from the FHWA Office of
Infrastructure and the FHWA Financial Management Division and from
Emergency Relief program officials. We performed a limited data
reliability assessment of the financial data and found them
sufficiently reliable for our purposes. However, FHWA's Fiscal
Management Information System's (FMIS) allocation data are only
available cumulatively since program inception or for the last 10 years
and do not provide a simple way to calculate total obligations by
event. Therefore, we chose to use program allocations, rather than
obligations, to document funding. To review the sources of funding used
to finance Emergency Relief allocations, we reviewed program
legislative history to identify annual authorizations and supplemental
appropriations. We judgmentally defined disasters needing repairs
costing over $100 million as "extraordinary events" because each of
them exceeded the Emergency Relief program's $100 million per state
annual allocation limit and the program's $100 million annual program
authorization. To determine how and to what extent program eligibility
has changed in recent years, we reviewed program guidance and relevant
legislation and interviewed FHWA headquarters Emergency Relief program
and Federal Lands Highway Division officials. We also selected five
states to visit (California, Florida, Mississippi, North Dakota, and
Ohio) based on factors such as the amount of their allocations,
occurrence of recent disasters eligible for the program, presence of
large Emergency Relief projects, and geographical dispersion. During
these visits we interviewed FHWA division office and state department
of transportation officials, obtained information on the program
oversight, application of program criteria, and the approval of
projects. We performed our work from May 2006 to December 2006 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Appendix I provides a more detailed description of our scope and
methodology.
Results in Brief:
From fiscal years 1997 through 2006, FHWA has allocated over $8 billion
to states through the Emergency Relief program. While 56 states and
other jurisdictions received funds during this time, FHWA allocated 70
percent of this total to 5 states: California, Florida, Louisiana,
Mississippi, and New York. This concentration of allocated funds is
mainly a result of specific extraordinary disasters costing in excess
of $100 million affecting these states, such as Hurricane Katrina in
2005. From 1998 through 2006--the period for which FHWA has data on
individual disaster events--large, extraordinary events accounted for
nearly two-thirds of the funding allocated to the states for emergency
highway repairs--about $4.1 billion of the $6.6 billion total
allocated. Numerous smaller events such as floods, landslides, and
earthquakes costing less than $100 million, have resulted in about $2.4
billion of the $6.6 billion allocated to states during this time.
Since 1990, 86 percent of the Emergency Relief program has been funded
by supplemental appropriations because demand for the program has far
exceeded the $100 million in annual contract authority. Demand has
exceeded the $100 million annual authorization in eight of nine years
from 1998 through 2006, resulting in a long-term fiscal imbalance
between available funds and eligible projects. Even if the program had
only funded smaller, ordinary events--those needing under $100 million
in funding--the $100 million annual authorization would still have
fallen far short of meeting the $271 million average annual funding
need for repairing the damaged roads from 1998 through 2006.[Footnote
4] In part, these shortfalls are due to the fact that the program has
been funded at a constant $100 million level since 1972. As a result,
current real funding is worth about one-fourth the 1972 level. Since
1990, Congress has responded to the additional funding demands by
providing supplemental appropriations. However, because Congress has
not always appropriated supplements to the Emergency Relief program on
an annual basis, and because demand for funds has outstripped funding,
backlogs for reimbursements---reaching $740 million in 2004--have
emerged. Reimbursement backlogs can tie up available state highway
dollars because states often use other highway dollars to pay for
Emergency Relief projects while awaiting reimbursement. As a result,
these backlogs may also affect the timely construction and repair of
road facilities, particularly in states with small highway budgets.
Given the expected demands of future disasters, these backlogs and
resulting fiscal imbalance, along with the need for supplemental
funding, are likely to continue. Until Hurricane Katrina, Congress
provided supplemental funding through the Highway Trust Fund, but Trust
Fund balances are projected to decline steadily from 2006 through 2011.
In 2005 Congress passed SAFETEA-LU, limiting the Highway Trust Fund
portion of the Emergency Relief program to $100 million and authorizing
such sums as may be needed above the $100 million from the General
Fund. However, the nation faces a more general long-term fiscal crisis,
making the use of general funds for the Emergency Relief program
problematic, raising significant questions about the long-term
sustainability of the program. Finally, despite the program's fiscal
imbalance and the depletion of the Highway Trust Fund, FHWA is not
recapturing unused program funds and reallocating them to states with
immediate program needs, as stated in the Emergency Relief Manual. FHWA
does not annually review the program's existing obligated and
unobligated balances to identify potentially unneeded funds--we
estimate the balance of inactive obligated funds to be close to $158
million. We also identified potentially unneeded allocations from
specific past disasters that could be recaptured for the Highway Trust
Fund, including $62 million originally appropriated for California
earthquakes that took place in 1989 and 1994. By law these funds are
dedicated to projects related to the earthquakes and therefore need
congressional action to be reallocated. However, these inactive funds
and balances of past allocations are not sufficient to place the
program on a sound financial footing.
Contributing to the fiscal imbalance and concerns about long-term
sustainability of the program have been the gradual expansion of
eligibility criteria and congressional action to increase funding for
certain projects or disasters above what the program would ordinarily
provide. Congress established the Emergency Relief program to fund the
repair or reconstruction of federal-aid highways and roads on federal
lands that have suffered serious damage as a result of natural
disasters or catastrophic failures due to external causes. The typical
project accomplished through the Emergency Relief program is repair or
restoration of a highway to predisaster conditions. Emergency Relief
funds are not intended to replace other federal-aid, state, or local
funds to increase capacity, correct nondisaster-related deficiencies,
or make other improvements. Yet we identified several projects funded
by the Emergency Relief program that demonstrate the gradual expansion
of eligibility criteria or congressional direction to increase program
funding. For example:
* The program has funded several large projects that go beyond
restoration--projects with scope and costs that have grown as a result
of environmental and community concerns, such as the $811 million
Cypress Viaduct and the $441 million Devil's Slide project in
California, both of which involve the relocation of the highway.
* Congress has sometimes directed that the Emergency Relief program
provide funding for replacement projects beyond the normal federal cost
share for federal-aid highway projects, or beyond what FHWA would have
funded to repair the damaged facility. For example, Congress funded the
$245 million Escambia Bay Bridge project in Florida, which was replaced
rather than repaired, as was possible, and Congress funded the project
at the replacement cost rather than the repair cost. In addition,
Congress and FHWA have expanded the definition of eligible disasters
and added to the types of work that can be funded under the program to
allow a gradual and predictable basin flooding event in North Dakota to
be eligible for Emergency Relief funds.
* For certain disasters, Congress has waived the requirement for states
to provide a share of the funding for Emergency Relief projects, or it
has waived the program limit on the amount of funding that could be
provided to any one state.
Also, FHWA has inconsistently applied the minimum eligibility threshold
defined in its Emergency Relief Manual. Specifically, while FHWA has a
criterion of $5,000 damage per site to meet the minimum eligibility
threshold, we found that different FHWA offices had different
interpretations of what constituted a site. For example, some FHWA
offices designated entire counties as sites, while others did not. Thus
damage sites that were eligible for Emergency Relief in one state may
have not been eligible in another, potentially affecting whether or not
the state qualified for Emergency Relief program funding, as well as
the cost to the program.
We are suggesting that Congress consider the expected future demands on
the program and reexamine the appropriate level and sources of funding-
-including whether to increase the $100 million annual authorized
funding and whether the Highway Trust Fund, the General Fund, or some
combination would allow the program to accomplish its purpose in a
fiscally sustainable manner. Congress should also consider tightening
the eligibility criteria for Emergency Relief funding, either through
amending the purpose of the Emergency Relief program or by directing
FHWA to revise its program regulations. Revised criteria could include
limitations on the use of Emergency Relief funds to fully finance
projects with scope and costs that have grown as a result of
environmental and community concerns.
We are also recommending that the Secretary of Transportation direct
FHWA to, within the scope of its authority, revise its emergency relief
regulations to tighten the eligibility criteria for Emergency Relief
funding. Revised criteria could include limitations on the use of
Emergency Relief funds to fully finance projects with scope and costs
that have grown as a result of environmental and community concerns.
FHWA should also clarify its Emergency Relief Manual to better define a
site and whether under certain circumstances variations from the basic
definition are permitted. Finally, FHWA should identify unexpended
obligated and unobligated Emergency Relief funds that will not be
needed for projects, withdraw the unneeded amounts, and determine if
they are needed for other eligible projects. In the event these funds
are not needed for other eligible projects, FHWA should identify these
funds to Congress for rescission or to offset future appropriations.
FHWA also should identify for rescission unexpended funds that have
been directed to specific disasters when those funds are no longer
needed. In commenting on a draft of this report, the Department of
Transportation (DOT) generally agreed with the facts presented but took
no position on our recommendations. DOT also provided technical
comments, which we incorporated into this report as appropriate.
Background:
Congress authorized the Emergency Relief program in Title 23, United
States Code, Section 125, to provide for the repair or reconstruction
of federal-aid highways and roads on federal lands that have sustained
serious damage resulting from natural disasters or catastrophic
failures from an external cause. Natural disasters such as floods,
hurricanes, earthquakes, tornadoes, tsunamis, severe storms, or
landslides all potentially qualify under the program. Catastrophic
failure refers to the sudden and complete failure of a major element or
segment of the highway system that causes a disastrous impact on
transportation. This is a long-established federal function--Congress
has provided funds for this purpose since at least 1928, and an
Emergency Relief program has existed since 1956.
The program supplements the resources of states and federal agencies to
help pay for unusually heavy expenses that result from extraordinary
conditions. The program provides states, and Puerto Rico, the District
of Columbia, and territories, with funding above and beyond their
regular federal-aid highway funding.[Footnote 5] FHWA's division
offices in each state administer the program, and states implement the
projects. The division offices process state highway agencies'
applications for funding and make decisions on the eligibility of
specific projects. Regulations currently define eligible disasters as
those where the cost of damage would exceed $700,000 in program
assistance in any state for a given disaster. The $700,000 threshold
includes the damage cost for all damage sites resulting from the
disaster. According to FHWA guidance, each prospective damage site must
have at least $5,000 of repair costs to qualify for funding---a
threshold intended to distinguish emergency relief work from
maintenance.
By law, FHWA can provide a state with up to $100 million in Emergency
Relief funding for each natural disaster found eligible for
funding.[Footnote 6] However, Congress has passed special legislation
lifting this cap for specific disasters. The Emergency Relief program
is currently authorized at $100 million annually out of the Highway
Trust Fund, and FHWA allocates these funds to states based on the
states' proportion of the total costs of all eligible projects. For
example, if a state had 10 percent of the total estimated reimbursable
costs for all Emergency Relief projects nationwide, that state would
receive 10 percent of the available Emergency Relief funds. As with
other FHWA programs, funding is provided to the states on a
reimbursable basis. If Emergency Relief funds are not available, states
may use other appropriate federal-aid program funds to initially pay
for projects while awaiting reimbursement from the Emergency Relief
program.
The program's regulations make a distinction between emergency and
permanent repairs. Emergency repairs are to quickly restore essential
highway traffic service and protect remaining facilities, and include
such things as debris removal, construction of detours, regrading, and
temporary structures. Permanent repairs restore seriously damaged
highway facilities to predisaster conditions. In some instances, such
as the destruction of a bridge, the complete replacement of the
facility may be needed. In these cases the facility would be rebuilt to
current design standards. By statute, the Emergency Relief program may
fund up to 100 percent of emergency repair project costs within the
first 180 days following the disaster.[Footnote 7] The program funds
permanent repair projects, and emergency repair project costs after the
first 180 days, at the percentage normally provided for work on that
type of federal-aid highway. For example, the federal share for
interstate highway projects is 90 percent of the cost, and the federal
share for most other federal projects is 80 percent.
Emergency Relief program regulations state that the program is not
intended to fund the correction of preexisting nondisaster-related
deficiencies. Additionally, the program is not intended to pay for
"betterments" that change the function or character of the highway
facility, such as expanding the capacity of roads. However, betterments
are eligible for program funding if they pass a benefit-cost test that
weighs their cost against the prospective cost to the Emergency Relief
program for future repairs. Additionally, where it is not feasible to
repair or replace an existing highway facility at its existing
location, an alternative selected through the National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA)[Footnote 8] process, if comparable to the destroyed
facility, is eligible for Emergency Relief funding. Except when
betterments are justified, or when a relocation results from the NEPA
process, program regulations state the cost of a project eligible for
Emergency Relief may not exceed the cost of repair or reconstruction of
a comparable facility.
In addition to providing funds to the states, the Emergency Relief
program also provides funding for the repair of roads on federal lands
through the Emergency Relief for Federally-Owned Roads program. This
program is intended for unusually heavy expenses associated with the
repair and reconstruction of federal roads and bridges seriously
damaged by a natural disaster or a catastrophic failure. FHWA's Federal
Lands Highway Division maintains, through interagency agreements,
oversight of the Emergency Relief funds for projects administered by
various federal agencies, including the Department of Defense, Army
Corps of Engineers, U.S. Forest Service, National Park Service, Fish
and Wildlife Service, Bureau of Reclamation, Bureau of Land Management,
and Bureau of Indian Affairs. The program may fund 100 percent of the
cost of repairs to federal roads.
