Port Risk Management
Additional Federal Guidance Would Aid Ports in Disaster Planning and Recovery Gao ID: GAO-07-412 March 28, 2007U.S ports are significant to the U.S. economy, handling more than 2 billion tons of domestic and import/export cargo annually. Since Sept. 11, 2001, much of the national focus on ports' preparedness has been on preventing potential acts of terror, the 2005 hurricane season renewed focus on how to protect ports from a diversity of threats, including natural disasters. This report was prepared under the authority of the Comptroller General to examine (1) challenges port authorities have experienced as a result of recent natural disasters, (2) efforts under way to address these challenges, and (3) the manner in which port authorities plan for natural disasters. GAO reviewed documents and interviewed various port stakeholders from 17 major U.S. ports.
Ports, particularly those impacted by the 2005 hurricane season, experienced many different kinds of challenges during recent natural disasters. Of the 17 U.S. ports that GAO reviewed, port officials identified communications, personnel, and interagency coordination as their biggest challenges. Many port authorities have taken steps to address these challenges. Individually, ports have created redundancy in communications systems and other backup equipment and updated their emergency plans. Collectively, the American Association of Port Authorities developed a best practices manual focused on port planning and recovery efforts, as well as lessons learned from recent natural disasters. Even ports that have not experienced problems as a result of recent disasters, but are nonetheless susceptible to disaster threats, have responded to lessons learned by other ports. Additionally, federal maritime agencies, such as the U.S. Coast Guard, the Maritime Administration, and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers have increased their coordination and communication with ports to strengthen ports' ability to recover from future natural disasters and to build stakeholders' knowledge about federal resources for port recovery efforts. Most port authorities GAO reviewed conduct planning for natural disasters separately from planning for homeland security threats. Unlike security efforts, natural disaster planning is not subject to the same type of specific federal requirements and, therefore, varies from port to port. As a result of this divided approach, GAO found a wide variance in ports' natural disaster planning efforts including: (1) the level of participation in disaster forums, and (2) the level of information sharing among port stakeholders In the absence of appropriate forums and information sharing opportunities among ports, some ports GAO contacted were limited in their understanding of federal resources available for predisaster mitigation and postdisaster recovery. Other ports have begun using existing forums, such as their federally mandated Area Maritime Security Committee, to coordinate disaster planning efforts. Port and industry experts, as well as recent federal actions, are now encouraging an all-hazards approach to disaster planning and recovery. That is, disaster preparedness planning requires that all of the threats faced by the port, both natural (such as hurricanes) and man-made (such as terror events), be considered together. The Department of Homeland Security, which through the Coast Guard oversees the Area Maritime Security Committees, provides an example of how to incorporate a wider scope of activity for ports across the country. Additionally, the Maritime Administration should develop a communication strategy to inform ports of the maritime resources available for recovery efforts.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-07-412, Port Risk Management: Additional Federal Guidance Would Aid Ports in Disaster Planning and Recovery
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Report to Congressional Committees:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
March 2007:
Port Risk Management:
Additional Federal Guidance Would Aid Ports in Disaster Planning and
Recovery:
GAO-07-412:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-07-412, a report to congressional committees
Why GAO Did This Study:
U.S ports are significant to the U.S. economy, handling more than 2
billion tons of domestic and import/export cargo annually. Since Sept.
11, 2001, much of the national focus on ports‘ preparedness has been on
preventing potential acts of terror, the 2005 hurricane season renewed
focus on how to protect ports from a diversity of threats, including
natural disasters. This report was prepared under the authority of the
Comptroller General to examine (1) challenges port authorities have
experienced as a result of recent natural disasters, (2) efforts under
way to address these challenges, and (3) the manner in which port
authorities plan for natural disasters. GAO reviewed documents and
interviewed various port stakeholders from 17 major U.S. ports.
What GAO Found:
Ports, particularly those impacted by the 2005 hurricane season,
experienced many different kinds of challenges during recent natural
disasters. Of the 17 U.S. ports that GAO reviewed, port officials
identified communications, personnel, and interagency coordination as
their biggest challenges.
Many port authorities have taken steps to address these challenges.
Individually, ports have created redundancy in communications systems
and other backup equipment and updated their emergency plans.
Collectively, the American Association of Port Authorities developed a
best practices manual focused on port planning and recovery efforts, as
well as lessons learned from recent natural disasters. Even ports that
have not experienced problems as a result of recent disasters, but are
nonetheless susceptible to disaster threats, have responded to lessons
learned by other ports. Additionally, federal maritime agencies, such
as the U.S. Coast Guard, the Maritime Administration, and the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers have increased their coordination and communication
with ports to strengthen ports‘ ability to recover from future natural
disasters and to build stakeholders‘ knowledge about federal resources
for port recovery efforts. Most port authorities GAO reviewed conduct
planning for natural disasters separately from planning for homeland
security threats. Unlike security efforts, natural disaster planning is
not subject to the same type of specific federal requirements and,
therefore, varies from port to port. As a result of this divided
approach, GAO found a wide variance in ports‘ natural disaster planning
efforts including:
* the level of participation in disaster forums, and
* the level of information sharing among port stakeholders
In the absence of appropriate forums and information sharing
opportunities among ports, some ports GAO contacted were limited in
their understanding of federal resources available for predisaster
mitigation and postdisaster recovery. Other ports have begun using
existing forums, such as their federally mandated Area Maritime
Security Committee, to coordinate disaster planning efforts. Port and
industry experts, as well as recent federal actions, are now
encouraging an all-hazards approach to disaster planning and recovery.
That is, disaster preparedness planning requires that all of the
threats faced by the port, both natural (such as hurricanes) and man-
made (such as terror events), be considered together. The Department of
Homeland Security, which through the Coast Guard oversees the Area
Maritime Security Committees, provides an example of how to incorporate
a wider scope of activity for ports across the country. Additionally,
the Maritime Administration should develop a communication strategy to
inform ports of the maritime resources available for recovery efforts.
What GAO Recommends:
To ensure that ports achieve adequate planning for natural disasters,
GAO recommends that the Secretary of Homeland Security encourage port
stakeholders to use existing forums for discussing all-hazards
planning. DHS, DOT and DOD generally agreed with the facts presented in
the report. However, DHS expressed concern about using existing forums
for planning. Our work showed that these forums are already being used
for planning in several cases which should be further encouraged.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-412].
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Katherine Siggerud at
(202) 512-6570 or siggerudk@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Recent Natural Disasters Created a Variety of Challenges; Some Recovery
Efforts Were More Difficult Than Expected:
Port Authorities Have Various Efforts Under Way to Mitigate Challenges:
Current Planning Approach Lessens Effective Coordination among All Port
Stakeholders:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: Port Stakeholder Roles:
Table 2: Federal Agency Role at Ports:
Table 3: Natural Disaster Planning Forums at Ports GAO Visited:
Table 4: Key FEMA Disaster Assistance Programs:
Figures:
Figure 1: Ports Selected for Case Studies and Phone Interviews:
Figure 2: Port Experiences with Natural Disasters Since 1998:
Figure 3: Port Elements:
Figure 4: GAO Risk Management Framework:
Abbreviations:
AAPA: American Association of Port Authorities:
AMSC: Area Maritime Security Committee:
COTP: Captain of the Port:
DHS: Department of Homeland Security:
DOD: Department of Defense:
DOT: Department of Transportation:
FEMA: Federal Emergency Management Agency:
GICA: Gulf Intracoastal Canal Association:
LEA: Local Emergency Management Agency:
MIRP: Maritime Infrastructure Recovery Plan:
MSRAM: Maritime Security Risk Assessment Model:
MTSA: Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002:
NIMS: National Incident Management System:
NRP: National Response Plan:
SAFE Port Act: Security and Accountability for Every Port Act of 2006:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
March 28, 2007:
Congressional Committees:
U.S. ports and waterways handle more than 2 billion tons of domestic
and import/export cargo annually, and more than 95 percent of U.S.
international trade moves by water. As such, ports are a global gateway
to world markets and significant engines in the U.S. economy. As
important as they are, virtually every major U.S. port faces one or
more types of natural disasters with potentially devastating
consequences. Ports throughout the eastern seaboard and the Gulf Coast
face the possibility of hurricanes, and ports on the West Coast are in
areas that are highly susceptible to earthquakes. Losing a major port,
even for a few weeks or months, could have a national economic impact,
making effective recovery a concern not only for the local area but for
the federal government as well.
Ports' complexities exacerbate the difficulty of taking adequate steps
to deal with possible natural disasters. Ports are often sprawling
enterprises, and each port is unique. Further, a "port" is seldom a
single entity. Rather, a port is usually a collection of varied
maritime stakeholders. Ports usually include a public entity, such as a
port authority. The role of port authorities varies from port to port.
For example, the Port of Mobile operates a coal plant in the port, but
it also has tenants that lease and operate their own facilities in the
port area. Other ports, such as the Port of Miami, are owned and
managed by county government,[Footnote 1] but terminal operators are
responsible for the day-to-day maintenance and repair of the terminal
area. Besides port authorities, port stakeholders include shipping
companies and other tenants that may be leasing port authority
facilities, factories and other industries located in the area, and
local and state law enforcement and emergency management agencies.
Terminals or facilities may also be privately owned. Federal agencies
also have a role at ports including the U.S. Coast Guard (Coast Guard),
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and the Maritime Administration.[Footnote
2] Despite these complexities, ports have various forums in which these
maritime stakeholders can coordinate on issues that affect the port as
a whole. For terrorism concerns, for example, major U.S. ports have a
Area Maritime Security Committee (AMSC)[Footnote 3] that provides a
venue for discussing security concerns. For disaster relief concerns,
U.S. ports would work with the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) regarding disaster assistance.
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, much of the focus on
emergency preparedness has been on preparedness for preventing,
mitigating the effects of, and responding to terrorist attacks. Through
legislation and presidential directives, the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) is the primary federal organization responsible for
preparing the nation both for terrorist attacks and for major
disasters. Homeland Security Presidential Directives 5 and 8 require
that DHS establish a single, comprehensive approach to and plans for
the management of emergency events whether the result of terrorist
attacks or large-scale natural or accidental disasters.[Footnote 4] As
we have previously reported, the capabilities needed to respond to
major disasters, whether the result of a terrorist attack or nature,
are similar in many ways. The devastating hurricane season of 2005,
which included Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma, focused renewed
attention on the potential effects that natural disasters could pose to
port operations. The numerous vulnerabilities port operations face,
together with the limited resources available to deal with them, have
also initiated a renewed look at how to protect ports from a variety of
threats.
In light of the continued attention both to port security and to
federal natural disaster response, we are providing a comprehensive
view of steps ports have taken to prepare and mitigate the impacts of
natural disasters. Consequently, we conducted this review, initiated
under the Comptroller General's authority, to examine port disaster
preparedness measures and to examine the federal role in helping ports
plan and recover from natural disaster impacts. More specifically, this
report examines (1) the challenges port authorities have experienced as
a result of recent natural disasters, (2) the efforts under way to
address challenges from these disasters, and (3) the manner in which
port authorities plan for natural disasters and the effect of this
approach on their ability to share information with port stakeholders
and access federal resources.
To address the challenges port authorities experience as a result of
recent disasters and the efforts to address these challenges, we
selected 17 U.S. ports for review (see fig. 1). We focused primarily on
commercial ports and various commercial aspects of these ports. The
criteria we used included selecting ports that (1) varied in size
(based on cargo value) and (2) varied in the degree to which they had
experienced some type of natural disaster since 1998.[Footnote 5] Based
on guidance from DHS regarding the most significant natural disaster
threats to ports, we limited the natural disasters we considered to
earthquakes and hurricanes. In particular, we focused on ports impacted
by the 2005 hurricane season; in all, 11 of the 17 ports we selected
were affected by hurricanes that year. We conducted site visits at 7 of
the 17 ports, where we interviewed various maritime stakeholders,
including officials from the port authorities, emergency management
agencies, and federal agencies such as the Coast Guard, U.S. Army Corps
of Engineers, Maritime Administration, and FEMA. We contacted the
remaining 10 ports by telephone and conducted a more limited range of
interviews. For all 17 ports, we reviewed numerous planning documents,
including emergency operations plans, business continuity plans, and
hurricane plans.
