Responses to Questions for the Record; Hearing on JPDO and the Next Generation Air Transportation System
Status and Issues Gao ID: GAO-07-918R May 29, 2007This letter responds to Congress's April 24, 2007, request that GAO address questions submitted for the record by Members of the Subcommittee related to the March 29, 2007, hearing entitled JPDO and the Next Generation Air Transportation System: Status and Issues.
As agreed, in addition to the responses that we provided on May 18, 2007, to two of the questions Congress submitted regarding the role of the Joint Planning and Development Office (JPDO), we are answering the remaining questions submitted by the House Committee on Science and Technology, Space and Aeronautics Subcommittee. Our attached responses to these questions are based on our previous and ongoing work and our knowledge of the areas addressed by the questions. We prepared our responses during May 2007 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
GAO-07-918R, Responses to Questions for the Record; Hearing on JPDO and the Next Generation Air Transportation System: Status and Issues
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May 29, 2007:
The Honorable Mark Udall:
Chairman:
Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics:
Committee on Science and Technology:
House of Representatives:
Subject: Responses to Questions for the Record; Hearing on JPDO and the
Next Generation Air Transportation System: Status and Issues:
Dear Chairman Udall:
This letter responds to your April 24, 2007, request that we address
questions submitted for the record by Members of the Subcommittee
related to the March 29, 2007, hearing entitled JPDO and the Next
Generation Air Transportation System: Status and Issues. As agreed with
your Office, in addition to the responses that we provided on May 18,
2007, to two of the questions you submitted regarding the role of JPDO,
we are answering the remaining questions submitted by you and by
Representative Calvert on behalf of the Minority Members of the
Committee. Our attached responses to these questions are based on our
previous and ongoing work and our knowledge of the areas addressed by
the questions. We prepared our responses during May 2007 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards. Because our
responses are based on our previously issued products[Footnote 1] for
which we sought and incorporated agency comments, as well as updates
that we obtained through interviewing FAA officials and reviewing their
documentation, we did not seek agency comments on our responses to
these questions.
We are sending copies of this report to the Administrator, Federal
Aviation Administration, and the Director, Joint Planning and
Development Office. We will make copies available to others on request.
The report is also available on GAO's Web site at www.gao.gov.
If you have any questions or would like to discuss the responses,
please contact me at (202) 512-2834 or dillinghamg@gao.gov.
Sincerely yours,
signed by:
Gerald L. Dillingham, Ph.D.
Director:
Physical Infrastructure Issues:
[End of section]
Enclosure:
Responses to Post-Hearing Questions for the Record: "JPDO and the Next
Generation Air Transportation System: Status and Issues"
Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics:
Committee on Science and Technology:
U.S. House of Representatives:
Hearing held on March 29, 2007:
Questions for Dr. Gerald L. Dillingham, Director:
Physical Infrastructure Issues:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
Questions for the Record Submitted by Chairman Mark Udall:
1. How long should the Joint Planning and Development Office (JPDO)
exist, and should its role evolve from its current one? If so, in what
ways?
JPDO was established to plan and coordinate the development of the next
generation air transportation system (NextGen) and should exist for the
duration of those tasks. The basic planning documents that JPDO is
developing for NextGen are near completion, but further iterations of
these planning documents will be needed as NextGen technologies are
developed and implemented. As NextGen has progressed from the initial
planning to the early implementation phase, JPDO's role has evolved to
include coordination and facilitation activities, as well as planning
activities. GAO believes this is a reasonable evolution and a proper
role for JPDO and is consistent with the language of JPDO's authorizing
legislation.
One example of this evolution is the role JPDO has begun to play in
incorporating NextGen goals and activities into the Air Traffic
Organization's (ATO) strategic plans. ATO has expanded and revamped its
Operational Evolution Partnership (OEP) to become the Federal Aviation
Administration's (FAA) implementation plan for NextGen. The Review
Board that oversees the OEP is cochaired by JPDO and ATO. If JPDO
ceased to exist before NextGen was more fully developed, some
alternative means of planning and coordinating NextGen's development
would have to be established, which could delay NextGen's
implementation. Similar developments are expected to occur with other
partner agencies as JPDO completes a Memorandum of Understanding with
these agencies.
