Motor Carrier Safety
Preliminary Information on the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration's Efforts to Identify and Follow Up with High-risk Carriers Gao ID: GAO-07-1074T July 11, 2007The Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) has the primary federal responsibility for reducing crashes involving large trucks and buses. FMCSA uses its "SafeStat" tool to select carriers for reviews for compliance with its safety regulations based on the carriers' crash rates and prior safety violations. FMCSA then conducts these compliance reviews and can place carriers out of service if they are found to be operating unsafely. This statement is based on a recent report (GAO-07-585) and other nearly completed work. GAO assessed (1) the extent to which FMCSA identifies carriers that subsequently have high crash rates, (2) how FMCSA ensures that its compliance reviews are conducted thoroughly and consistently, and (3) the extent to which FMCSA follows up with carriers with serious safety violations. GAO's work was based on a review of laws, program guidance, and analyses of data from 2004 through early 2006.
FMCSA generally does a good job in identifying carriers that pose high crash risks for subsequent compliance reviews, ensuring the thoroughness and consistency of those reviews, and following up with high-risk carriers. SafeStat is nearly twice as effective (83 percent) as random selection in identifying carriers that pose high crash risks. However, its effectiveness could be improved by using a statistical approach (negative binomial regression), which provides for a systematic assessment to apply weights to the four SafeStat safety evaluation areas (accidents and driver, vehicle, and safety management violations) rather than FMCSA's approach, which relies on expert judgment. The regression approach identified carriers that had twice as many crashes in the subsequent 18 months as did the carriers identified by the current SafeStat approach. FMCSA is concerned that adopting this approach would result in it placing more emphasis on crashes and less emphasis on compliance with its safety management, vehicle, and driver regulations. GAO believes that because (1) the ultimate purpose of compliance reviews is to reduce the number and severity of truck and bus crashes and (2) GAO's and others' research has shown that crash rates are stronger predictors of future crashes than is poor compliance with FMCSA's safety regulations, the regression approach would improve safety. GAO's preliminary assessment is that FMCSA promotes thoroughness and consistency in its compliance reviews through its management processes, which meet GAO's standards for internal controls. For example, FMCSA uses an electronic manual to record and communicate its compliance review policies and procedures and teaches proper compliance review procedures through both classroom and on-the-job training. Furthermore, investigators use an information system to document their compliance reviews, and managers review these data, helping to ensure thoroughness and consistency between investigators. For the most part, FMCSA and state investigators cover the nine major applicable areas of the safety regulations (e.g., driver qualifications and vehicle condition) in 95 percent or more of compliance reviews, demonstrating thoroughness and consistency. GAO's preliminary assessment is that FMCSA follows up with almost all carriers with serious safety violations, but it does not assess the maximum fines against all serious violators that GAO believes the law requires. FMCSA followed up with at least 1,189 of 1,196 carriers (99 percent) that received proposed unsatisfactory safety ratings from compliance reviews completed in fiscal year 2005. For example, FMCSA found that 873 of these carriers made safety improvements and it placed 306 other carriers out of service. GAO also found that FMCSA (1) assesses maximum fines against carriers for the third instance of a violation, whereas GAO reads the statute as requiring FMCSA to do so for the second violation and (2) does not always assess maximum fines against carriers with a pattern of varied serious violations, as GAO believes the law requires.
GAO-07-1074T, Motor Carrier Safety: Preliminary Information on the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration's Efforts to Identify and Follow Up with High-risk Carriers
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Testimony:
Before the Subcommittee on Highways and Transit, Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure, House of Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery Expected at 2:00 p.m. EDT:
Wednesday, July 11, 2007:
Motor Carrier Safety:
Preliminary Information on the Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Administration's Efforts to Identify and Follow Up with High-risk
Carriers:
Statement of Susan A. Fleming, Director:
Physical Infrastructure Issues:
GAO-07-1074T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-07-1074T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on
Highways and Transit, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,
House of Representatives
Why GAO Did This Study:
The Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) has the primary
federal responsibility for reducing crashes involving large trucks and
buses. FMCSA uses its ’SafeStat“ tool to select carriers for reviews
for compliance with its safety regulations based on the carriers‘ crash
rates and prior safety violations. FMCSA then conducts these compliance
reviews and can place carriers out of service if they are found to be
operating unsafely.
