Responses to Questions for the Record; Hearing on the Future of Air Traffic Control Modernization
Gao ID: GAO-07-928R May 30, 2007This letter responds to Congress's May 10, 2007, request that we address questions submitted for the record related to the May 9, 2007, hearing entitled The Future of Air Traffic Control Modernization.
Our responses are based on our previous work, preliminary results of ongoing work, and our knowledge of the areas addressed by the questions. We prepared our responses during May 2007 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Because our responses are based on our previously issued products for which we sought and incorporated agency comments, as well as updates that we obtained through interviewing Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) officials and reviewing their documentation, we did not seek agency comments on our responses to these questions.
GAO-07-928R, Responses to Questions for the Record; Hearing on the Future of Air Traffic Control Modernization
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May 30, 2007:
The Honorable Jerry F. Costello:
Chairman:
Subcommittee on Aviation:
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure:
House of Representatives:
Subject: Responses to Questions for the Record; Hearing on the Future
of Air Traffic Control Modernization:
Dear Chairman Costello:
This letter responds to your May 10, 2007, request that we address
questions submitted for the record related to the May 9, 2007, hearing
entitled The Future of Air Traffic Control Modernization. Our answers
to your questions are attached. Our responses are based on our previous
work, [Footnote 1] preliminary results of ongoing work, and our
knowledge of the areas addressed by the questions. We prepared our
responses during May 2007 in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards. Because our responses are based on our
previously issued products for which we sought and incorporated agency
comments, as well as updates that we obtained through interviewing FAA
officials and reviewing their documentation, we did not seek agency
comments on our responses to these questions.
We are sending copies of this letter to the Administrator, Federal
Aviation Administration, and the Director, Joint Planning and
Development Office. We will make copies available to others on request.
This letter is also available on GAO's Web site at www.gao.gov.
If you have any questions or would like to discuss the responses,
please contact me at (202) 512-2834 or dillinghamg@gao.gov.
Sincerely yours,
signed by:
Gerald L. Dilligham, Ph.D.
Director:
Physical Infrastructure Issues:
Enclosure:
Responses to Post-Hearing Questions for the Record: "The Future of Air
Traffic Control Modernization"
Subcommittee on Aviation:
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure:
U.S. House of Representatives:
Hearing held on May 9, 2007:
Questions for Dr. Gerald L. Dillingham, Director:
Physical Infrastructure Issues:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
Questions for the Record Submitted by Chairman Jerry F. Costello:
1. Several stakeholders and other observers have suggested that JPDO is
at a juncture wherein its current organizational structure and
operating procedures should be revisited. The suggestions have ranged
from the idea that JPDO should cease to exist as soon as it publishes
its primary planning documents to the idea that it should become more
autonomous, with more authority and budgetary control.
a. How long should JPDO continue to exist, and if it should continue to
exist, in what ways should its role and responsibilities with regard to
NextGen change?
JPDO was established to plan and coordinate the development of the next
generation air transportation system (NextGen) and should exist for the
duration of those tasks. The basic planning documents that JPDO is
developing for NextGen are near completion, but further iterations of
these planning documents will be needed as NextGen technologies are
developed and implemented. With NextGen's progression from the initial
planning to the early implementation phase, JPDO's role has evolved to
include coordination and facilitation activities, as well as planning
activities. GAO believes this is a reasonable evolution and a proper
role for JPDO and is consistent with the language of JPDO's authorizing
legislation.
One example of this evolution is the role JPDO has begun to play in
incorporating NextGen goals and activities into the Air Traffic
Organization's (ATO) strategic plans. ATO has expanded and revamped its
Operational Evolution Partnership (OEP) to become the Federal Aviation
Administration's (FAA) implementation plan for NextGen. The Review
Board that oversees the OEP is cochaired by JPDO and ATO. Similar
developments are expected to occur with other partner agencies as JPDO
completes a memorandum of understanding with these agencies. If JPDO
ceased to exist before NextGen was more fully developed, some
alternative means of planning and coordinating NextGen's development
would have to be established, which could delay NextGen's
implementation.
