Next Generation Air Transportation System
Status of the Transition to the Future Air Traffic Control System
Gao ID: GAO-07-784T May 9, 2007
The nation's current air traffic control system is reaching its capacity limits as demand for air transportation grows. The Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) represents a new system that will use state-of-the-art technologies and procedures. Transitioning to NextGen will require the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to continue to sustain the current air traffic control system while acquiring new systems on schedule and on budget. In 2003, Congress authorized the creation of the Joint Planning and Development Office (JPDO), housed within FAA, to plan NextGen and coordinate the transition. GAO's testimony focuses on the progress FAA is making in implementing businesslike operations that could provide a foundation for managing the transition to NextGen, the status of JPDO's planning and facilitation of NextGen, and some key challenges that FAA and JPDO need to address in moving toward NextGen. This statement is based on GAO's November 2006 report and recent testimonies as well as ongoing work. GAO's November report recommended that FAA study its technical and contract management expertise and that JPDO take actions to institutionalize its collaborative practices. FAA and JPDO said they would consider our recommendations.
During the last few years, FAA has made significant progress in implementing businesslike operations and procedures for managing and acquiring air traffic control systems. These operations and procedures have improved FAA's management of the current system and should better position the agency to manage the enormously complex transition to NextGen. One outcome of these changes is that FAA has reported exceeding its system acquisition goals for the past 3 fiscal years. However, further work remains to fully address past problems in acquiring systems and institutionalizing changes throughout the agency. JPDO has continued to make progress in furthering its key planning documents. JPDO has experienced delays in the release of key documents, but currently plans to have initial versions of these documents released by July 2007. JPDO has been working since 2005 to establish a memorandum of understanding between its partner agencies, although as of May 4, 2007, the memorandum had been signed by the Departments of Transportation and Commerce and NASA, but was not yet signed by the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security. JPDO is also working with the Office of Management and Budget to establish mechanisms to identify NextGen-related projects across the partner agencies and consider NextGen as a unified, cross-agency program for funding decisions. FAA and JPDO continue to face a number of challenges in moving toward NextGen, including questions about FAA's technical and contract management expertise; FAA's ability to maintain a number of existing systems, including monitoring and addressing equipment outages to ensure the safety of these existing systems as it transitions to NextGen; and conducting necessary human factors research. In addition, while JPDO recently estimated that the total federal cost for NextGen infrastructure through 2025 will range between $15 billion and $22 billion, questions remain about which entities will fund and conduct the necessary research, development, and demonstration projects that will be key to achieving certain NextGen capabilities. Also, JPDO faces a continuing challenge in ensuring the involvement of all key stakeholders, such as active air traffic controllers and system technicians, in its NextGen planning efforts.
GAO-07-784T, Next Generation Air Transportation System: Status of the Transition to the Future Air Traffic Control System
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Testimony:
Before the Subcommittee on Aviation, Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure, House of Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT:
Wednesday, May 9, 2007:
Next Generation Air Transportation System:
Status of the Transition to the Future Air Traffic Control System:
Statement of Gerald L. Dillingham, Ph.D.
Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues:
GAO-07-784T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-07-784T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on
Aviation, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, House of
Representatives
Why GAO Did This Study:
The nation‘s current air traffic control system is reaching its
capacity limits as demand for air transportation grows. The Next
Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) represents a new system
that will use state-of-the-art technologies and procedures.
Transitioning to NextGen will require the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) to continue to sustain the current air traffic
control system while acquiring new systems on schedule and on budget.
In 2003, Congress authorized the creation of the Joint Planning and
Development Office (JPDO), housed within FAA, to plan NextGen and
coordinate the transition. GAO‘s testimony focuses on the progress FAA
is making in implementing businesslike operations that could provide a
foundation for managing the transition to NextGen, the status of JPDO‘s
planning and facilitation of NextGen, and some key challenges that FAA
and JPDO need to address in moving toward NextGen. This statement is
based on GAO‘s November 2006 report and recent testimonies as well as
ongoing work. GAO‘s November report recommended that FAA study its
technical and contract management expertise and that JPDO take actions
to institutionalize its collaborative practices. FAA and JPDO said they
would consider our recommendations.
What GAO Found:
During the last few years, FAA has made significant progress in
implementing businesslike operations and procedures for managing and
acquiring air traffic control systems. These operations and procedures
have improved FAA‘s management of the current system and should better
position the agency to manage the enormously complex transition to
NextGen. One outcome of these changes is that FAA has reported
exceeding its system acquisition goals for the past 3 fiscal years.
However, further work remains to fully address past problems in
acquiring systems and institutionalizing changes throughout the agency.
JPDO has continued to make progress in furthering its key planning
documents. JPDO has experienced delays in the release of key documents,
but currently plans to have initial versions of these documents
released by July 2007. JPDO has been working since 2005 to establish a
memorandum of understanding between its partner agencies, although as
of May 4, 2007, the memorandum had been signed by the Departments of
Transportation and Commerce and NASA, but was not yet signed by the
Departments of Defense and Homeland Security. JPDO is also working with
the Office of Management and Budget to establish mechanisms to identify
NextGen-related projects across the partner agencies and consider
NextGen as a unified, cross-agency program for funding decisions.
FAA and JPDO continue to face a number of challenges in moving toward
NextGen, including questions about FAA‘s technical and contract
management expertise; FAA‘s ability to maintain a number of existing
systems, including monitoring and addressing equipment outages to
ensure the safety of these existing systems as it transitions to
NextGen; and conducting necessary human factors research. In addition,
while JPDO recently estimated that the total federal cost for NextGen
infrastructure through 2025 will range between $15 billion and $22
billion, questions remain about which entities will fund and conduct
the necessary research, development, and demonstration projects that
will be key to achieving certain NextGen capabilities. Also, JPDO faces
a continuing challenge in ensuring the involvement of all key
stakeholders, such as active air traffic controllers and system
technicians, in its NextGen planning efforts.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-784T].
To view the full product, click on the link above. For more
information, contact Gerald L. Dillingham, Ph.D., at (202) 512-2834 or
dillinghamg@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
I appreciate the opportunity to testify before you today to discuss the
future of air traffic control modernization. The nation's current air
traffic control system is reaching its capacity limits as demand for
air transportation continues to grow each year. The Next Generation Air
Transportation System (NextGen) represents a transformation to a new
system that will use satellite-based technologies and state-of-the-art
procedures to handle the increasing volume of air traffic, while
further improving safety and security. Transitioning to NextGen,
however, will require the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to
continue to operate and sustain the current air traffic control system
while simultaneously acquiring and deploying the new NextGen systems on
budget and on schedule.