FHWA's Emergency Relief program is one of a number of federal programs
and activities that provide major disaster and emergency assistance to
states and local governments. The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief
and Emergency Assistance Act primarily establishes the programs and
processes for the federal government to provide major disaster and
emergency assistance--upon a governor's request, the President can
declare an "emergency" or a "major disaster" under the Stafford Act,
triggering various emergency response activities such as debris
removal, temporary housing assistance, and the distribution of
medicine, food, and other consumables. The Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA), an agency of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS),
is the agency responsible for administering the Stafford Act. As part
of its responsibilities, FEMA provides funds to state and local
governments to repair and replace roads damaged as a result of
disasters that are not on the federal-aid highway system.[Footnote 9]
Funding for FEMA disaster relief is drawn from the General Fund of the
Treasury.
Extraordinary Events Determine Which States Receive Most Emergency
Relief Allocations:
During the 10-year period 1997 through 2006, FHWA has allocated over $8
billion to the states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, U.S.
territories, and other federal agencies to repair or replace highway
facilities damaged by natural or man-made events. Of this total, 70
percent has gone to five especially hard-hit states that have
experienced extraordinary or multiple disasters--California, Florida,
Louisiana, Mississippi, and New York. For the 9-year period from 1998
through 2006, the time frame for which FHWA has data on individual
disaster events, these very large events account for most of the
financial demands on the program, a total of about $4.1 billion of the
$6.6 billion allocated in that time frame. In addition, the large
number of smaller events that occurred each year accounted for about
$2.4 billion in demands since 1998.
States Experiencing Extraordinary Disasters Received Majority of
Emergency Relief Funds:
For some states that have experienced major or repeated disasters, the
Emergency Relief program has provided a significant amount of funding.
This funding has been generally concentrated in a small number of
states. During the 10-year period 1997 through 2006, FHWA has allocated
over $8 billion to states. (See app. II for a detailed list of state
Emergency Relief allocations). Of this amount, about 70 percent of all
Emergency Relief allocations went to five states--California (about
$1.4 billion, or 18 percent), Florida (about $1.6 billion, or 20
percent), Louisiana (about $1.2 billion, or 15 percent), Mississippi
(about $1 billion, or 13 percent) and New York (about $352 million, or
4 percent). (See fig. 1.) Since the beginning of the program, all 50
states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and U.S. territories all
have received some FHWA Emergency Relief funds.
Figure 1: Total Emergency Relief Allocations, Fiscal Years 1997 through
2006:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of FHWA data.
[End of figure]
The Emergency Relief Program Has Experienced Increased Demand due to
Extraordinary Events.
The majority of Emergency Relief program funding for the 9-year period
of 1998 through 2006, the time frame for which FHWA had data on
individual disaster events, has gone to 5 states as a result of series
of extraordinary disasters including the World Trade Center terrorist
attacks, Florida's 2004 hurricanes, and Hurricanes Katrina and Rita,
among others. These very large events have each totaled from over $100
million to over $1 billion, as figure 2 illustrates.
Figure 2: Emergency Relief Program Events with Allocations of $100
Million or Greater Fiscal Years 1998 through 2006:
[See PDF for image]
Sources: FHWA, Map Resources (map), and GAO.
[End of figure]
These very large disasters can be considered extraordinary events in
the context of the Emergency Relief program because each of them
exceeded the $100 million annual program authorization. Also,
individual events exceeding $100 million in Emergency Relief
allocations to a state require congressional legislation that exempts
the state from the statutory limitation that no state may receive more
than $100 million in Emergency Relief funds in 1 year for any single
event.
Over time, these individual extraordinary disasters have placed greater
financial demands on the Emergency Relief program than the numerous
smaller eligible events that occur each year. During the 9-year period
1998 through 2006 extraordinary events resulted in about $4.14 billion
in allocations to states (see table 1). Over the same period, smaller
events, those requiring less than $100 million, required about $2.44
billion in emergency relief funding, or an average of $271 million per
year. The allocations needed for smaller events may be thought of as a
baseline cost for the program, the amount that was needed assuming no
extraordinary event occurred. Because the program's annual
authorization was set at $100 million during this period, the annual
funding covered about 37 percent of what may be considered the baseline
costs of the program during this period.
Table 1: Annual State Allocations for Ordinary and Extraordinary
Events, 1998 to 2006:
Year: 1998;
Number of ordinary events: 43;
Total ordinary event allocations: $346,003,591;
Number of extraordinary events: 0;
Total extraordinary event allocations: 0;
Total number of events: 43;
Total allocations: $346,003,591.
Year: 1999;
Number of ordinary events: 31;
Total ordinary event allocations: 218,618,630;
Number of extraordinary events: 0;
Total extraordinary event allocations: 0;
Total number of events: 31;
Total allocations: 218,618,630.
Year: 2000;
Number of ordinary events: 13;
Total ordinary event allocations: 92,085,847;
Number of extraordinary events: 0;
Total extraordinary event allocations: 0;
Total number of events: 13;
Total allocations: 92,085,847.
Year: 2001;
Number of ordinary events: 26;
Total ordinary event allocations: 271,825,473;
Number of extraordinary events: 1;
Total extraordinary event allocations: $242,000,000;
Total number of events: 26;
Total allocations: 513,825,473.
Year: 2002;
Number of ordinary events: 22;
Total ordinary event allocations: 127,918,797;
Number of extraordinary events: 0;
Total extraordinary event allocations: 0;
Total number of events: 22;
Total allocations: 127,918,797.
Year: 2003;
Number of ordinary events: 31;
Total ordinary event allocations: 264,539,510;
Number of extraordinary events: 0;
Total extraordinary event allocations: 0;
Total number of events: 31;
Total allocations: 264,539,510.
Year: 2004;
Number of ordinary events: 43;
Total ordinary event allocations: 502,500,740;
Number of extraordinary events: 4;
Total extraordinary event allocations: 928,376,031;
Total number of events: 47;
Total allocations: 1,430,876,771.
Year: 2005;
Number of ordinary events: 33;
Total ordinary event allocations: 418,350,335;
Number of extraordinary events: 4;
Total extraordinary event allocations: 2,487,926,621;
Total number of events: 37;
Total allocations: 2,906,276,956.
Year: 2006;
Number of ordinary events: 23;
Total ordinary event allocations: 197,092,432;
Number of extraordinary events: 1;
Total extraordinary event allocations: 478,000,000;
Total number of events: 24;
Total allocations: 775,092,432.
Total;
Number of ordinary events: 264;
Total ordinary event allocations: $2,437,439,355;
Number of extraordinary events: 10;
Total extraordinary event allocations: $4,136,302,652;
Total number of events: 274;
Total allocations: $6,573,742,007.
Average;
Number of ordinary events: 29;
Total ordinary event allocations: $270,826,595;
Number of extraordinary events: 1;
Total extraordinary event allocations: $459,589,183;
Total number of events: 30;
Total allocations: $730,415,779.
Source: FHWA.
[End of table]
Finally, another measure of the program's funding need is the average
allocation per individual disaster event. Under FHWA's classification,
events are defined as disasters causing a federal share of at least
$700,000 damage to a state, with each state counted separately. Thus,
Hurricane Katrina, which reached this level of damage for four states,
counts as four events for the program, one each for Alabama, Florida,
Louisiana, and Mississippi. From 1998 through 2006, the number of
events per year varied from 13 to 47, and the median allocation per
event was about $3.7 million.[Footnote 10] Appendix III provides a
detailed list of event allocations from fiscal years 1998 through 2006.
Annual Emergency Relief Authorizations Do Not Reflect Total Program
Demands:
In recent years, annual demands on the Emergency Relief program have
exceeded the $100 million annual authorization, resulting in a long-
term fiscal imbalance and reliance on supplemental appropriations. More
specifically, on average the program's needed allocations for ordinary
events--disaster events requiring under $100 million in federal
funding--are 2.7 times the annual authorization. One reason for this
funding shortfall is the program's static funding level, which has
remained the same since 1972. Since 1990, the program has often relied
on supplemental appropriations to make up for the funding shortfall,
but because these supplemental funds are not provided on an annual
basis, the program has experienced a fiscal imbalance, resulting in
funding reimbursement backlogs that have placed a burden on some
states. Furthermore, demands for Emergency Relief program funding may
place a burden on the Highway Trust Fund, unless alternative funding is
used. Despite the program's long-term fiscal imbalance and a depleting
Highway Trust Fund, FHWA is not recapturing unused program funds.
The Program's Annual Demands Have Exceeded Annual Authorizations:
FHWA has allocated over $8 billion between fiscal years 1997 and 2006
to meet annual demand for the Emergency Relief program. This is an
average of over $800 million a year for all events, which is
significantly more than the program's $100 million annual
authorization. Funding needs for extraordinary events--those events
needing more than $100 million in funding--have averaged about $460
million annually since 1998, the earliest year for which FHWA has data
on individual disaster events. Furthermore, annual demand for ordinary
events--those events totaling less than $100 million--is also more than
the $100 million annual authorization. As mentioned earlier, for fiscal
years 1998 through 2006 the average annual funding need for ordinary
events was $271 million (see fig. 3). This has resulted in an annual
deficit between program demands and program funding.
Figure 3: Annual Allocations for Ordinary and Extraordinary Events,
Fiscal Years 1998 through 2006:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of FHWA data.
[End of figure]
The Program's Annual Authorization Has Remained Level for More than 30
Years:
One reason for the shortfall between program funding and demand is the
program's static annual authorization. The Emergency Relief program has
been funded with an annual authorization of $100 million through
contract authority from the Highway Trust Fund, with a $100 million per
event obligation limit imposed since 1972. However, after adjusting for
inflation, the value of the annual authorization has decreased
significantly over time, resulting in program demands exceeding annual
program funding. The fiscal year 2005 authorization of $100 million is
the equivalent of $26.4 million in 1972 dollars (see fig. 4). Stated
differently, the $100 million annual authorization initiated in 1972
would need to be increased to over $378 million to have the same value
in real (2005) dollars. Funding at the $378 million level would be more
than sufficient to pay for the average annual cost of ordinary events
from fiscal years 1998 through 2006--about $271 million in real (2005)
dollars.
Figure 4: Emergency Relief Annual Authorizations (Contract Authority),
Fiscal Year 1972 through 2005:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of annual authorizations.
[End of figure]
Emergency Relief Program Has Primarily Relied on Supplemental
Appropriations:
Since 1990, the Emergency Relief program has frequently relied on
supplemental appropriations to make up for the fiscal imbalance created
by a static authorization coupled with additional program demand from
extraordinary events (see fig. 5). In total, from fiscal years 1990
through 2006, Congress provided about $12.3 billion for the Emergency
Relief program when including both annual authorizations and
supplemental appropriations. As a result, a large majority of the
funds--$10.6 billion, or 86 percent of the total during this period--
have come through supplemental appropriations.
Figure 5: Total Emergency Relief Funding, Fiscal Years 1990 through
2006:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of Emergency Relief Program annual authorizations
and supplemental appropriations.
[End of figure]
There has been a consistent shortfall between the static $100 million
annual authorization and the actual amounts needed for the Emergency
Relief program (see fig. 6). As a result, between fiscal years 1990 and
2006, Congress passed supplemental appropriations for the Emergency
Relief program 15 times. Historically the supplemental funds were drawn
from the Highway Trust Fund which at the time had accumulated large
balances. However, the Highway Trust Fund authorization is limited to
$100 million, and under SAFETEA-LU, additional supplemental funds are
to be appropriated from the General Fund. The fiscal year 2006
Emergency Relief program supplemental appropriations were taken from
the General Fund as the Highway Trust Fund balances have diminished.
Appendix IV provides a detailed list of supplemental appropriations
from fiscal year 1990 through 2006.
Figure 6: Total Emergency Relief Program Funding, Fiscal Years 1990
through 2006:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of annual authorizations and supplemental
appropriations.
[End of figure]
Reimbursement Backlogs Result from Fiscal Imbalance:
The Emergency Relief program has experienced reimbursement backlogs in
recent years---reaching as high as $741 million dollars in 2004--as a
result of program demands from extraordinary events, declining real
funding, and periodic supplemental appropriations. When nationwide
Emergency Relief needs exceed available Emergency Relief funding, FHWA
allocates the $100 million annual authorization proportionally to the
states based on the ratio of the total available Emergency Relief
funding to the total Emergency Relief needs. For example, if there are
sufficient funds to pay for half of the approved allocations, all
states receive half of the funds they requested. According to FHWA
officials, once program funds are exhausted, states with eligible
projects are placed on a reimbursement backlog list, which may build up
over several years. As program funds become available with each new
annual authorization, FHWA allocates the funds based on the
reimbursement backlog list. States may provisionally utilize other
federal-aid program funds to pay for projects while awaiting
reimbursement from the Emergency Relief program. When Congress has
provided the program with supplemental appropriations for extraordinary
events, it has often included supplemental funds intended to clear the
program's accumulated backlog. However, according to FHWA officials, in
the interim, when Congress does not provide supplemental appropriations
to clear accumulated backlogs, states go without full reimbursement.
While, according to FHWA officials, FHWA financial management systems
do not track reimbursement backlogs, congressional conference reports
reference reimbursement backlogs dating back as far as fiscal year
1997, with balances ranging from $259 million to $741 million.