JPDO's role could further evolve to include more coordination and
oversight activities. For example, JPDO could establish a program
oversight capacity that would enable it to perform such functions as
(1) harmonizing the enterprise architectures among the partner
agencies; (2) coordinating the research, development, and systems-
engineering and integration activities of the cooperating agencies and
industry; (3) overseeing multi-agency projects; (4) overseeing, with
FAA, the selection of products or outcomes of research and development
that would be moved to the next stage of a demonstration project
through the Joint Resources Council (JRC);[Footnote 2] (5) overseeing
the fundamental research activities that support the long-term
strategic investments of NextGen by managing a research portfolio among
NASA, academia, federally funded research and development centers, and
industry; and (6) maintaining a baseline modeling and simulation
environment for testing and evaluating alternative concepts to satisfy
NextGen enterprise architecture requirements.
Another example of the evolution of JPDO's role is the organizational
shift from integrated product teams to working groups. This shift
reflects the extension of JPDO's role beyond planning to the
development of work products or "outcomes" that will contribute to the
early development of NextGen and facilitate its implementation. As JPDO
assumes more responsibility for facilitating NextGen's implementation,
greater authority and resources would allow it to do more to coordinate
the efforts of the partner agencies and work with the Office of
Management and Budget as the principal NextGen point of contact. With
adequate funding and authority, JPDO could acquire staff with the
project management and systems engineering skills needed for JPDO to be
an effective oversight and coordinating office.
b. To what extent do you think that moving JPDO out of the Federal
Aviation Administration's Air Traffic Organization will give it greater
visibility and authority?
Currently, JPDO is located within FAA and reports to both the FAA
Administrator and the Chief Operating Officer of ATO. In GAO's view,
JPDO should not be moved out of FAA. Since JPDO provides the vision for
the future air traffic control (ATC) system and ATO is to be the
principal implementer of that vision, the two organizations need to
continue working closely together.
However, JPDO's dual reporting status hinders its ability to interact
on an equal footing with ATO and the other partner agencies. On one
hand, JPDO must counter the perception that it is a proxy for the ATO
and, as such, is not able to act as an "honest broker." On the other
hand, JPDO must continue to work with ATO and its partner agencies in a
partnership in which ATO is the lead implementer of NextGen. Therefore,
it is important for JPDO to have some independence from ATO. One change
that could begin to address this issue would be to have the JPDO
Director report directly to the FAA Administrator. This change may also
lessen what some stakeholders now perceive as unnecessary bureaucracy
and red tape associated with decision making and other JPDO and NextGen
processes.
As a part of any change in the dual reporting status of JPDO's
Director, consideration could be given to the possibility of creating
the position of Associate Administrator of NextGen and elevating the
JPDO Director to that post.
c. What are the potential pluses and minuses of such a move?
One plus or advantage of moving JPDO out of ATO is that it could raise
JPDO's authority and visibility in interagency deliberations by putting
JPDO on an equal footing with ATO and other FAA lines of business. For
example, moving JPDO out of ATO might strengthen its linkages to the
Department of Defense (DOD) and the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS). In addition, JPDO may be able to work more effectively with
other FAA lines of business, such as Airports, for which JPDO has
planning responsibilities. For example, JPDO is responsible for
developing plans to increase airport capacity. A minus or disadvantage
of moving JPDO out of ATO is that because much of the work related to
implementing NextGen must occur under ATO, this work could be harder to
accomplish.
d. What are some potential alternative organizational structures or
arrangements and operating procedures for JPDO?
We think that besides moving JPDO out of ATO and changing JPDO's
reporting status, a potential organizational alternative for JPDO could
be elevating the JPDO Director's position by having the Director and
the ATO Chief Operating Officer cochair the Joint Resources Council,
the body within FAA that provides executive review and oversight of
acquisitions. (Currently, the JRC is chaired by the Federal Acquisition
Executive, a responsibility delegated by the Administrator to the Vice
President of ATO-Administration.) Consideration could also be given to
creating the position of Associate Administrator of NextGen for the
JPDO Director. This would give greater authority, credibility, and
visibility to this important position.
e. What are your thoughts on the following suggestions?
1) JPDO should be established as a program office with program
management capabilities and tools to interact with other program
offices such as the FAA program office, the program office that DOD has
committed to create, and the joint weather office involving DOD, DOC,
and FAA.
