Joint Planning and Development Office
Progress and Key Issues in Planning the Transition to the Next Generation Air Transportation System
Gao ID: GAO-07-693T March 29, 2007
The skies over America are becoming more crowded every day. The consensus of opinion is that the current system cannot be expanded to meet projected growth. In 2003, recognizing the need for system transformation, Congress authorized the creation of the Joint Planning and Development Office (JPDO), housed within the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), to lead a collaborative effort of federal and nonfederal aviation stakeholders to conceptualize and plan the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen)--a fundamental redesign and modernization of the national airspace system. JPDO operates in conjunction with its partner agencies, which include FAA; the Departments of Transportation, Commerce, Defense, and Homeland Security; the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA); and the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy. GAO's testimony focuses on the progress that JPDO has made in planning the NextGen initiative and some key issues and challenges that JPDO continues to face. This statement is based on GAO's November 2006 report to this subcommittee as well as ongoing work. In our November 2006 report, we recommended that JPDO take actions to institutionalize its collaboration and determine if it had the involvement of all key stakeholders. JPDO said it would consider our recommendations.
JPDO has made progress in several areas in its planning of the NextGen initiative, but continues to face a number of challenges. JPDO's organizational structure incorporates some of the practices that we have found to be effective for federal interagency collaborations, and includes an institute that facilitates the participation of nonfederal stakeholders. JPDO has faced some organizational challenges, however. Leadership turnover at JPDO and the Institute have raised concerns about the stability of JPDO and the impact of the turnovers on its progress. Additionally, we and JPDO officials have heard concerns from stakeholders about the productivity of some integrated product teams and the pace of the planning effort. In response, JPDO officials are currently proposing several changes to JPDO's organizational structure aimed at improving the organization's effectiveness. JPDO has also made progress toward releasing several key planning documents, including a Concept of Operations, an Enterprise Architecture, and an Integrated Work Plan, although in some cases on a revised and extended timeline. JPDO is focusing on the right types of key documents for the foundation of NextGen planning, although the current draft Concept of Operations still lacks important details. In our November 2006 report, we noted that JPDO is fundamentally a planning and coordinating body that lacks authority over the key human and technological resources of its partner agencies. Consequently, institutionalizing the collaborative process with its partner agencies will be critical to JPDO's ability to facilitate the implementation of NextGen. JPDO has identified several tasks including aligning the enterprise architectures of its partner agencies, working with OMB to establish a cross-agency mechanism for NextGen funding decisions, and working with FAA to revamp a key planning document to focus on the NextGen effort. JPDO has made progress in developing cost estimates for NextGen, recently reporting that it estimates the total federal cost for NextGen infrastructure through 2025 will range between $15 billion and $22 billion. Questions remain, however, over which entities will fund and conduct some of the necessary research, development, and demonstration projects that in the past were often conducted by NASA, and which will be key to achieving certain NextGen capabilities. For example, JPDO's investment simulation capability, which relies heavily on a NASA modeling platform, may be constrained unless the JPDO or another partner agency can assume the modeling work. JPDO also faces a challenge in addressing questions concerning how human factors issues, such as the changing roles of air traffic controllers in a more automated NextGen environment, will be researched and addressed. Finally, JPDO has a continuing challenge in ensuring the involvement of all key stakeholders, including controllers and technicians. Similarly, issues have arisen over whether conflict of interest issues could chill the participation of industry stakeholders.
GAO-07-693T, Joint Planning and Development Office: Progress and Key Issues in Planning the Transition to the Next Generation Air Transportation System
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Testimony:
Before the Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics, Committee on Science
and Technology, House of Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT:
Thursday, March 29, 2007:
Joint Planning and Development Office:
Progress and Key Issues in Planning the Transition to the Next
Generation Air Transportation System:
Statement of Gerald L. Dillingham, Ph.D.
Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues:
GAO-07-693T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-07-693T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on Space
and Aeronautics, Committee on Science and Technology, House of
Representatives
Why GAO Did This Study:
The skies over America are becoming more crowded every day. The
consensus of opinion is that the current system cannot be expanded to
meet projected growth. In 2003, recognizing the need for system
transformation, Congress authorized the creation of the Joint Planning
and Development Office (JPDO), housed within the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), to lead a collaborative effort of federal and
nonfederal aviation stakeholders to conceptualize and plan the Next
Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen)”a fundamental redesign
and modernization of the national airspace system. JPDO operates in
conjunction with its partner agencies, which include FAA; the
Departments of Transportation, Commerce, Defense, and Homeland
Security; the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA); and
the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy.
GAO‘s testimony focuses on the progress that JPDO has made in planning
the NextGen initiative and some key issues and challenges that JPDO
continues to face. This statement is based on GAO‘s November 2006
report to this subcommittee as well as ongoing work. In our November
2006 report, we recommended that JPDO take actions to institutionalize
its collaboration and determine if it had the involvement of all key
stakeholders. JPDO said it would consider our recommendations.