JPDO's role could further evolve to include more coordination and
oversight activities. For example, JPDO could establish a program
oversight capacity that would enable it to perform such functions as
(1) harmonizing the enterprise architectures among the partner
agencies; (2) coordinating the research, development, and systems-
engineering and integration activities of the cooperating agencies and
industry; (3) overseeing multi-agency projects; (4) overseeing, with
FAA, the selection of products or outcomes of research and development
that would be moved to the next stage of a demonstration project
through the Joint Resources Council (JRC);[Footnote 2] (5) overseeing
the fundamental research activities that support the long-term
strategic investments of NextGen by managing a research portfolio among
NASA, academia, federally funded research and development centers, and
industry; and (6) maintaining a baseline modeling and simulation
environment for testing and evaluating alternative concepts to satisfy
NextGen enterprise architecture requirements.
Another example of the evolution of JPDO's role is the organizational
shift from integrated product teams to working groups. This shift
reflects the extension of JPDO's role beyond planning to development of
work products or "outcomes" that will contribute to the early
development of NextGen and facilitate its implementation. As JPDO
assumes more responsibility for facilitating NextGen's implementation,
greater authority and resources would allow it to do more to coordinate
the efforts of the partner agencies and work with the Office of
Management and Budget as the principal NextGen point of contact. With
adequate funding and authority, JPDO could acquire staff with the
project management and systems engineering skills needed for JPDO to be
an effective oversight and coordinating office.
2. Should JPDO be moved out of the Federal Aviation Administration's
Air Traffic Organization to be given greater visibility and authority?
For example, should it report directly to the Office of the Secretary
of Transportation? Why or why not?
Currently, JPDO is located within FAA and reports to both the FAA
Administrator and the Chief Operating Officer of ATO. In GAO's view,
JPDO should not be moved out of FAA. Since JPDO provides the vision for
the future air traffic control (ATC) system and ATO is to be the
principal implementer of that vision, the two organizations need to
continue working closely together.
However, JPDO's dual reporting status hinders its ability to interact
on an equal footing with ATO and the other partner agencies. On one
hand, JPDO must counter the perception that it is a proxy for the ATO
and, as such, is not able to act as an "honest broker." On the other
hand, JPDO must continue to work with ATO and its partner agencies in a
partnership in which ATO is the lead implementer of NextGen. Therefore,
it is important for JPDO to have some independence from ATO. One change
that could begin to address this issue would be to have the JPDO
Director report directly to the FAA Administrator. This change may also
lessen what some stakeholders now perceive as unnecessary bureaucracy
and red tape associated with decision making and other JPDO and NextGen
processes.
As a part of any change in the dual reporting status of JPDO's
Director, consideration could be given to the possibility of creating
the position of Associate Administrator of NextGen and elevating the
JPDO Director to that post. This would give greater credibility,
authority, and visibility to this important position.
JPDO should not report to the Secretary of Transportation because
placing JPDO in the Secretary's office would remove it too far from the
implementation and operations of NextGen.
3. What are the specific roles of the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) and the Department of Defense (DOD) in JPDO?
a. Do we know how much DOD plans to spend on NextGen for its
development and implementation? If so, how much will it be?
b. Do we know how much DHS plans to spend on NextGen for its
development and implementation? If so, how much will it be?
The specific role of DHS in JPDO is to lead the Security Working Group
and to develop an effective security system for the national airspace
system (NAS) without limiting mobility or civil liberties. DHS carries
out this role through its Transportation Security Administration (TSA).
More specifically, DHS's task, through TSA, is to develop and implement
a real-time network to share information with appropriate parties about
passengers, cargo, and aircraft and to create a transparent set of
security layers that will deliver security without causing undue
delays, limiting access, or adding excessive costs and time.
The specific role of DOD in JPDO is to lead the Net-Centric Operations
Working Group and to establish user-specific situational awareness.
Situational awareness means that each user of the NAS, including DOD
and the civilian sectors, has the awareness needed to reach decisions
through the creation of a combined information network. All users of
the system will have access to the air transportation system data they
require for their operations.