Reimbursement backlogs may tie up available state highway dollars and
affect the timely construction and repair of road facilities. In order
to prevent delays some state and local governments may borrow money to
pay Emergency Relief program project costs, while other states may
delay other planned nonemergency-related highway projects or delay
permanent Emergency Relief program projects. During our site visits, we
heard examples of the effects of reimbursement backlogs on the states
we visited. For example, in North Dakota, state officials told us that
one local government had delayed permanent Emergency Relief program
road repairs until reimbursement funding became available. State
officials in Mississippi delayed some regular federal-aid highway
projects in order to fund Hurricane Katrina-related Emergency Relief
projects while waiting for supplemental appropriations to provide
reimbursement funding. Mississippi officials also stated that these
regular state and federal-aid highway projects were delayed until
Emergency Relief reimbursements were received. In addition, Mississippi
officials told us that they also utilized an established line of credit
to fund some Emergency Relief projects and maintain some of their other
planned projects while awaiting Emergency Relief reimbursement. Similar
to the states we visited, federal land management agencies may also be
affected by reimbursement backlogs. FHWA officials told us that on
several occasions, federal land management agencies delayed initiating
a needed repair because of lack of reimbursement funding. FHWA
officials also told us that federal land management agencies are
particularly burdened because they do not have highway infrastructure
funding streams comparable to those of states. In almost all of our
site visits, program officials stated that the Emergency Relief
program's reimbursement backlogs (i.e., delayed reimbursements) are a
fiscal burden on state and local governments. This can be particularly
true for states with smaller highway budgets, such as Mississippi and
North Dakota, which may have less available highway funds to utilize
while experiencing reimbursement delays than other states.
The Use of the Highway Trust Fund for Extraordinary Disasters May Not
Be Sustainable Given Current Projections, and the General Fund Faces a
Fiscal Crisis:
Estimates from both the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and the
President's budget project the steady decline of the Highway Trust Fund
balance, as estimated outlays exceed estimated revenues each year for
2006 through 2011. According to CBO, the uncertainty associated with
Highway Trust Fund estimates implies that the Highway Trust Fund could
exhaust its resources before the anticipated 2009 date.[Footnote 11]
Because it is not possible to anticipate supplemental appropriations,
depending on how future emergencies are funded, the Highway Trust
Fund's future demand projections may not fully reflect the Emergency
Relief program's future effect on the fund. Furthermore, future demand
for a program driven by unpredictable events is necessarily uncertain.
The results of the Highway Trust Fund's declining balance can be seen
in the two most recent supplemental appropriations to the Emergency
Relief program. In the past, because the Highway Trust Fund maintained
significant unexpended balances, the Emergency Relief program's
supplemental appropriations have been funded through the Highway Trust
Fund. SAFETEA-LU designated the General Fund as the source for
additional Emergency Relief funds, and the most recent two supplemental
appropriations, passed in December 2005 and June 2006 to cover
Hurricane Katrina costs and backlogged projects, have come from the
General Fund. The change is at least in part due to the financial
uncertainty of the Highway Trust Fund. According to the Congressional
Research Service (CRS), because of the declining Highway Trust Fund
balance, using the Highway Trust Fund for the Hurricane Katrina
Emergency Relief supplemental appropriations would have constrained the
ability of the Highway Trust Fund to fully fund the SAFETEA-LU-
authorized highway programs over the life of the authorization. For
these reasons, it was doubtful that the Highway Trust Fund could fund
other large future Emergency Relief program supplemental appropriation
needs. Under the Highway Trust Fund's current structure, the historic
pattern of funding major Emergency Relief projects from the trust fund
is no longer sustainable.
However, the alternative used in the most recent appropriations, the
General Fund, also faces future demands that will place severe
pressures on all discretionary programs, including those that fund
transportation. Our simulations show that by 2040, revenues to the
federal government might barely cover interest on the debt--leaving no
money for either mandatory or discretionary programs--and that
balancing the budget could require cutting federal spending by as much
as 60 percent, raising taxes by up to 2½ times their current level, or
some combination of the two. This impending fiscal crisis means that it
will be difficult to fund extraordinary highway disaster needs for
highway repairs and for other programs from this source.
Despite a Long-term Fiscal Imbalance and a Depleting Highway Trust
Fund, FHWA Has Not Been Recapturing Unused Program Funds:
While the Emergency Relief program has experienced a fiscal imbalance,
FHWA officials do not routinely recapture unused funds. These unused
funds may come from (1) unobligated balances available to the states,
(2) obligated balances where the funds are no longer needed to complete
projects, or (3) funds Congress has directed to specific disasters that
remain available after the projects are completed. FHWA officials
explained that states may retain these unused Emergency Relief
obligations after projects are completed, and those funds can be used
for future disasters in the state. However, while states with completed
projects retain these unused obligations for future disasters, other
states with immediate Emergency Relief needs may experience a
reimbursement backlog.
While FHWA officials said they are currently beginning to identify
state-obligated funds that show no activity for a given time period,
the agency has not moved to recoup unneeded funds. FHWA's Office of
Financial Management can query program data to identify federal-aid
contracts with obligated funds where there has been no expenditure or
payment activity for 1 year, or 2, or more. Our analysis of FHWA
financial data found there to be over $158 million in inactive
unexpended balances from Emergency Relief program allocations between
fiscal years 1985 and 2006. Program officials acknowledge that allowing
states to hold on to inactive unexpended balances to pay for future
events enables states to bypass any backlog queue and fund their
projects before older projects in other states are addressed. However,
the amounts that could be recaptured from these sources are too small
to put the program on a solid financial footing.
In addition, the Emergency Relief Manual states that FHWA headquarters
officials should coordinate with FHWA division officials to identify
unobligated Emergency Relief balances that states will not use by the
end of the following fiscal year and reallocate these funds to states
with immediate Emergency Relief funding needs. Unobligated funds may
occur when a state's estimated need for a disaster exceed actual
project costs. The practice of identifying and reallocating unobligated
funds is intended to avoid accumulating a large balance of allocated
but unobligated Emergency Relief funds and to help manage available
funds nationwide as effectively as possible. Emergency Relief program
officials told us that identifying unneeded unobligated balances is
difficult and there has not been a specific effort to identify these
funds in recent years. According to FHWA officials, these funds may
remain because projects have not been completed or have not fully
utilized available program funds at the close of the fiscal year. The
unobligated balance at the end of fiscal year 2006, which includes
funding for the 2005 Gulf hurricanes and other funds yet to be
obligated for ongoing projects, was over $1.8 billion.[Footnote 12]
Finally, events with designated supplemental appropriations may have
remaining funds that cannot be used for any other disaster. Congress
has on occasion provided a supplemental appropriation to the Emergency
Relief program with designated funds to be used for specific disasters.
It has done so for disasters such as the Loma Prieta earthquake,
Hurricane Andrew, the attacks on the World Trade Center, and Hurricane
Katrina. Unless specifically worded otherwise, these funds cannot be
recaptured by FHWA and used for other Emergency Relief disasters.
Congress has more recently used language that allows for unused
designated funds to be used for other approved Emergency Relief
projects. However, this language was not always used in the past and
has resulted in unneeded balances that cannot be recaptured by FHWA. As
a result, these balances remain unexpended unless the state uses the
funds for additional work related to damage from the disaster.
During our site visit to California, we found the state still has $62
million in obligated but unexpended Emergency Relief funds designated
for the 1989 Loma Prieta and 1994 Northridge earthquakes. It is
unlikely that most of these funds, particularly those for the
Northridge earthquake, will be needed for additional work, according to
California Department of Transportation (Caltrans) officials. However,
these funds remain at the state level, and barring a rescission by
Congress, remain available until expended. Given that these events took
place 17 and 12 years ago respectively, the emergencies have long since
passed, and it is reasonable to expect related emergency projects to be
complete. Moreover, because the damage occurred on the federal-aid
system, the state could still use its normal federal-aid highway
funding to pay for any small residual cost, if the need arose. For
these reasons, these funds are potentially available for rescission.
Changing Interpretations of Program Criteria and Congressional
Involvement Have Resulted in Expanded Emergency Relief Eligibility:
The expansion of program eligibility criteria to fund larger and more
costly projects and congressional action to increase funding for
certain projects or disasters above what the program would ordinarily
provide have both contributed to the fiscal imbalance and concerns
about long-term sustainability of the program. Law and regulations
define qualifying criteria for disaster events, and link the federal
share of funding under the Emergency Relief program to the share of
funding provided under other federal-aid highway programs. However,
environmental requirements, community concerns, congressional
direction, and unique localized circumstances have increased the scope
and costs of projects, increased the portion of project costs funded by
the program, expanded the definition of program-eligible events, and
resulted in projects that go beyond the original intent of the program.
These include instances that go beyond restoration, involve replacement
rather than repairs, entail expansion of the type of work that the
program may fund, or involve waivers of the federal match.
Program Criteria Designed to Limit Eligibility and Funding:
Emergency Relief program regulations define disaster events that
qualify for program funding--and set criteria for projects that can be
funded--which help contain program expenditures. For instance,
regulations define eligible events as natural disasters--sudden and
unusual natural occurrences, such as floods, hurricanes, landslides,
and earthquakes--and catastrophic failures--the failure of a major
segment of a highway due to an external cause. Additionally, the
program is not intended to supplant other federal or state funds for
correction of preexisting nondisaster-related deficiencies. It is
expected that restoration to predisaster conditions will be the typical
type of repair accomplished through the Emergency Relief program.
FHWA's Emergency Relief program regulations limit the types of work
that are eligible for program funding. The regulations state that
betterments--additional features or improvements that change the
function or character of the highway facility--are eligible for funding
only if they are economically justified. That is, when the cost of the
betterment is weighed against the risk of recurring damage that would
be eligible for Emergency Relief funding and the cost of future
repairs. The regulations also state that except for those cases where
betterments are justified, the total cost of a project eligible for
Emergency Relief funding may not exceed the cost to repair or
reconstruct a comparable facility. However, where it is not feasible to
repair or replace an existing highway facility at its existing
location, an alternative selected through the NEPA process, if
comparable to the destroyed facility, is eligible for Emergency Relief
funding.
Emergency Relief program regulations also establish various dollar-
limit criteria that define program eligibility and funding for an
affected state. By law, FHWA can provide a state with up to $100
million in Emergency Relief funding for each natural disaster found
eligible for funding.[Footnote 13] Also, each prospective damage site
must have at least $5,000 of repair costs to qualify for funding---a
threshold intended to distinguish emergency relief work from
maintenance.
Responding to the Environmental Process Has Contributed to Larger
Projects:
Some emergency relief projects require a comprehensive environmental
review, and when such reviews take place, the project may expand
significantly in scope and cost. Repair projects funded under the
Emergency Relief program, like other federal-aid highway projects, must
comply with the requirements of NEPA. NEPA, which applies to all
federal agencies, and to states receiving federal funding, requires an
assessment of the environmental impact of federal programs and actions.
Emergency repair projects to restore existing facilities qualify as
"categorical exclusions" under NEPA, and normally do not require any
further environmental study or mitigation.[Footnote 14] However, large
projects such as replacing a bridge or relocating a length of roadway
that has been destroyed can trigger a need for more extensive review--
-an environmental impact statement (EIS) or an environmental assessment
(EA). An environmental impact statement presents a range of proposed
alternatives for a project and analyzes the cumulative effects of each.
The EIS process also requires public notice of relevant hearings and
meetings, and the draft and final EIS are made available for public
comment. An environmental assessment may be required for a project that
does not clearly qualify as a categorical exclusion or clearly require
an EIS. The environmental assessment process concludes with either a
finding of no significant impact or a decision that an EIS is required.
The process of completing an EIS can result in a finding that replacing
the destroyed facility at the same site is not possible, and that a
more costly relocation that addresses environmental or community
concerns is needed. The NEPA process addresses environmental issues,
but the hearings that are part of the process allow the public and
other interested parties to raise other concerns.
The need to address both public concerns and the NEPA process has
resulted in the Emergency Relief program funding larger and more costly
projects than it might have otherwise approved under the Emergency
Relief program. One such project followed the Loma Prieta earthquake.
In October 1989, the Loma Prieta earthquake struck northern California,
collapsing a two-tiered portion of Interstate 880 through Oakland known
as the Cypress Viaduct. Immediately after the earthquake, FHWA and
Caltrans planned to replace the Cypress Viaduct as it existed prior to
the earthquake, and FHWA prepared a cost estimate of $306 million.
However, this route had divided an Oakland neighborhood, and opposition
from residents and the city government led Caltrans to consider several
alternative alignments. Because of the size and complexity of these
alternatives, an environmental impact statement was required. After
completion of the EIS in 1992, Caltrans selected an alignment that
replaced the original 1.5-mile structure with a 5-mile structure that
circumvented the neighborhood.
GAO reported on the status of this project in May 1996.[Footnote 15] As
we noted then, the Emergency Relief program regulations allow for
funding betterments--such as relocation, replacement, upgrades, or
added features--only when they are economically justified to prevent
recurring damage.[Footnote 16] Although the Cypress Viaduct relocation
involved a significantly different design with more extensive
construction and higher costs, FHWA officials approved the relocation
based on the results of an EIS, and did not consider the project a
betterment. Therefore, Emergency Relief program regulations, which
place limits on funding improvements or changes in the character of a
destroyed facility, were not applicable. Emergency Relief funding for
the relocated Cypress Viaduct was approved without (1) making a finding
that relocation was economically justified to prevent recurring damage,
or (2) placing limits on the use of Emergency Relief funds. The project
was carried out as a permanent restoration project and completed in
1998 with the Emergency Relief program funding approximately $811
million of the more than $1.0 billion project cost.