In December 2000, President Clinton signed an executive order, and
Congress passed supporting legislation that, together, provided FAA
with the authority to create the performance-based[Footnote 1] Air
Traffic Organization (ATO) to administer and improve FAA's management
of its current air traffic control modernization efforts. In 2003,
Congress authorized the creation of the Joint Planning and Development
Office (JPDO), housed within FAA, to plan for and coordinate a
transition to NextGen--envisioned as a move from largely ground-based
radars to precision satellite-based navigation and including digital,
networked communications; an integrated weather system; layered,
adaptive security; and more. In addition to FAA, JPDO operates in
conjunction with multiple federal partner agencies and with the private
sector to collaboratively conceptualize and plan the NextGen
system.[Footnote 2]
The reauthorization of FAA provides an opportunity to examine how the
agency is managing the transformation to NextGen. My testimony today
focuses on the following questions: (1) What progress is FAA making in
implementing initiatives that could provide a solid foundation for
managing the transition to NextGen? (2) What is the status of JPDO's
planning and facilitation of the transition to NextGen? and (3) What
are some key challenges that FAA and JPDO need to address in moving
toward NextGen? My statement is based on our November 2006
report[Footnote 3] and recent testimonies[Footnote 4] as well as on-
going work. We conducted this work in accordance with generally
accepted government auditing standards.
In summary:
* During the last few years, FAA has made significant progress in
implementing businesslike operations and procedures for acquiring and
managing air traffic control systems which have improved FAA's
management of the current system and should better position the agency
to manage the enormously complex transition to NextGen. However,
further work remains to fully address past problems in acquiring
systems and to institutionalize changes throughout the agency. By
creating the Air Traffic Organization and appointing a chief operating
officer, FAA established a new management structure and adopted more
leading practices of private sector businesses to address the cost,
schedule, and performance shortfalls that have plagued air traffic
control acquisitions. One outcome of these changes is that for the past
3 fiscal years, FAA has reported exceeding its system acquisition
goals. For fiscal year 2006, FAA reported that its critical
acquisitions were 100 percent on budget and over 97 percent on
schedule. FAA has also improved its management of the air traffic
control system through increased efforts to achieve cost savings by
outsourcing and consolidating facilities. Currently, FAA is seeking
savings through outsourcing its planned nationwide deployment of a
critical NextGen surveillance technology. To help sustain progress in
managing acquisitions and address remaining program risks, FAA is
working with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to develop goals
and milestones for FAA to meet in further reducing acquisition risks.
Despite FAA's progress, however, the FAA administrator's term ends in
September 2007 and the chief operating officer left in February 2007,
after serving 3 years. Thus, FAA will have lost two of its significant
agents for change by the end of September. FAA's new leaders will need
to demonstrate the same commitment to improvement as the outgoing
leaders.
* JPDO has made progress in furthering its key planning documents, but
continues to face challenges in institutionalizing its collaborative
practices. JPDO is developing several key documents--a Concept of
Operations, an Enterprise Architecture, and an Integrated Work Plan--
that together form the foundation of NextGen planning. JPDO has missed
earlier milestones regarding the release of its Concept of Operations
and Enterprise Architecture. JPDO currently plans to release initial
versions of all three documents by July 2007. As we noted in November
2006, JPDO is fundamentally a planning and coordinating body that lacks
authority over the key human and technological resources of its partner
agencies. Thus, institutionalizing the collaborative process between
these partner agencies will continue to be critical to JPDO's success.
However, JPDO still does not have in place a formal, long-term
agreement among its partner agencies on their roles and
responsibilities in planning and facilitating the transition to
NextGen. JPDO has been working since 2005 to establish a memorandum of
understanding between the partner agencies, although as of May 4, 2007,
the memorandum had been signed by the Departments of Transportation and
Commerce and NASA; the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security had
not yet signed.[Footnote 5] It will also be important for
institutionalizing collaboration to incorporate NextGen goals and
activities into the partner agencies' key planning documents, as FAA is
currently doing with its Operational Evolution Partnership--FAA's new
implementation plan for NextGen. JPDO is also working with OMB to
establish mechanisms to identify NextGen-related projects across the
partner agencies and consider NextGen as a unified, cross-agency
program for funding decisions.
* FAA and JPDO continue to face a number of challenges in moving toward
NextGen, including determining whether the organizations have the
adequate and appropriate technical and contract management expertise,
managing and sustaining the current system, identifying who will
conduct necessary research and development activities, obtaining stable
leadership, conducting needed human factors research, and ensuring the
involvement of all key stakeholders. In November 2006, we recommended
that FAA examine its strengths and weaknesses with regard to the
technical and contract management expertise that will be required to
define, implement, and integrate the numerous complex programs inherent
in the transition to NextGen. In response to our recommendation, FAA is
working with the National Academy of Public Administration to explore
these issues. JPDO recently estimated that the total federal cost for
NextGen infrastructure through 2025 will range between $15 billion and
$22 billion. However, questions remain over which entities will fund
and conduct some of the necessary research, development, and
demonstration projects that will be key to achieving certain NextGen
capabilities. According to officials at FAA and JPDO, they are
currently studying these issues and trying to assess how much research
and development FAA can assume. Of critical importance in the area of
NextGen research is human factors research given the fundamental
changes that NextGen envisions in the roles of air traffic controllers
and pilots due to automation and changes in surveillance technologies
and communications. JPDO has suffered from a lack of stable leadership
and is now functioning under its third director. This issue is
exacerbated by JPDO's senior policy committee, which has met only four
times and has not met at all as a formal body since November 2005.
Finally, JPDO faces a continuing challenge in ensuring the involvement
of all key stakeholders, such as active air traffic controllers and
technicians. Our work on past air traffic control modernization
projects has shown that a lack of stakeholder or expert involvement
early and throughout a project can lead to costly increases and delays.
In November 2006, we recommended that the Secretary of Transportation
direct FAA to undertake a formal exploration of the agency's strengths
and weaknesses with regard to the technical expertise and contract
management expertise that will be required to define, implement, and
integrate the numerous complex programs and systems inherent in the
transition to NextGen. We recommended that the Secretary direct JPDO to
take actions to institutionalize the partner agencies' collaboration in
supporting NextGen, including action on a memorandum of understanding
among the partner agencies, actions to finalize procedures to leverage
partner agency resources, and actions to develop procedures for dispute
resolution. We also recommended that the Secretary direct JPDO to
determine whether key stakeholders and expertise are not currently
represented in JPDO planning efforts. FAA and JPDO officials neither
agreed nor disagreed with our recommendations, but said they would
consider them.
Improved, Businesslike Operations Should Better Position FAA to
Implement and Manage NextGen, but Further Work Remains:
During the last few years, FAA has made significant progress in
implementing businesslike processes and procedures for managing and
acquiring air traffic control systems. This contrasts with the previous
decade's air traffic control modernization program which was
characterized by chronic cost and schedule difficulties with systems
acquisitions. The implementation of these businesslike operations has
improved FAA's management of the current system and should better
position the agency to manage the enormously complex transition to
NextGen. However, further work remains to fully address past problems
and institutionalize these changes throughout the agency, especially
given the changing leadership within both FAA and ATO.