What GAO Found:
JPDO has made progress in several areas in its planning of the NextGen
initiative, but continues to face a number of challenges. JPDO‘s
organizational structure incorporates some of the practices that we
have found to be effective for federal interagency collaborations, and
includes an institute that facilitates the participation of nonfederal
stakeholders. JPDO has faced some organizational challenges, however.
Leadership turnover at JPDO and the Institute have raised concerns
about the stability of JPDO and the impact of the turnovers on its
progress. Additionally, we and JPDO officials have heard concerns from
stakeholders about the productivity of some integrated product teams
and the pace of the planning effort. In response, JPDO officials are
currently proposing several changes to JPDO‘s organizational structure
aimed at improving the organization‘s effectiveness.
JPDO has also made progress toward releasing several key planning
documents, including a Concept of Operations, an Enterprise
Architecture, and an Integrated Work Plan, although in some cases on a
revised and extended timeline. JPDO is focusing on the right types of
key documents for the foundation of NextGen planning, although the
current draft Concept of Operations still lacks important details. In
our November 2006 report, we noted that JPDO is fundamentally a
planning and coordinating body that lacks authority over the key human
and technological resources of its partner agencies. Consequently,
institutionalizing the collaborative process with its partner agencies
will be critical to JPDO‘s ability to facilitate the implementation of
NextGen. JPDO has identified several tasks including aligning the
enterprise architectures of its partner agencies, working with OMB to
establish a cross-agency mechanism for NextGen funding decisions, and
working with FAA to revamp a key planning document to focus on the
NextGen effort.
JPDO has made progress in developing cost estimates for NextGen,
recently reporting that it estimates the total federal cost for NextGen
infrastructure through 2025 will range between $15 billion and $22
billion. Questions remain, however, over which entities will fund and
conduct some of the necessary research, development, and demonstration
projects that in the past were often conducted by NASA, and which will
be key to achieving certain NextGen capabilities. For example, JPDO‘s
investment simulation capability, which relies heavily on a NASA
modeling platform, may be constrained unless the JPDO or another
partner agency can assume the modeling work. JPDO also faces a
challenge in addressing questions concerning how human factors issues,
such as the changing roles of air traffic controllers in a more
automated NextGen environment, will be researched and addressed.
Finally, JPDO has a continuing challenge in ensuring the involvement of
all key stakeholders, including controllers and technicians. Similarly,
issues have arisen over whether conflict of interest issues could chill
the participation of industry stakeholders.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-693T].
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Gerald L. Dillingham,
Ph.D., at (202) 512-2834 or dillinghamg@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
I appreciate the opportunity to testify before you today to discuss the
progress of the Joint Planning and Development Office (JPDO) in
conceptualizing, planning, and facilitating a transformation of the
current national airspace system to the Next Generation Air
Transportation System (NextGen). Our nation's current airspace system
is under growing strain as the demand for air travel is steadily
increasing, from over 740 million passengers flying in fiscal year 2006
to an estimated 1 billion passengers by 2015, according to Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) estimates. The system is also expected to
absorb a growing variety of aircraft, from the jumbo A380 which can
hold more than 500 passengers to very light jets which will transport
six or fewer passengers per flight. The consensus is that the current
system cannot be expanded to meet this projected growth. Without a
timely transition to NextGen capabilities, JPDO officials estimate a
future gap between the demand for air transportation and available
capacity that could cost the U.S. economy billions of dollars annually.
In 2003, recognizing the need for system transformation, Congress
authorized the creation of JPDO,[Footnote 1] housed within FAA, to lead
a collaborative effort of federal and nonfederal aviation stakeholders
to conceptualize and plan the NextGen system. NextGen is envisioned as
a major redesign of the air transportation system that will move from
largely ground-based radars to precision satellite-based navigation and
includes digital, networked communications; an integrated weather
system; layered, adaptive security; and more. In addition to FAA, JPDO
operates in conjunction with multiple federal partner agencies,
including the Departments of Transportation, Commerce, Defense, and
Homeland Security; the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA); and the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy.
My testimony today focuses on the following question: What is the
status of JPDO's planning and facilitation of NextGen with respect to
its organizational structure, technical planning, and initial research
and development? My statement is based on our November 2006 report to
this subcommittee[Footnote 2] as well as on-going work. We conducted
this work in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards.
In summary:
JPDO has made progress in several areas in its planning of the NextGen
initiative, but continues to face a number of challenges. JPDO's
organizational structure incorporates some of the practices that we
have found to be effective for federal interagency collaborations, and
includes an institute that facilitates the participation of nonfederal
stakeholders. JPDO has faced some organizational challenges, however.
Leadership turnover at JPDO and the Institute have raised concerns
about the stability of JPDO and the NextGen initiative. Additionally,
we and JPDO officials have heard concerns from stakeholders about the
productivity of some integrated product teams (IPTs) and the pace of
the planning effort at JPDO. In response, JPDO officials are currently
proposing several changes to JPDO's organizational structure aimed at
improving the effectiveness of the organization. We believe that these
changes could help address stakeholder concerns, but the effectiveness
of these changes will have to be evaluated.