Figure 1: Ports Selected for Case Studies and Phone Interviews:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO, Map Resources (map).
[End of figure]
To determine the manner in which port authorities prepare for disasters
and its effect on information sharing and access to federal resources,
we relied primarily on information obtained from our 17 case studies
and phone interviews, supplementing it as necessary with other
information related to risk management and disaster planning. For
perspective on risk management, we used our body of work related to
risk management throughout the federal government[Footnote 6] and
supplemented it with additional risk management models and tools from a
wide range of federal, professional, and academic stakeholders, as well
as interviews and documents from the Coast Guard and offices within
DHS. We did not include any separate planning efforts conducted by
private operators, for two key reasons: their roles and
responsibilities vary greatly from port to port and; unlike their
planning efforts for homeland security, their efforts for natural
disasters are not subject to the same type of federal requirements or
guidelines. We performed our work from December 2005 through March
2007, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. See appendix I for more detail regarding our objectives,
scope, and methodology.
Results in Brief:
Port authorities reported experiencing many different kinds of
challenges during recent natural disasters, with communication,
personnel, and interagency coordination reported as the most
problematic challenges. This was particularly true for ports that were
impacted by the 2005 hurricane season. Twelve of the 17 ports we
reviewed had experienced at least one hurricane or earthquake since
1998, and of these, 8 reported one or more types of challenges in
responding (see fig. 2). The most visibly apparent challenge port
authorities experienced was dealing with damaged infrastructure,
including structural damage to buildings and piers, and silting and
debris clogging key waterways. Port authorities also reported
difficulties restoring power, water, and other utilities. However, the
greatest challenges port officials said they experienced--and in many
cases did not anticipate--were in the following other areas:
* Communications. Many ports experienced difficulties in communicating
both outside the port and with port personnel and other port
stakeholders. Phone outages were extensive and cell phone reception was
limited. For example, one port was without services for 2 to 4 weeks
following Hurricane Katrina.
* Personnel. When many port personnel around the Gulf area were
evacuated from their homes, the evacuation caused problems both in
locating personnel and also in letting them know they should return to
work.
* Coordination. Officials reported difficulties coordinating with
local, state, and federal stakeholders, especially for planning and
recovery efforts. For example, in some cases, port officials had
difficulty re-entering the port because they lacked the credentials
required by local police and other emergency management officials. Some
ports also reported difficulty accessing federal resources for recovery
efforts. For example, officials at some ports said they had problems
understanding the process in filing for disaster assistance and
coordinating damage assessments with FEMA or were unaware of resources
available through the Maritime Administration, such as ships that could
be used for housing or for conveying supplies.
Figure 2: Port Experiences with Natural Disasters Since 1998:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
Port authorities and other stakeholders reported taking a variety of
steps to address these challenges. Port authorities have replaced,
repaired, and created redundancies for a variety of communications
systems and physical infrastructure--for example, purchasing backup
phone systems and power generators, creating alternative administrative
sites, and developing alternative storage for computer information.
Though the 2005 hurricane season primarily affected Gulf ports, port
authority officials elsewhere said the results of that season prompted
them to improve their preparation as well. One key effort was
undertaken by the American Association of Port Authorities (AAPA), an
industry group. It convened work groups to discuss lessons learned and,
based on the input, issued a manual with guidance for ports on such
issues as developing alternative communications, setting up an
emergency operations center, and identifying federal resources for
recovery efforts. Port authorities reported their changes often
extended to improving coordination with other stakeholders. Some ports
adapted forums intended for security planning, such as their AMSC,
while others with existing natural disaster forums took steps to
strengthen them. Some port authorities also established plans for
coordinating with neighboring ports. Actions have also been taken at
the federal level. For example, the Maritime Administration,
contributed to a one-time plan developed by FEMA--the Federal Support
Plan. This plan was specifically cited for the 2006 Hurricane Season
and was specific to the federal government's response to support the
State of Louisiana. The Maritime Administration contributed to this
plan by identifying government and commercial maritime capabilities
that could be employed in response to a disaster. To date, while the
Maritime Administration plans to provide a directive regarding
capabilities to all of their regional offices in June 2007, no plan
exists for communicating this information to ports.
Port authorities we reviewed generally conducted their natural disaster
planning separately from planning for homeland security threats, and
this approach has reduced their ability to facilitate sharing natural
disaster planning information among key stakeholders and to access
federal resources. Planning for homeland security, an activity that is
governed by federal law, tends to be consistent from port to port. By
contrast, natural disaster planning, which is not subject to the same
type of specific federal requirements, varied considerably at the ports
we reviewed in its extent and thoroughness. Separate planning for these
two threats means that ports are not able to effectively estimate the
impact of mitigation alternatives and optimize their investments in
these alternatives based on costs and benefits. Industry experts and
port stakeholders, such as the Coast Guard, are now encouraging unified
consideration of all risks faced by ports, but we found few port
authorities were taking a unified approach. One consequence of divided
planning is that key stakeholders were not necessarily participating in
natural disaster planning. Unlike security planning, where the
Secretary of Homeland Security can establish an AMSC with broad
representation across port stakeholders, natural disaster planning
carries no such requirement. During our review, we found substantial
variation in the maturity of, and participation in, natural disaster
planning forums at ports. In particular, one port had no forum that
brought together the port authority and the local disaster planning
agency, which had knowledge of available federal resources, such as
FEMA grant programs, as well as the expertise to deal with grant
requirements. In the absence of such a forum, it is not surprising that
some ports were limited in their understanding of federal resources
available for predisaster mitigation and postdisaster recovery. To help
improve information sharing, some ports have begun using their
federally authorized AMSC, or some other similar forum with wide
representation, in disaster planning efforts. DHS, which through the
Coast Guard coordinates the AMSCs, provides an example of how to
incorporate a wider scope of committee activity for ports across the
country.
To help ensure that ports achieve adequate planning for natural
disasters and effectively manage risk to a variety of threats, we are
recommending that the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security
encourage port stakeholders to use existing forums for discussing their
all-hazards planning efforts and include appropriate representatives
from DHS, the port authority, representatives from the local emergency
management office, the Maritime Administration, and vessel and facility
owner/operators. To help ensure that ports have adequate understanding
of maritime disaster recovery resources, we recommend that the
Secretary of the Department of Transportation direct the Administrator
of the Maritime Administration to develop a communication strategy to
inform ports of the maritime resources available for recovery efforts.
In commenting on a draft of this report, DHS, the Department of
Transportation (DOT), and the Department of Defense (DOD) generally
agreed with the facts presented. In its letter, DHS did not endorse
placing responsibility for disaster contingency planning on existing
committees in ports and said these responsibilities should remain with
state and local emergency management planners. Our recommendation was
not to place responsibility for such planning within port committees,
but rather to use these existing forums as a way to engage all relevant
parties in discussing natural disaster planning for ports. DOT
officials provided a number of comments and clarifications, which we
incorporated as appropriate to ensure the accuracy of our report. The
DOT generally concurred with GAO's recommendation. The DOD provided
technical comments and clarifications.
Background:
Port Activities Involve Many Different Entities:
Ports comprise many different stakeholders, both public and private.
Port authorities also may have jurisdiction over some or all of the
geographical area of a port. The port authority can be an agency of the
state, county, or city in which the port is located. In most ports in
North America, the actual task of loading and unloading goods is
carried out by private operators who lease space or equipment from the
port authority. (In some ports, the port authority also manages some of
these stevedoring activities.) The percentage of the port area over
which the port authority has jurisdiction, and the level of involvement
of the port authority in the port's operations, is different from port
to port. This variability in port authority jurisdiction and
operational involvement has direct consequences for portwide disaster
preparedness. Even though a port authority may have a thorough disaster
plan in place, that plan may not be binding on any of the private
operators in the port.
The stakeholders involved at any given port can vary but, in general,
they include port authorities, private-sector operators doing business
within the port, government agencies, and information-sharing forums.
Table 1 summarizes these basic participants and their roles.[Footnote
7]
Table 1: Port Stakeholder Roles:
Quasi-governmental.
Port stakeholder: Port authority;
Stakeholder role:
* Provides a limited governance structure for the port;
* Sometimes owns port assets such as cranes and pier space;
* The role of the port authority varies from port to port. Some ports
own and operate cargo terminals, while others lease their equipment and
pier space to private operators. Others engage in a combination of both
activities.
Private sector.
Port stakeholder: Facility/service operators;
Stakeholder role:
* Ship owners and operators;
* Stevedoring companies;
* Rail carriers/ operators;
* Trucking and shipping companies;
* Other operators to support the day-to-day activities of the port.
State and local governments.
Port stakeholder: State or local emergency management agency;
Stakeholder role:
* May assist port in planning for natural disasters and security
threats. May also help to coordinate disaster response services such as
police, fire, and medical teams for the port.
Information sharing forums.
Port stakeholder: Area Maritime Security Committee;
Stakeholder role:
* Federally established forum at all ports for all stakeholders to
share information on security issues through regularly scheduled
meetings, electronic bulletins on suspicious activities around seaport
facilities, and sharing of key documents.[A];
* The U.S. Coast Guard Captain of the Port (COTP)[B] is authorized to
establish and coordinate the AMSC and appoint members along with other
duties as prescribed by regulation.
Port stakeholder: Harbor Safety Committee;
Stakeholder role:
* Forum at many ports for all stakeholders to advise on regulatory and
nonregulatory safety-related issues, including disaster preparedness.
Only two Harbor Safety Committees, at the Ports of Houston, Texas, and
New Orleans, Louisiana, are federally mandated.[C].
Port stakeholder: Gulf Intracoastal Canal Association;
Stakeholder role:
* The Gulf Intracoastal Canal Association (GICA) is maritime trade
association that is an advocate for issues regarding the Gulf
Intracoastal Waterway, which is an inland navigable waterway located
along the Gulf Coast. One of GICA's missions is to work with it
members, as well as the Coast Guard and Corps, to identify
opportunities to improve the safety and efficiency of the Gulf
Intracoastal Waterway.
Port stakeholder: American Association of Port Authorities;
Stakeholder role:
* A trade association that represents more than 150 public port
authorities in the United States, Canada, the Caribbean, and Latin
America;
* Coordinated a series of working groups to develop best practices for
disaster preparation and recovery.
Source: GAO.
[A] Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (MTSA), Pub. L. No.
107-295, 116 Stat. 2064, contains many of the homeland security
requirements related specifically to port security. The Area Maritime
Security Committees are authorized by section 102 of MTSA, as codified
at 46 U.S.C. § 70112(a)(2).
[B] A Coast Guard officer designated as the lead official to facilitate
execution of Coast Guard duties in that area. 14 U.S.C. § 634.
[C] Coast Guard Authorization Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-241, § 18
and § 19, 105 Stat. 2208.
[End of table]
These various stakeholders interact in a variety of ways. The port
authority provides a limited governance structure for the port. Many
port authorities lease piers, or "terminals," and equipment to
stevedoring companies and shipping lines that are responsible for the
actual loading and transport of cargo. Some port authorities also
operate cargo terminals alongside the private operators. Figure 3
depicts the main elements of a typical port. Individual ports may not
include all of these elements, or may include some not depicted here.