Progress Has Been Made but Further Work Remains to Institutionalize
Recent Improvements in Management and Acquisition Processes:
A successful transition to NextGen will depend, to a great extent, on
FAA's ability to manage the acquisition and integration of multiple
NextGen systems. In recent years, FAA has made significant progress
toward improving its management of acquisitions. However, FAA's air
traffic control modernization program remains on our list of high risk
programs because of its history of systemic management and acquisition
problems that contributed to cost growth, schedule slippages, and
performance shortfalls and the relative recentness of the turnaround in
the program's performance. The realization of NextGen goals could be
severely compromised if FAA's improved program management and outcomes
are not institutionalized and carried over into the implementation of
NextGen, which is an even more complex and ambitious undertaking than
past modernization efforts.
By creating ATO and appointing a chief operating officer (COO) to head
ATO, FAA established a new management structure and adopted more
leading practices of private sector businesses to address the cost,
schedule, and performance shortfalls that have plagued air traffic
control acquisitions. ATO has worked to create a flatter organization,
with fewer management layers, and has reported reducing executive
staffing by 20 percent and total management by 16 percent. In addition,
FAA uses a performance management system to hold managers responsible
for the success of ATO. More specifically, to better manage its
acquisitions and address problems we have identified,[Footnote 6] FAA
has:
* undertaken human capital initiatives to improve its acquisition
workforce culture and build towards a results-oriented, high-performing
organization;
* developed and applied a process improvement model to assess the
maturity of its software and systems capabilities resulting in, among
other things, enhanced productivity and greater ability to predict
schedules and resources; and:
* reported that it has established a policy and guidance on using
earned value management (EVM) in its acquisition management system and
that 19 of its major programs are currently using EVM.[Footnote 7]
One outcome of the implementation of the changes in program management
and operations is that for the past three fiscal years, FAA has
reported exceeding system acquisition goals. FAA's goals for fiscal
year 2006 were to have 85 percent of critical acquisition programs
within 10 percent of budget, as reflected in its capital investment
plan, and to have 85 percent of critical acquisition programs on
schedule. For fiscal year 2006, FAA reported that its critical
acquisitions were 100 percent on budget and over 97 percent on
schedule.
FAA Has Reported Cost Savings through Outsourcing and Facility
Consolidations:
FAA has also improved its management of its air traffic control program
through increased efforts to achieve cost savings by outsourcing and
consolidating facilities. For example, FAA is outsourcing flight
service stations and estimates a $2.2 billion savings over 12 years.
Similarly, FAA is seeking savings through outsourcing its planned
nationwide deployment of Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast
(ADS-B), a critical NextGen surveillance technology. FAA is planning to
implement ADS-B through a performance-based contract in which FAA will
pay "subscription" charges for the ADS-B services and the vendor will
be responsible for building and maintaining the infrastructure. (FAA
also reports that the ADS-B rollout will allow the agency to remove 50
percent of its current secondary radars, saving money in the program's
baseline. The remaining radars will serve as a back-up system to ADS-
B.) As for consolidating facilities, FAA is currently restructuring
ATO's administrative service areas from nine offices to three offices,
which FAA estimates will save up to $460 million over 10 years.
We previously reported that FAA should pursue further cost control
options, such as exploring additional opportunities for contracting out
services and consolidating facilities. However, we recognize that FAA
faces challenges with consolidating facilities, an action that can be
politically sensitive. In recognition of this sensitivity, the
administration's reauthorization proposal presents an initiative in
which the Secretary of Transportation would be authorized to establish
an independent, five-member Commission, known as the Realignment and
Consolidation of Aviation Facilities and Services Commission, to
independently analyze FAA's recommendations to realign facilities or
services. The Commission would then send its own recommendations to the
President and Congress. In the past, we noted the importance of
potential cost savings through facility consolidations; however, any
such consolidations must be handled through a process that solicits and
considers stakeholder input throughout and fully considers the safety
implications of both proposed facility closures and consolidations.
Mitigating Remaining Risks and Institutionalization of Improvements
Will Continue to Be a Challenge for FAA:
Sustaining the acquisition progress achieved to date and addressing the
remaining program risks remains a challenge for FAA. FAA's air traffic
control modernization program has been on GAO's high-risk list since
1995. In recent years the agency has made measurable improvements in
its acquisition processes. GAO acknowledged those improvements in its
2007 high risk report.[Footnote 8] In 2005, FAA submitted a plan to OMB
for reducing the risks of cost overruns, schedule slippages, and
performance shortfalls with goals and milestones for FAA to meet in
further reducing acquisition risks. FAA expects to complete the risk
mitigation plan by the end of calendar year 2008.
Additionally, we have an ongoing study that is examining FAA's
performance and reporting on its critical acquisitions, including
applicable performance measures. We are exploring FAA's use of the most
recently approved cost and schedule baselines, which may have changed
significantly since the start of an acquisition, to measure and report
on program performance. Rebaselining acquisitions is an accepted
practice and there can be valid reasons for doing so, such as when
changes in a program's requirements fundamentally alter the acquisition
and make the originally approved schedule unrealistic. Because
rebaselining resets the cost and schedule variances to zero, however,
we want to verify that FAA's practice is not masking acquisition
performance problems and is providing full disclosure to the Congress.
We expect to issue a report on these issues later this year.
Institutionalizing Changes Within FAA Will Require Continued Strong
Leadership:
It will be important, as FAA begins to implement NextGen systems, to
maintain critical acquisitions on schedule and on budget to meet the
goal of transitioning to NextGen by 2025 and to prevent escalation of
the costs of NextGen. While FAA has implemented many positive changes
to its management and business processes in recent years, it currently
faces the loss of key leaders. We reported that the experiences of
successful transformations and change management initiatives in large
public and private organizations suggest that it can take 5 to 7 years
or more until such initiatives are fully implemented and cultures are
transformed in a sustainable manner.[Footnote 9] Such changes require
focused, full-time attention from senior leadership and a dedicated
team. However, FAA will have lost two of its significant agents for
change--the FAA administrator and the COO--by the end of September
2007. The administrator's term ends in September 2007; the COO left in
February 2007, after serving 3 years. For the financial, management,
and acquisition improvements to further permeate the agency, and thus
provide a firm foundation upon which to implement NextGen, FAA's new
leaders will need to demonstrate the same commitment to improvement as
the outgoing leaders. Because this is a critical time for FAA, the
agency needs to move expeditiously to find a new COO for ATO. A COO who
could commit to the current statutory 5-year term also would be useful
in providing stable leadership at ATO as foundational NextGen systems
begin to be implemented.
JPDO Has Made Progress in Planning NextGen, but Continues to Face
Challenges with Its Organization:
JPDO has continued to make progress in furthering its key planning
documents, but still faces challenges in institutionalizing its
collaborative practices.
JPDO Has Made Progress Toward Releasing Key Planning Documents,
although Further Work Remains:
JPDO's authorizing legislation requires the office to create a multi-
agency research and development plan for the transition to NextGen. To
comply, JPDO is developing several key documents that together form the
foundation of NextGen planning. These documents include a NextGen
Concept of Operations, a NextGen Enterprise Architecture, and an
Integrated Work Plan.