JPDO has also made progress toward releasing several key planning
documents, including a Concept of Operations, an Enterprise
Architecture, and an Integrated Work Plan, although in some cases on a
revised and extended timeline. JPDO is focusing on the right types of
key documents for the foundation of NextGen planning, although the
current draft Concept of Operations still lacks important details. In
our November 2006 report, we noted that JPDO is fundamentally a
planning and coordinating body that lacks authority over the key human
and technological resources of its partner agencies. Consequently,
institutionalizing the collaborative process with its partner agencies
will be critical to JPDO's ability to facilitate the implementation of
NextGen. JPDO has identified several tasks that will help
institutionalize collaboration, including aligning the enterprise
architectures of its partner agencies, working with OMB to establish a
cross-agency mechanism for NextGen funding decisions, and working with
FAA to revamp a key planning document to focus on the NextGen effort.
JPDO has made progress in developing cost estimates for NextGen,
recently reporting that it estimates the total federal cost for NextGen
infrastructure through 2025 will range between $15 billion and $22
billion. Questions remain, however, over which organizations will fund
and conduct some of the necessary research, development, and
demonstration projects that in the past were often conducted by NASA,
and which will be key to achieving certain NextGen capabilities. For
example, JPDO's investment simulation capability relies heavily on a
NASA modeling platform that NASA does not plan to upgrade for 2 years.
As a result, JPDO's investment simulation capability might be
constrained. JPDO also faces a challenge in addressing questions
concerning how human factors issues, such as the changing roles of air
traffic controllers in a more automated NextGen environment, will be
researched and addressed. Finally, JPDO has a continuing challenge in
ensuring the involvement of all key stakeholders. For example, active
air traffic controllers and technicians are not currently involved in
NextGen planning. Similarly, issues have arisen over whether conflict
of interest issues could chill the participation of industry
stakeholders.
In November 2006, we recommended that the Secretary of Transportation
direct JPDO to take actions to institutionalize the partner agencies'
collaboration in supporting NextGen, including action on a Memorandum
of Understanding among the partner agencies, actions to finalize
procedures to leverage partner agency resources, and actions to develop
procedures for dispute resolution. We also recommended that the
Secretary direct JPDO to determine whether key stakeholders and
expertise are not currently represented in JPDO planning efforts. JPDO
officials neither agreed nor disagree with our recommendations, but
said they would consider them.
JPDO Has Made Progress in Planning NextGen, but Continues to Face a
Number of Challenges:
JPDO has continued to make progress in facilitating the collaboration
that is central to its mission and in furthering its key planning
documents. However, JPDO faces a number of challenges involving its
organizational structure, institutionalization of its efforts, research
and development activities, and stakeholder participation.
JPDO's Organizational Structure Facilitates Collaboration, but
Continues to Evolve:
Vision 100 includes requirements for JPDO to coordinate and consult
with its partner agencies, private sector experts, and the public.
JPDO's approach has been to establish an organizational structure that
involves federal and nonfederal stakeholders throughout the
organization. This structure includes a federal interagency senior
policy committee, a board of directors, and an institute to facilitate
the participation of nonfederal stakeholders. JPDO's structure also
includes eight integrated product teams (IPT), which is where the
federal and nonfederal experts come together to plan for and coordinate
the development of technologies for NextGen. The eight IPTs are linked
to eight key strategies that JPDO developed early on for guiding its
NextGen planning work (see table 1).
Table 1: JPDO's Strategies and Related IPT Lead Agencies:
Strategy: Develop airport infrastructure to meet future demand;
Related IPT Lead Agency: Federal Aviation Administration.
Strategy: Establish an effective security system without limiting
mobility or civil liberties;
Related IPT Lead Agency: Department of Homeland Security.
Strategy: Establish an agile air traffic system that quickly responds
to shifts in demand;
Related IPT Lead Agency: National Aeronautics and Space
Administration[A].
Strategy: Establish shared situational awareness--where all users share
the same information;
Related IPT Lead Agency: Department of Defense.
Strategy: Establish a comprehensive and proactive approach to safety;
Related IPT Lead Agency: Federal Aviation Administration.
Strategy: Develop environmental protection that allows sustained
aviation growth; Related IPT Lead Agency: Federal Aviation
Administration.
Strategy: Develop a systemwide capability to reduce weather impacts;
Related IPT Lead Agency: Department of Commerce.
Strategy: Harmonize equipage and operations globally;
Related IPT Lead Agency: Federal Aviation Administration.
Sources: GAO and JPDO.
[A] NASA leads this IPT because it has primary responsibility for
conducting the necessary research; implementation of the agile air
traffic system is the responsibility of FAA.