In another case, the environmental review process led to the Emergency
Relief program funding a very large project to relocate a section of a
cliff-side highway that has been frequently closed by slides. The cost
of this project will also exceed the recent costs to the Emergency
Relief program of keeping the current highway open. The Devil's Slide
area in California is a formation of steep, geologically unstable
cliffs on the Pacific coast, south of San Francisco. State Route 1
(S.R.1), originally constructed in 1937, runs along the coast at the
base of Devil's Slide, and has long been subject to recurring rock
slides. From 1982 to the present there have been three significant
Devil's Slide events that have cost the Emergency Relief program $17
million to reopen S.R. 1. Following a major landslide over the winter
of 1982-1983 that closed S.R. 1 for nearly 3 months, Caltrans began to
pursue relocating S.R.1 away from the slide area.
The Devil's Slide project required a full environmental impact
statement, which was begun in 1983 and completed in 1986. The EIS set
out three options, one of which involved relocating S.R.1 inland, away
from the slide area, and FHWA selected this as the preferred
alternative. The environmental document was challenged in U.S. District
Court, and the project was enjoined in September 1986, prior to the
start of any construction. In orders issued in 1989 and 1990, the court
ultimately determined that the EIS was deficient only in regard to
noise impacts. Thereafter, FHWA and Caltrans began work on a
supplemental EIS to address noise impacts. In the years that had passed
since the original EIS, community attitudes had begun to shift in favor
of relocating S.R.1 by way of a tunnel through San Pedro Mountain
behind Devil's Slide. Public comments in the 1995 hearings for the
supplemental EIS, and a local referendum in 1996, called for
consideration of a tunnel alternative. A second supplemental EIS,
completed in 2002, resulted in selection of a tunnel route. FHWA had
previously determined that the federal share for an emergency relief
project is guided by the rules and regulations in effect at the time of
the disaster. In the case of Devil's Slide, that is the Surface
Transportation Assistance Act (STAA) of 1982, which established the
federal share as 100 percent.[Footnote 17] Also, the Transportation
Equity Act for the 21st Century (TEA-21), enacted in 1998, had directed
that the Devil's Slide project was Emergency Relief program
eligible.[Footnote 18]
Figure 7: Rockslide at Devil's Slide, 1998:
[See PDF for image]
Source: California Department of Transportation (copyright 1998).
[End of figure]
The current Devil's Slide project is a pair of 4,200-foot-long, 30-
foot-wide tunnels through the San Pedro Mountain, connected at the
north end to a 1,000-foot bridge spanning a valley, and connected at
the south end to a realignment of S.R.1. Construction began in early
2006, more than 20 years after the 1982-1983 event. The bridge portion
is currently under construction, and a contract was awarded for the
tunnel portion in December 2006. The total project will cost an
estimated $441 million, and is scheduled to be completed in 2011. FHWA
has allocated $241 million for the project, and an additional $200
million in future Emergency Relief funds will be needed to complete the
project. Following the completion of the Devil's Slide project,
Caltrans will relinquish the bypassed section of S.R.1 to the county,
which will maintain it for bicycle and pedestrian use.
During the two decades that the Devil's Slide project has been delayed,
S.R.1 has remained open, and subject to periodic slides that resulted
in road closures, including a 5-month closure in 1995 that cost about
$3 million to clean up, and a closure from April to early August in
2006 that cost $12 million in Emergency Relief funding. S.R.1 carries
significant commuter and business traffic through the Devil's Slide
area, and road closures due to slides have been a significant hardship
for commuters and the local communities. However, the goal of the
Emergency Relief program is to restore damaged or destroyed roadways to
essential traffic, which in the case of Devil's Slide had been
accomplished through cleanup and restoration. As a long-standing
problem, replacing S.R. 1 with a tunnel could have been addressed
through the state's regular federal-aid highway program.
Congress Increased Project Funding beyond What the Program Would
Otherwise Have Funded:
Congressional action has increased the amount of Emergency Relief
program funding provided to certain disasters and projects. The
devastation caused by Hurricane Katrina at the end of August 2005
included the destruction of the 1.6-mile U.S. Highway 90 Biloxi Bay
Bridge in Mississippi (see fig. 8). The bridge provided essential
emergency, commercial, and residential traffic between the city of
Biloxi, Mississippi, and the city of Ocean Springs across Biloxi Bay.
The original bridge was a four-lane bascule bridge.[Footnote 19]
Mississippi Department of Transportation (DOT) proposed to replace it
with a six-lane high-rise fixed structure bridge. Mississippi DOT
justified the increased capacity, from four lanes to six lanes, based
on a prehurricane traffic model that was not updated to consider
posthurricane projections. An environmental assessment for the
replacement bridge project was completed in November 2005 with a
finding of no significant impact, but other issues were raised in the
course of Mississippi DOT working with the communities through the NEPA
process. These included accommodations for pedestrian and bicycle
traffic and protection of existing trees, but a more significant
concern was raised by a local shipbuilder about the proposed height of
the new bridge.
Figure 8: Damage to U.S. 90 Biloxi Bay Bridge:
[See PDF for image]
Source: FHWA.
[End of figure]
According to Mississippi DOT officials, DOT initially proposed a bridge
that would provide an 85-foot clearance above Biloxi Bay. During a
public comment period on the proposed bridge design, a local
shipbuilder expressed concern that the height was not sufficient to
allow for future ships to pass under the bridge. Mississippi DOT
revised its proposed bridge design to provide a 95-foot clearance,
which increased the cost of the bridge from an estimated $275 million
to the current cost of $339 million. As noted in the November 2005
final environmental assessment document, the plan was to limit
Emergency Relief program funding to the portion of the project required
to reestablish the function of the original bridge, widen the structure
to six lanes, and construct it to current standards--other work would
be eligible for funding with normal federal-aid program funds. However,
in December 2005, Congress passed an emergency supplemental
appropriation that addressed the Gulf Coast hurricanes of 2005, and
authorized 100 percent federal funding for the repair or reconstruction
of hurricane-damaged highways, roads, and bridges.[Footnote 20] This
effectively included the Biloxi Bay Bridge. As of December 2006,
construction of the new bridge has begun, with completion expected in
May 2008.
Another instance of Congress increasing the Emergency Relief program's
funding to a project followed Hurricane Ivan striking the Florida
panhandle near Pensacola in September 2004, causing severe structural
damage to both spans of the I-10 Bridge over Escambia Bay. In the
aftermath of the hurricane, the Florida DOT decided it would replace
rather than repair the bridge, because of the age and the extent of
damage to the old bridge. Like the old bridge, the new bridge would
also have two spans, but built to a higher elevation to better protect
against storm surge damage, with three lanes on each span--increasing
the capacity of the old bridge.
Under FHWA's Emergency Relief Manual, program participation in project
funding can be limited depending on the circumstances involved.
Specifically, when repair and restoration of a damaged facility are
possible, but the state prefers to build a replacement facility,
Emergency Relief funding can be limited to what the program would have
contributed to the cost of repairing the damaged facility. FHWA
estimated the cost to repair the original bridge to be $179 million.
FHWA division officials were in discussions with the Florida DOT about
the level of Emergency Relief program funding for the project when, in
December 2004, passage of the Consolidated Appropriations Act of
2005[Footnote 21] directed that replacement of the Escambia Bay Bridge
be federally funded. The program would fund 90 percent of the project
cost, the federal share for work on interstate highways. As of December
2006, the bridge is under construction, with one of the spans nearing
completion, and FHWA officials informed us the entire bridge project is
expected to be finished ahead of the scheduled December 2007 completion
date at an estimated cost of $245 million. Although FHWA could have
limited the Emergency Relief program's participation to 90 percent of
the prospective repair cost of the Escambia Bay Bridge, congressional
action ensured that the Emergency Relief program would have a larger
financial commitment in the project.
Definition of a Disaster Has Been Expanded, and New Types of Work Have
Been Authorized:
In the Emergency Relief program regulations, a natural disaster is
described as a sudden and unusual natural occurrence, and a
catastrophic failure is described as the sudden failure of a segment of
the highway system due to an external cause. In one circumstance,
Congress and FHWA have decided that a gradual and predictable basin
flooding event, which was not a sudden occurrence, warranted treatment
as a disaster for Emergency Relief program eligibility, and have
defined its eligibility in legislation, regulation, and revisions to
the Emergency Relief Manual.
Devils Lake in North Dakota lies in a large natural basin and lacks a
natural outlet for rising water to flow out of the lake. Starting in
the early 1990s, the lake level has risen dramatically--over 25 feet
from 1993 to the present. The volume of water in the lake has
quadrupled in that time, flooding or threatening nearby communities,
farms, reservation lands, and roads (see fig. 9). According to North
Dakota DOT officials, many roads in the Devils Lake area were built in
the 1930s and 1940s, when the lake's water levels were near their
historic low point. Initially, the approach to preserve roads from
being inundated was to buildup the grade of roads that were threatened
by the rising waters of Devils Lake. FHWA amended its Emergency Relief
program regulation in December 1996 to explicitly provide that raising
road grades in response to an unprecedented rise in basin water levels
was an Emergency Relief-eligible activity. FHWA's next Emergency Relief
Manual revision in 1998 identified basin flooding as an Emergency
Relief-eligible disaster. In April 2000, FHWA also issued a memorandum
that provided authorization for grade raises in basin flooding
situations based on forecasted rising water levels--a unique provision
for the Emergency Relief program, which otherwise funds only
postdisaster repair or restoration. Some roads have already had their
grades raised more than once, and according to North Dakota DOT
officials, one bridge had been built up three times in 4 years. As of
September 2006, North Dakota DOT officials informed us that they had
essentially completed raising the road grades to the levels currently
allowed,[Footnote 22] based on existing forecasts for lake levels, but
further grade raises might be necessary in the future if lake levels
continue to rise. As of September 2006, the Emergency Relief program
has funded over $145 million for projects related to Devils Lake
flooding.
Figure 9: Map of Devils Lake, North Dakota, Expansion:
[See PDF for image]
Source: North Dakota State Water Commission and GAO.
[End of figure]
Additional problems at Devils Lake led to Congress authorizing FHWA to
fund an additional type of project through the Emergency Relief
program. According to North Dakota DOT officials, grade raises to roads
in the Devils Lake area begun in the mid-1990s were constructed with
culverts embedded in the roadway embankments to allow water to flow
through the embankment, in order to equalize water pressure on each
side of the raised roadway. According to North Dakota DOT and FHWA
division office officials, in 1997 some communities and the local
Indian reservation plugged some of these culverts, without FHWA's or
the state DOT's knowledge, to prevent water from flowing through and
onto their land. As a result, in these areas, the raised roadways were
now acting as dams, which increased their risk of failure. As
additional grade raises to these roads became necessary, FHWA was
prohibited by regulation[Footnote 23] from authorizing additional work
on such roads unless their safety could be certified by the agency
responsible for the safety of dams--in this case the Army Corps of
Engineers. However, the Corps of Engineers determined that it could not
certify the safety of the existing roads acting as dams without major
modifications, such as the construction of additional embankments.
In 2005, the passage of SAFETEA-LU reauthorized the FHWA highway
program, and authorized up to $10 million of Emergency Relief program
funds to be expended annually, up to a total of $70 million, for work
in the Devils Lake region of North Dakota to address roads acting as
dams, which were not previously eligible for Emergency Relief
funds.[Footnote 24] This $10 million comes out of the $100 million
annual authorization of contract authority that funds the Emergency
Relief program, effectively reducing Emergency Relief funding available
to other states to $90 million. SAFETEA-LU also included language
authorizing FHWA to carry out necessary work in connection with Devils
Lake roads acting as dams, and it exempts the work in the Devils Lake
area from the need for further emergency declarations to qualify for
Emergency Relief funding. As of September 2006, FHWA has been working
with the Bureau of Indian Affairs to address high-priority sites on the
Indian reservation adjacent to the lake where roads were acting as
dams, and it has been meeting with North Dakota DOT and the Corps of
Engineers to develop solutions for other sites. These solutions may
include building dams or dikes to control lake flooding or protect the
raised roadways. While the damage and financial loss caused by this
flooding are very real, defining a gradual and predictable event--which
is not a sudden occurrence--as an eligible disaster represents a
broadening of the definition of what is a disaster for purposes of the
Emergency Relief program, and places an additional claim on limited
program funding. The North Dakota DOT estimates the cost of all of the
additional work at Devils Lake may well exceed $200 million.
Congressional Action Has Increased Program Funding Commitments for Some
Disasters and Projects:
In its first fiscal year 2006 supplemental appropriation for the
Emergency Relief program,[Footnote 25] Congress directed that the
Emergency Relief program shall fund 100 percent of all repair and
reconstruction of highways, roads, and bridges necessitated by
Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma, because the states' resources were
inadequate to deal with the string of disasters. For example,
Mississippi's allotment for Hurricane Katrina damage was about $1
billion, and a 20 percent local share would have cost the state about
$200 million. To put the level of damage in perspective, total prior
2005 Federal-aid Highway Program funding for Mississippi was about $402
million.
This can especially affect large replacement projects. For example, the
original Biloxi Bay Bridge was on a noninterstate federal-aid highway
and the Emergency Relief program would ordinarily fund 80 percent of
the project cost.[Footnote 26] However, as a result of the supplemental
appropriation, the Emergency Relief program will fund the full cost of
the Biloxi Bay Bridge project rather than the 80 percent that would
normally be funded under the program criteria. Also, as noted earlier,
Congress authorized program funding for the replacement of the I-10
Escambia Bay Bridge. In the absence of congressional direction, the
Emergency Relief program may have funded only 90 percent of the
prospective repair cost of $179 million.