The Concept of Operations is the most fundamental of JPDO's key
planning documents, as the other key documents flow from it. Although
an earlier version was delayed so that stakeholder comments could be
addressed, Version 1.2 of the Concept of Operations is currently posted
on JPDO's Website for review and comment by the aviation community.
This 226-page document provides written descriptions of how the NextGen
system is envisioned to operate in 2025 and beyond, including
highlighting key research and policy issues that will need to be
addressed.[Footnote 10] For example, some key policy issues are
associated with automating the air traffic control system, including
the need for a backup plan in case automation fails, the
responsibilities and liabilities of different stakeholders during an
automation failure, and the level of monitoring needed by pilots when
automation is ensuring safe separation between aircraft. Over the next
few months, JPDO plans to address the public comments it receives and
issue a revised version of the Concept of Operations.
In addition to the Concept of Operations, JPDO is working on an
Enterprise Architecture for NextGen--that is, a technical description
of the NextGen system, akin to blueprints for a building. The
Enterprise Architecture is meant to provide a common tool for planning
and understanding the complex, interrelated systems that will make up
NextGen. According to JPDO officials, the Enterprise Architecture will
provide the means for coordinating among the partner agencies and
private sector manufacturers, aligning relevant research and
development activities, and integrating equipment. JPDO plans to issue
an early version of its Enterprise Architecture next month, although
three previous release dates--March 2006, June 2006, and September
2006--were not met. According to JPDO officials, until the Enterprise
Architecture is released, precise cost estimates cannot be developed
and the partner agencies' research plans cannot be coordinated.
Finally, JPDO is developing an Integrated Work Plan that will describe
the capabilities needed to transition to NextGen from the current
system and provide the research, policy and regulation, and acquisition
timelines necessary to achieve NextGen by 2025. The Integrated Work
Plan is akin to a project plan and will be critical for fiscal year
2009 partner agency budget and program planning. According to a JPDO
official, the office intends to issue its initial draft of the
Integrated Work Plan in July 2007.
Figure 1: Key NextGen Planning Documents:
[See PDF for image]
Source: JPDO.
[End of figure]
We have discussed JPDO's planning documents with JPDO officials and
examined both an earlier version of JPDO's Concept of
Operations[Footnote 11] and the current version that is out for public
comment.[Footnote 12] As we previously testified, JPDO is focusing on
the right types of key documents for the foundation of NextGen
planning.[Footnote 13] As for the Concept of Operations, the current
version is improved from the prior version due to additional detail.
Nonetheless, we believe that it still does not include key elements
such as scenarios illustrating NextGen operations, a summary of
NextGen's operational impact on users and other stakeholders, and an
analysis of the benefits, alternatives, and trade-offs that were
considered for NextGen. In addition, it lacks an overall description
that ties together the eight key areas that the document covers. As
noted earlier, JPDO does plan to release another version of the Concept
of Operations later this year.
In fact, JPDO plans further versions of all of its key planning
documents. We see the development of all three of JPDO's key documents
as part of an iterative and evolutionary process. Thus, it is unlikely
that any of these documents will ever be truly "finalized," but rather
will continue to evolve throughout the implementation of NextGen to
reflect, for example, the development of new technologies or problems
uncovered during research and development of planned technologies.
Finally, while each of the three key documents has a specific purpose,
the scope and technical sophistication of these documents makes it
difficult for some stakeholders to understand the basics of the NextGen
planning effort. To address this issue, JPDO is currently drafting what
the office refers to as a "blueprint" for NextGen, meant to be a short,
high-level, non-technical presentation of NextGen goals and
capabilities. We believe that such a document could help some
stakeholders develop a better understanding of NextGen and the planning
effort to date.
Institutionalizing the Collaborative Process Will Continue to be
Critical to JPDO's Facilitating NextGen:
In our November 2006 report, we noted that JPDO is fundamentally a
planning and coordinating body that lacks authority over the key human
and technological resources of its partner agencies. Consequently,
institutionalizing the collaborative process with its partner agencies
will be critical to JPDO's ability to facilitate the implementation of
NextGen. JPDO, however, has not established some practices significant
to institutionalizing its collaborative process. For example, at a
fundamental level, JPDO does not have formal, long-term agreements
among its partner agencies on their roles and responsibilities in
creating NextGen. There is no mechanism that assures that the partner
agencies' commitment will continue over the 20-year timeframe of
NextGen or that ensures accountability to JPDO. According to JPDO
officials, they are working to establish a memorandum of understanding
(MOU), signed by the Secretary or other high-ranking official from each
partner agency, which will broadly define the partner agencies' roles
and responsibilities. JPDO first informed us of the development of this
MOU in August 2005; in November 2006 we recommended that JPDO finalize
the MOU and present it to JPDO's senior policy committee for its
consideration and action. Nonetheless, according to a JPDO official, as
of May 4, 2007, the MOU has been signed by the Departments of
Transportation and Commerce and NASA, but remains unsigned by the
Departments of Defense and Homeland Security.
Another key method for institutionalizing the collaborative effort is
incorporating NextGen goals and activities into the partner agencies'
key planning documents. For example, we noted in November 2006 that
NASA and FAA had incorporated NextGen goals into their strategic plans.
These types of efforts will be critical to JPDO's ability to leverage
its partner agency resources for continued JPDO planning efforts. Even
more importantly, these efforts will be critical to helping ensure that
partner agencies--given competing missions and resource demands--
dedicate the resources necessary to support the implementation of
NextGen research efforts or system acquisitions.
Recognizing that JPDO does not have authority over partner agency
resources, FAA and JPDO have initiated several efforts to
institutionalize NextGen. First, JPDO is working with FAA to refocus
one of FAA's key planning documents on the implementation of NextGen--
an effort that also appears to be improving the collaboration and
coordination between JPDO and ATO. FAA has expanded and revamped its
Operational Evolution Plan (OEP)--renamed the Operational Evolution
Partnership--to become FAA's implementation plan for NextGen.[Footnote
14] The OEP is being expanded to apply to all of FAA and is intended to
become a comprehensive description of how the agency will implement
NextGen, including the required technologies, procedures, and
resources. (Figure 2 shows the new OEP framework.) An ATO official told
us that the new OEP is to be consistent with JPDO's key planning
documents and its budget guidance to the partner agencies. According to
FAA, the new OEP will allow it to demonstrate appropriate budget
control and linkage to NextGen plans and help ensure that FAA's
research and development is relevant to NextGen's requirements.
According to FAA documents, the agency plans to publish a new OEP in
June 2007.
Figure 2: New OEP Framework:
[See PDF for image]
Source: JPDO.