Figure 3: Port Elements:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
Federal Role in Port Activities Is Extensive:
Several federal agencies provide support to ports in natural disaster
planning, response, and recovery (see table 2). These agencies have
different missions that relate to port operations, including natural
disaster planning and response. For example, the Coast Guard is the
agency responsible for most federal oversight related to portwide
safety and security. It plays the primary role in coordinating efforts
for homeland security efforts. FEMA plays a role in homeland security
planning and also administers several assistance programs for disaster
preparation and recovery. The Maritime Administration plays a general
role in coordinating efforts to strengthen the maritime system and also
has the ability to provide maritime assets that could be used to
support homeland security interests. These vessels are part of the
country's National Defense Ready Reserve Fleet, including ships and
barges, which could be used for housing, power generation, or the
movement of water and other supplies.
Table 2: Federal Agency Role at Ports:
Department of Homeland Security.
Stakeholders: U.S. Coast Guard;
Selected mission-related activities: Promotes and carries out five
operating goals at every U.S. port: Maritime Safety, Protection of
Natural Resources, Mobility (i.e., facilitation of the movement of
people and goods), Maritime Security, and National Defense; Coordinates
the AMSC where they have been created; Responsible for closing the port
to vessel traffic before or during a disaster and reopening the port to
traffic following the incident; Reviews facility security plans and
oversees compliance with these plans.
Stakeholders: FEMA;
Selected mission-related activities: Administers the Public Assistance
Grant Program that provides funds for the repair, replacement, or
restoration of disaster-damaged, publicly owned facilities. Few ports
have received funding for post-disaster recovery under this program;
Administers the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program that provides funds to
state and local governments to implement long- term hazard mitigation
measures after a major disaster declaration. Ports may be included as
sub-applicants on a state or local government application. Very few
ports have applied for and received hazard mitigation grants;
Administers the Predisaster Mitigation Program that provides technical
and financial assistance for hazard mitigation planning and the
implementation of mitigation projects prior to a disaster event.
Stakeholders: Preparedness Directorate-Office of Grants and Training;
Selected mission-related activities: Administers the Port Security
Grant Program that provides funds each year to mitigate security
threats to ports. Both port authorities and private operators may
apply. The program has distributed $876,394,146 since its inception,
and $168,052,500 in the fiscal year 2006 program.
Department of Transportation.
Stakeholders: Maritime Administration;
Selected mission-related activities:
* Seeks to improve and strengthen the U.S. marine transportation
system--including infrastructure, industry and labor-- to meet the
economic and security needs of the nation;
* Provides ready reserve vessels that could be used to support vital
homeland and national security interests.[B];
* Publishes a Port Risk Management and Insurance Guidebook that is
currently being revised to include disaster preparedness guidance for
ports.
Department of Defense.
Stakeholders: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers;
Selected mission-related activities:
* Maintains any federal channels leading to a port. Following
disasters, surveys the channel, removes debris, and oversees any
necessary dredging.
Source: GAO.
[A] The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers maintains more than 12,000 miles
(19,200 km) of inland waterways and operates 235 locks.
[B] The Maritime Administration manages this inactive inventory for the
Department of Defense.
[End of table]
Federal Disaster Planning Guidance:
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, prompted additional
federal efforts to address a broad spectrum of emergencies. The
Homeland Security Act of 2002[Footnote 8] required DHS to develop a
comprehensive National Incident Management System (NIMS). NIMS is
intended to provide a consistent framework for incident management at
all jurisdictional levels regardless of the cause, size, or complexity
of the situation and to define the roles and responsibilities of
federal, state, and local governments, and various first responder
disciplines at each level during an emergency event. To manage all
major incidents, NIMS has a standard incident management system, called
the Incident Command System, with five functional areas--command,
operations, planning, logistics, and finance and administration. NIMS
also prescribes interoperable communications systems and preparedness
before an incident happens, including planning, training, and
exercises.
In December 2004, DHS issued the National Response Plan (NRP), intended
to be an all-discipline, all-hazards plan establishing a single,
comprehensive framework for the management of domestic incidents where
federal involvement is necessary. The NRP includes planning
assumptions, roles and responsibilities, concept of operations, and
incident management actions. The NRP also includes a Catastrophic
Incident Annex, which provides an accelerated, proactive national
response to a "catastrophic incident," defined as any natural or man-
made incident, including terrorism, resulting in extraordinary levels
of mass casualties, damage, or disruption severely affecting the
population, infrastructure, environment, economy, national morale, or
government functions.
Developing the capabilities needed to deal with large-scale disasters
is part of an overall national preparedness effort that should
integrate and define what needs to be done, where, based on what
standards, how it should be done, and how well it should be done. Along
with the NRP and NIMS, DHS has developed the National Preparedness
Goal. Considered as a group, these three documents are intended to
guide investments in emergency preparedness and response capabilities.
The NRP describes what needs to be done in response to an emergency
incident, either natural or man-made, the NIMS describes how to manage
what needs to be done, and the National Preparedness Goal describes how
well it should be done. The National Preparedness Goal is particularly
useful for determining what capabilities are needed, especially for a
catastrophic disaster. The interim goal addresses both natural
disasters and terrorist attacks. It defines both the 37 major
capabilities that first responders should possess to prevent, protect
from, respond to, and recover from disaster incidents and the most
critical tasks associated with these capabilities.[Footnote 9] An
inability to effectively perform these critical tasks would, by
definition, have a detrimental impact on effective protection,
prevention, response, and recovery capabilities.
The Maritime Infrastructure Recovery Plan (MIRP), released by DHS in
April 2006, applies these disaster preparedness documents to the
maritime sector. The MIRP is intended to facilitate the restoration of
maritime commerce after a terrorist attack or natural disaster and
reflects the disaster management framework outlined in the National
Response Plan. The MIRP addresses issues that should be considered by
ports when planning for natural disasters. However, it does not set
forth particular actions that should be taken at the port level,
leaving those determinations to be made by the port operators
themselves.
The 9/11 Commission pointed out that no amount of money or effort can
fully protect against every type of threat. As a result, what is needed
is an approach that considers the relative risks these various threats
pose and determines how best to use limited resources to prevent
threats, where possible, and to respond effectively if they occur.
While the Homeland Security Act of 2002 and Homeland Security
Presidential Directive 7 call for the use of risk management in
homeland security, little specific federal guidance or direction exists
as to how risk management should be implemented. In previous work
examining risk management efforts for homeland security and other
functions, we developed a framework summarizing the findings of
industry experts and best practices.[Footnote 10] This framework, shown
in figure 4, divides risk management into five major phases: (1)
setting strategic goals and objectives, and determining constraints;
(2) assessing the risks; (3) evaluating alternatives for addressing
these risks; (4) selecting the appropriate alternatives; and (5)
implementing the alternatives and monitoring the progress made and
results achieved.
Figure 4: GAO Risk Management Framework:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
Recent Natural Disasters Created a Variety of Challenges; Some Recovery
Efforts Were More Difficult Than Expected:
Recent natural disasters--particularly Hurricanes Katrina, Wilma, and
Rita in 2005--challenged affected ports on several fronts, according to
port authority officials. Since 1998, hurricanes have damaged
buildings, cranes, and other equipment owned by seven of the port
authorities we interviewed. Ports also reported damage to utility
systems and experienced delays in water, sewer, and power restoration.
Port authorities cited clearing waterways and debris removal as another
difficulty. In the case of Hurricane Katrina, some ports, such as
Gulfport and New Orleans, have not yet returned or took about 6 months
to return to predisaster operational levels, respectively. Separate
from the physical impact of the disasters, challenges occurred with
personnel, communications and coordination issues and, according to
port authority officials, these challenges proved more difficult than
anticipated. In some cases, personnel had evacuated the area, and port
officials were unsure when staff would be able to return to work. Given
that many phone lines were down, there were delays in restoring phone
service and, in most cases, ports did not have communications
alternatives in place. Some port authorities also reported difficulties
in working with local, state, and federal entities during the recovery
process, including coordinating re-entry to the port of port personnel
and filing for FEMA disaster recovery assistance.
Damage to Infrastructure Affected Operations at Most Ports Experiencing
Recent Natural Disasters:
Even though most ports anticipated and had plans in place to mitigate
infrastructure damage from natural disasters, over half of the port
authorities we contacted reported that the disasters created
infrastructure challenges. Twelve of the 17 ports we reviewed had
experienced a hurricane or earthquake since 1998, and among those 12
port authorities, 7 reported challenges in restoring infrastructure
(see fig.2). While we were unable to review a complete list of disaster
assistance estimates, some port authorities were able to provide
specific dollar amounts for repair damage to buildings, cranes, or
other equipment. For instance, the Port of Miami reported spending more
than $6 million on repairs as a result of Hurricanes Katrina, Wilma,
and Rita, including damage to facilities, signage, sea wall and storm
drainage system. Likewise, The Port of Houston reported spending
$200,000 for facility repairs following Hurricane Rita. Ports were
still faced with these repair costs even though a majority of the port
plans we reviewed included infrastructure damage mitigation. As a way
to work around the damaged structures, ports also utilized temporary
trailers for administrative and operational functions. For example,
this occurred at the Port of Port Arthur, where the strategy of
reserving backup equipment with appropriate vendors was included in
that port's Hurricane Readiness Plan.
Besides the repair costs involved, another indication of the
significance of damage to infrastructure was the effect on port
operations. In several cases, tenants left the port and moved
elsewhere. For example, Port of New Orleans officials said that because
they are unsure if departed tenants at the port will return, they have
been reluctant to replace three severely damaged container cranes.
Operations have been even more curtailed at the Port of Gulfport, also
because of Hurricane Katrina. Port authority officials report that they
have been able to repair only 3 of their 12 warehouses, which limited
their ability to accommodate storage for some of their major operators.
These operators have since moved their operations to other nearby
ports, such as Pascagoula, Mississippi, or Mobile, Alabama.
Besides damage to buildings, cranes, and other equipment involved
specifically in moving cargoes, port authorities also reported damages
to their utility systems, including water, sewer, and power. For
example, following Hurricane Katrina, the Port of Port Arthur was
without power for approximately 2 weeks. Because of a lack of on-site
generators, port officials limited port operations to daylight hours
only. The power outage also limited operation of certain hangar doors
that required electrical power to be opened. Ports with damage to water
and sewer included Gulfport, where 2 months were needed to restore its
sewer and water capacity. Similarly, the Port of Pascagoula had three
damaged water wells as a result of Hurricane Katrina. Port officials
told us one of those wells was still not operational almost a year
later. While some ports included backup water and power resources in
their contingency utility plans, officials at one port said their
backup resources may not be adequate to address long-term or extensive
outages. In fact, 10 of the 17 ports we reviewed did not have plans for
utility system restoration. The lack of anticipation of these
vulnerabilities was particularly apparent for ports affected by
Hurricanes Katrina, Wilma, and Rita; only 4 of the 10 ports impacted by
those storms had planned for utility challenges. For example, Port of
New Orleans officials said their supply of 5 to 10 days of water and 3
to 5 days of power through generators was not enough to sustain them
through the outages caused by Hurricane Katrina.
While many ports indicated that several federal agencies were
eventually able to effectively aid in clearing the waterways and
restoring aids to navigation, ports' experiences varied. Their
experiences also demonstrated that rapid clearing of waterways is key
to reestablishing port operations and emphasizes the need for ports to
coordinate and arrange for debris removal and restoring aids to
navigation ahead of time. Following are some examples:
* Following Hurricane Katrina, the Port of Gulfport had to remove large
amounts of debris, such as tree limbs that were hanging and leaning
over roads, as well as containers, cargo, and other equipment that
winds had scattered into the roadways. Port officials said that
clearing these obstructions was essential to re-establishing port
operations. Immediately after the hurricane, the local Navy
construction battalion (called Seabees) volunteered to assist the port
by clearing roads with their large bulldozers, which enabled supplies
and cargo to move in and out of the port. The Seabees also cleared boat
ramps so that Coast Guard search and rescue vessels could safely enter
the waterway. Port officials estimated that, over a period of 3 weeks,
the Seabees cleared about 30 percent of the debris in the port area.