This statement is based on a recent report (GAO-07-585) and other
nearly completed work. GAO assessed (1) the extent to which FMCSA
identifies carriers that subsequently have high crash rates, (2) how
FMCSA ensures that its compliance reviews are conducted thoroughly and
consistently, and (3) the extent to which FMCSA follows up with
carriers with serious safety violations. GAO‘s work was based on a
review of laws, program guidance, and analyses of data from 2004
through early 2006.
What GAO Found:
FMCSA generally does a good job in identifying carriers that pose high
crash risks for subsequent compliance reviews, ensuring the
thoroughness and consistency of those reviews, and following up with
high-risk carriers.
SafeStat is nearly twice as effective (83 percent) as random selection
in identifying carriers that pose high crash risks. However, its
effectiveness could be improved by using a statistical approach
(negative binomial regression), which provides for a systematic
assessment to apply weights to the four SafeStat safety evaluation
areas (accidents and driver, vehicle, and safety management violations)
rather than FMCSA‘s approach, which relies on expert judgment. The
regression approach identified carriers that had twice as many crashes
in the subsequent 18 months as did the carriers identified by the
current SafeStat approach. FMCSA is concerned that adopting this
approach would result in it placing more emphasis on crashes and less
emphasis on compliance with its safety management, vehicle, and driver
regulations. GAO believes that because (1) the ultimate purpose of
compliance reviews is to reduce the number and severity of truck and
bus crashes and (2) GAO‘s and others‘ research has shown that crash
rates are stronger predictors of future crashes than is poor compliance
with FMCSA‘s safety regulations, the regression approach would improve
safety.
GAO‘s preliminary assessment is that FMCSA promotes thoroughness and
consistency in its compliance reviews through its management processes,
which meet GAO‘s standards for internal controls. For example, FMCSA
uses an electronic manual to record and communicate its compliance
review policies and procedures and teaches proper compliance review
procedures through both classroom and on-the-job training. Furthermore,
investigators use an information system to document their compliance
reviews, and managers review these data, helping to ensure thoroughness
and consistency between investigators. For the most part, FMCSA and
state investigators cover the nine major applicable areas of the safety
regulations (e.g., driver qualifications and vehicle condition) in 95
percent or more of compliance reviews, demonstrating thoroughness and
consistency.
GAO‘s preliminary assessment is that FMCSA follows up with almost all
carriers with serious safety violations, but it does not assess the
maximum fines against all serious violators that GAO believes the law
requires. FMCSA followed up with at least 1,189 of 1,196 carriers (99
percent) that received proposed unsatisfactory safety ratings from
compliance reviews completed in fiscal year 2005. For example, FMCSA
found that 873 of these carriers made safety improvements and it placed
306 other carriers out of service. GAO also found that FMCSA (1)
assesses maximum fines against carriers for the third instance of a
violation, whereas GAO reads the statute as requiring FMCSA to do so
for the second violation and (2) does not always assess maximum fines
against carriers with a pattern of varied serious violations, as GAO
believes the law requires.
What GAO Recommends:
In June, GAO recommended that FMCSA use a regression model approach to
identify high-risk carriers. FMCSA agreed that this approach looks
promising but is concerned that it results in less emphasis on other
regulatory areas. GAO is considering several recommendations, including
that FMCSA assess maximum penalties in situations which GAO believes
the law requires.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-1074T.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Susan A. Fleming at (202)
512-2834 or flemings@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
We appreciate the opportunity to participate in this hearing to discuss
the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration's (FMCSA) oversight of
motor carriers that pose high crash risks. This is an important issue
because each year about 5,500 people die as a result of crashes
involving large commercial trucks or buses,[Footnote 1] and about
160,000 more people are injured. These crashes may result from errors
by truck, bus, or passenger vehicle drivers; vehicle condition; and
other factors. Effective oversight is important because of the large
size of the motor carrier industry (over 700,000 carriers are
registered with FMCSA[Footnote 2]) compared to the number of compliance
reviews--reviews of carriers at their bases of operations for
compliance with FMCSA's safety regulations--that FMCSA and its state
partners are able to conduct each year (about 15,000 in 2006). As a
result, it is crucial that FMCSA identify the most unsafe carriers so
that the carriers either improve their operations or are put out of
service.
My remarks are based on work we have recently completed for this
Subcommittee and the full committee[Footnote 3] and on the preliminary
results of our ongoing work for the Chairman of the full committee.
This latter work is nearing completion, and we expect to report on our
final results on these and other topics later this summer.