[End of table]
JPDO's senior policy committee is headed by the Secretary of
Transportation (as required in Vision 100) and includes senior-level
officials from JPDO's partner agencies. The Next Generation Air
Transportation System Institute (the Institute) was created by an
agreement between the National Center for Advanced
Technologies[Footnote 3] and FAA to incorporate the expertise and views
of stakeholders from private industry, state and local governments, and
academia. The Institute Management Council (IMC), composed of top
officials and representatives from the aviation community, oversees the
policy, recommendations, and products of the Institute and provides a
means for advancing consensus positions on critical NextGen issues. The
IPTs are headed by representatives of JPDO's partner agencies and
include more than 200 nonfederal stakeholders from over 100
organizations, whose participation was arranged through the Institute.
Figure 1 illustrates JPDO's position within FAA and the JPDO structures
that bring together federal and nonfederal stakeholders, including the
Institute and the IPTs. To meet Vision 100's requirement that JPDO
coordinate and consult with the public, the Institute held its first
public meeting in March 2006 and plans to hold another public meeting
in May 2007.
Figure 1: Organization of JPDO:
[See PDF for image]
Source: JPDO.
[End of figure]
In November 2006, we reported that JPDO's organizational structure
incorporated some of the practices that we have found to be effective
for federal interagency collaborations--an important point given how
critical such collaboration is to the success of JPDO's mission. For
example, the JPDO partner agencies have worked together to develop key
strategies for NextGen and JPDO has leveraged its partner agency
resources by staffing various levels of its organization with partner
agency employees. Also, our work has shown that involving stakeholders
can, among other things, increase their support for a collaborative
effort, and the Institute provides a method for involving nonfederal
stakeholders in planning NextGen.
Recently, JPDO officials told us they have proposed to FAA management
and the IMC executive board a change in the IPT structure and operation
to improve the efficiency of the organization. JPDO has proposed
converting each IPT into a "work group" with the same participants as
the current IPT, but with each work group led by a joint government and
industry steering committee. The steering committee would oversee the
creation of small, ad hoc subgroups that would be tasked with short-
term projects exploring specific issues and delivering discrete work
products. Under this arrangement, work group members would be free of
obligations to the group when not engaged in a specific project.
According to JPDO officials, if these changes are approved, the work
groups would be more efficient and output-or product-focused than the
current IPTs. JPDO officials also noted that they are proposing to
create a ninth work group to address avionics issues.
We believe that these changes could help address concerns that we have
heard from some stakeholders about the productivity of some IPTs and
the pace of the planning effort at JPDO. Nonetheless, the effectiveness
of these changes will have to be evaluated over time. Also, JPDO's
director has pointed out the need for the office to begin transitioning
from planning NextGen to facilitating the implementation of NextGen. We
believe that these changes are potentially useful in supporting such a
transition. However, it will be important to monitor these changes to
ensure that the participation of stakeholders is neither decreased nor
adversely affected. Maintaining communications within and among work
groups could increase in importance if, as work group members focus on
specific projects, they become less involved in the overall
collaborative planning effort.
Finally, while the organizational structure of JPDO and the Institute
have been in place and largely unchanged for several years now, both of
these entities have suffered from a lack of stable leadership. As JPDO
begins its fourth year in operation, it is on its third director and
operated during most of 2006 under the stewardship of an acting
director. The Institute pointed out in its recent annual report that
JPDO's leadership turnover had made it a challenge for JPDO to move out
more aggressively on many goals and objectives, as the office waited on
a full-time director. The Institute also stated that JPDO's leadership
turnover had limited the ability of the IMC executive committee to
forge a stronger relationship with JPDO leadership and work jointly on
strategic issues and challenges. However, the Institute has also had
issues with turnover and is currently functioning under an acting
director due to the recent departure of its second director, who had
been in the position less than two years. The leadership turnovers at
both JPDO and the Institute raise concerns about the stability of JPDO
and about the impact of these turnovers on the progress of the NextGen
initiative.
JPDO Has Made Progress Toward Releasing Key Planning Documents,
although Further Work Remains:
JPDO's authorizing legislation requires the office to create a multi-
agency research and development plan for the transition to NextGen. To
comply, JPDO is developing several key documents that together form the
foundation of NextGen planning. These documents include a NextGen
Concept of Operations, a NextGen Enterprise Architecture, and an
Integrated Work Plan.
The Concept of Operations is the most fundamental of JPDO's key
planning documents, as the other key documents flow from it. Although
an earlier version was delayed so that stakeholder comments could be
addressed, Version 1.2 of the Concept of Operations is currently posted
on JPDO's Website for review and comment by the aviation community.
This 226-page document provides written descriptions of how the NextGen
system is envisioned to operate in 2025 and beyond, including
highlighting key research and policy issues that will need to be
addressed.[Footnote 4] For example, some key policy issues are
associated with automating the air traffic control system, including
the need for a backup plan in case automation fails, the
responsibilities and liabilities of different stakeholders during an
automation failure, and the level of monitoring needed by pilots when
automation is ensuring safe separation between aircraft. Over the next
few months, JPDO plans to address the public comments it receives and
issue a revised version of the Concept of Operations.