Currently, we do not think JPDO has the technical resources, tools, or
operational knowledge to function as a program office. Moreover, the
partner agencies, led by ATO, have the operational knowledge to best
implement NextGen systems. JPDO, however, could function purely as a
coordinating body or executive council. For example, JPDO could be
provided with the resources and authority to establish a program
oversight capacity that would enable it to perform such functions as
(1) harmonizing the enterprise architectures among the partner
agencies; (2) coordinating the research, development, and systems-
engineering and integration activities of the cooperating agencies and
industry; (3) overseeing multi-agency projects; (4) overseeing, with
FAA, the selection of products or outcomes of research and development
that would be moved to the next stage of a demonstration project
through the Joint Resources Council (JRC); [Footnote 3] (5) overseeing
the fundamental research activities that support the long-term
strategic investments of NextGen by managing a research portfolio among
NASA, academia, federally funded research and development centers, and
industry; and (6) maintaining a baseline modeling and simulation
environment for testing and evaluating alternative concepts to satisfy
NextGen enterprise architecture requirements.
2) JPDO lacks the technical capacity to evaluate the R&D efforts of its
government partners and private sector clients and should be provided
with an increased capacity and technical resources to carry out this
function.
To oversee multi-agency programs and have the capacity to evaluate
NextGen R&D efforts, JPDO must have the requisite human and technical
resources, such as a sufficient number of personnel with expertise in
areas related to NextGen technologies. JPDO does not currently have
these resources, but it could obtain them with funding over and above
the level in the FAA reauthorization proposal. Such resources are
needed for JPDO to monitor the implementation of NextGen.
3) JPDO lacks a clear process to identify inconsistencies in partner
agency budgeting. JPDO should become a partner in the budgeting process
and there should be a budget resolution council to provide a forum for
negotiation of budget priorities.
JPDO is already a partner in the budgeting process. JPDO has been
working with OMB to develop a process that would allow OMB to identify
NextGen-related projects across the partner agencies and consider
NextGen as a unified, cross-agency program. Under this process, JPDO
and its partner agencies can jointly present OMB with business cases
for the partner agencies' NextGen-related efforts, and these business
cases can be used as inputs to funding decisions for NextGen research
and acquisitions across the agencies.
We do not believe JPDO needs a forum to negotiate budget priorities.
The Senior Policy Committee (SPC), headed by the Secretary of
Transportation, includes senior-level officials from JPDO's partner
agencies and was established, in part, to address NextGen budget
issues. In JPDO's enabling legislation, SPC was explicitly made
responsible for identifying NextGen resource needs and making
recommendations to the members' respective agencies for the necessary
funding.
2. Much has been written and spoken about the role of and contributions
of the various partner agencies to JPDO. Some observers have commented
that the degree of participation by the partner agencies seemed to be
on a continuum from a significant amount of participation to seemingly
not very much at all. FAA and NASA are consistently indicated as the
most involved participants.
a. In your opinion, to what extent are the partner agencies
participating in the vision and work of JPDO?
The partner agencies' participation in the vision and work of JPDO has
varied to date and will continue to evolve over time. Interagency
partnerships are difficult because it takes time to forge working
relationships and establish accountability. While FAA and NASA have
been the most involved in the planning and coordination of NextGen, the
other agencies are also participating. The Department of Defense, for
example, is transferring to NextGen the technology it has developed for
sharing information across networks, is establishing a program office
to coordinate all of its NextGen activities, and is collaborating with
FAA and the Department of Commerce to develop and implement NextGen's
weather forecasting capability. The Department of Homeland Security is
participating by contributing "in-kind" services in the form of
personnel and research.
b. How could the roles of the partner agencies be changed to enhance
their participation or positively affect the development of NextGen?
We believe that the partner agencies' participation in NextGen could be
enhanced by incorporating NextGen goals and activities in the agencies'
key planning documents and research agendas. For example, JPDO is
working with FAA to refocus one of FAA's key planning documents--its
Operational Evolution Partnership (OEP)--on the implementation of
NextGen. Formerly a plan for airport capacity, OEP has been expanded
and revamped to become a comprehensive description of how FAA will
implement NextGen. We believe that similar efforts by the other partner
agencies could increase both their accountability to JPDO and JPDO's
authority over them. In addition, JPDO has been working with OMB to
develop a process for identifying NextGen-related research in the
partner agencies' budgets (see 1e. (3)).
c. What do you think about the idea of having each partner agency
designate a senior-level official as the responsible individual for all
NextGen-related programs in the agency?