Specifically, we have been assessing (1) the extent to which FMCSA
identifies carriers that subsequently have high crash rates, (2) how
FMCSA ensures that its compliance reviews are conducted thoroughly and
consistently, and (3) the extent to which FMCSA follows up with
carriers with serious safety violations.
Our work was based on a review of laws, regulations, program guidance,
analyses of data, and discussions with FMCSA. To determine the extent
to which FMCSA identifies carriers that subsequently have high crash
rates, we analyzed data from FMCSA's Motor Carrier Management
Information System for its June 2004 assessment of carriers and
compared it to data on crashes the carriers experienced over the
subsequent 18 months (July 2004 through December 2005).[Footnote 4] To
assess how FMCSA ensures that its compliance reviews are completed
thoroughly and consistently, we identified our key internal control
standards related to the communication of policy, documentation of
results, and monitoring and reviewing of activities and
findings.[Footnote 5] We gathered information on these key internal
controls through discussions with FMCSA officials in its headquarters
as well as in 7 of FMCSA's 52 field division offices and reviews of
policy documents and reports. To assess the extent to which FMCSA
follows up with carriers with serious violations and assesses maximum
fines in certain situations, we reviewed regulations and FMCSA policies
directing how FMCSA must follow up and track these violators, analyzed
data to determine if FMCSA had met these requirements, and held
discussions with FMCSA officials. As part of our review, we assessed
internal controls and the reliability of FMCSA's data on motor
carriers' safety history and compliance review and enforcement
activities pertinent to this effort. While there are known problems
with the quality of the crash data reported to FMCSA, we determined
that the data were sufficiently reliable for our use, which was to
assess whether different approaches to categorizing carriers could lead
to better identification of carriers that subsequently have high rates
of crashes. We conducted our work from February 2006 through July 2007
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
By and large, FMCSA does a good job of identifying carriers that pose
high crash risks for subsequent compliance reviews, ensuring the
thoroughness and consistency of those reviews, and following up with
high-risk carriers. That being said, we have identified areas that
could be improved. In summary:
* Overall, the data-driven model that FMCSA uses to identify carriers
that pose high crash risks--the Motor Carrier Safety Status Measurement
System (SafeStat)--does a good job of identifying carriers that pose
high crash risks. In this regard, we found that it is nearly twice as
effective (83 percent better) as random selection in identifying
carriers that pose high crash risks. Thus, in our view, it has value
for improving safety. However, we believe that its effectiveness could
be improved through either of two enhancements that we analyzed. One
enhancement entails applying a statistical approach, called the
negative binomial regression model, to the four SafeStat safety
evaluation areas (accidents and driver, vehicle, and safety management
violations) instead of its current approach, which relies on expert
judgment to assign weights to each of the four areas.[Footnote 6] The
other enhancement--the results of which are preliminary--uses the
existing SafeStat overall design but places greater weight on carriers
that scored among the worst in the accident safety evaluation area.
Both enhancements performed better than the current SafeStat approach.
For example, the regression approach identified carriers that had twice
as many crashes in the subsequent 18 months as the carriers the current
SafeStat approach identified. We believe that the negative binomial
regression model approach offers a greater potential for improving
safety over the other enhancement that we analyzed and the current
SafeStat approach because it provides for a systematic assessment of
the relative contributions of accidents and driver, vehicle, and safety
management violations rather than the use of expert judgment to apply
weights to these areas. FMCSA agreed that our approach looks promising
but believes that placing more emphasis on crashes is
counterproductive, in part, because it would have to place less
emphasis on compliance with its safety management, vehicle, and driver
regulations. We disagree because the ultimate purpose of compliance
reviews is to reduce the number and severity of truck and bus crashes,
and high crash rates are stronger predictors of future crashes than is
poor compliance with safety regulations.
* Our preliminary assessment showed that FMCSA's management of its
compliance reviews meets our standards for internal controls, thereby
promoting thoroughness and consistency. FMCSA records its compliance
review policies and procedures in an electronic operations manual and
distributes the manual to investigators and managers. FMCSA also trains
investigators on these policies and procedures. Investigators we spoke
with found both the electronic manual and the training to be effective
means of communicating policies and procedures. FMCSA and state
investigators use an information system to document the results of the
compliance reviews. This information system supports thoroughness and
consistency by alerting investigators if they are not following key
policies or if data appears suspect; the system also provides managers
readily available data to review. For the most part, FMCSA and state
investigators cover the nine major applicable areas of the safety
regulations (e.g., driver qualifications and vehicle repair and
maintenance) in 95 percent or more of compliance reviews, demonstrating
thoroughness and consistency.