In addition to the Concept of Operations, JPDO is working on an
Enterprise Architecture for NextGen--that is, a technical description
of the NextGen system, akin to blueprints for a building. The
Enterprise Architecture is meant to provide a common tool for planning
and understanding the complex, interrelated systems that will make up
NextGen. According to JPDO officials, the Enterprise Architecture will
provide the means for coordinating among the partner agencies and
private sector manufacturers, aligning relevant research and
development activities, and integrating equipment. JPDO plans to issue
an early version of its Enterprise Architecture next month, although it
was originally scheduled for release in September 2006.
Finally, JPDO is developing an Integrated Work Plan that will describe
the capabilities needed to transition to NextGen from the current
system and provide the research, policy and regulation, and schedules
necessary to achieve NextGen by 2025. The Integrated Work Plan is akin
to a project plan and will be critical for fiscal year 2009 partner
agency budget and program planning. According to a JPDO official, the
office intends to issue its initial draft of the Integrated Work Plan
in July 2007.
Figure 2: Key NextGen Planning Documents:
[See PDF for image]
Source: JPDO.
[End of figure]
We have discussed JPDO's planning documents with JPDO officials and
examined both an earlier version of JPDO's Concept of
Operations[Footnote 5] and the current version that is out for public
comment.[Footnote 6] Based on our analysis, JPDO is focusing on the
right types of key documents for the foundation of NextGen planning. As
for the Concept of Operations, the current version is much improved
from the prior version, with additional details added. Nonetheless, we
believe that it still does not include key elements such as scenarios
illustrating NextGen operations, a summary of NextGen's operational
impact on users and other stakeholders, and an analysis of the
benefits, alternatives, and trade-offs that were considered for
NextGen. In addition, it lacks an overall description that ties
together the eight key areas that the document covers. As noted, JPDO
does plan to release another version of the Concept of Operations later
this year.
In fact, JPDO plans further versions of all of its key planning
documents. We see the development of all three of JPDO's key documents
as part of an iterative and evolutionary process. Thus, it is unlikely
that any of these documents will ever be truly "finalized," but rather
will continue to evolve throughout the implementation of NextGen to
reflect, for example, the development of new technologies or problems
uncovered during research and development of planned technologies.
Finally, while each of the three key documents has a specific purpose,
the scope and technical sophistication of these documents makes it
difficult for some stakeholders to understand the basics of the NextGen
planning effort. To address this issue, JPDO is currently drafting what
the office refers to as a "blueprint" for NextGen, meant to be a short,
high-level, non-technical presentation of NextGen goals and
capabilities. We believe that such a document could help some
stakeholders develop a better understanding of NextGen and the planning
effort to date.
Institutionalizing the Collaborative Process Poses a Continuing
Challenge for JPDO:
In our November 2006 report, we noted that JPDO is fundamentally a
planning and coordinating body that lacks authority over the key human
and technological resources of its partner agencies. Consequently,
institutionalizing the collaborative process with its partner agencies
will be critical to JPDO's ability to facilitate the implementation of
NextGen. As we reported in November, JPDO has not established some
practices significant to institutionalizing its collaborative process.
For example, one method for establishing collaboration at a fundamental
level would be for JPDO to have formal, long-term agreements among its
partner agencies on their roles and responsibilities in creating
NextGen. Currently, there is no mechanism that assures the partner
agencies' commitment continuing over the 20-year timeframe of NextGen
or their accountability to JPDO. According to JPDO officials, they are
working to establish a memorandum of understanding (MOU), signed by the
Secretary or other high-ranking official from each partner agency,
which will broadly define the partner agencies' roles and
responsibilities. JPDO first informed us of the development of this MOU
in August 2005; in November 2006 we recommended that JPDO finalize the
MOU and present it to the senior policy committee for its consideration
and action. However, as of March 28, 2007, the MOU remained unsigned by
some of the partner agencies.
Another key method for institutionalizing the collaborative effort is
incorporating NextGen goals and activities into the partner agencies'
key planning documents. For example, we noted in November 2006 that
NASA and FAA had incorporated NextGen goals into their strategic plans.
These types of efforts will be critical to JPDO's ability to leverage
its partner agency resources for continued JPDO planning efforts. Even
more importantly, these efforts will be critical to helping ensure that
partner agencies--given competing missions and resource demands--
dedicate the resources necessary to support the implementation of
NextGen research efforts or system acquisitions.
Recognizing that JPDO does not have authority over partner agency
resources, FAA and JPDO have initiated several efforts to
institutionalize NextGen. For example, JPDO is working with FAA to
refocus one of FAA's key planning documents on the implementation of
NextGen--an effort that also appears to be improving the collaboration
and coordination between JPDO and FAA's Air Traffic Organization (ATO),
which has primary responsibility for modernization of the air traffic
control system. FAA has expanded and revamped its Operational Evolution
Plan (OEP)--renamed the Operational Evolution Partnership--to become
FAA's implementation plan for NextGen.[Footnote 7] The OEP is being
expanded to apply to all of FAA and is intended to become a
comprehensive description of how the agency will implement NextGen,
including the required technologies, procedures, and resources. (Figure
3 shows the OEP framework.) An ATO official told us that the new OEP is
to be consistent with JPDO's key planning documents and its budget
guidance to the partner agencies. According to FAA, the new OEP will
allow it to demonstrate appropriate budget control and linkage to
NextGen plans and will force FAA's research and development to be
relevant to NextGen's requirements. According to FAA documents, the
agency plans to publish a new OEP in June 2007.