Note: The concentric rings indicate the nature of initiative
development from the outer ring (NextGen strategic initiatives), in
which new programs and concepts are analyzed and demonstrated; to the
second ring, where decisions are made regarding safety, operating
policy, performance standards, and certification requirements; to the
third ring (technical development), where concepts are prototyped and
investment analysis decisions are made. The progression through the
rings is not necessarily linear, and a program may be in more than one
ring at a time. Data communications, for example, is in the technical
development ring and also in the middle ring as policy and rulemaking
is considered. The core is divided into three sections, which indicate
the FAA offices that implement the final NextGen program.
[End of figure]
In addition, to further align FAA's efforts with JPDO's plans for
NextGen, FAA has created a NextGen review board to oversee the OEP.
This review board is co-chaired by JPDO's director and ATO's vice
president of operations planning services. Initiatives, such as concept
demonstrations or research, proposed for inclusion in the OEP now need
to go through the review board for approval. These efforts are assessed
for relation to NextGen requirements, concept maturity, and risk. An
ATO official told us that the new OEP process should also help identify
some smaller programs that might be inconsistent with NextGen and which
could be discontinued. Additionally, as a further step towards
integrating ATO and JPDO, the administration's reauthorization proposal
calls for the JPDO director to be a voting member of FAA's joint
resources council and ATO's executive council.
While progress is being made in incorporating NextGen initiatives into
FAA's strategic and planning documents, more remains to be done with
FAA and the other JPDO partner agencies. For example, one critical
activity that remains in this area will be synchronizing the NextGen
enterprise architecture--once JPDO releases and further refines it--
with the partner agencies' enterprise architectures. Doing so should
help align agencies' current work with NextGen while simultaneously
identifying gaps between agency plans and NextGen plans. Also, while
FAA is making significant progress toward creating an implementation
plan for NextGen with its OEP, the other partner agencies are less far
along or have not begun such efforts. JPDO's lack of authority over
partner agency resources will be minimized as a challenge if the
partner agencies commit to NextGen goals and initiatives at a
structural level. By further incorporation of NextGen efforts into
strategic planning documents, the partner agencies will better
institutionalize their commitments to JPDO and the NextGen initiative.
Finally, JPDO has made progress in establishing mechanisms for
leveraging partner agency resources--another important practice for
institutionalizing JPDO's collaborative effort. As we noted in our
November 2006 report, JPDO is working with OMB to develop a process
that would allow OMB to identify NextGen-related projects across the
partner agencies and consider NextGen as a unified, cross-agency
program. We recommended that JPDO develop written procedures that
formalize agreements with OMB regarding the leveraging of partner
agency resources and the identification of NextGen-related programs
within agency budgets. We recently met with OMB officials who said that
they felt there has been significant progress with JPDO over the last
year. JPDO is now working on an OMB Exhibit 300 form for NextGen that
will allow JPDO to present OMB a joint business case for the NextGen-
related efforts within the partner agencies and will be used as input
to funding decisions for NextGen research and acquisitions across the
agencies.[Footnote 15] This Exhibit 300 will be due to OMB in September
2007 to inform decisions about the partner agencies' 2009 budget
submissions.
Ultimately, the success of JPDO will have to be measured in the efforts
of its partner agencies to implement policies and procedures, conduct
research, and acquire systems that support NextGen. For example, JPDO
is currently working to establish a joint weather office involving FAA
and the Departments of Defense and Commerce. The goal of this joint
office is to eliminate redundancies in weather research and leverage
the resources of these partner agencies to implement a joint weather
product by 2012, according to a senior JPDO official. Similarly, JPDO
has secured a commitment from the Departments of Defense and Homeland
Security and FAA to jointly fund the developmental testing of scenarios
for network enabled operations.
With regard to implementation of NextGen technologies, JPDO can point
to its success in collaborating with FAA to fund and speed FAA's
rollout of two systems considered cornerstone technologies for NextGen:
ADS-B and System Wide Information Management (SWIM). ADS-B will replace
many existing radars with less costly ground-based transceivers. SWIM
will provide an initial network centric capability to all the users of
the air transportation system. This means that the FAA and the
Departments of Homeland Security and Defense will eventually share a
common, real-time, secure picture of aviation operations across the
airspace system. Identifying such NextGen programs across the partner
agencies and establishing implementation plans for them in JPDO's
Integrated Work Plan will be critical going forward to creating
performance metrics for JPDO.
FAA and JPDO Continue to Face a Number of Challenges in Moving Toward
NextGen:
FAA and JPDO continue to face a number of challenges as they move
toward the implementation of NextGen systems and procedures, including
assessing FAA's technical and contract management expertise, sustaining
the current air traffic control system, identifying which entities will
handle necessary research and development, addressing JPDO's leadership
challenges, conducting human factors research, and ensuring the
involvement of all key stakeholders.
FAA Needs to Explore Whether It Has the Technical and Contract
Management Expertise Necessary to Implement NextGen:
In the past, a lack of expertise contributed to weaknesses in FAA's
management of air traffic control modernization efforts, and industry
experts with whom we spoke questioned whether FAA will have the
technical expertise needed to implement NextGen. In addition to
technical expertise, FAA will need contract management expertise to
oversee the systems acquisitions and integration involved in NextGen.
Recognizing the complexity of the NextGen implementation effort and the
possibility that FAA may not have the in-house expertise to manage it
without assistance, we have identified potential approaches for
supplementing FAA's capabilities. One of these approaches is for FAA to
contract with a lead systems integrator (LSI). Generally, an LSI is a
prime contractor that would help to ensure that the discrete systems
used in NextGen will operate together and whose responsibilities may
include designing system solutions, developing requirements, and
selecting major system and subsystem contractors. The government has
used LSIs before for programs that require the integration of multiple
complex systems. Our research indicates that although LSIs have certain
advantages, such as the knowledge, understanding, skills, and ability
to integrate functions across various systems, their use also entails
certain risks.[Footnote 16] For example, because an LSI may have
significantly more responsibility than a prime contractor usually does,
careful oversight is necessary to ensure that the government's
interests are protected and that conflicts of interest are avoided.
Providing the oversight that is needed, however, can be compromised
when government expertise is lacking. Consequently, selecting,
assigning responsibilities to, and managing an LSI could pose
significant challenges for JPDO and FAA.
Another approach that we have identified involves obtaining technical
advice from federally funded research and development corporations to
help the agency oversee and manage prime contractors. These nonprofit
corporations are chartered to provide long-term technical advice to
government agencies in accordance with various statutory and regulatory
rules to ensure independence and prevent conflicts of interest.
In November 2006, we recommended that FAA examine its strengths and
weaknesses with regard to the technical expertise and contract
management expertise that will be required to define, implement, and
integrate the numerous complex programs inherent in the transition to
NextGen.[Footnote 17] In response to our recommendation, FAA has
contracted with the National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA) to
determine the needed skill mix and the number of those skilled persons,
such as technical personnel and program managers, that would be
necessary to implement the new OEP and to compare those requirements
with current FAA staff resources. According to FAA, the next step in
this process would be to contract with NAPA or another organization for
advice on how best to fill any skills gaps and how to proceed with
management and oversight of the implementation of NextGen. We believe
this is a reasonable approach that should help FAA begin to address
this challenge.
