Railroad Safety--Responses to Posthearing Questions
Gao ID: GAO-07-610R March 15, 2007
This letter responds to a Congressional request that we provide responses to questions related to our recent testimony before Congress on reauthorizing federal rail safety programs. Our testimony discussed how the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) (1) focuses its efforts on the highest priority risks related to train accidents in planning its oversight, (2) identifies safety problems on railroad systems in carrying out its oversight, and (3) assesses the impact of its oversight efforts on safety. This testimony was based on our recent report on these topics.
A number of FRA's current safety initiatives do rely to a great extent on voluntary actions by the railroads. As we reported in January, one railroad has committed to participate in this pilot project in one rail yard, and, according to FRA, two others have expressed strong interest. In addition, FRA's efforts to develop a model to address the problem of worker fatigue depend on the extent to which railroads eventually use this model to improve train crew scheduling practices. Also, the agency emphasizes achieving compliance from railroads voluntarily and takes enforcement action only in a small percentage of cases of noncompliance found. FRA estimates that it is able to inspect about 0.2 percent of railroad operations each year. For the most part, FRA inspections determine whether railroads are complying with various safety standards, such as those related to track and equipment condition, and its inspections are targeted at locations where accidents have occurred or previous inspections have identified problems. We did not assess whether the number of FRA inspectors was sufficient, nor did we assess the degree to which state railroad inspections complement FRA's inspections. However, we did note that the number of these inspectors is quite small compared with the size of the industry. We did not attempt to compare the effectiveness of FRA's safety program to that of other modal administrations. Like other modal safety administrations that we have reviewed--the Federal Aviation Administration, the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, and the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Administration, FRA is relatively small compared to the industry it regulates. However, there are important differences among industries that would require careful study as part of any comparison of effectiveness. For example, the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration regulates about 677,000 commercial motor carriers, while FRA regulates fewer than 700 railroads. We are encouraged that, in 2005, FRA developed an overall strategy through its National Rail Safety Action Plan for targeting its oversight to areas of greatest risk. We believe that the action plan provides a reasonable framework for guiding these efforts. We also concluded that FRA needs to (1) do more to measure the direct results of its oversight, such as the extent to which identified safety problems are corrected, and (2) measure the effectiveness of its enforcement program. We found that FRA cannot demonstrate how its inspection and enforcement efforts are contributing to rail safety and that FRA lacks key information, such as measures of the direct results of these efforts, that could help it improve performance. While such measures are not always easy to develop, at least two other modal administrations within the department--the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration and the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration--have done so. Coupled with better measures of FRA's direct results is the need to assess the effectiveness of its enforcement approach, especially its use of civil penalties, to understand the degree to which they contribute to improved safety outcomes and to determine whether it should adjust its approach to improve performance. As we noted in our January 2007 report, 30 state oversight agencies participate in a partnership program with FRA to conduct safety oversight activities at railroads' operating sites. About 160 state inspectors work with FRA to conduct inspections and other investigative and surveillance activities as needed. These inspectors are an important supplement to FRA's 400 inspectors, since the size of the railroad industry is quite large.
GAO-07-610R, Railroad Safety--Responses to Posthearing Questions
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March 15, 2007:
The Honorable Corrine Brown:
Chairwoman, Subcommittee on Railroads,Pipelines, and Hazardous
Materials:
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure:
House of Representatives:
Subject: Railroad Safety-Responses to Posthearing Questions:
Dear Madam Chairwoman:
This letter responds to your request that we provide responses to
questions related to our recent testimony before your subcommittee on
reauthorizing federal rail safety programs.[Footnote 1] Our testimony
discussed how the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) (1) focuses its
efforts on the highest priority risks related to train accidents in
planning its oversight, (2) identifies safety problems on railroad
systems in carrying out its oversight, and (3) assesses the impact of
its oversight efforts on safety. This testimony was based on our recent
report on these topics.[Footnote 2] Your questions, along with our
responses, follow.
1. You mention that the success of many of FRA's initiatives addressing
the most common causes of accidents will depend on voluntary actions by
the railroads. Why? Is FRA focusing too much on voluntary measures and
not enough on mandating regulations?