* Our preliminary assessment showed that FMCSA follows up with many
carriers with serious safety violations, but it does not assess maximum
fines against all serious violators, as we believe is required by law.
FMCSA followed up with at least 1,189 of 1,196 carriers (99 percent)
that received a proposed safety rating of unsatisfactory following
compliance reviews completed in fiscal year 2005. For example, FMCSA
found that 873 of these carriers made safety improvements and it placed
306 other carriers out of service. FMCSA monitors carriers to identify
those that are violating out-of-service orders, but in fiscal years
2005 and 2006, it cited only 26 of 768 carriers that its monitoring
showed had a roadside inspection or crash while subject to an out-of-
service order. An FMCSA official told us that some of the 768 carriers,
such as carriers that were operating intrastate,[Footnote 7] may not
have been violating the out-of-service order and that FMCSA did not
have enough resources to determine whether each of the carriers was
violating an out-of-service order. Finally, we found that while FMCSA
assesses maximum fines against carriers that repeat a serious
violation, it does not, as we believe federal law requires, assess
maximum fines against carriers with a pattern of serious violations. In
addition, FMCSA assesses maximum fines only for the third instance of a
violation. We read the statute as requiring FMCSA to assess the maximum
fine if a serious violation is repeated once--not only after it is
repeated twice.
In our June report we recommended that FMCSA use a negative binomial
regression model approach to identify carriers that pose high crash
risks. We are considering making several recommendations based on our
ongoing work, including that FMCSA assess maximum fines, as discussed
above, in circumstances that we believe the law requires it to do so.
Finally, we have also reported on other aspects of FMCSA's operations
within the past 18 months. These products are listed at the end of this
statement.
Background:
In the United States, commercial motor carriers account for less than 5
percent of all highway crashes, but these crashes result in about 13
percent of all highway deaths, or about 5,500 of the approximately
43,000 nationwide highway fatalities that occur annually. In addition,
about 160,000 of the approximately 3.2 million highway injuries per
year involve motor carriers. While the fatality rate for trucks has
generally decreased over the past 30 years, it has been fairly stable
since 2002. (See fig. 1.) The fatality rate for buses decreased
slightly from 1975 to 2005, but it has more annual variability than the
fatality rate for trucks due to a much smaller total vehicle miles
traveled.
Figure 1: Commercial Motor Vehicle Fatality Rate, 1975 to 2005:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of Department of Transportation data.
Notes: Fewer buses are involved in fatal or non-fatal accidents than
large trucks, but they tend to involve more people. The latest year for
which data were available was 2005.
[End of figure]
FMCSA's primary mission is to reduce the number and severity of crashes
involving large trucks and buses. FMCSA relies heavily on the results
of compliance reviews to determine whether carriers are operating
safely and, if not, to take enforcement action against them. FMCSA
conducts these on-site reviews to determine carriers' compliance with
safety regulations that address areas such as alcohol and drug testing
of drivers, driver qualifications, driver hours of service, vehicle
maintenance and inspections, and transportation of hazardous materials.
FMCSA uses a data-driven analysis model called SafeStat to assess
carriers' risks relative to all other carriers based on safety
indicators, such as their crash rates and safety violations identified
during roadside inspections and prior compliance reviews. A carrier's
score is calculated based on its performance in four safety evaluation
areas: accidents and driver, vehicle, and safety management violations.
(See fig. 2.)
Figure 2: FMCSA's Safety Oversight Approach:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO and FMCSA.
[End of figure]
FMCSA assigns categories to carriers ranging from A to H according to
their performance in each of the safety evaluation areas. (See table
1.) Although a carrier may receive a value in any of the four safety
evaluation areas, the carrier receives a SafeStat score only if it is
deficient in two or more safety evaluation areas. The calculation used
to determine a motor carrier's SafeStat score is:
SafeStat Score = 2 x accident value + 1.5 x driver value + vehicle
value + safety management value:
Table 1: SafeStat Categories:
Deficient in two or more areas.
Category: A;
Condition: Deficient in all 4 safety evaluation areas or deficient in 3
safety evaluation areas that result in a weighted SafeStat score of 350
or more;
Priority for compliance review: High.
Category: B;
Condition: Deficient in 3 safety evaluation areas that result in a
weighted SafeStat score of less than 350 or deficient in 2 safety
evaluation areas that result in a weighted SafeStat score of 225 or
more;
Priority for compliance review: High.