Although FAA Is Now Focusing on NextGen, It Must Continue to Manage and
Sustain the Current System:
While FAA works to acquire and deploy NextGen technologies, it will be
equally important that FAA maintain many existing systems and, for
those systems that FAA determines should be phased out, that the agency
do so using a risk-based approach. The adequacy of FAA's maintenance of
existing systems was raised following a power outage and equipment
failures in Southern California that caused hundreds of flight delays
during the summer of 2006. Investigations by FAA and the Department of
Transportation Inspector General into these incidents identified a
number of underlying issues, including the age and condition of
equipment. Nationwide, the number of scheduled[Footnote 18] and
unscheduled outages of air traffic control equipment and ancillary
support systems has been increasing. Increases in the number of
unscheduled outages indicate that systems are failing more frequently.
It will be critical for FAA to monitor and address equipment outages to
ensure the safety and efficiency of the legacy systems, since they will
be the core of the national airspace system for a number of years and,
in some cases, will become part of NextGen.
FAA and JPDO Have Begun to Release Early Cost Estimates for NextGen,
but Questions Remain Over Who Will Conduct Necessary Research and
Development:
In our November report, we noted that JPDO had not yet developed a
comprehensive estimate of the costs of NextGen. Since then, in its
recently released 2006 Progress Report,[Footnote 19] JPDO reported some
estimated costs for NextGen, including specifics on some early NextGen
programs. JPDO believes the total federal cost for NextGen
infrastructure through 2025 will range between $15 billion and $22
billion. JPDO also reported that a preliminary estimate of the
corresponding cost to system users, who will have to equip with the
advanced avionics that are necessary to realize the full benefits of
some NextGen technologies, produced a range of $14 billion to $20
billion. JPDO noted that this range for avionics costs reflects
uncertainty about equipage costs for individual aircraft, the number of
very light jets that will operate in high-performance airspace, and the
amount of out-of-service time required for installation.
FAA, in its capital investment plan for fiscal years 2008-2012,
includes estimated expenditures for 11 line items that are considered
NextGen capital programs.[Footnote 20] The total 5-year estimated
expenditures for these programs is $4.3 billion. In fiscal year 2008,
only 6 of the line items are funded for a total of roughly $174
million; funding for the remaining 5 programs would begin with the
fiscal year 2009 budget. According to FAA, in addition to capital
spending for NextGen, the agency will spend an estimated $300 million
on NextGen-related research and development from fiscal years 2008
through 2012. The administration's budget for fiscal year 2008 for FAA
includes a total of $17.8 million to support the activities of JPDO.
While FAA and JPDO have begun to release estimates for FAA's NextGen
investment portfolio, questions remain over which entities will fund
and conduct some of the necessary research, development, and
demonstration projects that will be key to achieving certain NextGen
capabilities. In the past, a significant portion of aeronautics
research and development, including intermediate technology
development, has been performed by NASA. To its credit, NASA plans to
focus its research on the needs of NextGen. However, NASA is also
moving toward a focus on fundamental research and away from
developmental work and demonstration projects, which could negatively
impact NextGen if these efforts are not assumed by others.
In addition, JPDO will need to conduct modeling for NextGen and may
look to its partner agencies to provide modeling capabilities and
support. For example, NASA's NAS-wide modeling platform, the Airspace
Concepts Evaluation System (ACES),[Footnote 21] permits JPDO to, among
other things, evaluate alternative research ideas and assess the
performance of competing vendors. According to a JPDO official, this
capability, which is critical to NextGen research, is eroding as JPDO's
investment simulation requirements are expanding. As part of its
fundamental research mission, NASA intends to upgrade to ACES-X (a more
sophisticated representation of the national airspace system), but not
for another two years. Until then, JPDO's investment modeling
capability will be constrained unless the office or another partner
agency can assume the modeling work. For example, the Department of
Defense has detailed aircraft models and the Department of Homeland
Security has detailed models of airport terminals that are relevant for
JPDO's simulations. This is an issue that needs to be addressed in the
short-term.
JPDO faces the challenge of determining the nature and scope of the
research and technology development necessary to begin the transition
to NextGen, as well as identifying the entities that can conduct that
research and development. According to officials at FAA and JPDO, they
are currently studying these issues and trying to assess how much
research and development FAA can assume. An FAA official recently
testified that the agency proposes to increase its research and
development funding by $280 million over the next 5 years. However, a
draft report by an advisory committee to FAA stated that FAA would need
at least $100 million annually in increased funding to assume NASA's
research and development work, and establishing the necessary
infrastructure within FAA could delay the implementation of NextGen by
5 years.[Footnote 22] JPDO's Integrated Work Plan will permit NASA and
the other partner agencies to assess the research and development needs
of NextGen, determine funding, and conduct the necessary initiatives.
The Integrated Work Plan is critical for the timely completion of
research and testing of proposed NextGen systems and keeping NextGen on
schedule.
JPDO's Lack of Stable Leadership and the Authority to Enforce
Accountability Threaten the Credibility of Organization:
While basic organizational structure of JPDO has been in place for
several years (see app. 1), it has suffered from a lack of stable
leadership. As JPDO begins its fourth year in operation, it is
functioning under its third director and operated for much of 2006
under the stewardship of an acting director. The current director of
JPDO has held the position since August 2006. The Next Generation Air
Transportation System Institute (the Institute), created to facilitate
the participation of nonfederal stakeholders in the NextGen effort,
noted in its recent annual report that JPDO's leadership turnover had
made it a challenge for JPDO to move out more aggressively on many
goals and objectives, as the office waited on a full-time director. The
Institute also stated that JPDO's leadership turnover had limited the
ability of the Institute's executive committee[Footnote 23] to forge a
stronger relationship with JPDO leadership and work jointly on
strategic issues and challenges. These fundamental leadership issues
are exacerbated by the lack of meetings of JPDO's senior policy
committee. Although JPDO has been functioning for just over 3 years,
the senior policy committee has met only four times, and has not met at
all as a formal body since November 2005.
In addition to the lack of stable leadership, JPDO's management lacks
the authority to hold much of JPDO's staff accountable for their
performance. As we noted in November 2006, JPDO has staffed the various
levels of its organization with employees from its partner agencies and
this practice helps to leverage partner agency human resources.