A number of FRA's current safety initiatives do rely to a great extent
on voluntary actions by the railroads. For example, the close call
reporting system[Footnote 3] will depend for its success on extensive
participation by railroads. As we reported in January, one railroad has
committed to participate in this pilot project in one rail yard, and,
according to FRA, two others have expressed strong interest. In
addition, FRA's efforts to develop a model to address the problem of
worker fatigue depend on the extent to which railroads eventually use
this model to improve train crew scheduling practices. Also, the agency
emphasizes achieving compliance from railroads voluntarily and takes
enforcement action only in a small percentage of cases of noncompliance
found. We have not directly compared FRA's emphasis on voluntary
actions with that of other modal administrations. For example, the
Federal Aviation Administration has emphasized partnership with
industry through programs that allow participants, such as airlines or
pilots, to self-report violations of safety regulations and potentially
mitigate or avoid civil penalties or other legal action. In the end,
what is important is whether FRA is able to demonstrate, through the
use of performance measures and evaluations of effectiveness, that its
initiatives are effective in improving safety and are superior in terms
of costs and benefits to other safety regulatory interventions.
2. What percentage of railroad operations is FRA able to inspect each
year?
FRA estimates that it is able to inspect about 0.2 percent of railroad
operations each year. See also the response to question 6 for a
discussion of this issue and question 3 for an approach that could
extend the reach of safety efforts.
3. You state that FRA inspections are not designed to determine how
well railroads are managing safety risks throughout their systems. What
should FRA and its inspectors be doing differently?
For the most part, FRA inspections determine whether railroads are
complying with various safety standards, such as those related to track
and equipment condition, and its inspections are targeted at locations
where accidents have occurred or previous inspections have identified
problems. A complementary approach to these compliance inspections is
oversight of risk management, which can help to prevent accidents. Risk
management can be described as a continuous process of managing--
through the systematic identification, analysis, and control of risks
associated with such hazards--the likelihood of their occurrence and
their negative impact.[Footnote 4] Oversight of risk management can
provide additional assurance of safety beyond that provided by
inspections of compliance with minimum safety standards. It can
supplement uniform, minimum standards by encouraging or requiring
companies to identify and address their unique safety risks. Risk
management has been used in the private and public sectors for decades.
For example, risk management approaches are being used for public
transit and pipeline safety in the United States and for railroad
safety in Canada, and the American Public Transportation Association,
the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, and
Transport Canada, respectively, oversee these approaches. While FRA has
taken some steps in a limited number of areas to encourage risk
management in the railroad industry, it does not oversee railroads'
overall approach for managing safety risks on their systems.
While we believe that adopting a comprehensive approach to overseeing
railroads' management of safety risks can lead to improved safety, we
did not recommend that FRA adopt such an approach. FRA is pursuing
several initiatives aimed at reducing accident rates, and these
initiatives need time to mature to demonstrate their effects. At the
appropriate time, the agency may wish to determine whether additional
actions are needed.
4. In follow-up to some questions at the hearing, has GAO studied,
determined, or in any way looked at whether the number of inspectors at
the FRA is sufficient?
We did not assess whether the number of FRA inspectors was sufficient,
nor did we assess the degree to which state railroad inspections
complement FRA's inspections. However, we did note that the number of
these inspectors is quite small compared with the size of the industry.
(According to FRA, its inspectors inspect about 0.2 percent of railroad
operations each year.)
As discussed both in our January 2007 report and in our testimony
statement, the agency's implementation of its new inspection planning
approach allows it to better target the greatest safety risks and
therefore make more effective use of its inspector workforce. However,
the agency's approach to conducting inspections focuses on determining
compliance with minimum standards at specific sites visited. Oversight
of railroads' management of safety risks throughout their systems could
provide FRA with a greater "reach" and understanding of safety overall.
However, we did not recommend that FRA adopt such an approach because
its current initiatives to bring down the train accident rate need time
to demonstrate their effects.
5. How effective is FRA's safety program compared to the safety
programs of other modal administrations?
We did not attempt to compare the effectiveness of FRA's safety program
to that of other modal administrations. Like other modal safety
administrations that we have reviewed--the Federal Aviation
Administration, the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, and
the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Administration, FRA is relatively
small compared to the industry it regulates. However, there are
important differences among industries that would require careful study
as part of any comparison of effectiveness. For example, the Federal
Motor Carrier Safety Administration regulates about 677,000 commercial
motor carriers, while FRA regulates fewer than 700 railroads.
6. In your testimony, you state that FRA inspections cover only two-
tenths of one percent all railroad operations. Is this a large enough
sample to accurately gauge safety in the railroad industry?
This is a difficult question to answer because it would require an
assessment of not only the absolute number of inspections and resulting
problems found, but also the manner in which FRA is deploying its
inspectors and any deterrent effect that FRA's inspections and
enforcement actions might have. We are encouraged that, in 2005, FRA
developed an overall strategy through its National Rail Safety Action
Plan for targeting its oversight to areas of greatest risk. We believe
that the action plan provides a reasonable framework for guiding these
efforts.