After the Seabees were called to other duties, Port of Gulfport
officials hired a contractor to remove the remaining debris at a cost
of about $5 million. Port of Gulfport officials said that they applied
for FEMA reimbursement of these costs. Further, they explained that the
use of and planning for existing federal resources for debris removal,
such as the Navy Seabees, could have saved even more time and possibly
federal dollars that would later be paid to the port in the FEMA
reimbursement process.
* Inside the port area, the Port of Mobile experienced challenges with
debris removal that federal agencies such as the Corps or the Coast
Guard were not responsible for removing. These challenges may have
caused additional delays in restoring port operations. For instance,
port officials explained that storm surge waters from Katrina loosened
several oil rigs in the Gulf, one of which made its way into the port's
pier area and damaged several piers. They said the port is currently in
litigation to resolve who will pay for the damages. Port of Mobile
officials also estimated that dredging expenses, including the removal
of branches, sand, and silt from pier areas will be more than $7.5
million. Because the rig obstruction and other pier damages were not in
the federal waterway or jurisdiction, Port of Mobile officials said
they were only able to receive limited assistance from federal agencies
in resolving their internal damage issues.
Difficulties with Personnel, Communication, and Coordination Issues
Were Greater Than Expected during Recovery Efforts:
Officials of eight port authorities we contacted reported challenges
related to personnel, communications, or coordination with port
stakeholders as a result of hurricanes since 1998 and, in conversations
with us, they indicated that these challenges were more difficult than
anticipated. Port plans we reviewed addressed some of these types of
vulnerabilities to natural disasters. However, ports still identified
such vulnerabilities as a significant obstacle to their ability to
return to predisaster operational levels. Several ports cited examples
about how their personnel had evacuated and, for numerous reasons, were
unable to return to work. For example, several Port of Gulfport
employees lost their homes during Hurricane Katrina and had no local
living arrangements for themselves or their families. Likewise, the
Port of New Orleans said its operations were stifled by the lack of
personnel and labor in both Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Rita. At
the Port of Port Arthur, lack of power for area homes kept employees
from retuning immediately, causing temporary delays in port operations.
Port authorities also did not anticipate the extent to which their
communications systems would be impacted. High winds and flooding from
the hurricanes rendered phone lines out of service. With phones lines
down, port authorities were unable to get in touch with their staff or
other port stakeholders to share information. For instance, we learned
that approximately 50 percent of phones at the Port of Mobile were out
of service for about 2 to 4 weeks. Other ports, including New Orleans,
Pascagoula, and Port Arthur, also experienced phone outages and
reported limitations in cell phone reception.
Ports also identified coordination challenges with local, state, and
federal stakeholders while planning for and recovering from natural
disasters. At the local level, one coordination problem port officials
experienced was in re-entering the port after the storm. For example,
in Gulfport, port officials were denied entry to port property for the
first 2 weeks following Hurricane Katrina. Similarly in Houston, law
enforcement agencies blocked roads for access back into Houston after
the Hurricane Rita evacuation. In some cases, port officials did not
have the proper credentials required by local police and other
emergency management officials to be allowed roadway access through the
city to their port.
In other instances, we found that ports experienced varied levels of
coordination with local emergency management agencies, especially
regarding planning efforts. For example, Mobile County Emergency
Management officials affirmed that they have a close working
relationship with the Port of Mobile, where they have helped the port
conduct risk assessments and emergency planning activities, and where
they coordinate with port officials on other plans involving safety,
security, and the environment. Conversely, Port of Gulfport and
Harrison County Emergency Management officials in Mississippi said they
had limited contact and coordination regarding emergency recovery. One
county emergency management official said that although the agency has
made efforts to share planning documents with the port, the agency is
required to work through the Mississippi Emergency Management Agency
and follow any guidance in the state emergency plan to request
resources from or provide assistance to the port.
At the federal level, one coordination issue reported by port
stakeholders involved difficulties in coordinating with FEMA for
recovery resources. Some local emergency management officials and port
officials that we interviewed expressed concerns about the level of
interaction with FEMA officials before an incident occurs. For example,
Port of Jacksonville officials said they would like to see FEMA take a
more active role in the disaster planning process, such as
participation on the AMSC at the local level or coordinating with the
Florida State Department of Community Affairs at the state
level.[Footnote 11] Similarly, Port of Los Angeles officials said
effective communication with FEMA is essential and that they would like
to communicate more clearly with FEMA about reimbursement policies
before a disaster takes place. In fact, in November 2006, port
officials from Los Angeles and Oakland held a joint meeting with FEMA
and the California Office of Emergency Services to discuss the current
federal and state regulations and practices regarding disaster relief
fund and reimbursement policy.
Port stakeholders also expressed concerns about coordinating with FEMA
after an incident occurred, including inconsistencies in information
and difficulty in appropriately completing FEMA forms and other
documents required for reimbursement. At the county emergency
management level, one agency official cited an inconsistency of the
interpretation of FEMA policies and changing personnel as some of the
challenges in working with FEMA. This official suggested that
interacting with FEMA officials more frequently before a disaster would
help the port authority better understand which personnel to contact in
an emergency situation. The official said this coordination problem
became obvious during the Hurricane Katrina recovery effort when, after
the port had made several requests, FEMA did not send a representative
to the area. Port officials in Gulfport also found it difficult to
reconcile their damages using FEMA's cost estimate process. To resolve
the paperwork confusion, the Port of Gulfport hired an outside company
to deal with FEMA directly and to handle all reimbursement-related
issues on their behalf. While Port of Gulfport officials recognized
that FEMA's attention to detail was an effort to prevent fraud and
abuse, they also said FEMA staff could have done a better job in
providing guidance about the reimbursement process.
Besides having coordination challenges with FEMA, we learned that
several ports were unclear about resources that were available for
recovery from the Maritime Administration. Immediately following
Hurricane Katrina, the Gulf area was in need of critical resources such
as power, water, and personnel. However, due to infrastructure damages
around the area, it was difficult to get these resources into ports. As
such, The Maritime Administration provided, with the concurrence of the
Department of Defense, ready reserve vessels for FEMA's use. These
ready reserve vessels are strategic sealift assets usually used for
defense purposes that could be used for command and control, housing,
power generation, or the movement of water and other supplies. We found
that ports' knowledge about these assets and how to request them was
limited. For example, port authority officials at one port turned down
the Maritime Administration's offer for a housing vessel. The port
determined that the deep draft and large size of the vessel might
impede commercial traffic and block other vessels from entering their
port. Port officials reached this determination without the knowledge
that smaller vessels for the same purpose could have been provided by
the Maritime Administration. The vessel offered by the Maritime
Administration, however, was instead deployed to the Port of New
Orleans area to house first responders.
Port Authorities Have Various Efforts Under Way to Mitigate Challenges:
Many port authorities have taken steps to address the challenges
resulting from recent natural disasters. Individually, they have taken
such steps as upgrading communications equipment, adding backup
communications approaches and power equipment, and creating alternative
sites for administrative operations and storage of computer data.
Collectively, they have shared best practices for disaster planning and
response, most notably through an industry-wide publication with
detailed planning steps and guidelines. Port authorities that were not
directly impacted by recent disaster events have also taken steps to
revise their planning efforts, including greater coordination with
other port stakeholders. Many port authorities have adapted or improved
existing stakeholder forums to assist in facilitating port planning for
natural disasters. At the federal level, agencies such as the Maritime
Administration have taken steps to assist ports in identifying federal
resources available for disaster response and recovery.
Steps Taken Include Port-Specific and Industry-Wide Actions:
As a result of the lessons learned from recent natural disasters, port
authorities report taking many steps to mitigate vulnerabilities. One
mitigation tactic reported by many port authorities is to add equipment
and develop redundant systems to help during any recovery efforts. The
most frequent redundancy added was in creating communications
alternatives. Various port authorities reported purchasing
communications equipment that does not necessarily rely on traditional
land lines for calling, such as analog pagers, wireless handheld
devices, CB radios, and satellite phones. They also integrated more
sophisticated communications hardware and software programs. Some
ports, such as Houston and San Diego, implemented 1-800 phone numbers
to receive calls from port personnel. As an additional precaution, the
Port of Houston utilizes call centers located out of state in areas
that are less likely to have been impacted by the same storm. In
another effort to route calls out of the impacted area, the Port of New
Orleans has also been assigned phone numbers with alternative area
codes.
Besides making improvements to communications systems, many port
authorities took steps related to power and administrative operations.
Seven port authorities reported purchasing or arranging for alternative
power supplies that could be used during an outage. For example, the
Port of New Orleans purchased generators after the 2005 hurricane
season. Ports also recognized the need for administrative and
information technology location alternatives. Four port authorities
reported changing their alternative administrative sites since recent
storms. Port authorities also told us that they have changed the way
they back up and store their electronic data and equipment. For
example, the Port of New Orleans previously had its alternative work
site only 3 miles away from its regular operations location. Since both
operations sites could be susceptible to the same disaster event, Port
of New Orleans officials have partnered with the Port of Shreveport,
Louisiana, almost 200 miles away, to use Shreveport's facilities as an
alternate operations site if the Port of New Orleans is out of business
for more than 5 days. Further, the two ports have prepared a mutual
agreement, which includes cost sharing efforts for information
technology infrastructure upgrades at the Port of Shreveport, to better
accommodate New Orleans' needs in a disaster.
Another mitigation tactic by ports has been the sharing of best
practices and lessons learned from recent natural disasters. Through
efforts by the AAPA, a nationwide industry group, ports from across the
U.S. and Canada participated in the development of an industry best
practices document.[Footnote 12] In developing this document, AAPA
organized various working groups, which included port officials from
ports that had been affected by recent natural disasters, as well as
ports that had not been affected. Acting as a forum for port officials
to share their experiences with natural disasters, these working groups
were able to develop a manual focused on port planning and recovery
efforts. Vetted by AAPA members, the manual includes planning for
emergency operations, communications, damage assessments, insurance and
FEMA claims processes, coordinating with federal agencies, and overall
emergency planning objectives.
Another industry group, the GICA,[Footnote 13] has worked closely with
the Corps, Coast Guard and other maritime agencies to implement new
practices for a more efficient response to maritime related incidents.
Many of these efforts have been implemented as result of recent
hurricanes. For example, a special Logistics Support Center is set up
during response times for the sole purpose of assisting the Corps and
Coast Guard with contracting special equipment, including water, fuel
and crane barges, towing vessels, pumps, and generators. Regarding
clearing the waterways, GICA barge members have provided knowledgeable
waterway operators and state-of-the-art boats to assist Coast Guard
personnel in conducting channel assessments immediately following a
storm. In an effort to restore aids to navigation, GICA contacts also
towed 50 temporary buoys and supplied aircraft for aerial surveillance
of the waterways. Moreover, the Corps, Coast Guard, and GICA formed the
Gulf Coast Inland Waterways Joint Hurricane Team to develop a protocol
for storm response. Finalized in July 2006, the Joint Hurricane
Response Protocol[Footnote 14] is an effort to more fully develop
lessons learned from previous hurricane seasons and waterways
management practices, with the goal of implementing an effective
restoration of Gulf Coast maritime commerce following future storms.
Ports that have not experienced problems as a result of recent
disasters but that are nonetheless susceptible to disaster threats have
also responded to these lessons learned by other ports. For example,
the Port of Tacoma hired a consultant to assist in developing a
business continuity plan. The Port of Jacksonville has also undertaken
a comprehensive enhancement to its continuity of operations plan.
Likewise, as a result of lessons learned from the Loma Prieta
Earthquake in Oakland, the Port of Los Angeles developed more stringent
seismic building codes. Additionally, Port of Savannah officials told
us that they, too, have changed their prehurricane crane operations
based on lessons learned from hurricanes in the Gulf region.