Category: C;
Condition: Deficient in 2 safety evaluation areas that result in a
weighted SafeStat score of less than 225;
Priority for compliance review: Medium.
Deficient in one area only.
Category: D;
Condition: Deficient in the accident safety evaluation area (area value
between 75-100);
Priority for compliance review: Low.
Category: E;
Condition: Deficient in the driver safety evaluation area (area value
between 75-100);
Priority for compliance review: Low.
Category: F;
Condition: Deficient in the vehicle safety evaluation area (area value
between 75-100);
Priority for compliance review: Low.
Category: G;
Condition: Deficient in the safety management safety evaluation area
(area value between 75- 100);
Priority for compliance review: Low.
Not deficient in any area.
Category: H;
Condition: Not deficient in any of the safety evaluation areas;
Priority for compliance review: Low.
Source: GAO summary of FMCSA data.
[End of table]
Based on the results of a compliance review, FMCSA assigns the carrier
a safety rating of satisfactory, conditional, or unsatisfactory. The
safety rating, which is distinct from a carrier's SafeStat category,
reflects FMCSA's determination of a carrier's fitness to operate
safely. FMCSA issues out-of-service orders to carriers rated
unsatisfactory, and these carriers are not allowed to resume operating
until they make improvements that result in an upgraded safety rating.
Carriers rated conditional are allowed to continue operating, but FMCSA
aims to conduct follow-up compliance reviews on these carriers.
Regardless of a carrier's safety rating, FMCSA can assess a fine
against a carrier with violations, and it is more likely to assess
higher fines when these violations are serious.
SafeStat Identifies Many High-risk Carriers, but Enhancements Could
Identify Carriers with Even Higher Risks:
SafeStat identifies many carriers that pose a high risk for crashes and
is about twice as effective (83 percent) as randomly selecting carriers
for compliance reviews. As a result, it has value for improving motor
carrier safety. However, two enhancements that we analyzed could lead
to FMCSA identifying carriers that pose greater crash risks overall.
These approaches entail giving more weight to crashes than the current
SafeStat model does. FMCSA has concerns about these approaches, in
part, because placing more emphasis on accidents would require it to
place less emphasis on other types of problems. FMCSA recognizes that
SafeStat can be improved, and as part of its Comprehensive Safety
Analysis 2010 reform initiative--which is aimed at improving its
processes for identifying and dealing with unsafe carriers and drivers-
-the agency is considering replacing SafeStat by 2010.
Using Either a Statistical Approach or Modifying Existing SafeStat
Categorization Rules Could Improve Identification of High-risk
Carriers:
In June 2007, we reported that FMCSA could improve SafeStat's ability
to identify carriers that pose high crash risks if it applied a
statistical approach, called the negative binomial regression model, to
the four SafeStat safety evaluation areas instead of its current
approach.[Footnote 8] We used this approach to determine whether
systematic analyses of data through regression modeling offered
improved results in identifying carriers that pose high crash risks
over FMCSA's model, which uses expert judgment and professional
experience to apply weights to each of the safety evaluation areas. The
negative binomial model results in a rank order listing of carriers by
crash risk and the predicted number of crashes. This differs from
SafeStat's current approach, which gives the highest priority to
carriers that are deficient in three or more safety evaluation areas or
that score over a certain amount--SafeStat categories A and B. (See
table 1.)
The other enhancement that we analyzed--the results of which are
preliminary--utilized the existing SafeStat overall design but examined
the effect of providing greater priority to carriers that scored among
the worst 5 percent of carriers in the accident safety evaluation area
(SafeStat category D). We chose this approach because we found that
while the driver, vehicle, and safety management evaluation areas are
correlated with the future crash risk of a carrier, the accident
evaluation area correlates most with future crash risk.[Footnote 9]
This approach would retain the overall SafeStat framework and
categorization--categories A through G for carriers with safety
problems--but would substitute carriers in category D (the accident
category) for carriers in categories A and B that have either (1) lower
overall SafeStat scores or (2) lower accident area scores.
We compared the performance of our regression model approach and
placing greater weight on carriers that scored among the worst 5
percent of carriers in SafeStat category D to the current SafeStat
model. The comparison showed that both these approaches performed
better than the current SafeStat approach. (See table 2.) For example,
the regression model approach identified carriers with an average of
111 crashes per 1,000 vehicles over an 18-month period compared with
the current SafeStat approach, which identified carriers for compliance
reviews with an average of 102 crashes per 1,000 vehicles. This 9
percent improvement would have enabled FMCSA to identify carriers with
almost twice as many crashes in the following 18 months as those
carriers identified in its current approach (19,580 v.