Figure 3: New OEP Framework:
[See PDF for image]
Source: JPDO.
Note: The concentric rings indicate the nature of initiative
development from the outer ring (NextGen strategic initiatives), in
which new programs and concepts are analyzed and demonstrated; to the
second ring, where decisions are made regarding safety, operating
policy, performance standards, and certification requirements; to the
third ring (technical development), where concepts are prototyped and
investment analysis decisions are made. The progression through the
rings is not necessarily linear, and a program may be in more than one
ring at a time. Data communications, for example, is in the technical
development ring and also in the middle ring as policy and rulemaking
is considered. The core is divided into three sections, which indicate
the FAA offices that implement the final NextGen program.
[End of figure]
In addition, to further align FAA's efforts with JPDO's plans for
NextGen, FAA is creating a NextGen Review Board to oversee the OEP.
This Review Board will be co-chaired by JPDO's Director and ATO's Vice
President of Operations Planning Services. Initiatives, such as concept
demonstrations or research, proposed for inclusion in the OEP will now
need to go through the Review Board for approval. Initiatives are to be
assessed for their relation to NextGen requirements, concept maturity,
and risk. An ATO official told us that the new OEP process should also
help identify some smaller programs that might be inconsistent with
NextGen and which could be discontinued. Additionally, as a further
step towards integrating ATO and JPDO, the administration's
reauthorization proposal calls for the JPDO director to be a voting
member of FAA's Joint Resources Council and ATO's Executive Council.
While progress is being made in incorporating NextGen initiatives into
FAA's strategic and planning documents, more remains to be done with
FAA and the other JPDO partner agencies. For example, one critical
activity that remains in this area will be synchronizing the NextGen
enterprise architecture, once JPDO releases and further refines it,
with the partner agencies' enterprise architectures. Doing so should
help align agencies' current work with NextGen while simultaneously
identifying gaps between agency plans and NextGen plans. Also, while
FAA is making significant progress toward creating an implementation
plan for NextGen, the other partner agencies are less far along or have
not begun such efforts. JPDO's lack of authority over partner agency
resources will be minimized as a challenge if the partner agencies
commit to NextGen goals and initiatives at a structural level. By
further incorporation of NextGen efforts into strategic planning
documents, the partner agencies will better institutionalize their
commitments to JPDO and the NextGen initiative.
Finally, another important method for institutionalizing the
collaborative effort will be for JPDO to establish mechanisms for
leveraging partner agency resources. JPDO has made progress in this
area, although further work remains. As we noted in our November
report, JPDO is working with OMB to develop a process that would allow
OMB to identify NextGen-related projects across the partner agencies
and consider NextGen as a unified, cross-agency program. We recently
met with OMB officials who said that they felt there has been
significant progress with JPDO over the last year. JPDO is now working
on an OMB Exhibit 300 form for NextGen.[Footnote 8] This will allow
JPDO to present OMB a joint business case for the NextGen-related
efforts within the partner agencies and will be used as input to
funding decisions for NextGen research and acquisitions across the
agencies. This Exhibit 300 will be due to OMB in September 2007 to
inform decisions about the partner agencies' 2009 budget submissions.
Ultimately, the success of JPDO will have to be measured in the efforts
of its partner agencies to implement policies and procedures and
acquire systems that support NextGen. To date, JPDO can point to its
success in collaborating with FAA to fund and speed its rollout of two
systems considered cornerstone technologies for NextGen: Automatic
Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) and System Wide Information
Management (SWIM). ADS-B is a new air traffic surveillance system that
will replace many existing radars with less costly ground-based
transceivers. SWIM will provide an initial network centric capability
to all the users of the air transportation system. This means that the
FAA and the Departments of Homeland Security and Defense will
eventually share a common, real-time, secure picture of aviation
operations across the airspace system. Identifying such NextGen
programs across the partner agencies and establishing implementation
plans for them in JPDO's Integrated Work Plan will be critical going
forward to creating performance metrics for JPDO.
Although we recommended in our November report that JPDO develop
written procedures that formalize agreements with OMB regarding the
leveraging of partner agency resources, this is still a work in
progress. For example, OMB officials said they had not reviewed JPDO's
2008 partner agency budget guidance prior to its release to the partner
agencies, which highlights the need for JPDO to further develop its
procedures for working with OMB. Going forward, it will be important
for Congress and other stakeholders to evaluate the success of the 2009
budgets in supporting NextGen initiatives, especially as 2009 is
expected to be a critical year in the transition from planning NextGen
to implementing NextGen.