However, a drawback of such staffing is a lack of real or perceived
accountability to JPDO. According to JPDO officials, the JPDO workforce
consists largely of part-time partner agency personnel who have been
detailed to JPDO and part-time private sector volunteers. Only a few
permanently-assigned FAA staff have their performance appraised by JPDO
management, although the director does provide input to the performance
appraisals of some of the managers detailed to JPDO from partner
agencies. We have noted in previous studies that improved performance
has been linked to accountability.[Footnote 24]
Similarly, although the organizational structure of the Institute has
been in place for 2 years, the Institute is currently led by an acting
director while a search is being conducted for the Institute's third
executive director. Some Institute Management Council (IMC) members
with whom we spoke believed that this turnover might be indicative of
problems with the structure of the Institute and a need for greater
clarity in roles and responsibilities. For example, these IMC members
noted that there were stresses placed on the Institute's executive
director resulting from the need to meet the competing demands of the
IMC, the IMC executive committee, and JPDO management. Other IMC
members attributed the stresses on the executive director to the lack
of clarity in the Institute's role. These members noted that while the
Institute is clearly charged with selecting private sector participants
for JPDO's work groups, the Institute's role of conducting research for
the JPDO could be viewed as overlapping with other advisory
organizations such as RTCA.[Footnote 25] Two IMC members believed that
the Institute's award of only two research contracts in two years
illustrates that the Institute is not yet functioning as intended. Some
IMC members also pointed out that a formal mechanism for providing
industry input to JPDO on NextGen concepts and issues has not yet been
fully established, even though this is one of the missions of the
Institute. Although the Institute is currently seeking a new executive
director, some IMC members felt that the IMC would do better to first
try and gain a better understanding of the factors that have led to the
turnover in the executive director position.
Human Factors Research Is Critical to Some Fundamental NextGen
Capabilities:
Among the central assumptions of the NextGen system is a concept of
operations that envisions an increased reliance on automation, which
dramatically changes the roles and responsibilities of both the air
traffic controllers and the pilots. In such an automated environment
some of the controller's responsibilities will shift from air traffic
control to air traffic management and pilots will take on a greater
share of the responsibility for maintaining safe separation and other
tasks currently performed by controllers. These changes in roles and
responsibilities raise significant human factors issues for the safety
and efficiency of the national airspace system.
Although JPDO has begun to model how shifts in air traffic controllers'
workloads would affect their performance, it has not yet begun to model
the effect of how this shift in workload to pilots would affect pilot
performance. According to a JPDO official, modeling the effect of
changes in pilot workload has not yet begun because JPDO has not yet
identified a suitable model to incorporate into its suite of modeling
tools. According to a JPDO official, the evolving roles of pilots and
controllers is the NextGen initiative's most important human factors
issue, but will be difficult to research because data on pilot behavior
are not readily available for use in creating models. In addition to
the study of changing roles, JPDO has not yet studied the training
implications of various systems or solutions proposed for NextGen. For
example, JPDO officials said they will need to study the extent to
which new air traffic controllers will have to be trained to operate
both the old and the new equipment as the concept of operations and
enterprise architecture mature.
JPDO Faces A Continuing Challenge in Ensuring the Involvement of All
Key Stakeholders:
Some stakeholders, such as current air traffic controllers and
technicians, will play critical roles in NextGen, and their involvement
in planning for and deploying the new technology will be important to
the success of NextGen. In November 2006, we reported that active air
traffic controllers were not involved in the NextGen planning effort
and recommended that JPDO determine whether any other key stakeholders
and expertise were not represented on its integrated product teams,
divisions, or elsewhere within the office. Since then, the head of the
controllers' union has taken a seat on the IMC. However, no active
controllers are yet participating at the more detailed group planning
level. Also, aviation technicians do not participate in NextGen
efforts. Input from current air traffic controllers who have recent
experience controlling aircraft and current technicians who will
maintain NextGen equipment is important when considering human factors
and safety issues. Our work on past air traffic control modernization
projects has shown that a lack of stakeholder or expert involvement
early and throughout a project can lead to costly increases and delays.
In addition, we found that some private sector stakeholders have
expressed concerns that participation in the Institute might either
preclude bidding on future NextGen acquisitions or pose organizational
conflicts of interest. FAA's acquisition process, generally, precludes
bids from organizations that have participated in, materially
influenced, or had prior knowledge of the requirements for an
acquisition. The Institute was aware of this concern and attempted to
address it through an amendment to its governing document that
strengthened the language protecting participants from organizational
conflicts of interest for participation in the NextGen initiative.
However, while the amendment language currently operates to protect
stakeholders, the language has never been tested or challenged. Thus,
it is unclear at this time whether any stakeholder participation is
being chilled by conflict of interest concerns.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to
respond to any questions from you or other Members of the Subcommittee.
GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgment:
For further information on this testimony, please contact Dr. Gerald L.
Dillingham at (202) 512-2834 or dillinghamg@gao.gov. Individuals making
key contributions to this statement include Kevin Egan, Jessica Evans,
Colin Fallon, Ed Menoche, Faye Morrison, Taylor Reeves, and Richard
Scott.
[End of section]
Appendix I: JPDO's Organizational Structure Facilitates Collaboration,
but Continues to Evolve:
In November 2006, we reported that the Joint Planning and Development
Office's (JPDO) organizational structure incorporated some of the
practices that we have found to be effective for federal interagency
collaborations--an important point given how critical such
collaboration is to the success of JPDO's mission. For example, the
JPDO partner agencies have worked together to develop key strategies
for the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) and JPDO
has leveraged its partner agency resources by staffing various levels
of its organization with partner agency employees. Also, our work has
shown that involving stakeholders can, among other things, increase
their support for a collaborative effort.
Vision 100 includes requirements for JPDO to coordinate and consult
with its partner agencies, private sector experts, and the public.
JPDO's approach has been to establish an organizational structure that
involves federal and nonfederal stakeholders throughout the
organization. This structure includes a federal interagency senior
policy committee. JPDO's senior policy committee is headed by the
Secretary of Transportation (as required in Vision 100) and includes
senior-level officials from JPDO's partner agencies. The JPDO board is
an adjunct to the senior policy committee and is composed of at least
one senior representative from each of the partner agencies.
The Next Generation Air Transportation System Institute (the Institute)
was created by an agreement between the National Center for Advanced
Technologies[Footnote 26] and the Federal Aviation Administration to
meet Vision 100's requirement that JPDO coordinate and consult with the
public. The Institute incorporates the expertise and views of
stakeholders from private industry, state and local governments, and
academia. In addition, the Institute arranges for the participation of
nonfederal stakeholders in JPDO's planning efforts, reviews and selects
private sector organizations to conduct research studies needed by
JPDO, and holds public meetings to obtain the views of the aviation
community. The Institute held its first public meeting in March 2006
and plans to hold another public meeting in May 2007. The Institute is
directed by an Institute Management Council (IMC), which consists of
top officials and representatives from the aviation community. The IMC
oversees the policy, recommendations, and products of the Institute and
provides a means for advancing consensus positions on critical NextGen
issues. An executive committee, consisting of the IMC's two co-chairs
and three members selected by them, conducts business on behalf of the
IMC. The Institute is managed on a day-to-day basis by an executive
director, who reports to the IMC and the executive committee, and works
closely with JPDO management.
Recently, JPDO announced they are in the process of implementing
several structural and operational changes to improve the efficiency of
the organization (see fig. 3). JPDO's structure used to include eight
integrated product teams (IPT), which was where the federal and
nonfederal experts came together to plan for and coordinate the
development of capabilities for NextGen. The eight IPTs were linked to
eight key strategies that JPDO developed early on for guiding its
NextGen planning work. The IPTs were headed by representatives of
JPDO's partner agencies and include more than 200 nonfederal
stakeholders from over 100 organizations.