The specific roles of both DHS and DOD in JPDO are related to the "curb-
to-curb" approach to air traffic management that Vision 100 established
for NextGen. Under this approach, JPDO envisions an expansion of the
air transportation system that includes airport departures and arrivals
as well as flights. The JPDO working groups, which evolved from FAA's
former integrated product teams (IPT), focus on eight strategies, such
as how to use weather information to improve the performance of the
NAS. The working groups are composed of personnel from FAA, other
federal agencies, and the private sector. Each of the working groups is
headed by a steering committee under both a federal agency--in this
case, DHS or DOD--and a private sector representative.
We do not know how much either DOD or DHS plans to spend on NextGen.
However, we are aware that DOD, FAA, and DHS each plan to provide $5
million for net-centric (i.e., a continuously-evolving network of
information sharing and situational awareness) demonstrations. Both DOD
and DHS also provide a variety of "in-kind" services through personnel
assigned to the JPDO working groups and through the potential
leveraging of mission-specific research that could support the
development and implementation of NextGen.
4. NextGen technologies will increase flight efficiency by means of
automated flight operations and reduced separations.
a. Will this render the system more brittle against disturbances such
as terrorism and equipment failure and acts of nature?
b. How will we ensure the continued safe operation of the system in the
event of such disturbances?
NextGen technologies will not render the system more brittle than the
current system. Although no system is 100 percent safe, GAO has not
seen any data or other information indicating that the planned
satellite based navigation system is more vulnerable to security
threats than the current ground based radar system. JPDO's plans call
for robust security system protocols and firewalls to increase
protection, as well as sufficient redundancies within the system to
reduce vulnerabilities and offset any disruptions. Security will exist
in "layers of defense" designed for early detection of threats from
terrorism, equipment failure, and natural disasters and will provide
appropriate intervention. Additionally, although the system will become
more automated, there will still be opportunities for human
intervention if the system fails.
Questions for the Record Submitted by Rep. Calvert:
Implementation by Other Federal Partners:
1. In your written statement, when discussing the planning efforts of
the JPDO partner agencies (exclusive of NASA and FAA), you stated that
they are not as far along developing implementation plans and
institutionalizing JPDO goals into their planning documents. Why is
that? Does this reflect a lack of commitment?
The current situation does not necessarily reflect a lack of commitment
on the part of the partner agencies. JPDO partner agencies face
competing mission and resource demands. In addition, NextGen is an
extraordinarily complex undertaking, and some agencies are still
learning to work collaboratively. By contrast, FAA and NASA have a long
history of working with each other, and the core effort of JPDO is
within their purview.
The partner agencies will engage more collaboratively as NextGen's
processes and mechanisms mature. For example, the Department of
Transportation (DOT) was recently designated as the Managing Partner
responsible for ensuring collaboration among the partner agencies in
implementing NextGen-related research and development. DOT is also
responsible for submission of the OMB 300 for the NextGen as a
portfolio project after review by JPDO.[Footnote 3] JPDO's decision to
develop a Memorandum of Understanding to broadly define the roles and
responsibilities of the partner agencies is another positive step.
Additionally, the extent to which Congress provides JPDO with the
authority and resources it needs for program oversight will affect the
nature and scope of the partner agencies' collaboration.
FAA Financing Proposal:
2. What would be the effect, if any, on the NextGen budget if Congress
does not enact the Administration's proposed aviation financing reform
package (ticket taxes; aviation fuel taxes) as part of a new
authorization, but instead leaves the current ticket and fuel taxes in
place?