Ports Have Taken Steps to Improve Stakeholder Coordination:
We found several examples of port efforts to improve stakeholder
coordination, including utilizing existing forums to coordinate
disaster planning, as well as realigning and enhancing their current
plans. Regarding the use of existing forums, port authorities in both
New Orleans and Mobile said they were using their AMSC to coordinate
response and recovery efforts. Moreover, GAO has previously reported
that in the wake of Hurricane Katrina, information was shared
collaboratively through AMSCs to determine when it was appropriate to
close and then reopen the port.[Footnote 15] Port-specific coordination
teams, such as those at the Port of Houston, have also used their
lessons learned to improve coordination for natural disaster planning.
Houston's port coordination teams are an outgrowth of the port's
relationships with other maritime stakeholders in the Houston-Galveston
Navigation Safety Committee,[Footnote 16] which includes a wide variety
of waterway users and operators. In another example, the Port of
Oakland works closely with the City Disaster Council on emergency
planning and participates in various exercises with city, county, and
state officials.
We also found several examples of how ports have aligned their local
planning with the national planning structure and have identified
various ways to enhance their current coordination plans. The national
structure, which includes NIMS and NRP, is designed to provide a
consistent framework and approach for emergency management. Port plans
that we reviewed, in particular those from ports in hurricane impacted
areas, have identified the importance of adapting to this national
structure and emergency response system. For example, the Port of
Mobile's emergency operations plan explains that the complexity of
incident management and the growing need for stakeholder coordination
has increased its need for a standard incident management system.
Therefore, the Port of Mobile's emergency operations plan outlines the
use of an incident management framework from which all agencies can
work together in an efficient and effective manner. Some port
authorities making changes have not experienced any significant impact
from recent disasters. For instance, Port of Jacksonville officials
reported that Hurricane Katrina impacts in the Gulf region prompted
them to revise their disaster preparedness plans, including
reorganizing the plans to reflect NIMS language and alignment with NRP
guidelines. Similarly, Port of San Diego officials said they hired a
consultant to assist them with drafting their emergency response and
business continuity plan. San Diego's plan prioritized risks, clarified
roles and responsibilities of key departments, and laid out directions
on how to better coordinate with local emergency management officials
during a disaster event.
Federal Agencies Have Attempted to Help Ports Strengthen Recovery
Efforts:
Since the 2005 hurricane season, federal agencies have also taken steps
to help port authorities strengthen ports' ability to recover from
future natural disasters. These efforts have focused on increased
coordination and communication with stakeholders and also on building
stakeholders' knowledge about federal resources for port recovery
efforts. The efforts primarily involve four federal agencies that in
some fashion work directly with ports--the Maritime Administration, the
Coast Guard, FEMA and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Efforts for
those four agencies are as follows:
Maritime Administration Efforts: The Maritime Administration has taken
two main steps: developing an approach for activating maritime assets
in disaster recovery, and updating a risk management guidebook. During
the 2005 hurricane season, the Maritime Administration emerged as a
critical resource for the Gulf area by providing vessels from the
nation's National Defense Ready Reserve Fleet to enable recovery
operations and provide shelter for displaced citizens. Since that time,
FEMA developed a one-time plan--the Federal Support Plan, which was
cited specifically for the 2006 Hurricane Season and specific to the
federal government's response efforts in the State of Louisiana. The
Maritime Administration contributed to this plan by identifying
government and commercial maritime capabilities that could be employed
in response to a disaster.[Footnote 17] According to Maritime
Administration officials, while the information is focused on the Gulf
area, it could be easily adapted to other areas in the United States if
a disaster occurred. To date, the Maritime Administration is completing
the process of identifying needs and capabilities and plans to provide
a directive regarding capabilities to its regional offices in June
2007. However, no strategy exists for communicating this information to
ports.
The Maritime Administration is also currently updating its publication
titled Port Risk Management and Insurance Guidebook (2001). This
publication is the Maritime Administration's "best practices" guide for
port risk management. Developed primarily to assist smaller ports in
conducting risk management, it includes information on how ports can
obtain insurance coverage, facilitate emergency management and port
security, and apply risk management. The Maritime Administration began
updating the guidebook after the 2005 hurricane season. According to
officials from the Maritime Administration, ports are actively using
this guidebook, especially since many of the contributors are port
directors and risk managers at the ports.
While these efforts demonstrate the Maritime Administration's increased
involvement in assisting ports in planning for future disasters, we
also observed that Maritime Administration regions vary in their level
of communication and coordination with ports. According to a Maritime
Administration official, the Gulf and East Coast regions have been
working with FEMA regional offices to quickly activate needed assets in
case of a disaster. However, while the Gulf and East Coast regions have
been strengthening these relationships, other regions may not have the
same level of coordination. We found, in general, port authorities'
interaction with the Maritime Administration was limited for natural
disaster planning, and the ports we spoke to said they usually did not
work directly with the agency in disaster planning.[Footnote 18] This
view was echoed by Maritime Administration officials who said that the
relationship between the agency's regional offices and the ports in
their respective areas varied across the country.
Coast Guard efforts: Coast Guard efforts in natural disaster planning
varied considerably from port to port and were most extensive in the
Gulf. While in general, the Coast Guard was considered successful in
its missions during the 2005 hurricane season, its officials said they
were taking additional steps in improving planning for recovery efforts
with port stakeholders based on their experiences with recent natural
disasters. For example, at the Port of Mobile, Coast Guard officials
said that participating in an actual Incident Command System[Footnote
19]emergency centers has been as helpful as exercises and, since the
2005 hurricane season, they have utilized such a unified command at
least 10 times in preparation for potential hurricane landfalls in the
region. At other ports, the Coast Guard had a more limited role in
assisting ports in planning for natural disasters.
Even at ports that had not experienced substantial damage from a recent
natural disaster, however, Coast Guard units were applying lessons
learned from other ports' experiences and increasing their level of
involvement. For example, the Port of Houston sustained minimal damage
from Hurricane Rita; however, Coast Guard officials said that they
identified areas where they could make improvements. The Coast Guard at
the Port of Houston leads a recovery planning effort through port
coordination teams, which include stakeholders such as the port
authority, Coast Guard, and private operators, working together during
disaster recovery efforts. These teams are all-hazards focused and are
activated differently for terrorist incidents or natural disasters.
Coast Guard officials said that although the teams were successful in
planning for Hurricane Rita, there were areas for improvement,
including outreach and training with port stakeholders and
communication. Further, Coast Guard officials at the Port of Tacoma
said that other ports' experiences with recent natural disasters has
generated interest in them becoming more involved in the planning and
coordination of natural disasters. They also indicated they were
interested in adapting, in some form, a planning forum similar to the
Port of Houston's port coordination teams.
FEMA efforts: While state and local emergency management agencies
assist in facilitating FEMA disaster planning at the port level, FEMA
has several efforts under way to improve its assistance to ports for
disaster recovery. For instance, FEMA officials said that through the
Public Assistance Program, FEMA is able to provide assistance to ports
that are eligible applicants after a major disaster or emergency. Based
on lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina, FEMA is also reviewing and
updating its policies and guidance documents associated with this
program. To administer the program, FEMA will coordinate closely with
federal, state, and local authorities (including emergency management
agencies) through its regional offices. Officials also said that
through planning, training, and exercise activities sponsored by DHS,
they hope to have greater opportunities to interact and coordinate with
port authorities and other local agencies before disasters occur.
Further, officials agree that coordination with their local
counterparts is an important part of emergency management and disaster
recovery efforts.
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers efforts: Although the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers generally does not conduct natural disaster planning with
ports, staff at the district level have made some efforts to increase
their level of involvement in this process, particularly in the Gulf
region. For example, district U.S. Army Corps of Engineers staff have
(1) organized and chaired yearly hurricane planning forums to which all
ports in the region are invited; (2) organized prestorm teleconferences
for port stakeholders, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration,
U.S. Navy, and in some instances, the media; (3) participated in the
Coast Guard's Partner Emergency Action Team, which specifically address
disaster preparedness; (4) geographically aligned with the Coast Guard
to better facilitate coordination during an emergency; and (5)
implemented informational training on planning for hurricanes to ports
and other maritime stakeholders. Many of these improvements were
implemented as a result of Hurricane Ivan (2001) and the hurricanes
from the 2005 season. However, the extent of the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers participation in natural disaster planning with ports varies.
For instance, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers representatives in Savannah
said they do not play a significant role in the port's natural disaster
planning for recovery efforts. Similarly in Jacksonville, U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers officials explained that their primary natural
disaster recovery duty at the Port of Miami is to repair the federal
channel and they do not participate in the port authority's disaster
planning efforts. However, the Jacksonville U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers does cooperate with the Coast Guard's Marine Safety Office in
Jacksonville in the development of their hurricane preparedness plan.
For this effort, it assisted in determining what vessels could remain
in port during a hurricane and what vessels would be required to leave.
Current Planning Approach Lessens Effective Coordination among All Port
Stakeholders:
Most port authorities we reviewed conduct planning for natural
disasters separately from planning for homeland security threats.
Federal law established security planning requirements that apply to
ports. Similar requirements do not exist with regard to natural
disaster planning. The ports we contacted used markedly different
approaches to natural disaster planning, and the extent and
thoroughness of their plans varied widely. A few ports have integrated
homeland security and natural disaster planning in what is called an
all-hazards approach, and this approach appeared to be generating
benefits and is in keeping with experts' recommendations and with the
newest developments in federal risk management policy. A consequence of
the divided approach was a wide variance in the degree to which port
stakeholders were involved in natural disaster planning and the degree
to which port authorities were aware of federal resources available for
disaster recovery. For homeland security planning, federal law provides
for the establishment of AMSCs with wide stakeholder representation,
and some ports are using these committees or another similar forum with
wide representation in their disaster planning efforts. DHS, which
through the Coast Guard oversees the AMSCs, provides an example of how
to incorporate a wider of scope of committee activity.
Port-Level Natural Disaster Planning Is Primarily Conducted Separately
from Other Threats:
Of the ports we visited, more than half developed plans for natural
disasters separately from plans that address security threats. This is
likely due to the requirement that port authorities carry out their
planning for homeland security under the federal framework created by
the Congress in the Maritime Transportation Security Act
(MTSA),[Footnote 20] under which all port operators are required to
draft individual security plans identifying security vulnerabilities
and approaches to mitigate them. Under the Coast Guard's implementing
regulations, these plans are to include such items as measures for
access control, responses to security threats, and drills and exercises
to train staff and test the plan.[Footnote 21] The plans are
"performance-based"; that is, the security outcomes are specified, but
the stakeholders are free to identify and implement appropriate
solutions as long as these solutions achieve the specified outcomes.
Because of the similarities in security and natural hazard planning
these plans can be useful for guiding natural disaster response.
MTSA also provided the Secretary of Homeland Security with the
authority to create AMSCs at the port level. These committees--with
representatives from the federal, state, local, and private sectors--
offer a venue to identify and deal with vulnerabilities in and around
ports, as well as a forum for sharing information on issues related to
port security. The committee assists the Coast Guard's COTP in
developing an area maritime security plan, which complements the
facility security plans developed by individual port operators. The
plan provides a framework for communication and coordination among port
stakeholders and law enforcement officials and identifies and reduces
vulnerabilities to security threats throughout the port area.
In contrast, port authority and operator natural disaster planning
documents are generally not required by law and vary widely. According
to one member from the AAPA, ports will have various interrelated
plans, such as hurricane readiness plans, emergency operations plans,
engineering plans, and community awareness and emergency response
plans. Taken as a whole, the distinct plans for a particular port may
represent the port's risk management approach to disaster planning.