10,076).[Footnote 10] Placing greater emphasis on carriers in category
D provided superior results to the current SafeStat approach both in
terms of identifying carriers with higher crash rates (from 6 to 9
percent higher) and greater numbers of crashes (from about 600 to 800
more). In addition, the regression approach performed at least as well
as placing greater emphasis on carriers in category D in terms of
identifying carriers with the highest crash rates and much better in
identifying carriers with the greatest number of crashes.
Table 2: Regression Model Approach Compared With Refined
Categorizations of SafeStat Results and with Current SafeStat Approach:
Approach: Regression model approach;
Crash rate[A]: 111.4;
Number of crashes in 18 months: 19,580.
Approach: Refined categorization alternative 1: substitute SafeStat
category D (accident) carriers for category A and B carriers with the
lowest overall SafeStat scores;
Crash rate[A]: 111.0;
Number of crashes in 18 months: 10,682.
Approach: Refined categorization alternative 2: substitute SafeStat
category D (accident) carriers for category A and B carriers with the
lowest accident area scores;
Crash rate[A]: 107.8;
Number of crashes in 18 months: 10,887.
Approach: Current SafeStat approach;
Crash rate[A]: 102.2;
Number of crashes in 18 months: 10,076.
Source: GAO analysis of FMCSA data.
[A] Crash rates are crashes per 1,000 vehicles in the 18 months
following the June 2004 SafeStat categorization.
Note: The relationship between number of crashes and the crash rate is
not linear because the different analyses identified carriers with
different fleet sizes as posing a high crash risk.
[End of table]
Because both the approaches that we analyzed would identify a larger
number of carriers that pose high crash risks, FMCSA would choose the
number of carriers to review based on the resources available to it,
much as it currently does.
We believe that our statistically based regression model is preferable
to placing greater weight on carriers in category D because it provides
for a systematic assessment of the relative contributions of accidents
and driver, vehicle, and safety management violations. We recommended
that FMCSA adopt such an approach. By its very nature the regression
approach looks for the "best fit" in identifying the degree to which
prior accidents and driver, vehicle, and safety management violations
identify the likelihood of carriers having crashes in the future,
compared to the current SafeStat approach, in which the relationship
among the four evaluation areas is based on expert judgment. In
addition, because the regression model could be run monthly--as is the
current SafeStat model--any change in the degree to which accidents and
driver, vehicle, and safety management violations better identify
future crashes will be automatically considered as different weights to
the four evaluation areas are assigned. This is not the case with the
current SafeStat model, in which the evaluation area weights generally
remain constant over time.[Footnote 11]
FMCSA agreed that use of a negative binomial regression model looks
promising but officials said that the agency believes that placing more
emphasis on the accident area would be counterproductive. First, FMCSA
is concerned that this would require placing correspondingly less
emphasis on the types of problems the compliance review is designed to
address so that crashes can be reduced (i.e., the lack of compliance
with safety regulations related to drivers, vehicles, and safety
management that is captured in the other evaluation areas). Along this
line, FMCSA said that compliance reviews of carriers in SafeStat
category D have historically resulted in fewer serious violations than
compliance reviews of carriers in SafeStat category A or B. We agree
with FMCSA that the use of the approaches that we are discussing here
today could tilt enforcement heavily toward carriers with high crash
rates and away from carriers with compliance issues. We disagree,
however, that this would be counterproductive. We found that while
driver, vehicle, and safety management evaluation area scores are
correlated with the future crash risk of a carrier, high crash rates
are a stronger predictor of future crashes than poor compliance with
safety regulations. FMCSA's mission--as well as the ultimate purpose of
compliance reviews--is to reduce the number and severity of truck and
bus crashes.
Second, FMCSA officials said that placing more emphasis on the accident
evaluation area would increase emphasis on the least reliable type of
data used by SafeStat--crash data--and in so doing, it would increase
the sensitivity of the results to crash data quality issues. However,
in June 2007 we reported that FMCSA has made considerable efforts to
improve the reliability of crash data. The report also concluded that
as FMCSA continues its efforts to have states improve crash data, any
sensitivity of results from our statistically based model to crash data
quality issues should diminish.