There have also been other instances where Congress has waived the
requirement for state matching funds or waived the limit on funding
provided to any one state, to support states that have been overwhelmed
by the costs of terrorist attacks or natural disasters. However, this
has added to the costs borne by the Emergency Relief program. Congress
authorized 100 percent federal funding for Emergency Relief program
highway projects in its 2002 supplemental appropriation[Footnote 27] to
fund recovery from the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. Congress
has also acted to waive the $100 million maximum limit on the Emergency
Relief program funding that could be provided to a single state for a
disaster eight times since 1989--in the two supplemental appropriations
cited above, and in six other supplemental appropriation acts.[Footnote
28]
Defining the Damage Threshold for a Site Can Affect Program Outlays:
FHWA's division offices have been inconsistent in how they identify
eligible damage sites, which has a potential impact on program funding.
The Emergency Relief Manual states that, generally, a site is an
individual location where damage has occurred. However, a site could
also incorporate several adjoining locations within a reasonable
distance where similar damage has occurred, such as damage to traffic
signs over an area. The manual cautions, however, that aggregating
damage locations to form a site should be done with care, as it is not
the intent of the Emergency Relief program to pay for damage that a
transportation agency would normally perform as maintenance. We found
that different FHWA division offices accepted differing definitions of
what constituted a site. For example, in Florida, where hurricanes and
storms have leveled signs and signals over a wide area, whole counties
have been designated as sites. In California, where wildfires have
destroyed signs and guardrails over a wide area, state DOT officials
told us that 20-to 30-mile stretches of highway have been treated as
single sites. On the other hand, an official in the Ohio division
office said that he generally limits the scope of a site to the
distance a person could see in both directions, although that is not an
absolute rule.
The physical size of a site that an FHWA division office will accept
has implications for the Emergency Relief program, because a site must
have at least $5,000 worth of damage to qualify for Emergency Relief
funds. When a major disaster covers a large area, and there is clearly
sufficient damage to qualify for Emergency Relief funding, treating
widespread damage at a limited number of damage sites can simplify
program administration. In addition, in the case of a more limited
disaster--with damage around the $700,000 level needed to qualify for
Emergency Relief funding--allowing sites to incorporate large areas,
with a higher dollar amount of damage, might allow a state to qualify
for Emergency Relief program funds, while a state held to a narrower
site definition might not.
Conclusions:
There is a continuing need for a federal role to assist states in
responding to and recovering from natural disasters. The long history
of federal support to states to repair highway infrastructure in the
wake of disasters, and the potential for states to be financially
overwhelmed by the burden of the resulting costs, especially after
extraordinary events, argues strongly for a continued Emergency Relief
program. However, where a continued federal role is seen in the future,
the nation's pending fiscal crisis requires reexamining whether the
current mission is fully consistent with the initial or updated
statutory mission, whether significant expansion of scope has occurred,
and whether a program is affordable and financially sustainable over
the long term, given known cost trends, risks, and future fiscal
imbalances. From this perspective, the Emergency Relief program faces
sustainability concerns in the future, exacerbated by the gradual
expansion of eligibility criteria that should be addressed.
While predicting the future financial requirements of disasters is not
possible in any precise way, on the basis of past demands on the
program, it is reasonable to expect a continuing fiscal imbalance if
the program remains at the current funding level. Thus Congress has the
opportunity to establish a more sustainable funding level and to
identify a stable long-term source of funding consistent with future
demands. Given current projections on the status of the Highway Trust
Fund and the recent history of large costs incurred by the states
responding to disasters, the program does not appear to be sustainable
in the long term if funding is derived from the Highway Trust Fund, as
currently structured. In fact, the current authorization from the
Highway Trust Fund does not cover the ordinary events states
experience, and the supplemental appropriations from the General Fund
are funding both extraordinary and ordinary events. The National
Surface Transportation Policy and Revenue Commission can help--it will
be examining alternatives to replace or supplement the fuel tax as the
principal revenue source to support the Highway Trust Fund, and putting
the Highway Trust Fund on a sustainable basis. In theory, sufficient
revenues could allow all Emergency Relief funding, including funding
for extraordinary events, to be financed by the Highway Trust Fund, the
approach taken when the Highway Trust Fund held large balances. This
would have the advantage of relying on a predictable source of revenue
intended for highway projects as the source of the program.
Alternatively, Congress could, as it also has done in the past, provide
some or all emergency funding from the General Fund. This might be
particularly appropriate for extraordinary events because such events
are comparatively rare, can occur on a large multistate level, can
overwhelm all levels of government, and cannot be reasonably planned
and budgeted for. This would also place the Emergency Relief program on
the same footing as FEMA's disaster relief programs, which are financed
through the General Fund. While this approach would help the short-term
sustainability of the Highway Trust Fund, because the nation faces a
long-term fiscal crisis, relying solely or heavily on the General Fund
is a limited option.
In order to put the program on a sound financial footing, additional
alternatives to address the fiscal imbalance need to be considered.
Revising the program's criteria to place limitations on the use of
Emergency Relief funds to fully finance projects with scope and costs
that have grown as a result of environmental and community concerns is
one possibility. Looking for alternative funding for projects designed
to solve chronic problems, as opposed to immediate road opening needs,
is another. These changes would place greater burden on the states,
which would have to pay for project expansion driven by nonemergency
factors and projects to address chronic, predictable conditions, while
saving federal funds for larger disasters.
The funding imbalance makes FHWA's fiscal stewardship of the Emergency
Relief program especially important. While the fiscal imbalance in the
program is too great to be solved by improved stewardship by FHWA
alone, FHWA is not routinely recapturing all unused program funds once
a project is complete. In fact, states with immediate disaster needs
experience reimbursement backlogs, while unused program funds are
maintained by states with no current disaster needs. Furthermore, the
lack of a standard definition of what constitutes a damage site opens
the door for many smaller costs to be charged against the program, and
may result in higher federal reimbursements.
Matters for Congressional Consideration:
In order to put the Emergency Relief program on a sound financial
footing, Congress should consider the expected future demands on the
program and reexamine the appropriate level and sources of funding--
including whether to increase the $100 million annual authorized
funding and whether the Highway Trust Fund, the General Fund, or some
combination would allow the program to accomplish its purpose in a
fiscally sustainable manner. Congress should also consider tightening
the eligibility criteria for Emergency Relief funding, either through
amending the purpose of the Emergency Relief program, or by directing
FHWA to revise its program regulations. Revised criteria could include
limitations on the use of Emergency Relief funds to fully finance
projects with scope and costs that have grown as a result of
environmental and community concerns.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
In order to help put the Emergency Relief program on a more sound
financial footing, we recommend that the Secretary of Transportation
direct the Administrator, FHWA, to revise its emergency relief
regulations to tighten the eligibility criteria for Emergency Relief
funding, to the extent possible within the scope of FHWA's authority.
Revised criteria could include limitations on the use of Emergency
Relief funds to fully finance projects with scope and costs that have
grown as a result of environmental and community concerns. In order to
improve FHWA's financial oversight of Emergency Relief funds, FHWA
should require division offices to annually coordinate with states to
identify unexpended obligated and unused unobligated Emergency Relief
funds that will not be needed for projects, withdraw the unneeded
amounts, and determine if they are needed for other eligible projects.
In the event these funds are not needed for other eligible projects,
FHWA should identify these funds to Congress for rescission or to
offset future appropriations. FHWA also should identify for rescission
unexpended funds that have been directed to specific disasters when
those funds are no longer needed. Finally, in order to ensure that
similar types of events result in consistent determinations of
eligibility, FHWA should clarify its Emergency Relief Manual to better
specify the definition of a site, and whether under certain
circumstances variations from the basic definition are permitted.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We provided copies of a draft of this report to DOT for its review and
comment. DOT provided its comments in an e-mail message on February 5,
2007. DOT generally agreed with the facts presented but took no
position on our recommendations. DOT also provided technical comments,
which we incorporated into this report as appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to congressional committees and
subcommittees with responsibilities for DOT. We will also make copies
available to others upon request. This report will be available at no
charge on the GAO Web site at [Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202)
512-2834 or siggerudk@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of
Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last
page of this report. Staff who made key contributions to this report
are listed in appendix VI.
Signed by:
Katherine Siggerud:
Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues:
List of Congressional Addressees:
The Honorable James M. Inhofe:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Environment and Public Works:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Patty Murray:
Chairwoman:
The Honorable Christopher S. Bond:
Ranking Minority Member:
Subcommittee on Transportation, Housing and Urban Development, and
Related Agencies:
Committee on Appropriations:
United States Senate:
The Honorable John L. Mica:
Ranking Republican Member:
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable John W. Olver:
Chairman:
Subcommittee on Transportation, Housing and Urban Development, and
Related Agencies:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable John J. Duncan:
Ranking Republican Member:
Subcommittee on Highways and Transit:
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure:
House of Representatives:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
The objectives of this report were to review (1) the total amount of
Emergency Relief program funding allocated to the states in recent
years, how this funding was distributed among the states, and the
events for which it was allocated; (2) the sources of funding used to
finance these emergency relief allocations and the financial challenges
facing the program; and (3) the scope of activities eligible for
funding and the extent to which the scope of eligible activities has
changed in recent years.
To examine the total amount of Emergency Relief funding allocated to
states in recent years, we interviewed and obtained documentation from
the Federal Highway Administration's (FHWA) Office of Financial
Management and analyzed Fiscal Management Information System (FMIS)
data on program trends, including allocations by state, total program
allocations, unexpended balances of "inactive" projects, and
unobligated balances. We assessed the reliability of the information
system extracts and queries by reviewing relevant system documentation,
interviewing agency officials who worked with the information system,
and conducted manual data testing. We found that state allocations data
were available only for two specific time periods--cumulatively
beginning at program inception or the last 10 fiscal years--rather than
from fiscal year 1985 to present as requested. We determined the data
to be sufficiently reliable for analysis of state allocation data from
1997 through fiscal year 2006--the last 10 years. We also found that
Emergency Relief projects may be initially funded through other federal-
aid programs and converted to Emergency Relief funding in FMIS once
funds are available. Consequently, the Emergency Relief program
obligations in FMIS may not be exhaustive, as they may not include
funds that will be converted to Emergency Relief. We determined that
FMIS Emergency Relief program obligations data were not sufficiently
complete for analysis of project obligations by state. These data were
not used in any of our analyses and therefore had no impact on our
findings.
To examine the value of the annual $100 million authorization over time
in constant dollars, we adjusted the $100 million authorization using
the annual values of gross domestic product (GDP) price index for
fiscal years 1972 through 2005. Fiscal year 2005 is the most recent
year for which there were accurate GDP index annual values available.
To examine the purposes for which Emergency Relief funds were
allocated, we interviewed the Emergency Relief program manager and
obtained data on program allocations by event from him, rather than
using FMIS data. While FMIS contains fields that document disaster
sequence number and fiscal year, there is not a simple way to calculate
the total obligations by event. Event cost data have been maintained by
the Emergency Relief program manager from fiscal years 1998 through
2006. We accessed the reliability of program data on allocations by
event by interviewing the program manager and manually testing program
data against congressional appropriations legislation and found the
data to be sufficiently reliable for analysis of event cost from fiscal
years 1998 through 2006.
To examine the sources of funding used to finance the Emergency Relief
allocations, we analyzed supplemental and annual authorizations using
the legislative history of the Emergency Relief program from fiscal
years 1990 through 2006. We also used the legislative history of the
program from fiscal years 1985 through 2006 to obtain information on
program reimbursement backlogs. Because FHWA officials do not maintain
historical reimbursement backlog data, we relied on periodic references
to reimbursement backlogs in the legislative history.
To examine the scope of activities eligible for Emergency Relief
program funding and the extent to which the scope of eligible
activities has changed in recent years, we obtained and reviewed
program manuals, guidance, and documentation for program eligibility
criteria and policies and requirements. We also interviewed FHWA
officials at U. S. Department of Transportation headquarters who are
responsible for providing guidance and policies for the Emergency
Relief program and the Emergency Relief program for federally owned
roads. In addition, we conducted site visits to five states
(California, Florida, Mississippi, North Dakota, and Ohio) and
conducted interviews with state department of transportation and FHWA
officials, including managers, team leaders, and engineers, that are
responsible for the administration of Emergency Relief program, as well
as other FHWA highway programs. We also interviewed officials from the
FHWA's Eastern Federal Land Highway Division Office in Virginia. We
gathered relevant program documentation from each site visit, including
project Detailed Damage Inspection Reports, environmental assessments,
and cost analyses. To capture a variety of disaster events and
projects, we selected five states considering (1) the dollar amount of
program allocations from fiscal program inception through 2005, (2) the
dollar amount of program allocations from fiscal years 2001 through
2005, (3) geographical dispersion, (4) whether the state sustained
damage from the 2005 Gulf hurricanes, and (5) whether the states had
Emergency Relief projects costing more than $1 million within the last
10 years.
To examine the extent to which the scope of eligible activities has
changed in recent years, we reviewed the legislative history of the
program from fiscal years 1985 through 2006. We identified
congressional waivers of program requirements such as the requirement
for state matching funds and the $100 million maximum limit on program
funding that could be provided to a single state per fiscal year.