Designating a senior-level official within each partner agency as
responsible for all of that agency's NextGen-related programs could be
an effective way of helping to ensure that all the partner agencies are
interacting on an equal footing and providing the needed leadership and
commitment.
d. Some observers have noted that there seems to be a lack of
accountability and authority in the current JPDO structure, especially
with regard to partner agencies. Would you agree or disagree with this
assertion? If you agree with the assertion, how could this problem be
addressed?
We would agree that, as a planning and coordinating organization, JPDO
lacks authority over the key human and technological resources of its
partner agencies. Consequently, institutionalizing its process for
collaborating with its partner agencies will be critical to JPDO's
ability to leverage its partner agencies' resources and facilitate the
implementation of NextGen. Institutionalizing the collaborative process
means that, as administrations and staffing within JPDO change over the
years, those coming into JPDO will clearly understand what is expected
of them and what time and resource commitments are entailed. JPDO,
however, has not yet established some practices that are important to
institutionalizing its collaborative process. For example, JPDO does
not yet have formal long-term agreements among its partner agencies on
their roles and responsibilities in creating NextGen. According to JPDO
officials, a memorandum of understanding (MOU), signed by the Secretary
or another high-ranking official from each partner agency, will define
the partner agencies' roles and responsibilities. To date, this MOU has
been signed by the Departments of Transportation and Commerce and NASA,
but remains unsigned by the Departments of Defense and Homeland
Security. (See 2e.)
e. What kind of changes to the authority and resources now provided to
JPDO would you suggest to enhance its effectiveness in coordinating the
partner agencies?
Besides institutionalizing the collaborative process between JPDO and
its partner agencies, elevating the position of JPDO within the NextGen
implementation process could enhance its effectiveness in coordinating
the partner agencies. In addition, JPDO could be provided with the
resources and authority to establish a program oversight capacity that
would enable it to perform such functions as (1) harmonizing the
enterprise architectures among the partner agencies; (2) coordinating
the research, development, and systems-engineering and integration
activities of the cooperating agencies and industry; (3) overseeing
multi-agency projects; (4) overseeing, with FAA, the selection of
products or outcomes of research and development that would be moved to
the next stage of a demonstration project through the Joint Resources
Council (JRC); (5) overseeing the fundamental research activities that
support the long-term strategic investments of NextGen by managing a
research portfolio among NASA, academia, federally funded research and
development centers, and industry; and (6) maintaining a baseline
modeling and simulation environment for testing and evaluating
alternative concepts to satisfy NextGen enterprise architecture
requirements.
JPDO's efforts to reorganize itself internally may also increase its
authority and enhance the participation of its partner agencies. We see
this as a positive development that extends JPDO's role beyond planning
to focus more on the development of work products or "outcomes" that
will contribute to the early development of NextGen and facilitate its
implementation. As JPDO assumes more responsibility for facilitating
NextGen's implementation, greater authority and resources would allow
it to do more to coordinate the efforts of the partner agencies and
work with the Office of Management and Budget as the principal NextGen
point of contact. We believe that with adequate authority and funding,
JPDO could acquire staff with the project management and systems
engineering skills needed for JPDO to be an effective oversight and
coordinating office for NextGen.
3. JPDO has been described as having a government staff of fewer than a
dozen full-time government employees to coordinate a long-term
initiative involving tens of billions of dollars investment. Some
observers say that JPDO will only be credible in its joint role when
funded by all principal partners. Only FAA and NASA currently fund JPDO
and its funding has not grown since inception despite its maturing
requirements.
a. What are your thoughts on the following suggestions related to
funding JPDO?
1) JPDO operations should be funded equally with money from FAA, NASA,
DOD, DHS, and DOC until such time as a memorandum of understanding can
be established to determine an alternative proportional scheme.