FAA and JPDO Have Begun to Release Early Cost Estimates for NextGen,
but Questions Remain Over Who Will Conduct Necessary Research and
Development:
In our November report, we noted that JPDO had not yet developed a
comprehensive estimate of the costs of NextGen. Since then, in its
recently released 2006 Progress Report,[Footnote 9] JPDO reported some
estimated costs for NextGen, including specifics on some early NextGen
programs. JPDO believes the total federal cost for NextGen
infrastructure through 2025 will range between $15 billion and $22
billion. JPDO also reported that a preliminary estimate of the
corresponding cost to system users, who will have to equip with the
advanced avionics that are necessary to realize the full benefits of
some NextGen technologies, produced a range of $14 billion to $20
billion. JPDO noted that this range for avionics costs reflects
uncertainty about equipage costs for individual aircraft, the number of
very light jets that will operate in high-performance airspace, and the
amount of out-of-service time required for installation.
FAA, in its capital investment plan for fiscal years 2008-2012,
includes estimated expenditures for 11 line items that are considered
NextGen capital programs.[Footnote 10] The total 5-year estimated
expenditures for these programs is $4.3 billion. In fiscal year 2008,
only 6 of the line items are funded for a total of roughly $174
million; funding for the remaining 5 programs would begin with the
fiscal year 2009 budget. According to FAA, in addition to capital
spending for NextGen, the agency will spend an estimated $300 million
on NextGen-related research and development from fiscal years 2008
through 2012. The administration's budget for fiscal year 2008 for FAA
includes a total of $17.8 million to support the activities of JPDO.
While FAA and JPDO have begun to release estimates for FAA's NextGen
investment portfolio, questions remain over which entities will fund
and conduct some of the necessary research, development, and
demonstration projects that will be key to achieving certain NextGen
capabilities. In the past, a significant portion of aeronautics
research and development, including intermediate technology
development, has been performed by NASA. However, NASA's aeronautics
research budget and proposed funding shows a 30-percent decline, in
constant 2005 dollars, from fiscal year 2005 to fiscal year 2011. To
its credit, NASA plans to focus its research on the needs of NextGen.
However, NASA is also moving toward a focus on fundamental research and
away from developmental work and demonstration projects, which could
negatively impact NextGen if these efforts are not assumed by others.
According to its 2006 Progress Report, JPDO is building a research and
development plan that will document NextGen's research needs and the
organizations that will perform the work.
For example, JPDO's investment simulation capability relies heavily on
NASA's NAS-wide modeling platform, the Airspace Concepts Evaluation
System (ACES).[Footnote 11] This investment simulation capability
permits JPDO to, among other things, evaluate alternative research
ideas and assess the performance of competing vendors. According to a
JPDO official, this capability, which is critical to NextGen research,
is eroding as JPDO's investment simulation requirements are expanding.
As part of its fundamental research mission, NASA intends to upgrade to
ACES-X (a more sophisticated representation of the national airspace
system), but not for another two years. Until then, JPDO investment
modeling capability will be constrained unless the office or another
partner agency can assume the modeling work. While one option would be
to contract with private sector vendors to do this type of modeling on
a per simulation basis, this solution could be expensive for the
government. Moreover, JPDO might not be able to continue facilitating
participation by both small and large companies, thus giving both an
equal opportunity to demonstrate their ideas, because small companies
would have to pay for access to this proprietary modeling capability.
This is an issue that needs to be addressed in the short-term.
JPDO faces the challenge of determining the nature and scope of the
research and technology development necessary to begin the transition
to NextGen, as well as identifying the entities that can conduct that
research and development. According to officials at FAA and JPDO, they
are currently studying these issues and trying to assess how much
research and development FAA can assume. An FAA official recently
testified that the agency proposes to increase its research and
development funding by $280 million over the next 5 years. However, a
draft report by an advisory committee to FAA stated that FAA would need
at least $100 million annually in increased funding to assume NASA's
research and development work, and establishing the necessary
infrastructure within FAA could delay the implementation of NextGen by
5 years.[Footnote 12] More work remains to completely assess the
research and development needs of NextGen and the ability of FAA and
the other JPDO partner agencies to budget for and conduct the necessary
initiatives. This information is critical as the timely completion of
research and testing of proposed NextGen systems is necessary to
keeping the NextGen initiative on schedule.
Some Fundamental NextGen Capabilities Will Require Human Factors
Research:
Addressing questions about how human factors issues will affect the
move to some key NextGen capabilities is another challenge for JPDO.
For example, the NextGen Concept of Operations envisions an increased
reliance on automation, which raises questions about the role of the
air traffic controllers in such an automated environment. Similarly,
the Concept of Operations envisions that pilots will take on a greater
share of the responsibility for maintaining safe separation and other
tasks currently performed by controllers. This raises human factors
questions about whether pilots can safely perform these additional
duties.