FMCSA Is Considering Replacing SafeStat with a New Tool by 2010:
As part of its Comprehensive Safety Analysis 2010, a reform initiative
aimed at improving its processes for identifying and dealing with
unsafe carriers and drivers, FMCSA is considering replacing SafeStat
with a new tool by 2010. The new tool could take on greater importance
in FMCSA's safety oversight framework because the agency is considering
using the tool's assessments of carriers' safety to determine whether
carriers are fit to continue operating. In contrast, SafeStat is
primarily used now to prioritize carriers for compliance reviews, and
determinations of operational fitness are made only after compliance
reviews are completed. FMCSA also plans to develop a tool to assess the
safety status of individual drivers, along with tools for dealing with
unsafe drivers. Even though FMCSA is considering replacing SafeStat, we
believe that implementing either of the approaches discussed in this
statement would be worthwhile because it would be relatively easy to do
and result in immediate safety benefits that could save lives.
FMCSA's Management of Its Compliance Reviews Promotes Thoroughness and
Consistency:
Our preliminary assessment is that FMCSA manages its compliance reviews
in a way that meets our standards for internal control, thereby
promoting thoroughness and consistency in the reviews.[Footnote 12] It
does so by establishing compliance review policies and procedures
through an electronic manual and training, using an information system
to document the results of its compliance reviews, and monitoring
performance. We also found that compliance reviews cover most of the
major areas of the agency's safety regulations.
FMCSA Communicates Its Compliance Review Policies and Procedures
through an Electronic Manual and Training:
FMCSA's communication of its policies and procedures related to
conducting compliance reviews meets our standards for internal control.
These standards state that an organization's policies and procedures
should be recorded and communicated to management and others within the
entity who need it and in a form (that is, for example, clearly written
and provided as a paper or electronic manual) and within a time frame
that enables them to carry out their responsibilities. FMCSA records
and communicates its policies and procedures electronically through its
Field Operations Training Manual, which it provides to all federal and
state investigators and their managers. The manual includes guidance on
how to prepare for a compliance review (for example, by reviewing
information on the carrier's accidents, drivers, and inspections), and
it explains how this information can help the investigator focus the
compliance review. It also specifies the minimum number of driver and
vehicle maintenance records to be examined and the minimum number of
vehicle inspections to be conducted during a compliance review. FMCSA
posts updates to the manual that automatically download to
investigators and managers when they connect to the Internet. In
addition to the manual, FMCSA provides classroom training to
investigators and requires that investigators successfully complete
that training and examinations before they conduct a compliance review.
According to FMCSA officials, investigators then receive on-the-job
training, in which they accompany an experienced investigator during
compliance reviews. Investigators can also take additional classroom
training on specialized topics throughout their careers.
FMCSA Investigators Use an Information System to Document the Results
of Compliance Reviews:
FMCSA's documentation of compliance reviews meets our standards for
internal control. These standards state that all transactions and other
significant events should be clearly and promptly documented, and the
documentation should be readily available for examination. FMCSA and
state investigators use an information system to document the results
of their compliance reviews, including information on crashes and any
violations of the safety regulations that they identify. This
documentation is readily available to FMCSA managers, who told us that
they review it to help ensure completeness and accuracy. FMCSA
officials told us that the information system also helps ensure
thoroughness and consistency by prompting investigators to follow
FMCSA's policies and procedures, such as requirements to meet a minimum
sample size. The information system also includes checks for
consistency and reasonableness and prompts investigators when the
information they enter appears to be inaccurate. FMCSA said managers
may assess an investigator's thoroughness by comparing the rate of
violations the investigator identified over the course of several
compliance reviews to the average rate for investigators in their
division office; a rate that is substantially below the average
suggests insufficient thoroughness.
FMCSA Monitors the Performance of Its Compliance Reviews and Has Taken
Actions to Address Identified Issues:
FMCSA's performance measurement and monitoring of its compliance review
activities meet our standards for internal control. These standards
state that managers should compare actual performance to planned or
expected results and analyze significant differences. According to
FMCSA and state managers and investigators, the managers review all
compliance reviews in each division office and state to ensure
thoroughness and consistency across investigators and across compliance
reviews. The investigators we spoke with generally found these reviews
to be helpful, and several investigators said that the reviews helped
them learn policies and procedures and ultimately perform better
compliance reviews.