The current FAA funding structure can provide sufficient funding for
NextGen--with some caveats. Congress has used the current funding
structure--excise taxes plus a General Fund contribution--to fund FAA
for many years. As the number of air travelers has grown, so have
excise tax revenues. Even though revenues fell during the early years
of this decade as the demand for air travel fell, they began to rise
again in fiscal year 2004, and FAA estimates that if the current taxes
remain in effect at their current rates, revenues will continue to
increase. According to projections prepared by the Congressional Budget
Office (CBO),[Footnote 4] revenues obtained from the existing funding
structure will increase substantially. Assuming the General Fund
continues to provide about 19 percent of FAA's budget, CBO estimates
that through 2016 the Airport and Airway Trust Fund (Trust Fund) can
support about $19 billion in additional spending over the baseline FAA
spending levels CBO has calculated for FAA (the fiscal year 2006
funding level, with projected growth for inflation) provided that most
of the spending occurs after fiscal year 2010. How far this money will
go to fund modernization is subject to a number of uncertainties--
including the future cost of NextGen investments, the volume of air
traffic, the future cost of operating the NAS, and the levels of future
appropriations for the Airport Improvement Program, all of which
influence the amount of funding available for FAA.
However, if the desired level of funding exceeded what was likely to be
available from the Trust Fund at current tax rates, Congress could make
changes within the current structure to provide FAA with additional
revenue. Congress could raise more revenue from airspace system users
for NextGen or for other purposes by raising the rates on one or more
of the current excise taxes. Congress could also provide more General
Fund revenues for FAA, although the nation's fiscal imbalance may make
a larger contribution from this source difficult.
JPDO Organizational Authority:
3. Would GAO recommend any changes to the authorities and resources now
provided to JPDO to enhance its effectiveness in coordinating the
partner agencies, and if so, what would they be?
Yes, providing JPDO with the authority and the resources to establish a
program oversight capacity would enable JPDO to perform such functions
as (1) harmonizing the enterprise architectures among the partner
agencies; (2) coordinating the research, development, and systems-
engineering and integration activities of the cooperating agencies and
industry; (3) overseeing, with FAA, the selection of products or
outcomes of research and development that would be moved to the next
stage of a demonstration project through the Joint Resources Council
(JRC); (4) overseeing the fundamental research activities that support
the long-term strategic investments of NextGen by managing a research
portfolio among NASA, academia, federally funded research and
development centers and industry; and (5) maintaining a baseline
modeling and simulation environment for testing and evaluating
alternative concepts to satisfy NextGen enterprise architecture
requirements.
JPDO will need additional funding and staff to expand its role in
coordinating the efforts of the partner agencies and working with the
Office of Management and Budget as the principal NextGen point of
contact.
However, JPDO's dual reporting status hinders its ability to interact
on an equal footing with ATO and the other partner agencies. Therefore,
it is important for JPDO to have some independence from ATO. One change
that could begin to address this issue would be to have the JPDO
Director report directly to the FAA Administrator. This change might
also lessen what some stakeholders now perceive as unnecessary
bureaucracy and red tape associated with decision making and other JPDO
and NextGen processes. As a part of any change in the dual reporting
status of JPDO's Director, consideration could be given to the
possibility of creating the position of Associate Administrator of
NextGen and elevating the JPDO Director to that post. This would give
greater credibility, authority, and visibility to this important
position.
NASA's Role in JPDO:
4. Traditionally NASA has developed promising technologies to a high
maturity level, enabling FAA to incorporate them into its air traffic
control system without too much additional development. Now that NASA
is confining its development work to a basic level of technical
maturity, do FAA and the other federal partners have the resources and
capability to fill this void?
It is not clear whether FAA and the other federal partners have the
resources and capability to fill this void. As your question indicates,
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) formerly
conducted the type of intermediate research and development (R&D) and
demonstration projects that will be needed for the NextGen program, but
the funding for these efforts was discontinued when NASA's aeronautical
research portfolio was restructured to focus more on fundamental
research. Although FAA has not fully determined the impact of the NASA
restructuring on the R&D needs for NextGen, some additional R&D funds
will be needed and are critical for the timely development of NextGen.
FAA recognizes that this is a critical issue and has already taken some
action to address it. For example, in the President's fiscal year 2008
budget request for FAA, funds have been included for developmental and
transition research in the Facilities and Equipment (F&E) Activity 1
account. In light of the NASA restructuring, FAA has also undertaken a
study to assess the nature and scope of its NextGen R&D needs.
According to JPDO officials, this study will be completed in August
2007. More work remains to completely assess the research and
development needs of NextGen and the ability of FAA and the other JPDO
partner agencies to budget for and conduct the necessary initiatives.