In addition, port natural disaster plans are not reviewed by the Coast
Guard. Representatives of the Coast Guard at locations we visited
confirmed they do not review port authority or port operator planning
documents pertaining to natural disaster planning. For example,
officials at the Port of Oakland and the Port of Tacoma said they do
not review the port or port stakeholders planning documents for natural
disaster planning. Coast Guard officials at the Port of Savannah also
noted that they do not review the hurricane plans for port operators.
They contended that they do not have the expertise to advise the
operators on how to protect or restart their particular operations.
Moreover, natural disaster plans developed by port authorities
generally do not apply to the port's private operators. Only in one
case did a port authority state that it required its private operators
to draft a natural disaster plan.
Under the Separate Approach, Disaster Plans Show Wide Variation:
We found that the thoroughness of natural disaster plans varied
considerably from port to port. For instance, the Port of Mobile had a
relatively thorough plan. The Port of Mobile was affected by three
major hurricanes in 2005-2006. Roughly a year after Hurricane Katrina,
the Alabama State Port Authority completed an extensive emergency
operations plan, based on an analysis that considered natural, man-
made, and security-related hazards. The operations plan describes
preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation procedures for each
identified threat, establishes requirements for conducting exercises,
and establishes a schedule for regular plan reviews and
updates.[Footnote 22] In contrast, the Port of Morgan City does not
have a written plan for preparing for natural disaster threats but
instead relies on port personnel to assess disaster risk and prepare
appropriately. Following a disaster, the port authority relies on
senior personnel to direct recovery efforts as needed.
In the absence of uniform federal guidance for port disaster planning,
some local governments have instituted local planning requirements. The
differences in these local guidelines account for some of the variation
in the content and thoroughness of port disaster plans. For example,
the Miami-Dade County Emergency Management Office helps to coordinate
disaster preparedness for all county agencies, including the Port of
Miami. As such, the port submits its hurricane plans and continuity of
operations plan to the office each year for review, which provides a
certain level of quality assurance. By comparison, the Port of Los
Angeles found local seismic building codes were insufficient to reach
the desired level of preparedness, so the port developed its own
seismic codes to guide infrastructure construction and repair.
Combined All-Hazards Approach Shows Promise for Improved Planning:
In contrast to the disjunctional planning for both natural disasters
and security at ports, industry experts encourage the unified
consideration of all risks faced by the port. Unified disaster
preparedness planning requires that all of the threats faced by the
port, both natural and man-made, be considered together. This is
referred to as an all-hazards approach. Experts consider it to offer
several advantages:
* Application of planning resources to both security and natural
disaster preparedness. Because of the similarities between the effects
of terrorist attacks and natural or accidental disasters, much of the
planning, personnel, training, and equipment that form the basis of
protection, response, and recovery capabilities are similar across all
emergency events. As we have previously reported, the capabilities
needed to respond to major disasters, whether the result of terrorist
attack or nature, are similar in many ways.[Footnote 23] Unified risk
management can enhance the efficiency of port planning efforts because
of the similarity in recovery plans for both natural and security-
related disasters. One expert noted that responding to a disaster would
likely be the same for a security incident and a natural disaster
incident from an operational standpoint.
* Efficient allocation of disaster-preparation resources. An all-
hazards approach allows the port to estimate the relative impact of
mitigation alternatives and identify the optimal mix of investments in
these alternatives based on the costs and benefits of each. The
exclusion of certain risks from consideration, or the separate
consideration of a particular type of risk, gives rise to the
possibility that risks will not be accurately assessed or compared, and
that too many or too few resources will be allocated toward mitigation
of a particular risk. Port risk management experts noted that, in the
absence of an all-hazards risk management process, it is difficult to
accurately assess and address the full spectrum of threats faced by a
port.
Federal Actions Reflect Movement Toward All-Hazards Approach:
At the federal level, the Congress has introduced various elements of
an all-hazards approach to risk management and assistance to ports.
Examples are as follows:
* Single response approach to all types of emergency events. NIMS and
NRP, which were implemented by DHS, provide a unified framework for
responding to security and natural disaster events. NIMS is a policy
document that defines roles and responsibilities of federal, state, and
local first responders during all types of emergency events. The NRP is
designed to integrate federal government domestic prevention,
protection, response, and recovery plans into a single operational plan
for all-hazards and all-emergency response disciplines. Using the
framework provided by NIMS, the NRP describes operational procedures
for federal support to emergency managers and organizes capabilities,
staffing, and equipment resources in terms of functions that are most
likely to be needed during emergency events. In addition, along with
the NRP and NIMS, DHS has developed the National Preparedness Goal, as
required by Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8. Considered as a
group, these three documents are intended to guide investments in
emergency preparedness and response capabilities for all hazards. An
inability to effectively perform these critical tasks would, by
definition, have a detrimental impact on effective protection,
prevention, response, and recovery capabilities.
* Broadened focus for risk mitigation efforts. Security and
Accountability for Every Port Act, passed in October 2006, contains
language mandating that the Coast Guard institute Port Security
Training and Exercise Programs to evaluate response capabilities of
port facilities to respond to acts of terrorism, natural disasters, and
other emergencies.[Footnote 24] Officials from the DHS Preparedness
Directorate's Grants and Training Office also noted that the criteria
for the Port Security Grant Program is beginning to reflect the
movement toward all-hazards planning in the future. DHS officials
stated that the program may evolve to focus more on portwide risk
management, rather than on risk mitigation for particular assets.
Furthermore, grant applications that demonstrate mitigation of natural
hazard risks in addition to security risks may be more competitive.
Other officials noted that while the program may focus more on all
hazards in the future, it will remain focused on security priorities
for now.
Another agency-level movement toward the all-hazards approach is
occurring in the Coast Guard's improvement of a computer tool it uses
to compare security risks for targets throughout a port, including
areas not under the jurisdiction of a local port authority. This tool,
called the Maritime Security Risk Assessment Model (MSRAM), provides
information for the U.S. Coast Guard COPT to use in deciding the most
efficient allocation of resources to reduce security risks at a port.
The Coast Guard is developing an all-hazards risk assessment and
management system, partially fed by MSRAM, which will allow comparison
of risks and risk-mitigation activities across all goals and hazards.
The Coast Guard directs the Area Maritime Security Committee to use
MSRAM in the development of the Area Maritime Security Plan. Given that
the Coast Guard is enhancing the MSRAM with a tool that will
incorporate natural hazards, the risks addressed in the Area Maritime
Security Plan could likely include both natural and security threats in
the future.
An all-hazards approach is in many ways a logical maturation of port
security planning, which saw an aggressive homeland security expansion
in the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. One expert
in seismic risk management we spoke with said port officials he
contacted indicated that they were not focused on natural disaster risk
because, in their view, the federal government wanted them to focus on
security risks instead. At some ports, hurricanes or earthquakes may be
a greater threat than terrorism, and a case can be made that overall
risk to a port might be more effectively reduced through greater
investment in mitigating these risks. While federal law provides
guidance on addressing security risks through MTSA[Footnote 25] and its
implementing regulations, it does not provide similar guidance
pertaining to mitigation of natural disaster threats.
Our previous work on risk management has examined the challenges
involved in comparing risk across broader threat categories.[Footnote
26] A risk management framework that analyzes risks based on the
likelihood that they will occur and the consequences of their
occurrence is a useful tool for ensuring that program expenditures are
prioritized and properly focused. In light of the competition for
scarce resources available to deal with the threats ports face, a clear
understanding of the relative significance of these threats is an
important step.
Port Authorities Using an All-Hazards Approach Indicate Benefits
Resulted:
Two port authorities we reviewed have begun to take an all-hazards
approach to disaster planning by developing planning documents and
structures that address both security risks and natural disasters, and
officials at both ports said this approach yielded benefits.[Footnote
27] At the Port of Houston, the Coast Guard used its authority to
mandate the creation of port coordination teams by creating teams that
include all port stakeholders and combine planning and response efforts
for both security and natural disaster threats. This unified approach
to risk management has allowed the port to respond efficiently to
disasters when they occur, according to port officials. In particular,
they said, the organization of the team changes to match the nature of
the threat. For security threats, the teams are organized
geographically and do not require that the entire port close down,
thereby appropriately matching resources to the threat being faced. For
natural disasters, the teams are organized functionally because of the
more dispersed nature of the threat.
Following the 2005 hurricane season, the Port of Mobile convened a task
force to reorganize its disaster planning to address both security
incidents and natural disasters. The task force, which recently
completed its emergency operations plan, included the Port Authority
Police Chief; Harbormaster; Environmental, Health and Safety Manager;
and representatives of the port's rail, cargo, intermodal and
development divisions. A member of the county emergency management
agency also served on the task force to provide expert guidance on
emergency response planning.
Port stakeholders in other ports that had not moved to an all-hazards
approach also said preparedness and response practices for security
incidents and natural disasters are sufficiently similar to merit
combined planning. Officials in several ports said that although they
are required to allocate certain resources to security risk mitigation,
overall risk to the port would be more effectively reduced if they had
the flexibility to allocate some of those resources to mitigating
natural disaster risk.
Under the Separate Approach, Gaps Exist in Coordinating Maritime
Stakeholders and Obtaining Information about Federal Resources:
We have previously reported that, for homeland security planning, the
AMSCs established under federal law have been an effective coordination
tool.[Footnote 28] These committees have provided a structure to
improve the timeliness, completeness, and usefulness of information
sharing between federal and nonfederal stakeholders. Port stakeholders
said that the committees were an improvement over previous information-
sharing efforts because they established a formal structure for
communicating information and new procedures for sharing information.
Stakeholders stated that, among other things, the committees have been
used as a forum for sharing assessments of vulnerabilities, providing
information on illegal or suspicious activities, and providing input on
Area Maritime Security Plans. Stakeholders, including private
operators, said the information sharing had increased their awareness
of security issues around the port and allowed them to identify and
address security issues at their facilities. Likewise, Coast Guard
officials said the information they received from nonfederal
participants had helped in mitigating and reducing risks.
In contrast to the regulatory requirements for the establishment of
AMSCs, there are no nationwide federal mandates for all-hazards
planning forums that involve a broad spectrum of stakeholders in
disaster planning. In the absence of any consistent requirement or
approach, we found substantial variation in the maturity of, and
participation in, natural disaster planning forums at ports. As table 3
shows, the level of activity and the participants varied considerably.
Some ports utilized their AMSC for both types of planning, while others
conducted natural disaster planning efforts primarily within the local
area's broader emergency management forums, and still others conducted
their planning piecemeal, with various entities meeting separately and
not in one coordinated forum.
Table 3: Natural Disaster Planning Forums at Ports GAO Visited:
Port: Tacoma;
Description of forum: The port does not have a central forum for
coordinating stakeholder natural disaster planning efforts. Instead,
occasional disaster preparedness exercises with the county emergency
management agency and the Coast Guard provide stakeholders with
opportunities to share lessons learned. However, the Port of Tacoma
conducts planning activities with the county emergency management
department.
Port: Oakland;
Description of forum: The port is an active member of the City's
Emergency Management Board (Disaster Council) which works closely with
the Port of Oakland on emergency planning and testing of
plans/exercises. The port is also involved in a number of city, county,
and statewide exercises.
Port: Houston;
Description of forum: The port has an all-hazards forum through the
Port Coordination Team and its constituent Port Coordination Centers.
These centers and team include representatives from the port authority
and the Coast Guard and a range of stakeholders from private entities.
The forum plans for natural disasters and security threats and is
activated differently depending on the type of event. However, the
forum does not include representatives from the local emergency
management office.[A].
Port: Mobile;
Description of forum: The port's AMSC is the most significant forum for
disaster planning. Following the 2005 hurricane season, the port
authority convened a task force to reorganize its disaster planning to
address both security incidents and natural disasters. The task force
included stakeholders from across the port area. The port also works
with the county emergency management agency.