We also concluded that FRA needs to (1) do more to measure the direct
results of its oversight, such as the extent to which identified safety
problems are corrected, and (2) measure the effectiveness of its
enforcement program. We made recommendations to this effect and are
looking forward to FRA's response. Finally, as discussed earlier (see
our response to question 3), adopting a risk management framework could
expand the reach of FRA's inspection and enforcement programs.
7. In your testimony, you state that the FRA does not oversee
railroads' management of safety risk, while many other agencies do.
Would such oversight improve the safety of railroad operations? Are
there any models that the FRA should look at to implement its own
program?
See the response to question 3 for a discussion of this issue.
8. What should the FRA do to improve its safety enforcement program?
We found that FRA cannot demonstrate how its inspection and enforcement
efforts are contributing to rail safety and that FRA lacks key
information, such as measures of the direct results of these efforts,
that could help it improve performance. While such measures are not
always easy to develop, at least two other modal administrations within
the department--the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration and the
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration--have done so.
Coupled with better measures of FRA's direct results is the need to
assess the effectiveness of its enforcement approach, especially its
use of civil penalties, to understand the degree to which they
contribute to improved safety outcomes and to determine whether it
should adjust its approach to improve performance. We recommended that
FRA (1) develop and implement direct measures of its inspection and
enforcement programs and (2) evaluate its enforcement program to
provide further information on the program's results and the need for
any changes to improve performance.
9. Based on the small sample of railroad operations that the FRA
inspects, and how it inspects them, do you believe that the FRA is in a
position to say if the railroads are safe or not?
See our response to question 6 for a discussion of this topic.
10. In your testimony, you state that the FRA efforts to improve safety
will depend on voluntary action by railroads. Is voluntary action
sufficient to improve safety?
See our response to question 1 for a discussion of this issue.
11. States can play an important role in assisting FRA with ensuring
safety along the rail lines. Unfortunately, FRA has been reluctant to
allow states to regulate the railroads in order to provide a safe
environment for their residents. What role do you feel states should
play in assisting with railroad safety and regulation?
As we noted in our January 2007 report, 30 state oversight agencies
participate in a partnership program with FRA to conduct safety
oversight activities at railroads' operating sites. About 160 state
inspectors work with FRA to conduct inspections and other investigative
and surveillance activities as needed. These inspectors are an
important supplement to FRA's 400 inspectors, since the size of the
railroad industry is quite large. FRA officials have told us that the
agency does not provide funding for state inspection activities (except
for training and computer equipment) and therefore does not have
authority to tell states what inspections to conduct. FRA's regional
offices do coordinate inspection activities with participating states
in their region.
Our work focused on FRA's activities. We did not assess potential and
actual states' roles or FRA's efforts to encourage state participation.
If a larger role is envisioned for states, several questions would have
to be addressed, including (1) the goals for state participation (e.g.,
increased safety levels to be achieved), (2) how federal and state
efforts would complement each other, (3) what inspection and
enforcement authority (e.g., to cite violations) would be allowed; and
(4) who would pay for any increase in state inspection presence.
We are making copies of this letter available to others upon request
and it will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at
http://www.gao.gov. If you have any questions about its content, please
contact me at (202) 512-2834 or siggerudk@gao.gov. Contact points for
our offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found
on the last page of this letter. Key contributors to this letter were
Judy Guilliams-Tapia and James Ratzenberger.
Sincerely yours,
Signed by:
Katherine A. Siggerud:
Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues:
(542113):
FOOTNOTES
[1] GAO, Rail Safety: The Federal Railroad Administration Is Better
Targeting Its Oversight, but Needs to Assess the Impact of Its Efforts,
GAO-07-390T (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 30, 2007).
[2] GAO, The Federal Railroad Administration Is Taking Steps to Better
Target Its Oversight, but Assessment of Results Is Needed to Determine
Impact, GAO-07-149 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 26, 2007).
[3] According to FRA, a close call represents a situation in which an
ongoing sequence of events was stopped from developing further,
preventing the occurrence of potentially serious safety-related
consequences.
[4] A framework for risk management based on industry best practices
and other criteria that we have developed divides risk management into
five major phases: (1) setting strategic goals and objectives, and
determining constraints; (2) assessing risks; (3) evaluating
alternatives for addressing these risks; (4) selecting the appropriate
alternatives; and (5) implementing the alternatives and monitoring the
progress made and the results achieved. See pages 35-39 of GAO-07-149
for further discussion.