JPDO recently converted each IPT into a "working group" with the same
participants as the former IPT, but with each working group led by a
joint government and industry steering committee. These steering
committees will oversee the creation of small, ad hoc subgroups that
will be tasked with short-term projects exploring specific issues and
delivering discrete work products. Under this arrangement, working
group members will be free of obligations to the group when not engaged
in a specific project. According to JPDO officials, they believe the
working groups will be more efficient and output-or product-focused
than the former IPTs. JPDO officials noted that they are also in the
process of staffing a new, ninth working group to address avionics
issues.
Figure 3: JPDO New Organizational Chart:
[See PDF for image]
Source: JPDO.
Note: There are nine working groups covering aircraft, air navigation
services, airports, environment, global harmonization, net-centric
operations, safety, security, and weather.
[End of figure]
We believe that these changes could help address concerns that we have
heard from some stakeholders about the productivity of some IPTs and
the pace of the planning effort at JPDO. However, it will be important
to monitor these changes to ensure that the participation of
stakeholders is neither decreased nor adversely affected. Maintaining
communications within and among work groups could increase in
importance if, as work group members focus on specific projects, they
become less involved in the overall collaborative planning effort. The
effectiveness of the changes to JPDO's organizational structure will
need to continue to be evaluated over time. Currently, we have on-going
study examining the views and concerns of JPDO's federal and nonfederal
stakeholders about the office and its performance. We expect to issue a
report on our findings later this year.
FOOTNOTES
[1] Performance-based organizations are discrete units, led by a chief
operating officer, that commit to clear objectives, specific measurable
goals, customer service standards, and targets for improved
performance.
[2] JPDO's partner agencies include the Departments of Transportation,
Commerce, Defense, and Homeland Security; FAA; the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration (NASA); and the White House Office of Science
and Technology Policy.
[3] GAO, Next Generation Air Transportation System: Progress and
Challenges Associated with the Transformation of the National Airspace
System, GAO-07-25 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 13, 2006).
[4] GAO, Federal Aviation Administration: Key Issues in Ensuring the
Efficient Development and Safe Operation of the Next Generation Air
Transportation System, GAO-07-636T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 22, 2007)
and GAO, Joint Planning and Development Office: Progress and Key Issues
in Planning the Transition to the Next Generation Air Transportation
System, GAO-07-693T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 29, 2007).
[5] According to JPDO, it is not appropriate for the Office of Science
and Technology Policy, as a White House agency, to sign the MOU.
[6] GAO, Federal Aviation Administration: Stronger Architecture Program
Needed to Guide Systems Modernization Efforts, GAO-05-266 (Washington,
D.C.: Apr. 29, 2005); Air Traffic Control: System Management
Capabilities Improved, but More can be Done to Institutionalize
Improvements, GAO-04-901 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 20, 2004); and
Information Technology: FAA Has Many Investment Management Capabilities
in Place, but More Oversight of Operational Systems is Needed, GAO-04-
822 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 20, 2004).
[7] EVM is a project management technique that combines measurements of
technical performance, schedule performance, and cost performance with
the intent of providing an early warning of problems while there is
time for corrective action.
[8] GAO, High Risk Series: An Update, GAO-07-310 (Washington, D.C.:
January 2007).
[9] GAO, National Airspace System: Transformation will Require Cultural
Change, Balanced Funding Priorities, and Use of All Available
Management Tools, GAO-06-154 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 14, 2005).
[10] Following an introductory section, the Concept of Operations has
eight sections covering air traffic management operations, airport
operations and infrastructure services, net-centric infrastructure
services, shared situational awareness services, security services,
environmental management framework, safety management services, and
performance management services.
[11] Concept of Operations for the Next Generation Air Transportation
System, version 0.2, July 24, 2006.
[12] We reviewed JPDO's current Concept of Operations for the Next
Generation Air Transportation System, version 1.2, dated February 28,
2007, by comparing it with the IEEE Standard 1362-1998 for concept of
operations documents.
[13] GAO-07-693T.
[14] Prior to expansion of the OEP, the document centered around plans
for increasing capacity and efficiency at 35 major airports.
[15] Section 300 of OMB Circular No. A-11, Preparation, Submission, and
Execution of the Budget (Nov. 2, 2005), sets forth requirements for
federal agencies for planning, budgeting, acquiring, and managing
information technology capital assets.
[16] GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Future Combat System Risks Underscore
the Importance of Oversight, GAO-07-672T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 27,
2007).
[17] GAO-07-25.
[18] Scheduled outages occur for scheduled maintenance.
[19] JPDO, Making the NextGen Vision a Reality: 2006 Progress Report to
the Next Generation Air Transportation System Integrated Plan
(Washington, D.C; Mar. 14, 2007).
[20] FAA has six capital investment programs that it considers
transformational NextGen programs slated to receive funding in fiscal
year 2008: ADS-B nationwide implementation, System Wide Information
Management (SWIM), NextGen Data Communications, NextGen Network Enabled
Weather, National Airspace System Voice Switch, and NextGen Technology
Demonstration. In addition, five other programs are slated to begin
funding in 2009: NextGen System Development, NextGen High Altitude
Trajectory Based Operations, NextGen High Density Airports, NextGen
Networked Facilities, and NextGen Cross-Cutting Infrastructure.
[21] ACES provides a detailed flight simulation environment and an open
framework to integrate the results of other simulations. This allows
JPDO to test concepts well before they have to be demonstrated with
real hardware and people. This platform provides a basis for evaluating
the timing of many agencies' current budget requests and is a method
for comparing competitive ideas.
[22] Research, Engineering and Development Advisory Committee, Draft
Report on Financing the Next Generation Air Transportation System
(Washington, D.C; April 2006).
[23] The Institute's executive committee is a subset of the Institute's
governing body, the Institute Management Council. The Institute
Management Council members represent commercial airline operations,
commercial pilots, air traffic control technology, air traffic
controllers, airport operators, business aircraft operations, federal
advisory committees, universities, and non-profit research
organizations, small aircraft general aviation, helicopter operations,
manufacturers of air vehicles and airborne/space-borne and ground based
equipment, and regional commercial airline operations. The JPDO
director is an ex-officio member and there are two at-large members.
[24] GAO, Air Traffic Control Modernization: Status of the Current
Program and Planning for the Next Generation Air Transportation System,
GAO-06-653T (Washington, D.C.: June 21, 2006)
[25] Organized in 1935 and once called the Radio Technical Commission
for Aeronautics, RTCA is today known by its acronym. RTCA is a private,
not-for-profit corporation that develops consensus-based performance
standards for ATC systems. RTCA serves as a federal advisory committee,
and its recommendations are the basis for a number of FAA's policy,
program, and regulatory decisions.
[26] The National Center for Advanced Technologies is a nonprofit unit
established by the Aerospace Industries Association.
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