Port: Gulfport;
Description of forum: The port authority meets once a year with
customers and tenants to discuss hurricane preparedness and review the
hurricane plan. The port provides training on transporting cargo during
hurricanes and participates in separate response and recovery planning
meetings with other maritime stakeholders, such as the U.S. Army Corps
of Engineers.
Port: Miami;
Description of forum: The primary forum used to discuss natural
disaster planning is the Safety First Committee, which discusses a
variety of safety issues. The committee is led by the Port of Miami and
meets monthly. To address individual private sector stakeholders, a
subcommittee meets with individuals as needed.
Port: Savannah;
Description of forum: The port authority is involved in several port
forums that discuss a variety of issues; emergency issues may be
addressed in these forums if they are imminent. Externally, the port
authority's primary interactions are with the state for hazard
mitigation programming and with the local emergency management office
for response and evacuation. Until recently, interaction with the local
emergency management office was limited.
Source: GAO.
[A] According to port officials, the Port of Houston does coordinate
with the local emergency management agency during a disaster event.
[End of table]
The Port of Savannah provides an example of how separate planning for
natural disasters and security can lead to a lack of coordination and
information-sharing. While officials from the local emergency
management agency said they reviewed and provided comments on the
Georgia Port Authority's most recent Hurricane Plan and Draft Emergency
Operations Plan, this had not traditionally been the case over the past
several years. According to a representative from the emergency
management agency, if the port is not sharing its emergency operations
plans, it makes it difficult for responders in the local area to
understand what is happening within the port in terms of planning for
natural disasters. Additionally, while the local EMA is enjoying an
ongoing productive dialogue with port representatives in developing the
Emergency Operations Plan and working on port safety and security
issues, they are not having the same level of success with port
representatives responsible for hurricane planning. Even so, officials
said that they had seen marked improvement in the area of portwide
cooperation and involvement among stakeholders.
Port authorities' lack of familiarity with FEMA's programs is another
example of the gaps that exist. We found that port authorities'
understanding of FEMA's assistance was dependent on their relationship
with the local or state emergency management office--a stakeholder that
is not necessarily involved in the forums where the port's natural
disaster planning occurs. We discussed three FEMA programs with
officials from our seven case study ports: the Public Assistance
Program, Hazard Mitigation Grant Program and the Predisaster Mitigation
Grant Program (see table 4 for brief descriptions). These programs
provide ports with funds for disaster mitigation efforts before and
after disaster events and assist ports in avoiding costly damages. Of
the three programs, port authorities were most knowledgeable about, and
most involved with, the Public Assistance Program, although even with
this program, some port authorities reported encountering challenges
with the process during the 2005 hurricane season. Their knowledge and
participation in the two hazard mitigation grant programs was dependent
on their involvement with the emergency planning office. FEMA officials
told us that no ports have applied as an applicant or subapplicant for
the Predisaster Mitigation Program,[Footnote 29] and only a few had
received assistance through the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program since
1998. AAPA officials made the same point--that many ports are unaware,
unsure how to navigate or do not understand the resources that are
available to them for disasters. In its new best practices manual for
natural disaster planning, AAPA included a section regarding various
federal resources available, including FEMA.
Table 4: Key FEMA Disaster Assistance Programs:
Public Assistance Program[A];
Provides grants for the repair, replacement, or restoration of disaster-
damaged, publicly owned facilities and the facilities of certain
private nonprofit organizations. The federal share is not less than 75
percent of the eligible cost for emergency measures and permanent
restoration. The state determines who pays the nonfederal share.
Hazard Mitigation Grant Program[B];
Provides grants to states and local governments to implement long-term
hazard mitigation measures after a major disaster declaration. The
purpose of program is to reduce the loss of life and property due to
natural disasters and to enable mitigation measures to be implemented
during the immediate recovery from a disaster. Provides up to 75% of
the cost of hazard mitigation measures. The State or grantee must
provide a 25% match.
Predisaster Hazard Mitigation Program[C];
The program provides funds on a competitive basis to states,
territories, Indian tribal governments, and communities for hazard
mitigation planning and the implementation of mitigation projects prior
to a disaster event. Funding these plans and projects reduces overall
risks to the population and structures, while also reducing reliance on
funding from actual disaster declarations. The nonfederal share of the
grant is at least 25%. Eligibility for a project grant is dependent on
the applicant and sub- applicant having a FEMA approved hazard
mitigation plan. States are eligible as applicants for grants and ports
are eligible as a subgrantee of the state.
Source: GAO.
[A] Established by Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency
Assistance Act Pub. L. No. 93-288, 88 Stat.143 (1974), codified in 42
U.S.C. ch. 68.
[B] Authorized in 42 U.S.C. § 5170c.
[C] Authorized in 42 U.S.C. § 5133.
[End of table]
Conclusions:
The 2005 hurricane season emphasized the need for ports to plan for
other threats in addition to security. Since the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001, the country has focused on enhancing its security
measures, and ports in particular have been targeted due to their
vulnerability and their criticality to the U.S. economy. While ports
have long prepared to some degree for hurricanes and earthquakes, the
hurricanes of 2005 highlighted key areas in which natural disaster
planning was often inadequate. Even ports that were not directly
impacted by the hurricanes recognized their own vulnerabilities and
took additional actions. As ports continue to revise and improve their
planning efforts, available evidence indicates that, if ports take a
system-wide approach, thinking strategically about using resources to
mitigate and recover from all forms of disaster, they will be able to
achieve the most effective results. The federally established framework
for ports' homeland security planning appears to provide useful
elements for establishing an all-hazards approach and adopting these
elements appears to be a logical starting point for an all-hazards
approach for port authorities. In particular, greater coordination
between stakeholders appears important to ensure that available federal
resources can be most effectively applied. A forum for sharing
information and developing plans across a wide range of stakeholders,
as occurs with a port's AMSC, is critical for ensuring that local
stakeholders can use federal resources effectively. This is especially
the case for mitigation grants administered by the Federal Emergency
Management Agency and the Maritime Administration's communication of
information regarding making ships and other maritime resources
available for disaster recovery.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To help ensure that ports achieve adequate planning for natural
disasters and effectively manage risk to a variety of threats, we are
recommending that the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security
encourage port stakeholders to use existing forums for discussing all-
hazards planning efforts and include appropriate representatives from
DHS, the port authority, representatives from the local emergency
management office, the Maritime Administration, and vessel and facility
owner/operators.
To help ensure that ports have adequate understanding of maritime
disaster recovery resources, we recommend that the Secretary of the
Department of Transportation direct the Administrator of the Maritime
Administration to develop a communication strategy to inform ports of
the maritime resources available for recovery efforts.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We provided a draft of this report to DHS, DOT, and DOD for their
review and comment.
In DHS's letter, the department generally agreed existing forums
provide a good opportunity to conduct outreach to and participation by
stakeholders from various federal, state, and local agencies and, as
appropriate, industry and nongovernmental organizations. However, the
department said it did not endorse placing responsibility for disaster
contingency planning on existing committees in ports and said these
responsibilities should remain with state and local emergency
management planners. Our recommendation was not to place responsibility
for such planning within port committees, but rather to use these
existing forums as a way to engage all relevant parties in discussing
natural disaster planning for ports. The problem we found at various
locations we visited was that all parties have not been involved in
these efforts. In our view, these committees represent a ready way to
accomplish this task. While we understand Coast Guard's concern with
diluting existing statutorily mandated port-related committees, we
found during the course of our fieldwork that some ports were already
using existing port committees effectively to plan for all hazards.
Further, we believe that the unique nature of ports and their
criticality to goods movement warrants that all ports be encouraged to
have a specific forum for all-hazard planning. DHS's letter is
reprinted in appendix II. DHS officials provided technical comments and
clarifications, which we incorporated as appropriate to ensure the
accuracy of our report.
In general, DOT agreed with the facts presented in the report.
Department officials provided a number of comments and clarifications,
which we incorporated as appropriate to ensure the accuracy of our
report. The department generally concurred with GAO's recommendation.
Additionally, DOD generally agreed with the facts presented in the
report. Department officials provided some technical comments and
clarifications, which we incorporated as appropriate to ensure the
accuracy of our report.
We will send copies of this report to the interested congressional
committees, the Secretary of Transportation, and other interested
parties. We also will make copies available to others upon request. In
addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site
at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff has any questions about this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-6570 or sigerrudk@gao.gov. Contact points for
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found
on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions
to this report are listed in appendix III.
Signed by:
Katherine Siggerud:
Director, Physical Infrastructure:
List of Committees:
The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye:
Chairman:
Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman:
Chairman:
The Honorable Susan M. Collins:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Robert C. Byrd:
Chairman:
Committee on Appropriations:
United States Senate:
The Honorable James Oberstar:
Chairman:
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson:
Chairman:
Committee on Homeland Security:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable David E. Price:
Chairman:
Subcommittee on Homeland Security:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
This report, initiated under the Comptroller General's authority to
examine government operations, examines (1) the challenges port
authorities have experienced as a result of recent natural disasters,
(2) the efforts under way to address challenges from these disasters,
and (3) the manner in which port authorities prepare for disasters and
the effect of this approach on their ability to share information with
port stakeholders and access federal resources.
To address these objectives, we focused much of our work on 17 U.S.
ports. We focused primarily on commercial ports and various commercial
aspects of these ports. The main criteria we used to select ports for
study were as follows:
* Size of port, based on the value of imported cargo. To ensure a
varied size of ports, we selected ports that were among the top 50 in
size, but within these 50, we chose ports whose total cargo values were
greater than and less than the average cargo value for all 50 top
ports.
* Experience with recent natural disasters. We focused our efforts
primarily--but not exclusively--on ports that had some degree of
experience with a natural disaster since 1998. Based on Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) guidance about the most significant disaster
threats and potential hazards, we limited our focus to ports that have
hurricane or seismic threats. In particular, we included a number of
ports affected by the 2005 hurricane season--primarily hurricanes
Katrina, Wilma, and Rita. In all, 10 of the 17 ports we selected were
affected by hurricanes that year.
* Operational type. We chose ports that reflected a range of operating
types, including those that (1) manage port operations and provide all
services, (2) act as a landlord and lease operations and facilities to
tenants, and (3) conduct limited operations in the port and lease
facilities to others.
* Region of the United States. We selected ports from the East, Gulf,
and West Coasts. There is an overrepresentation of Gulf region ports to
ensure adequate coverage of hurricane affected ports.
In making our selections, we used information from the Maritime
Administration, including port demographics operational, legal type,
and region from the Public Port Finance Survey Report and Maritime
Administration waterborne statistics which report the top 50 ports in
terms of total cargo value. We determined that what we found at those
ports is not generalizable to all U.S. ports. We used disaster data
from Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to assess how many
natural disasters had affected the counties in which each port was
located. Based on our review of data documentation, we determined that
the data we used in applying our criteria for port selection were
sufficiently reliable for our purposes.
We took two approaches to reviewing these ports--site visits and
telephone interviews. We conducted site visits at seven ports, as
follows:
* Tacoma, Washington:
* Houston, Texas:
* Oakland, California:
* Gulfport, Mississippi:
* Mobile, Alabama:
* Miami, Florida:
* Savannah, Georgia:
During these visits, we gathered information from various maritime
stakeholders, including officials from port authorities, emergency
management agencies, the U.S. Coast Guard, the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers, and the Maritime Administration. Although we talked to four
private operators, we excluded interviewing other private operators
because their roles and responsibilities vary greatly from port to port
and because their efforts for natural disasters, unlike their efforts
for homeland security, are not subject to federal requirements or
guidelines. We designed our case study interview questions to provide
insight on (1) general governance and operations of the port, (2)
impacts from recent natural disasters, (3) lessons learned from
previous natural disasters, (4) risk management procedures, and (5)
stakeholder collaboration.