We conducted our work in California, Florida, Mississippi, North
Dakota, Ohio, Virginia, and Washington, D.C., between April 2006 and
December 2006 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Emergency Relief Allocations, by State, Fiscal Years 1997
through 2006:
Table 2:
State: Florida;
Allocations: $1,610,221,999.
State: California;
Allocations: 1,407,593,370.
State: Louisiana;
Allocations: 1,197,186,159.
State: Mississippi;
Allocations: 1,018,492,758.
State: New York;
Allocations: 351,959,991.
State: Ohio;
Allocations: 252,726,560.
State: Washington;
Allocations: 226,192,038.
State: North Dakota;
Allocations: 183,192,689.
State: North Carolina;
Allocations: 169,318,189.
State: Federal land management agencies;
Allocations: 150,397,788.
State: Oregon;
Allocations: 146,828,474.
State: Idaho;
Allocations: 103,603,390.
State: Pennsylvania;
Allocations: 102,223,909.
State: Alabama;
Allocations: 94,754,342.
State: West Virginia;
Allocations: 84,967,478.
State: Puerto Rico;
Allocations: 82,121,303.
State: Texas;
Allocations: 73,545,635.
State: Virginia;
Allocations: 72,716,074.
State: Alaska;
Allocations: 62,403,890.
State: New Jersey;
Allocations: 61,472,168.
State: Hawaii;
Allocations: 57,581,279.
State: Arkansas;
Allocations: 50,526,038.
State: Oklahoma;
Allocations: 45,678,083.
State: South Dakota;
Allocations: 41,031,174.
State: Guam;
Allocations: 39,287,726.
State: Montana;
Allocations: 38,692,910.
State: Nevada;
Allocations: 36,139,306.
State: Colorado;
Allocations: 35,924,445.
State: American Samoa;
Allocations: 32,929,435.
State: New Hampshire;
Allocations: 22,375,948.
State: Minnesota;
Allocations: 21,274,187.
State: Utah;
Allocations: 14,422,113.
State: Vermont;
Allocations: 14,242,337.
State: Maine;
Allocations: 13,860,774.
State: Connecticut;
Allocations: 11,636,008.
State: Iowa;
Allocations: 10,490,033.
State: Illinois;
Allocations: 9,185,887.
State: Maryland;
Allocations: 8,803,500.
State: Wyoming;
Allocations: 8,642,033.
State: Michigan;
Allocations: 7,430,170.
State: Indiana;
Allocations: 7,378,050.
State: Delaware;
Allocations: 6,460,000.
State: Northern Marianas;
Allocations: 6,407,000.
State: Arizona;
Allocations: 6,313,750.
State: Missouri;
Allocations: 6,221,126.
State: Nebraska;
Allocations: 5,784,846.
State: Kentucky;
Allocations: 5,136,894.
State: Virgin Islands;
Allocations: 4,281,655.
State: Kansas;
Allocations: 3,887,968.
State: Massachusetts;
Allocations: 3,884,375.
State: South Carolina;
Allocations: 3,512,493.
State: Wisconsin;
Allocations: 2,735,059.
State: Rhode Island;
Allocations: 1,650,000.
State: New Mexico;
Allocations: 1,021,631.
State: Georgia;
Allocations: 971,836.
State: Tennessee;
Allocations: 209,694.
State: District of Columbia;
Allocations: 0.
State: Total;
Allocations: $8,037,927,969.
Source: FMIS:
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix III: Tables of Allocations by Event from Fiscal Years 1998
through 2006:
Table 3: Allocations by Event for 1998:
State: California;
1998 events: February 1998 flood;
Allocations: $84,400,000.
State: Federal land management agencies;
1998 events: Federal lands management agencies;
Allocations: 47,970,591.
State: Puerto Rico;
1998 events: September 1998 Hurricane Georges;
Allocations: 40,860,000.
State: Ohio;
1998 events: June 1998 flood;
Allocations: 26,663,000.
State: Alabama;
1998 events: September 1998 Hurricane Georges;
Allocations: 12,983,000.
State: Guam;
1998 events: December 16-17, 1998 Typhoon Paka;
Allocations: 12,000,000.
State: New York;
1998 events: January 1998 ice storm;
Allocations: 12,000,000.
State: Alabama;
1998 events: March 1998 flooding;
Allocations: 10,400,000.
State: Maine;
1998 events: January 1998 ice storm;
Allocations: 8,475,000.
State: Vermont;
1998 events: June/July 1998 storms and flooding;
Allocations: 6,600,000.
State: Idaho;
1998 events: June 1998 flood;
Allocations: 6,070,000.
State: Iowa;
1998 events: June 1998 flood;
Allocations: 6,000,000.
State: South Dakota;
1998 events: Spring 1998 basin flood;
Allocations: 6,000,000.
State: New York;
1998 events: June/July 1998 storm;
Allocations: 5,500,000.
State: Pennsylvania;
1998 events: May 1998 failure of I-95 Chester Creek bridge;
Allocations: 5,000,000.
State: Florida;
1998 events: September 1998 Hurricane Georges;
Allocations: 4,954,000.
State: Northern Mariana Islands;
1998 events: Nov. 2/Dec.16, 1997, Typhoons Keith and Paka;
Allocations: 4,269,000.
State: North Carolina;
1998 events: January 1998 winter storm;
Allocations: 4,027,000.
State: North Dakota;
1998 events: Spring 1998 Devils Lake Basin flooding;
Allocations: 3,907,000.
State: Mississippi;
1998 events: September 1998 Hurricane Georges;
Allocations: 3,754,000.
State: Colorado;
1998 events: March/April 1998 landslide;
Allocations: 3,564,000.
State: North Dakota;
1998 events: Spring 1998 basin flooding;
Allocations: 2,676,000.
State: West Virginia;
1998 events: June 1998 flooding;
Allocations: 2,542,000.
State: New York;
1998 events: September 1998 storm;
Allocations: 2,500,000.
State: Minnesota;
1998 events: March 1998 storms/tornadoes;
Allocations: 2,348,000.
State: North Carolina;
1998 events: August 1998 Hurricane Bonnie;
Allocations: 2,152,000.
State: Virginia;
1998 events: September 1998 Hurricane Georges;
Allocations: 2,100,000.
State: Missouri;
1998 events: July 1998 flooding;
Allocations: 1,954,000.
State: Florida;
1998 events: September 1998 Hurricane Earl;
Allocations: 1,665,000.
State: Washington;
1998 events: July 1998 flooding;
Allocations: 1,241,000.
State: Vermont;
1998 events: January 1998 ice storm;
Allocations: 1,048,000.
State: North Carolina;
1998 events: Failure of SR 1755 bridge over I- 40;
Allocations: 1,030,000.
State: Texas;
1998 events: August 1998 Tropical Storm Charlie;
Allocations: 880,000.
State: Georgia;
1998 events: March 1998 flooding;
Allocations: 770,000.
State: Florida;
1998 events: May 1998 forest fires;
Allocations: 732,000.
State: Arizona;
1998 events: March 1998 failure of US 70 bridge;
Allocations: 660,000.
State: Michigan;
1998 events: March/April 1998 flood;
Allocations: 627,000.
State: Washington;
1998 events: March 1998 failure of Carbon River Bridge on SR165;
Allocations: 625,000.
State: Texas;
1998 events: September 1998 Tropical Storm Frances;
Allocations: 603,000.
State: Florida;
1998 events: February 1998 storms and flooding;
Allocations: 600,000.
State: Louisiana;
1998 events: September 1998 Hurricane Georges;
Allocations: 507,000.
State: Wisconsin;
1998 events: August 1998 flooding;
Allocations: 506,000.
State: New Hampshire;
1998 events: January 1998 ice storm;
Allocations: 505,000.
Total;
1998 events: [Empty];
Allocations: $343,667,591.
Source: FHWA.
[End of table]
Table 4: Allocations by Event for 1999:
State: North Carolina;
1999 events: September 1999 Hurricane Floyd;
Allocations: $38,000,000.
State: Federal land management agencies;
1999 events: Federal lands management agencies;
Allocations: 32,636,030.
State: Washington;
1999 events: January/March 1999 storm;
Allocations: 22,073,000.
State: North Dakota;
1999 events: April/May 1999 flood;
Allocations: 14,010,000.
State: New York;
1999 events: September 1999 Hurricane Floyd;
Allocations: 14,000,000.
State: New Jersey;
1999 events: Hurricane Floyd;
Allocations: 11,900,000.
State: Texas;
1999 events: October 1998 flood;
Allocations: 11,600,000.
State: Virginia;
1999 events: September 1999 Hurricane Floyd;
Allocations: 11,105,600.
State: Colorado;
1999 events: April/May 1999 flood;
Allocations: 7,400,000.
State: Washington;
1999 events: Washington, November/December 1998 storm;
Allocations: 6,634,000.
State: Ohio;
1999 events: November 1998 US 32 failure;
Allocations: 5,076,000.
State: California;
1999 events: February 1999 storm;
Allocations: 5,000,000.
State: Idaho;
1999 events: October 1998 US 95 slide;
Allocations: 4,655,000.
State: Colorado;
1999 events: July 1999 flood;
Allocations: 4,300,000.
State: Nevada;
1999 events: July 1999 flood;
Allocations: 4,200,000.
State: Florida;
1999 events: September 1999 Hurricane Floyd;
Allocations: 3,426,000.
State: Virginia;
1999 events: December 1998 ice storm;
Allocations: 3,422,000.
State: South Carolina;
1999 events: September 1999 Hurricane Floyd;
Allocations: 3,100,000.
State: Oregon;
1999 events: January 1999 storm;
Allocations: 2,590,000.
State: North Carolina;
1999 events: April 1999 I-40 slide;
Allocations: 2,086,000.
State: Pennsylvania;
1999 events: September 1999 Hurricane Floyd;
Allocations: 2,000,000.
State: Oklahoma;
1999 events: May 1999 tornado and storm;
Allocations: 1,801,000.
State: Iowa;
1999 events: May 1999 flood;
Allocations: 1,500,000.
State: Maryland;
1999 events: September 1999 Hurricane Floyd;
Allocations: 1,500,000.
State: Minnesota;
1999 events: July 1999 storm;
Allocations: 1,296,000.
State: North Carolina;
1999 events: August 1999 Hurricane Dennis;
Allocations: 1,035,000.
State: Oklahoma;
1999 events: October/November 1998 storm;
Allocations: 755,000.
State: Kansas;
1999 events: November 1998 flood;
Allocations: 658,000.
State: New York;
1999 events: July 1999 storm;
Allocations: 640,000.
State: Alabama;
1999 events: December 1998 storm;
Allocations: 531,000.
State: Kansas;
1999 events: October 1998 flood;
Allocations: 529,000.
Total;
1999 events: [Empty];
Allocations: $219,458,630.
Source: FHWA.
[End of table]
Table 5: Allocations by Event for 2000:
State: Federal land management agencies;
2000 events: Federal land management agencies;
Allocations: $30,469,847.
State: New York;
2000 events: May 2000 flooding;
Allocations: 16,000,000.
State: Hawaii;
2000 events: March 2000 rock slide;
Allocations: 11,250,000.
State: North Carolina;
2000 events: January 2000 winter storm;
Allocations: 7,000,000.
State: Oregon;
2000 events: November 1999 heavy rains;
Allocations: 6,704,000.
State: New Jersey;
2000 events: August 2000 flood;
Allocations: 5,519,000.
State: North Dakota;
2000 events: June 2000 flood;
Allocations: 4,680,000.
State: Washington;
2000 events: December 1999 storm and flood;
Allocations: 3,314,000.
State: Florida;
2000 events: September 1999 Hurricane Irene;
Allocations: 2,600,000.
State: Wisconsin;
2000 events: May/June 2000 storm;
Allocations: 2,234,000.
State: West Virginia;
2000 events: February 2000 flood;
Allocations: 936,000.
State: Missouri;
2000 events: May 2000 flood;
Allocations: 829,000.
State: Virginia;
2000 events: November 1999 Hurricane Lenny;
Allocations: 550,000.
Total;
2000 events: [Empty];
Allocations: $92,085,847.
Source: FHWA.
[End of table]
Table 6: Allocations by Event for 2001:
State: New York;
2001 events: September 11, 2001, World Trade Center terrorist attacks;
Allocations: $242,000,000.
State: Arizona;
2001 events: December 2000 ice storm;
Allocations: 45,951,937.
State: Washington;
2001 events: February 2001 Nisqually earthquake;
Allocations: 46,225,000.
State: North Dakota;
2001 events: Spring 2001 Devils Lake;
Allocations: 45,073,000.
State: Hawaii;
2001 events: November 2000 flooding;
Allocations: 32,968,000.
State: Federal land management agencies;
2001 events: Federal land management agencies;
Allocations: 17,270,686.
State: Texas;
2001 events: September 2001 Queen Isabella Bridge failure;
Allocations: 12,800,000.
State: West Virginia;
2001 events: July 7, 2001, flood;
Allocations: 10,357,000.
State: Oklahoma;
2001 events: December/January 2001 ice storm;
Allocations: 10,257,000.
State: New Jersey;
2001 events: June 2001 I-80 truck fire;
Allocations: 6,575,000.
State: Texas;
2001 events: December/January 2001 ice storm;
Allocations: 5,910,000.
State: Arizona;
2001 events: October 2000 flood;
Allocations: 5,788,800.
State: Texas;
2001 events: June 2001 Storm Allison;
Allocations: 5,440,000.
State: Ohio;
2001 events: May 2001 I-77 failure;
Allocations: 5,217,000.