We believe the partner agencies' funding of JPDO operations could be
based on the roles and resources of the the partner agencies or the
partner agencies could continue to contribute cash, expertise, and
other resources as needed and available. For example, DOD plans to
provide $5 million for a demonstration of information sharing across
networks this year (FAA and DHS are also providing $5 million each for
this demonstration). The other partner agencies provide a variety of
"in-kind" services through personnel assigned to JPDO and research.
Nonetheless, it is most important to ensure that JPDO's funding needs
are fully met.
2) FY09 funding from DOD, DHS, and DOC should match the ongoing
commitment from FAA and NASA of at least $18M per entity for a total of
$90M in FY09.
Contributions of some amount by the partner agencies could encourage
those agencies to have JPDO undertake work that is valuable to them as
well as to JPDO. While some stakeholders have said that requiring $18
million per agency, the amount currently contributed by FAA and NASA,
would not be likely to have a significant impact on the R&D budgets of
DOD, DHS, and DOC, we believe it is most important that the agencies
contribute some amount to JPDO relative to their roles and
responsibilities for making NextGen a reality.
b. Some stakeholders and other observers have opined that it is
essential that JPDO be independent of ATO to be successful in
objectively facilitating the implementation of NextGen with its other
governmental partners.
In GAO's view, making JPDO independent of ATO could help to reduce or
eliminate any perceptions on the part of JPDO's other governmental
partners that JPDO might be too closely aligned with FAA to serve as an
objective, independent facilitator of a multiagency partnership.
Independence could also raise JPDO's authority and visibility in
interagency deliberations by putting it on an equal footing with ATO
and other FAA divisions. Furthermore, we believe loosening JPDO's ties
to ATO could strengthen its linkages to DOD and DHS and enable it to
work more effectively with other FAA divisions, such as Airports, for
which JPDO has planning responsibilities. For example, JPDO is
responsible for developing plans to increase airport capacity. Moving
JPDO out of ATO could, however, make it harder for JPDO to obtain ATO's
collaboration on efforts related to the implementation of NextGen.
c. What are some alternative governance structures that could be used
by JPDO?
Besides moving JPDO out of ATO and thereby eliminating its dual
reporting status (to both the FAA Administrator and the ATO Chief
Operating Officer), the operation of the Joint Resources Council, the
body within FAA that provides executive review and oversight of
acquisitions, could be changed so that is the council would be chaired
jointly by the Chief Operating Officer and the JPDO Director.
(Currently, the JRC is chaired by the Federal Acquisition Executive, a
responsibility delegated by the Administrator to the Vice President of
ATO-Acquisition & Business Services.) Additionally, consideration could
be given to creating the position of Associate Administrator of NextGen
to put the JPDO Director on a more equal organizational footing with
the ATO Chief Operating Officer.
d. What are the advantages and disadvantages of any such governance
structures, including potential unintended consequences?
As discussed, moving JPDO out of ATO and elevating the position of the
JPDO Director could increase JPDO's independence, raise its authority
and visibility in interagency deliberations, strengthen its linkages to
DHS and DOD, and enable it to work more effectively with other FAA
divisions. Such changes could, however, make it harder for JPDO to
collaborate with ATO.
e. You testified that the Senior Policy Committee (SPC) meets only
sporadically and has not been actively engaged in providing cross-
agency leadership. What do you think would be the effect of a mandated
schedule for SPC meetings, i.e., quarterly or semi-annually?
To date, the SPC has not met regularly. During the time JPDO has been
functioning--just over 3 years--the SPC has met four times and has not
convened as a formal body since November 2005. Although JPDO's enabling
legislation calls for the SPC to advise the Secretary of
Transportation, provide policy guidance for NextGen, and provide
ongoing policy review for the transformation of the air transportation
system, the legislation does not require a meeting schedule for the
SPC. To the extent that the SPC cannot voluntarily meet on a regular
schedule, then we think requiring regular meetings could be beneficial.
f. The JPDO Board has no legislative basis, as it was not created by
Vision 100. A junior and senior level board (i.e., SPC) for governance
is unprecedented in industry. Why not dissolve the JPDO Board?
The JPDO Board acts as an action arm of the SPC members whose wide-
ranging responsibilities limit their continuing and comprehensive
involvement in NextGen. We believe a designated senior person from each
agency who has access to and can act with the authority of the SPC
member from that agency is needed to carry out necessary actions.
g. What are your thoughts on the following governance related ideas?