Although JPDO has begun to model how shifts in air traffic controllers'
workloads would affect their performance, it has not yet begun to model
the effect of how this shift in workload to pilots would affect pilot
performance. According to a JPDO official, modeling the effect of
changes in pilot workload has not yet begun because JPDO has not yet
identified a suitable model for incorporation into its suite of
modeling tools. According to a JPDO official, the evolving roles of
pilots and controllers is the NextGen initiative's most important human
factors issue, but will be difficult to research because data on pilot
behavior are not readily available for use in creating models. In
addition to the study of changing roles, JPDO has not yet studied the
training implications of various systems or solutions proposed for
NextGen. For example, JPDO officials said they will need to study the
extent to which new air traffic controllers will have to be trained to
operate both the old and the new equipment as the Concept of Operations
and enterprise architecture mature.
JPDO Faces A Continuing Challenge in Ensuring the Involvement of All
Key Stakeholders:
Some stakeholders, such as current air traffic controllers and
technicians, will play critical roles in NextGen, and their involvement
in planning for and deploying the new technology will be important to
the success of NextGen. In November 2006, we reported that active air
traffic controllers were not involved in the NextGen planning effort
and recommended that JPDO determine whether any key stakeholders and
expertise were not represented on its IPTs, divisions, or elsewhere
within the office. Since then, the head of the controllers' union has
taken a seat on the Institute Management Council. However, no active
controllers are yet participating at the IPT planning level. Also,
aviation technicians do not participate in NextGen efforts. Input from
current air traffic controllers who have recent experience controlling
aircraft and current technicians who will maintain NextGen equipment is
important when considering human factors and safety issues. Our work on
past air traffic control modernization projects has shown that a lack
of stakeholder or expert involvement early and throughout a project can
lead to costly increases and delays.
In addition, we found that some private sector stakeholders have
expressed concerns that participation in the Institute might either
preclude bidding on future NextGen acquisitions or pose organizational
conflicts of interest. FAA's acquisition process, generally, precludes
bids from organizations that have participated in, materially
influenced, or had prior knowledge of the requirements for an
acquisition. The Institute was aware of this concern and attempted to
address it through an amendment to its governing document that
strengthened the language protecting participants from organizational
conflicts of interest for participation in the NextGen initiative.
However, while the amendment language currently operates to protect
stakeholders, the language has never been tested or challenged. Thus,
it is unclear at this time whether any stakeholder participation is
being chilled by conflict of interest concerns.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to
respond to any questions from you or other Members of the Subcommittee.
GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgements:
For further information on this testimony, please contact Dr. Gerald L.
Dillingham at (202) 512-2834 or dillinghamg@gao.gov. Individuals making
key contributions to this statement include Kevin Egan, Colin Fallon,
Rick Jorgenson, Faye Morrison, and Richard Scott.
FOOTNOTES
[1] JPDO was authorized by the Vision 100--Century of Aviation
Reauthorization Act (Pub. L. No. 108-176). The office began operating
in early 2004.
[2] GAO, Next Generation Air Transportation System: Progress and
Challenges Associated with the Transformation of the National Airspace
System, GAO-07-25 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 13, 2006).
[3] The National Center for Advanced Technologies is a nonprofit unit
within the Aerospace Industries Association.
[4] Following an introductory section, the Concept of Operations has
eight sections covering air traffic management operations, airport
operations and infrastructure services, net-centric infrastructure
services, shared situational awareness services, security services,
environmental management framework, safety management services, and
performance management services.
[5] Concept of Operations for the Next Generation Air Transportation
System, version 0.2, July 24, 2006.
[6] Our senior level technologist reviewed JPDO's current Concept of
Operations for the Next Generation Air Transportation System, version
1.2, dated February 28, 2007, by comparing it with the IEEE Standard
1362-1998 for concept of operations documents.
[7] Prior to expansion of the OEP, the document centered around plans
for increasing capacity and efficiency at 35 major airports.
[8] Section 300 of OMB Circular No. A-11, Preparation, Submission, and
Execution of the Budget (Nov. 2, 2005), sets forth requirements for
federal agencies for planning, budgeting, acquiring, and managing
information technology capital assets.
[9] JPDO, Making the NextGen Vision a Reality: 2006 Progress Report to
the Next Generation Air Transportation System Integrated Plan
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 14, 2007).
[10] FAA has six capital investment programs that it considers
transformational NextGen programs slated to receive funding in fiscal
year 2008: ADS-B nationwide implementation, System Wide Information
Management (SWIM), NextGen Data Communications, NextGen Network Enabled
Weather, National Airspace System Voice Switch, and NextGen Technology
Demonstration. In addition, five other programs are slated to begin
funding in 2009: NextGen System Development, NextGen High Altitude
Trajectory Based Operations, NextGen High Density Airports, NextGen
Networked Facilities, and NextGen Cross-Cutting Infrastructure.
[11] ACES provides a detailed flight simulation environment and an open
framework to integrate the results of other simulations. This allows
JPDO to test concepts well before they have to be demonstrated with
real hardware and people. This platform provides a basis for evaluating
the timing of many agencies' current budget requests and is a method
for comparing competitive ideas.
[12] Research, Engineering and Development Advisory Committee, Draft
Report on Financing the Next Generation Air Transportation System
(Washington, D.C.: April 2006).
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