One way to fill an identified research and development need might be to
make more use of the resources available at the FAA Technical Center in
Atlantic City, New Jersey, and the FAA Aeronautical Center in Oklahoma
City, Oklahoma.
Certification:
In his statement before the Subcommittee, the President and CEO of the
Aerospace Industries Association, Mr. Douglass expressed concerns about
the time required to prototype, validate, and certify new technologies
required for NextGen, in addition to the time required for rulemakings.
Do you share Mr. Douglass's concerns? How much of a risk do these
processes pose to the timely development of NextGen?
Yes, we share Mr. Douglass's concerns. The time required to prototype,
validate, and certify a technology can present a significant risk to
the timely and cost effective implementation of NextGen. We have
studied the lead times required to prototype, validate, and certify new
technologies. JPDO or FAA do not currently have sufficient resources to
prototype, validate, and certify new technologies, and cannot currently
develop them internally without causing significant delays in the
implementation of NextGen. In addition, stakeholders have expressed
concern over the time it takes to develop rules for new equipment and
the problems caused when equipment is fielded before rules are
finalized. Any activities that will be required to implement new
policies, demonstrate new capabilities, set parameters for the
certification of new systems, and develop technologies will take time.
Just as important, the time required to prototype, validate, and
certify a new technology must be balanced against the need to ensure
the reliability of the technology and the safety of the flying public.
Accountability:
6. In his statement before the Subcommittee, Mr. Douglass raised
concerns about the potential lack of accountability and authority in
the current JPDO structure, especially with regard to partner agencies.
He recommends that each partner agency designate a senior-level
official as the responsible individual for all NextGen-related
programs. Do you share Mr. Douglass's concerns? Should agencies
designate a senior program official?
Yes, we share Mr. Douglass's concerns and further note that these
fundamental leadership issues are exacerbated by the apparent
inactivity of JPDO's Senior Policy Committee (SPC). This committee is
responsible for overseeing the work of JPDO, but has met only four
times in 3 years and has not convened as a body since November 2005.
The committee is chaired by the Secretary of Transportation and
includes senior leaders from the partner agencies and the Director of
the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy. SPC was
established to provide policy guidance and review; make legislative
recommendations; and identify and align resources. A more regular
schedule of meetings and an agenda for SPC could lead to more
participation and accountability on the part of the partner agencies.
Additionally, assigning sole responsibility for supporting NextGen to a
senior official from each agency would be a positive step. As a point
of contact and coordinator for NextGen activities, that person should,
within prescribed limits, have access to, and authority from, the SPC
member from their agency to make decisions and act on behalf of their
agency.
Finally, to the extent that the pending Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU) between the partner agencies defines the roles and
responsibilities of each agency, it will, when signed, be a useful
document for ensuring accountability.
(540155):
FOOTNOTES
[1] GAO, Next Generation Air Transportation System: Status of the
Transition to the Future Air Traffic Control System, GAO-07-784T
(Washington D.C.: May 9, 2007); GAO, Joint Planning and Development
Office: Progress and Key Issues in Planning the Transition to the Next
Generation Air Transportation System, GAO-07-693T (Washington, D.C.:
Mar. 29, 2007); GAO, Federal Aviation Administration: Key Issues in
Ensuring the Efficient Development and Safe Operation of the Next
Generation Air Transportation System, GAO-07-636T (Washington, D.C.:
Mar. 22, 2007) and GAO, Next Generation Air Transportation System:
Progress and Challenges Associated with the Transformation of the
National Airspace System, GAO-07-25 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 13, 2006).
[2] FAA's Joint Resources Council establishes and manages acquisition
program baselines which define cost, schedule, performance, and benefit
parameters for programs over the full lifecycle of the program.
[3] Section 300 of OMB Circular No. A-11, Preparation, Submission, and
Execution of the Budget (Nov. 2, 2005), sets forth requirements for
federal agencies for planning, budgeting, acquiring, and managing
information technology capital assets.
[4] Congressional Budget Office, Financing Investment in the Air
Traffic Control System (Washington, D.C.: Sept 27, 2006):
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