State: Missouri;
2001 events: September 2001 Rte. MM bridge over I-44 failure;
Allocations: 5,062,000.
State: Ohio;
2001 events: January 2001 rock slide on Route 7;
Allocations: 2,873,000.
State: Oregon;
2001 events: October 2000 heavy rains;
Allocations: 2,315,000.
State: Virginia;
2001 events: July 2001 flood;
Allocations: 2,230,034.
State: Minnesota;
2001 events: April 2001 flood;
Allocations: 1,865,016.
State: West Virginia;
2001 events: July 26, 2001 flood;
Allocations: 1,458,000.
State: Colorado;
2001 events: August 2001 flood;
Allocations: 1,357,000.
State: Puerto Rico;
2001 events: November 2001 flood;
Allocations: 1,315,000.
State: Pennsylvania;
2001 events: June 2001 flood;
Allocations: 1,138,000.
State: West Virginia;
2001 events: May 2001 flood;
Allocations: 887,000.
State: New York;
2001 events: December 2000 flood;
Allocations: 775,000.
State: South Dakota;
2001 events: Spring 2001 flood;
Allocations: 717,000.
Total;
2001 events: [Empty];
Allocations: $513,825,473.
Source: FHWA.
[End of table]
Table 7: Allocations by Event for 2002:
State: Illinois;
2002 events: April 2002 flood;
Allocations: $30,562,000.
State: Oklahoma;
2002 events: May 2002 I-40 bridge failure;
Allocations: 28,645,000.
State: Texas;
2002 events: July 2002 flood;
Allocations: 13,673,000.
State: West Virginia;
2002 events: May 2002 flood;
Allocations: 8,196,000.
State: Guam;
2002 events: July 2002 Typhoon Chatan;
Allocations: 7,072,500.
State: Federal land management agencies;
2002 events: Federal land management agencies;
Allocations: 5,468,376.
State: Nebraska;
2002 events: July 2002 flood;
Allocations: 4,550,000.
State: Virginia;
2002 events: March 2002 flood;
Allocations: 4,417,073.
State: Missouri;
2002 events: April 2002 flood;
Allocations: 3,000,000.
State: Alabama;
2002 events: January 2002 I-65 bridge failure;
Allocations: 2,807,000.
State: Arizona;
2002 events: Rodeo-Chediski wild fire 2002;
Allocations: 2,695,200.
State: Michigan;
2002 events: April 2002 flood;
Allocations: 2,637,000.
State: American Samoa;
2002 events: October 2001 rockfall on Route 1;
Allocations: 2,613,000.
State: Minnesota;
2002 events: June 2002 flood;
Allocations: 2,333,415.
State: Washington;
2002 events: November/December 2001 flood;
Allocations: 1,847,000.
State: Guam;
2002 events: October 2001 earthquake;
Allocations: 1,687,000.
State: Washington;
2002 events: January 2002 storm;
Allocations: 1,400,000.
State: Wyoming;
2002 events: August 2002 flood;
Allocations: 1,297,955.
State: Montana;
2002 events: June 2002 flood;
Allocations: 882,000.
State: Idaho;
2002 events: April 2002 flood;
Allocations: 732,000.
State: Alaska;
2002 events: Spring 2002 flood;
Allocations: 713,262.
State: New York;
2002 events: April 2002 earthquake--Clinton County;
Allocations: 690,016.
State: Total;
2002 events: [Empty];
Allocations: $127,918,797.
Source: FHWA.
[End of table]
Table 8: Allocations by Event for 2003:
State: California;
2003 events: December 2002 storms;
Allocations: $54,200,000.
State: Alaska;
2003 events: November 3, 2002 earthquake;
Allocations: 37,804,337.
State: Virginia;
2003 events: September 2003 Hurricane Isabel;
Allocations: 34,988,948.
State: North Carolina;
2003 events: September 2003 Hurricane Isabel;
Allocations: 21,000,000.
State: North Carolina;
2003 events: December, 2002 winter storm;
Allocations: 18,000,000.
State: Alaska;
2003 events: October/November 2002 floods;
Allocations: 11,736,409.
State: Federal lands Management agencies;
2003 events: Federal lands management agencies;
Allocations: 11,435,365.
State: Guam;
2003 events: December 2002 Typhoon Pongsonga;
Allocations: 9,977,526.
State: Louisiana;
2003 events: 2003 Hurricane Lilli;
Allocations: 7,125,552.
State: New York;
2003 events: April 2003 ice storm;
Allocations: 6,691,951.
State: North Carolina;
2003 events: February 2003 ice storm;
Allocations: 6,000,000.
State: Maryland;
2003 events: September 2003 Hurricane Isabel;
Allocations: 5,721,500.
State: American Samoa;
2003 events: May 2003 flooding/landslides;
Allocations: 5,015,500.
State: West Virginia;
2003 events: June 2003 storms/flooding;
Allocations: 3,694,695.
State: Mississippi;
2003 events: April 2003 storms;
Allocations: 2,814,684.
State: Pennsylvania;
2003 events: September 2003 flooding;
Allocations: 2,743,600.
State: New Hampshire;
2003 events: August 2003 storms;
Allocations: 2,697,000.
State: New York;
2003 events: Summer 2003 storms;
Allocations: 2,648,669.
State: Puerto Rico;
2003 events: April 2003 Rains, runoff, and flooding;
Allocations: 2,600,000.
State: Colorado;
2003 events: June 2003 sinkhole I-70;
Allocations: 2,421,928.
State: Delaware;
2003 events: 2003 Hurricane Isabel and Storm Henri;
Allocations: 2,250,000.
State: Michigan;
2003 events: May 2003 storms;
Allocations: 2,103,736.
State: Pennsylvania;
2003 events: July 2003 storms;
Allocations: 1,940,956.
State: Washington;
2003 events: February 2003 storms--multiple counties;
Allocations: 1,725,000.
State: Nebraska;
2003 events: May 2003 I-80 overpass collapse;
Allocations: 1,500,000.
State: Northern Mariana Islands;
2003 events: December 2002 Typhoon Pongsonga;
Allocations: 1,168,157.
State: Texas;
2003 events: 2003 Hurricane Claudette;
Allocations: 1,061,212.
State: Kansas;
2003 events: June 2003 flood;
Allocations: 1,026,285.
State: New York;
2003 events: August 2003 power outage;
Allocations: 1,000,000.
State: Vermont;
2003 events: August 2003 storm;
Allocations: 815,500.
State: West Virginia;
2003 events: February 2003 storms;
Allocations: 631,000.
State: Total;
2003 events: [Empty];
Allocations: $264,539,510.
Source: FHWA.
[End of table]
Table 9: Allocations by Event for 2004:
State: Florida;
2004 events: September 2004 Hurricane Ivan;
Allocations: $442,458,964.
State: Florida;
2004 events: September 2004 Hurricane Jeanne;
Allocations: 222,757,654.
State: Florida;
2004 events: August 2004 Hurricane Charley;
Allocations: 155,884,806.
State: Florida;
2004 events: September 2004 Hurricane Frances;
Allocations: 107,274,607.
State: Federal land management agencies;
2004 events: Federal land management agencies;
Allocations: 68,796,364.
State: Ohio;
2004 events: Hurricane Ivan;
Allocations: 66,057,000.
State: Federal land management agencies;
2004 events: Federal land management agencies (2004 hurricanes);
Allocations: 50,247,100.
State: California;
2004 events: October 2003 San Diego wildfires;
Allocations: 44,300,000.
State: Pennsylvania;
2004 events: Hurricane Ivan;
Allocations: 39,400,000.
State: Ohio;
2004 events: January 2004 flooding;
Allocations: 32,423,648.
State: North Carolina;
2004 events: Hurricane Ivan;
Allocations: 22,000,000.
State: Alabama;
2004 events: September 2004 Hurricane Ivan;
Allocations: 18,300,000.
State: Washington;
2004 events: October 2003 storms and flooding;
Allocations: 17,246,000.
State: American Samoa;
2004 events: January 2004 Tropical Cyclone Heta;
Allocations: 15,725,525.
State: North Carolina;
2004 events: May 2004 Devils Lake;
Allocations: 13,572,000.
State: West Virginia;
2004 events: Hurricane Ivan;
Allocations: 13,540,814.
State: Connecticut;
2004 events: March 2004 I-95 truck fire;
Allocations: 11,200,000.
State: California;
2004 events: Inyo County flood;
Allocations: 9,300,000.
State: West Virginia;
2004 events: November 2003 rains and flooding;
Allocations: 7,052,805.
State: New Jersey;
2004 events: July 2004 flooding;
Allocations: 6,572,309.
State: Virginia;
2004 events: August 2004 Tropical Storm Gaston;
Allocations: 6,154,060.
State: Pennsylvania;
2004 events: January 24, 2004, Route 33 sinkhole;
Allocations: 5,839,886.
State: Puerto Rico;
2004 events: November 2003 rainfall;
Allocations: 5,800,000.
State: West Virginia;
2004 events: May 2004 flooding;
Allocations: 5,063,199.
State: Texas;
2004 events: April 2004 I-20 bridge failure;
Allocations: 4,766,192.
State: Montana;
2004 events: November 2003 US 2 bridge damage;
Allocations: 3,678,076.
State: California;
2004 events: December 2003 San Simeon Earthquake;
Allocations: 3,600,000.
State: North Carolina;
2004 events: Hurricane Frances;
Allocations: 3,220,000.
State: Iowa;
2004 events: May/June 2004 storms and flooding;
Allocations: 3,000,028.
State: Ohio;
2004 events: May/June 2004 flooding;
Allocations: 2,610,000.
State: New York;
2004 events: August/September 2004 storms and flooding;
Allocations: 2,025,000.
State: Georgia;
2004 events: Hurricane Ivan;
Allocations: 2,000,000.
State: Puerto Rico;
2004 events: September 2004 Hurricane Jeanne;
Allocations: 2,000,000.
State: North Dakota;
2004 events: Spring 2004 flooding in northeast North Dakota;
Allocations: 1,980,949.
State: Arizona;
2004 events: April 2004 Flooding;
Allocations: 1,812,834.
State: New York;
2004 events: May/June 2004 storms and flooding;
Allocations: 1,660,000.
State: Georgia;
2004 events: Hurricane Frances;
Allocations: 1,600,000.
State: Washington;
2004 events: November 2003 storms and flooding;
Allocations: 1,400,000.
State: South Carolina;
2004 events: Tropical Storm Gaston;
Allocations: 1,223,470.
State: Texas;
2004 events: May 2004 flooding;
Allocations: 1,156,871.
State: Virginia;
2004 events: November 2003 rainfall;
Allocations: 1,100,000.
State: Delaware;
2004 events: September 2004 Tropical Storm Jeanne;
Allocations: 1,000,000.
State: South Carolina;
2004 events: January 2004 ice storm;
Allocations: 977,441.
State: Northern Mariana Islands;
2004 events: August 2004 Typhoon Chaba;
Allocations: 944,264.
State: Montana;
2004 events: February 2004 rock slide;
Allocations: 840,605.
State: Idaho;
2004 events: August 2004 rains;
Allocations: 763,600.
State: Guam;
2004 events: Tropical Storm Ting-Ting;
Allocations: 550,700.
Total;
2004 events: [Empty];
Allocations: $1,430,876,771.
Source: FHWA.
[End of table]
Table 10: Allocations by Event for 2005:
State: Louisiana;
2005 events: August 2005 Hurricane Katrina;
Allocations: $1,111,417,263.
State: Mississippi;
2005 events: August 2005 Hurricane Katrina;
Allocations: 1,013,000,000.
State: California;
2005 events: 2004-2005 winter storms;
Allocations: 245,000,000.
State: Florida;
2005 events: July 2005 Hurricane Dennis;
Allocations: 118,509,358.
State: Louisiana;
2005 events: September 2005 Hurricane Rita;
Allocations: 78,136,384.
State: Ohio;
2005 events: December 2004 rainfall and flooding;
Allocations: 60,035,013.
State: Florida;
2005 events: August 2005 Hurricane Katrina;
Allocations: 42,843,797.
State: Texas;
2005 events: September 2005 Hurricane Rita;
Allocations: 36,994,607.
State: Ohio;
2005 events: January 2005 rainfall and flooding;
Allocations: 28,962,132.
State: Federal land management agencies;
2005 events: Federal land management agencies;
Allocations: 28,600,000.
State: Alabama;
2005 events: August 2005 Hurricane Katrina;
Allocations: 17,577,720.
State: Montana;
2005 events: May 2005 Beartooth Highway landslides;
Allocations: 17,000,000.
State: Nevada;
2005 events: January 2005 flooding;
Allocations: 16,883,960.
State: North Dakota;
2005 events: Devils Lake SAFETEA-LU Section 1937;
Allocations: 10,000,000.
State: West Virginia;
2005 events: January 2005 flooding;
Allocations: 9,577,789.
State: New York;
2005 events: April 2005 flooding;
Allocations: 8,805,139.
State: Utah;
2005 events: January 2005 flooding;
Allocations: 8,800,000.
State: Alabama;
2005 events: I-65/I-20 bridge damage;
Allocations: 8,508,666.
State: Pennsylvania;
2005 events: April 2005 flooding;
Allocations: 6,467,410.
State: Idaho;
2005 events: June 3, 2005, US 95 landslide;
Allocations: 4,420,646.
State: Pennsylvania;
2005 events: January 2005 heavy rains;
Allocations: 4,007,046.