1) JPDO should report directly to the Office of the Secretary of
Transportation.
In GAO's view, JPDO should not report to the Secretary of
Transportation because placing JPDO in the Secretary's office would
remove it too far from the implementation and operations of NextGen.
2) The JPDO Director should report to the FAA Administrator
exclusively, rather than also to the ATO Chief Operating Officer (COO),
as is currently the case and proposed in FAA's reauthorization.
As discussed, this change could increase JPDO's independence and
authority and strengthen JPDO's linkages to some other agencies and
divisions, but it could also hamper interactions with ATO.
3) FAA funding of JPDO should be direct from FAA Financial Services, as
is the case for other independent internal FAA entities, e.g., Airports
and Commercial Space Transportation, rather than through ATO.
Yes, this change would be consistent with moving JPDO out of ATO and
could help to raise the visibility and legitimacy of JPDO. If JPDO
becomes organizationally independent of ATO, then its FAA funding
should come directly from FAA Financial Services, as does the funding
for FAA's Airports and Commercial Space Transportation divisions.
4) FAA should create the position of "Associate Administrator for Next
Generation Systems" that is co-equal internally with positions of the
same title for Commercial Space Transportation, Airports, and Aviation
Safety.
FAA should consider creating the position of Associate Administrator of
NextGen and elevating the JPDO Director to that post. We think that
this would give greater credibility, authority, and visibility to this
important position.
5) If such a position were created what do you think would be the
effect of the JPDO Director filling that position or reporting to it?
The JPDO Director could fill that position. Another reporting level
could increase red tape and bureaucracy.
6) The Director of JPDO or Associate Administrator for Next Generation
Systems should be a voting member of the FAA Joint Resources Council
and participate in making capital investment decisions.
In GAO's view, the JPDO Director should be a member of the Joint
Resources Council (JRC), the body within FAA that makes capital
investment decisions and provides executive review and oversight of
acquisitions. The FAA reauthorization proposal calls for the JPDO
Director to be a voting member of the JRC, as is the Chief Operating
Officer of ATO. This change would help ensure that NextGen plans are
consistent with current operations.
4. You have testified that FAA's funding system based on the current
ticket and fuel taxes is sufficient to fund the NextGen. However, the
Administrator suggests that if the current funding structure were able
to support NextGen, it would be a much longer process and has argued
for a user fee based system.
a. What would be the effect, if any on the NextGen budget if Congress
does not enact the Administration's proposed aviation financing reform
package (ticket taxes; aviation fuel taxes) as part of a new
authorization, but instead leaves the current ticket and fuel taxes in
place?
The current FAA funding structure can provide sufficient funding for
NextGen--with some caveats. Congress has used the current funding
structure--excise taxes plus a General Fund contribution--to fund FAA
for many years. As the number of air travelers has grown, so have
excise tax revenues. Even though revenues fell during the early years
of this decade as the demand for air travel fell, they began to rise
again in fiscal year 2004, and FAA estimates that if the current taxes
remain in effect at their current rates, revenues will continue to
increase. According to projections prepared by the Congressional Budget
Office (CBO),[Footnote 5] revenues obtained from the existing funding
structure are projected to increase substantially. Assuming the General
Fund provides about 19 percent of FAA's budget, CBO estimates that
through 2016 the Trust Fund can support about $19 billion in additional
spending over the baseline FAA spending levels CBO has calculated for
FAA (the 2006 funding level, growing with inflation) provided that most
of the spending occurs after 2010. How far this money will go to fund
modernization is subject to a number of uncertainties--including the
future cost of NextGen investments, the volume of air traffic, the
future cost of operating the national airspace system (NAS), and the
levels of future appropriations for the Airport Improvement program,
all of which influence funding for FAA.
However, if the desired level of funding exceeded what was likely to be
available from the Trust Fund at current tax rates, Congress could make
further changes within the current structure that would provide FAA
with additional revenue. Congress could raise more revenue from
airspace system users for NextGen or for other purposes by raising the
rates on one or more of the current excise taxes. Congress could also
provide more General Fund revenues for FAA, although the nation's
fiscal imbalance may make a larger contribution from this source
difficult.
b. If additional financial resources, in the range of $200 million
annually for the next five years over the President's current budget
request, were made available to JPDO, what would or should be its
priorities aimed at expediting NextGen capabilities into the NAS?