We conducted telephone interviews with officials at 10 ports, as
follows:
* Freeport, Texas:
* Jacksonville, Florida:
* Los Angeles, California:
* Morgan City, Louisiana:
* New Orleans, Louisiana:
* Pascagoula, Mississippi:
* Port Arthur, Texas:
* Richmond, Virginia:
* San Diego, California:
* Wilmington, North Carolina:
At these ports, we limited our telephone interviews to port authorities
only. These semi-structured interviews addressed the same topics as the
case study but focused more on damages and lessons learned as a result
of recent natural disasters. For both sets of ports, we also reviewed
numerous planning documents from port stakeholders including emergency
preparedness plans, disaster recovery plans, hurricane operations,
hurricane manuals, seismic guidelines, and business continuity plans.
To assess the challenges port authorities experienced as a result of
recent natural disasters, we used the interviews we conducted and the
documents we obtained from officials at the 17 ports. To determine the
efforts under way to address these challenges, we reviewed information
from our interviews with and documents from American Association of
Port Authorities (AAPA) officials and various federal agencies. In
particular, we reviewed the Emergency Preparedness and Continuity of
Operations Planning: Manual for Best Practices that was developed
through several working groups coordinated by the AAPA. The working
groups provided a forum for port officials across the United States and
Canada to share their experience in planning for the impacts of recent
natural disasters and to share their best practices. We conducted
interviews with the Chair of the working groups and other AAPA
officials to gather more information about the working group's
procedures and vetting process. Additionally, we interviewed various
regional and headquarter officials of the Maritime Administration, U.S.
Coast Guard (Coast Guard), Department of Transportation, U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers, FEMA, and DHS. We reviewed the following federal
risk management plans:
* The draft appendix for maritime resources for the Federal Support
Plan. The appendix is part of a one-time joint planning document
between the Department of Transportation and FEMA for the state of
Louisiana (2006 Hurricane Season). The Maritime Administration, an
agency within the Department of Transportation, developed this appendix
to assist in future recovery efforts by identifying resources,
protocols, and organizations for maritime resources.
* The Port Risk Management and Insurance Guidebook, developed by the
Maritime Administration. This publication is a best practices guide for
port risk management, including information on how ports obtain
insurance coverage and facilitate emergency management.
To determine how port authorities plan for natural disasters and the
effects of that approach on information-sharing among port stakeholders
and access to federal resources, we reviewed port and federal disaster
planning documents collected from various port stakeholders at each of
the seven ports we visited in person. In order to gain an understanding
of best practices for such planning efforts, we interviewed academic,
industry, and government experts.[Footnote 30] In particular, we
interviewed risk management experts from the following organizations:
* Georgia Institute of Technology's Port Seismic Risk Management Team
conducted damage assessments at seven ports in south Louisiana in
October 2005 immediately following Hurricane Katrina.
* ABS Consulting has worked with a variety of clients including the
Coast Guard, Maritime Administration, and FEMA and thus helped develop
several port risk management tools.
* The Office of Grants and Training at DHS administers both Port
Security and Homeland Security Grants.
* The Coast Guard has expertise in utilizing the Maritime Security Risk
Assessment Model (MSRAM) to assess security risk and has plans to
incorporate natural disaster risks into the model.
We also reviewed related laws and mandates that provide federal
oversight to ports--namely the Maritime Transportation Security Act of
2002 [Footnote 31] and its implementing regulations and other
applicable law. We also reviewed the Puget Sound area maritime security
plan and attended an Area Maritime Security Committee meeting at the
Port of Houston-Galveston. To determine steps that federal agencies
were taking with regard to all-hazards risk management, we reviewed (1)
the Security and Accountability for Every Port Act (SAFE Port
Act),[Footnote 32] which addresses risk mitigation of transportation
disruptions, including disruptions caused natural disasters and (2)
policy documents including the National Response Plan and the National
Incident Management System. We also reviewed a presentation on the
Coast Guard's MSRAM.
Our work, which we conducted from December 2005 through February 2007,
was conducted in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Washington, DC 20528:
March 13, 2007:
Ms. Katherine Siggerud:
Director, Physical Infrastructure:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, NW:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Ms. Siggerud:
RE: Draft Report GAO-07-412, Port Risk Management: Additional Federal
Guidance Would Aid Ports in Disaster Planning and Recovery (GAO Job
Code 542083):
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) appreciates the opportunity
to review and comment on the draft report referenced above. The
Government Accountability Office (GAO) recommends that the Secretary
encourage port stakeholders to use existing forums for discussing all
hazards planning efforts and include appropriate representatives from
DHS, the port authority, representatives from the local emergency
management office, the Maritime Administration, and vessel and facility
owner/operators. The intent of the recommendation is to ensure or
otherwise encourage ports to adequately plan for natural disasters and
effectively manage risk associated with a variety of threats.
Across the nation, the U.S. Coast Guard serves a leadership role in a
wide variety of port level committees. Some of these committees
specifically address contingency planning such as Area Committees and
Area Maritime Security Committees (AMSC), which focus on oil/hazardous
material preparedness and response, and port security respectively.
Additionally, where applicable, the Coast Guard is formally involved in
Harbor Safety Committees that primarily focus on ports and waterways
management issues. Each of these committees involves extensive outreach
to and participation by stakeholders, including various federal, state,
and local agencies, and, as appropriate, industry and non-governmental
organizations to address their specific focus areas. At the national
level, the Coast Guard provides forums such as the Towing Safety
Advisory Committee so that specific maritime stakeholder groups can
communicate with the Coast Guard. The National Response Plan
establishes a comprehensive all-hazards approach to enhance the ability
of the United States to manage domestic incidents. Collectively these
various committees and organizations may provide extensive
opportunities for stakeholder involvement in contingency planning.
We agree that existing forums provide a good opportunity for the
agency/agencies responsible for disaster planning to engage an
appropriate array of port stakeholders to ensure the ports are
adequately represented. DHS does not, however, endorse placing the
responsibility for disaster contingency planning on existing committees
as those responsibilities should properly remain with state and local
emergency management planners and other responsible government
agencies. Additionally, many of the existing port-related committees
were statutorily mandated to fulfill specific responsibilities and we
must caution against diluting their ability to effectively carry out
those missions.
GAO's recommendation does align well with DHS Preparedness
Directorate's Office of Grants and Training initiative to, in
conjunction with the United States Coast Guard, reach out to
appropriate port stakeholders to foster the concept of Port Wide Risk
Management. This concept, based on the risk management framework
identified in the National Infrastructure Protection Plan, will assist
the ports in the management of resources (including federal grant
funds) to address all risks encountered in their ports.
A port-wide risk management program will also be fully integrated into
the broader regional planning construct that forms the core of the
Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI), as well as applicable statewide
initiatives. Adoption of a deliberate risk management planning process,
consistent with that employed in the UASI and state programs, is also a
key focus of the recently signed Security and Accountability For Every
Port (SAFE Port) Act.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Steven J. Pecinovsky:
Director:
Departmental GAO/OIG Liaison Office:
[End of section]
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Katherine Siggerud, (202) 512-6570, siggerudk@gao.gov:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the individual named above, Sally Moino, Assistant
Director; Casey Hanewall; Lindsey Hemly; Christoph Hoashi-Erhardt; Bert
Japikse; Erica Miles; Sara Ann Moessbauer; Jamilah Moon; Sharon Silas;
Stan Stenerson; and Randall Williamson made key contributions to this
report.
FOOTNOTES
[1] The Dante B. Fascell Port of Miami-Dade is owned and managed by the
local government, Miami-Dade County.
[2] In this report, "port" usually refers to one of two things: (1) the
port authority or (2) the collective group of stakeholders. We have
taken care to ensure that the reference intended is clear. Where
necessary, we have inserted clarifying language (such as "port
authority") to help ensure clarity.
[3] Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-295,
116 Stat. 2064.
[4] GAO, Homeland Security: DHS' Efforts to Enhance First Responders'
All-Hazards Capabilities Continue to Evolve, GAO-05-652 (Washington,
D.C.: July, 11, 2005).
[5] We chose 1998 as the cutoff date for recent disasters based on the
available data from FEMA.
[6] See, for example, GAO, Risk Management: Further Refinements Needed
to Assess Risks and Prioritize Protective Measures at Ports and Other
Critical Infrastructure, GAO-06-91 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 15, 2005).
[7] See table 2 for federal agencies involved.
[8] Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002).
[9] Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 (HSPD-8).
[10] GAO-06-91.
[11] The Florida State Department of Community Affairs is the
department that houses the state emergency management agency.
[12] Emergency Preparedness and Continuity of Operations Planning:
Manual for Best Practices, American Association of Port Authorities,
Prepared by: Phyllis Saathoff, Managing Director, Port Freeport.
September 2006.
[13] GICA is maritime trade association that is an advocate for issues
regarding the Gulf Intracoastal Waterway, which is an inland navigable
waterway located along the Gulf Coast. One of GICA's missions is to
work with it members, as well as the Coast Guard and Corps, to identify
opportunities to improve the safety and efficiency of the Gulf
Intracoastal Waterway.
[14] Gulf Coast Inland Waterways Joint Hurricane Response Protocol:
Prepared by the Gulf Coast Joint Hurricane Team. July 2006.
[15] GAO, Maritime Security: Information Sharing Efforts are Improving,
GAO-06-933T (Washington, D.C.: July 10, 2006).
[16] Also known as HOGANSAC, this committee's 19 members include pilots
associations, operators, and environmental and academic interests. The
committee addresses a wide range of topics affecting navigation in the
area. Other individuals with experience and interest in navigation
safety issues serve on working groups established by the committee to
examine other issues of local interest.
[17] The primary planning instrument for DOT remains the Emergency
Support Function #1 Annex to the National Response Plan; however, the
annex does not detail site specific information as was done for this
plan.
[18] According to officials from MARAD, the DOT Regional Emergency
Transportation Coordinator and Representatives may play a supporting
role with regards to communicating and coordinating department response
processes and building relationships with local authorities.
[19] The Incident Command System, established under NIMS, is a system
for managing all types of major incidents. It defines the operating
characteristics, interactive management components and structure of
incident management and emergency response organizations engaged
throughout the life cycle of an incident.
[20] The Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (MTSA), Pub. L.
No. 107-295, 116 Stat. 2064 contains many of the homeland security
requirements related specifically to port security. The Area Maritime
Security Committees are authorized by section 102 of MTSA, (46 U.S.C. §
70112(a)(2)).
[21] The requirements for security plans are found in 33 C.F.R. Part
104, Subpart D for vessels, and 33 C.F.R. Part 105, Subpart D for
facilities.
[22] Mobile's plan, while relatively thorough, still has gaps in
coordination with port stakeholders. Port authority officials noted
that they do not share their emergency plans with tenants or outside
partners. While many tenants develop their own emergency plans, the
port authority does not require them.
[23] GAO-05-652.
[24] Security and Accountability for Every Port Act of 2006, Pub. L.
No. 109-347, §113(a) 114(a) 120 Stat. 1884 (SAFE Port Act).
[25] Pub. L. No. 107-295, 116 Stat. 2064 (2002).
[26] GAO-06-91.
[27] A third port, the Port of Oakland has taken a step toward
employing an all-hazards approach. The Area AMSC elected to add natural
disaster planning information to their Area Maritime Security Plan as a
set of appendixes.
[28] GAO-06-933T.
[29] Recently, the Port of Tacoma began participating in the
Predisaster Hazard Mitigation Program as a subgrantee of the county.
[30] For risk management, which is a central component of best
practices, we limited our investigation to the context of emergency
planning and did not address insurance-related risk management.
[31] Pub. L. No. 107-295, 116 Stat. 2064 (2002).
[32] Security and Accountability for Every Port Act of 2006 (SAFE Port
Act), Pub. L. No. 109-347, 120 Stat. 1884. We also reviewed the SAFE
Port Act Conference Report-House Report 109-711.
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