State: Alaska;
2005 events: October 2004 storm damage;
Allocations: 3,323,500.
State: American Samoa;
2005 events: February 2005 Tropical Cyclone Olaf;
Allocations: 3,245,410.
State: Colorado;
2005 events: June 2005 US 6 rock slide;
Allocations: 3,220,000.
State: Alaska;
2005 events: September 2005 storm surge and flooding;
Allocations: 2,610,505.
State: Utah;
2005 events: April-June 2005 flooding;
Allocations: 2,416,344.
State: Florida;
2005 events: September 2005 Hurricane Rita;
Allocations: 2,331,245.
State: Alaska;
2005 events: May 2005 flooding;
Allocations: 2,098,072.
State: Alabama;
2005 events: July 2005 Hurricane Dennis;
Allocations: 2,010,000.
State: Washington;
2005 events: December 10, 2004 storm;
Allocations: 1,789,820.
State: Colorado;
2005 events: November 2004 I-70 rock slide;
Allocations: 1,400,000.
State: New York;
2005 events: June 2005 flooding and mud slides/I-87 closure;
Allocations: 1,245,092.
State: North Carolina;
2005 events: September 2005 Hurricane Ophelia;
Allocations: 1,165,234.
State: Washington;
2005 events: September 2005 I-90 rock slide;
Allocations: 1,030,000.
State: New Mexico;
2005 events: February 2005 storms;
Allocations: 1,011,632.
State: New York;
2005 events: July 2005 Hadlock Pond Dam failure;
Allocations: 989,192.
State: New Hampshire;
2005 events: June 2005 flooding;
Allocations: 843,980.
Total;
2005 events: [Empty];
Allocations: $2,906,276,956.
Source: FHWA.
[End of table]
Table 11: Allocations by Event for 2006:
State: Florida;
2006 events: October 2005 Hurricane Wilma;
Allocations: $478,000,000.
State: Oregon;
2006 events: December 2005 flooding;
Allocations: 38,000,000.
State: Washington;
2006 events: 2005/2006 winter storms;
Allocations: 25,000,000.
State: Pennsylvania;
2006 events: June 2006 flooding;
Allocations: 18,500,000.
State: New Hampshire;
2006 events: October 2005 northeast flooding;
Allocations: 17,881,986.
State: Federal land management agencies;
2006 events: Federal land management agencies;
Allocations: 16,555,120.
State: Colorado;
2006 events: July 2006 flood damage to State Highway 67;
Allocations: 15,700,000.
State: New York;
2006 events: June 2006 flooding;
Allocations: 11,800,000.
State: Hawaii;
2006 events: March 2006 rainfall and flooding;
Allocations: 11,542,154.
State: North Dakota;
2006 events: Devils Lake SAFETEA-LU Section 1937;
Allocations: 10,000,000.
State: Ohio;
2006 events: July 2006 rainfall and flooding;
Allocations: 7,250,000.
State: Maine;
2006 events: May 2006 rainfall and flooding;
Allocations: 3,953,800.
State: Massachusetts;
2006 events: October 2005 flooding;
Allocations: 3,884,375.
State: Alaska;
2006 events: August 2006 storms;
Allocations: 3,028,797.
State: Puerto Rico;
2006 events: October 2005 rains;
Allocations: 2,510,246.
State: Delaware;
2006 events: June 2006 flooding;
Allocations: 2,500,000.
State: Rhode Island;
2006 events: October 2005 northeast flooding;
Allocations: 1,650,000.
State: Alaska;
2006 events: November 2005 winter storms;
Allocations: 1,610,456.
State: Minnesota;
2006 events: March/May 2006 flooding;
Allocations: 1,232,729.
State: Vermont;
2006 events: December 2005 Elm Street rock slope failure;
Allocations: 1,200,000.
State: Idaho;
2006 events: April 2006 State Highway 34 landslide;
Allocations: 1,090,000.
State: Kansas;
2006 events: October 2005 heavy rains and flooding;
Allocations: 931,055.
State: Connecticut;
2006 events: October 2005 northeast flooding;
Allocations: 812,714.
State: Idaho;
2006 events: May 2006 storm runoff damage;
Allocations: 459,000.
Total;
2006 events: [Empty];
Allocations: $675,092,432.
Source: FHWA.
[End of table]
Table 12: Summary Table of Annual Allocations:
Fiscal year: 1998;
Total all event allocations: $343,667,591.
Fiscal year: 1999;
Total all event allocations: 219,458,630.
Fiscal year: 2000;
Total all event allocations: 92,085,847.
Fiscal year: 2001;
Total all event allocations: 513,825,473.
Fiscal year: 2002;
Total all event allocations: 127,918,797.
Fiscal year: 2003;
Total all event allocations: 264,539,510.
Fiscal year: 2004;
Total all event allocations: 1,430,876,771.
Fiscal year: 2005;
Total all event allocations: 2,906,276,956.
Fiscal year: 2006;
Total all event allocations: 675,092,432.
Average;
Total all event allocations: $730,415,770.
Median;
Total all event allocations: $343,667,591.
Source: GAO analysis of FHWA data.
Note: Annual totals are not adjusted for inflation.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Summary of Emergency Relief Program Supplemental
Appropriations:
Table:
Public law reference: P.L. 101-130;
Fiscal year: 1990;
Title or description: Fiscal Year 1990 Dire Emergency Supplemental to
Meet the Needs of Natural Disasters of National Significance;
Supplemental appropriation amount: $1 billion.
Public law reference: P.L.-102-368;
Fiscal year: 1992;
Title or description: Supplemental appropriations for Fiscal Year 1992;
Supplemental appropriation amount: $30 million.
Public law reference: P.L.-103-75;
Fiscal year: 1993;
Title or description: Emergency supplemental appropriations for relief
from the major, widespread flooding in the Midwest for the fiscal year
ending September 30, 1993;
Supplemental appropriation amount: $175 million.
Public law reference: P.L.-103-211;
Fiscal year: 1994;
Title or description: Making emergency supplemental appropriations for
the fiscal year ending September 30, 1994, and for other purposes;
Supplemental appropriation amount: $1.665 billion.
Public law reference: P.L.-104-134;
Fiscal year: 1996;
Title or description: Making appropriations for fiscal year 1996 to
make a further down payment toward a balanced budget, and for other
purposes;
Supplemental appropriation amount: $300 million.
Public law reference: P.L.-104-208;
Fiscal year: 1997;
Title or description: Making Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations for
Fiscal Year 1997;
Supplemental appropriation amount: $82 million.
Public law reference: P.L.-105-18;
Fiscal year: 1997;
Title or description: 1997 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act
for Recovery from Natural Disasters, and for Overseas Peacekeeping
Efforts, Including Those in Bosnia;
Supplemental appropriation amount: $650 million.
Public law reference: P.L.-105-174;
Fiscal year: 1998;
Title or description: 1998 Supplemental Appropriations and Rescissions
Act;
Supplemental appropriation amount: $259 million.
Public law reference: P.L.-106-346;
Fiscal year: 2001;
Title or description: Department of Transportation and Related Agencies
Appropriations, 2001;
Supplemental appropriation amount: $720 million.
Public law reference: P.L.-107-117;
Fiscal year: 2002;
Title or description: Department of Defense and Emergency Supplemental
Appropriations for Recovery from and Response to Terrorist Attacks on
the United States Act, 2002;
Supplemental appropriation amount: $75 million.
Public law reference: P.L.-107-206;
Fiscal year: 2002;
Title or description: 2002 Supplemental Appropriations Act for Further
Recovery from and Response to Terrorist Attacks on the United States;
Supplemental appropriation amount: $265 million.
Public law reference: P.L.-108-324;
Fiscal year: 2005;
Title or description: Military Construction Appropriations and
Emergency Hurricane Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2005;
Supplemental appropriation amount: $1.202 billion.
Public law reference: P.L.-108-447;
Fiscal year: 2005;
Title or description: Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005;
Supplemental appropriation amount: $741 million.
Public law reference: P.L.-109-148;
Fiscal year: 2006;
Title or description: Department of Defense, Emergency Supplemental
Appropriations to Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, and
Pandemic Influenza Act, 2006;
Supplemental appropriation amount: $2.750 billion.
Public law reference: P.L. 109-234;
Fiscal year: 2006;
Title or description: Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for
Defense, The Global War on Terror, and Hurricane Recovery, 2006;
Supplemental appropriation amount: $702 million.
Source: GAO analysis of FHWA Emergency Relief program information and
congressional legislation.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix V: Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Katherine Siggerud, (202) 512-2834:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the individual named above, other key contributors to
this report were Steve Cohen, Assistant Director, and Ashley Alley,
Robert Ciszewski, Colin Fallon, Don Kittler, and Amber Yancey-Carroll.
FOOTNOTES
[1] In this report we refer to states as the 50 United States, the
District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and U.S. territories.
[2] Contract authority allows federal agencies to incur obligations
that will result in the outlay of funds, to be made in advance of
appropriations.
[3] Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A
Legacy for Users, Pub. L. No. 109-59, § 1937, 119 Stat. 1510 (Aug. 10,
2005).
[4] FHWA has allocation data for individual events dating back only to
1998.
[5] Through the many programs included under the umbrella of the
Federal-aid Highway Program, FHWA provides approximately $30 billion
per year to state and local governments for constructing, preserving,
and improving the National Highway System and other federal-aid
highways.
[6] The criteria for administering Emergency Relief funds are set out
in 23 C.F.R. Part 668.
[7] 23 U.S.C. sec. 120(e) (2006).
[8] The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 requires federal
agencies to assess the environmental impacts of their programs and
actions. As a condition for receiving federal funds for highway
projects, state departments of transportation must also comply with
NEPA.
[9] These activities are conducted under FEMA's Public Assistance
Program, as first authorized under the Stafford Act, Pub. L. No. 93-
288, 88 Stat. 143 (May 22, 1974) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 5172).
Under this program, the federal share is not less than 75 percent of
costs.
[10] Because of the extraordinary disasters, the average (mean) cost
per event during this period was much higher--about $23.9 million.
[11] Annual spending from the Highway Trust Fund is largely controlled
by limits on the amount of contract authority that can be obligated in
a particular year. Such obligation limitations are customarily set by
Congress in appropriation acts. CBO baseline projections of outlays for
the Highway Trust Fund assume that policymakers will continue to
control spending through obligation limitations set in annual
appropriation acts.
[12] This is the cumulative unobligated balance of Emergency Relief
program funds from fiscal years 1997 through 2006. This does not
include unobligated balances from the Federal Lands projects which are
not maintained in FMIS.
[13] The criteria for administering Emergency Relief funds are set out
in 23 C.F.R. Section 668.
[14] Categorical exclusions are actions that do not involve significant
environmental impacts. Under FHWA regulations for implementing NEPA (23
C.F.R. 771.117) emergency repairs qualify as categorical exclusions.
[15] GAO, Emergency Relief: Status of the Replacement of the Cypress
Viaduct, GAO/RCED-96-136 (Washington, D.C.: May 6, 1996).
[16] The Emergency Relief program regulations were amended in the year
2000, to state that where it was not feasible to replace a damaged
highway in an existing location, an alternative selected through the
NEPA process would be eligible for Emergency Relief program funding.
[17] Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-424,
§ 153, 96 Stat. 2097 (Jan. 6, 1983).
[18] Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century, Pub. L. No. 105-
178, § 1217, 112 Stat. 214 (Jun. 9, 1998).
[19] A bascule bridge is a type of movable drawbridge in which the span
swings upward to provide passage for ship traffic.
[20] Department of Defense, Emergency Supplemental Appropriation to
Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic Influenza Act,
2006, Pub. L. No. 109-148, Ch. 9, 119 Stat. 2778 (Dec. 30, 2005).
[21] Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005, Pub. L. No. 108-447, § 127,
118 Stat. 3214 (Dec. 8, 2004).
[22] The April 2000 FHWA memorandum also established criteria that
defined when a Devils Lake grade raise would become eligible, based on
forecasted increases in the lake level by the National Weather Service
and the U.S. Geological Survey.
[23] 23 C.F.R. section 650.115(c).
[24] Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act:
A Legacy for Users, Pub. L. No. 109-59, § 1937, 119 Stat. 1510 (Aug.
10, 2005).
[25] Department of Defense, Emergency Supplemental Appropriation to
Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic Influenza Act,
2006, Pub. L. No. 109-148, Ch. 9, 119 Stat. 2778 (Dec. 30, 2005).
[26] Or a higher sliding scale percentage for states with high
percentages of federally owned public lands.
[27] 2002 Supplemental Appropriations Act for Further Recovery from and
Response to Terrorist Attacks on the United States. Pub. L. No. 107-
206, 116 Stat. 882 (Aug. 2, 2002).
[28] Further Continuing Appropriations, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-130, 103
Stat. 775 (Oct. 26, 1989); Emergency Supplemental Appropriations and
Rescissions, Pub. L. No. 103-211, 108 Stat. 9 (Feb. 12, 1994); Omnibus
Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-134, 110 Stat. 1321-331 (Apr. 26, 1996); Omnibus Consolidated and
Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-277,
112 Stat. 2681-585 (Oct. 21, 1998); Military Construction
Appropriations and Emergency Hurricane Supplemental Appropriations Act,
2005, Pub. L. No. 108-324, 118 Stat. 1251 (Oct. 13, 2004); and
Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War
on Terror, and Hurricane Recovery, 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-234, 120 Stat.
471 (Jun. 15, 2006).
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