In GAO's view, JPDO could expedite the development of NextGen
capabilities with accelerated funding over and above the President's
current budget request. There are several areas in which additional
research and development and deployment could be undertaken or
accelerated with funding over and above the President's current budget
request. Two closely related areas that could be candidates for
increased funding are avionics development and aircraft equipage.
Additional support in these areas could accelerate the transition to
satellite-based navigation, which requires the commercial fleet to be
equipped with advanced avionics. This transition would allow FAA to
pursue the elimination of costly ground-based navigation aids; the
transition to data link; and the standardization of future aircraft
capabilities such as flight management systems, traffic collision
avoidance systems, and modular avionics. The successful development and
deployment of NextGen will require a series of incremental changes that
must be tested to help ensure that they do not degrade the safety of
the current system. Developing the evidence for regulatory bodies and
for the public that these incremental changes are safe will be time
consuming, costly, and difficult. For example, additional development
funding could help with the testing of a system in which both pilots
and air traffic controllers share in decisions about flight paths. Such
testing would increase the level of safety assurance for en route and
terminal automation and support the acquisition of air-to-ground data
communications used in trajectory negotiation.
Research and development for advanced concepts and applications could
also accelerate and strengthen the area of airborne applications. This
research area could include spacing and merging for approaches
including: optimizing the spacing of aircraft that are in fight,
allowing for closely spaced parallel approaches and reduced separation
standards, and addressing the issue of wake turbulence. Additional
funding could also allow for limited field trials to refine operational
and system requirements, and work could be done to integrate unmanned
aerial systems into the NAS. Establishing supporting processes for
rulemaking and software certification could also accelerate the removal
of potential bottlenecks to implementing NextGen.
Another area that could benefit from additional funding is human
factors research. As you know, one of the principal changes under
NextGen will be a transformation from air traffic control to air
traffic management. This will mean new roles for all participants in
the system, including air traffic controllers and pilots. Additional
funding could accelerate human factors research and training
initiatives that are central to the success of NextGen, such as
initiatives defining the relative responsibilities of aircraft
personnel and ground controllers, and modernizing controller training
through the use of advanced simulation and intelligent tutoring tools.
5. Traditionally, NASA has developed promising technologies to a high
maturity level enabling FAA to incorporate them into its air traffic
control system without too much additional development. Now that NASA
is confining its development work to a basic level of technical
maturity, JPDO/FAA must find ways to have the necessary R&D work
conducted by other organizations. This R&D includes work needed for
planning as well that needed for validation and demonstrations.
a. To what extent do FAA and the other federal partners have the
resources and capability to meet the R&D needs in these two areas?
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) formerly
conducted the type of intermediate research and development (R&D) and
demonstration projects that will be needed for the NextGen program, but
the funding for these efforts was discontinued when NASA's aeronautical
research portfolio was restructured to focus more on fundamental
research. Although FAA has not fully determined the impact of the NASA
restructuring on the R&D needs for NextGen, We agree with some key
stakeholders that additional R&D funds will be needed and are critical
for the timely development of NextGen. FAA recognizes that this is a
critical issue and has already taken some action to address it. For
example, in the President's fiscal year 2008 budget request for FAA,
funds have been included for developmental and transition research, in
the Facilities and Equipment (F&E) Activity 1 account. In light of the
NASA restructuring, FAA has also undertaken a study to assess the
nature and scope of its NextGen R&D needs. According to JPDO officials,
this study will be completed in August 2007. FAA officials say the
results of this study will be used as a basis for determining how any
"gap" identified can be addressed with government or private sector
resources.
b. What actions should JPDO take to help ensure that the
demonstrations, certifications, and transition R&D needed to validate
new technologies be conducted in a timely manner so that NextGen will
not be delayed?
The time required to prototype, validate, and certify a technology can
present a significant risk to the timely and cost-effective
implementation of NextGen. We have studied the lead times required to
prototype, validate, and certify new technologies. Neither JPDO nor FAA
currently has sufficient resources to prototype, validate, and certify
new technologies, and neither agency can currently develop the
technologies internally without causing significant delays in the
implementation of NextGen. In addition, stakeholders have expressed
concern over the time it takes to develop rules for new equipment and
the problems caused when equipment is fielded before rules are
finalized. Any activities that will be required to implement new
policies, demonstrate new capabilities, set parameters for the
certification of new systems, and develop technologies will take time.
Just as important, the time required to prototype, validate, and
certify a new technology must be balanced against the need to ensure
the reliability of the technology and the safety of the flying public.
If JPDO had sufficient resources, it could prototype, validate, and
certify new technologies in a timely manner. We believe another option
would be for JPDO to identify other organizations with the capacity to
accomplish these tasks and provide them with the resources to take on
these tasks. In addition, JPDO could work with FAA's Aviation Safety
organization to establish the metrics needed to assess compliance with
the standards to which these systems must conform.
c. It takes considerable time to prototype, validate, and certify new
technologies required for NextGen, in addition to time required for
rulemakings. How much of a risk do these processes pose to timely
development of NextGen?
We cannot quantify how much of risk exists, but we think that a
significant risk does exist for the timely development of NextGen
because demonstrations and transition R&D are necessary to develop
certification standards for new technologies.
JPDO does not currently have the resources to prototype, validate, and
certify new technologies. Moreover, several of the stakeholders with
whom we spoke believed that even if JPDO were to obtain the needed
resources, it could require as much as 5 years to establish the
infrastructure needed to prototype, validate, and certify new
technologies. Any activities that will be required to implement new
policies, demonstrate new capabilities, set parameters for certifying
new systems, and develop technologies will take time. Just as
important, the time required to prototype, validate, and certify new
technologies must be balanced against the need to ensure the
reliability and safety of the technology.
d. What do you think of the following suggestions related to research
and development?
1) Establish JPDO as the modeler for the NextGen business case, with a
formal charter and supporting resources made available to allow the
creation of a National Virtual Test Bed to link government, academic,
and industry simulation models in a nonpartisan and transparent fashion
to assess technical options and quantify cost and benefits of the
evolving implementation approach for NextGen.
Yes, this role seems to be consistent with JPDO's authorizing
legislation. As JPDO becomes more involved in facilitation, it must
test, validate, and assess technical options and quantify their costs
and benefits so that decision makers can evaluate the options for
inclusion in the NAS.
2) In order for FAA/JPDO to be able to conduct all but the most long-
term, fundamental research supporting NextGen development, some or all
of NASA's aeronautics research capabilities should be transferred to
FAA/ JPDO, specifically Langley Research Center and portions of Ames
Research Center.
In GAO's view, some or all of NASA's aeronautical research capabilities
that are located at Langley Research Center and portions of Ames
Research Center could be transferred to FAA or JPDO. However, another
alternative to consider might be to make more use of the resources
available at the FAA Technical Center in Atlantic City, New Jersey, and
the FAA Aeronautical Center in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. This decision
will be informed by the results of a JPDO study that is currently
underway to assess the nature and scope of NextGen's R&D needs.
According to JPDO officials, this study will be completed in August
2007.
(540156):
FOOTNOTES
[1] GAO, Next Generation Air Transportation System: Status of the
Transition to the Future Air Traffic Control System, GAO-07-784T
(Washington, D.C.: May 9, 2007); Joint Planning and Development Office:
Progress and Key Issues in Planning the Transition to the Next
Generation Air Transportation System, GAO-07-693T (Washington, D.C.:
Mar. 29, 2007); Federal Aviation Administration: Key Issues in Ensuring
the Efficient Development and Safe Operation of the Next Generation Air
Transportation System, GAO-07-636T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 22, 2007);
and Next Generation Air Transportation System: Progress and Challenges
Associated with the Transformation of the National Airspace System, GAO-
07-25 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 13, 2006).
[2] FAA's Joint Resources Council establishes and manages acquisition
program baselines, which define cost, schedule, performance, and
benefit parameters for programs over their full life cycle.
[3] FAA's Joint Resources Council establishes and manages acquisition
program baselines which define cost, schedule, performance, and benefit
parameters for programs over the full lifecycle of the program.
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