In addition to assessing the performance of individual investigators,
FMCSA periodically assesses the performance of FMCSA division offices
and state agencies and conducted an agencywide review of its compliance
review program in 2002. According to officials at one of FMCSA's
service centers, the service centers lead triennial reviews of the
compliance review and enforcement activities of each division office
and its state partner. These reviews assess whether the division
offices and state partners are following FMCSA policies and procedures,
and they include an assessment of performance data for items such as
the number of compliance reviews conducted, rate of violations
identified, and number of enforcement actions taken. The officials said
that some reviews identify instances in which division offices have
deviated from FMCSA's compliance review policies but that only minor
adjustments by the division offices are needed. The officials also said
that the service centers compile best practices identified during the
reviews and share these among the division offices and state partners.
FMCSA's review also concluded that most investigators were not
following FMCSA's policy requiring them to perform vehicle inspections
as part of a compliance review if the carrier had not already received
the required number of roadside vehicle inspections.[Footnote 13] Since
conducting its 2002 review, FMCSA changed its policy so that inspecting
a minimum number of vehicles is no longer a strict requirement--if an
investigator is unable to inspect the minimum number of vehicles, he or
she must explain why in the compliance review report.[Footnote 14]
Each of the Major Applicable Areas of the Safety Regulations Is
Consistently Covered by Most Compliance Reviews:
From fiscal year 2001 through fiscal year 2006, each of the nine major
applicable areas of the safety regulations was consistently covered by
most of the approximately 76,000 compliance reviews conducted by FMCSA
and the states. (See table 3.) For the most part, 95 percent or more of
the compliance reviews covered each major applicable area in the
agency's safety regulations.
Table 3: Percentage of Compliance Reviews for Fiscal Years 2001 through
2006 That Covered Each of the Major Applicable Areas of the Safety
Regulations:
Regulatory area: Procedures for handling and evaluating accidents;
Percent: 97.
Regulatory area: Drivers' qualifications;
Percent: 96.
Regulatory area: Drivers' hours of service;
Percent: 96.
Regulatory area: Inspection, repair, and maintenance of vehicles;
Percent: 96.
Regulatory area: Drug and alcohol use and testing;
Percent: 95.
Regulatory area: Commercial driver's license standards;
Percent: 95.
Regulatory area: Driving of motor vehicles;
Percent: 94.
Regulatory area: Minimum insurance coverage;
Percent: 90.
Regulatory area: Vehicle parts and accessories necessary for safe
operation;
Percent: 80.
Source: GAO analysis of FMCSA data.
[End of table]
An FMCSA official told us that not every compliance review is required
to cover these nine areas. For example, follow-up compliance reviews of
carriers rated unsatisfactory or conditional are sometimes streamlined
to cover only the one or a few areas of the regulations in which the
carrier had violations. As another example, minimum insurance coverage
regulations apply only to for-hire carriers and private carriers of
hazardous materials; they do not apply to private passenger and
nonhazardous materials carriers.
However, according to an FMCSA official, the area of these regulations
that had the lowest rate of coverage--vehicle parts and accessories
necessary for safe operation--is required for all compliance reviews
except streamlined reviews. Vehicle inspections are supposed to be a
key investigative technique for assessing compliance with this area,
and an FMCSA official said that the lower rate of coverage for the
parts and accessories area likely reflects the small number of vehicle
inspections that FMCSA and the states conduct during compliance
reviews.
FMCSA Follows Up with Many Carriers with Serious Safety Violations but
Does Not Assess Maximum Fines for All of the Violations Required by
Law:
Our preliminary assessment is that FMCSA placed many carriers rated
unsatisfactory in fiscal year 2005 out of service and followed up with
nearly all of the rest to determine whether they had improved. In
addition, FMCSA monitors carriers to identify those that are violating
out-of-service orders. However, it does not take additional action
against many violators of out-of-service orders that it identifies.
Furthermore, FMCSA does not assess maximum fines against all carriers,
as we believe the law requires, partly because FMCSA does not
distinguish between carriers with a pattern of serious safety
violations and those that repeat a serious violation.[Footnote 15]
FMCSA Followed Up with Almost All Carriers That Received a Proposed
Safety Rating of Unsatisfactory:
FMCSA followed up with at least 1,189 of 1,196 carriers (99 percent)
that received a proposed safety rating of unsatisfactory following
compliance reviews completed in fiscal year 2005. These follow-ups
resulted in either upgraded safety ratings or the carriers being placed
out of service. Specifically,
* Based on follow-up compliance reviews, FMCSA upgraded the final
safety ratings of 658 carriers (325 to satisfactory and 333 to
conditional).
* FMCSA assigned a final rating of unsatisfactory to 309 carriers.
FMCSA issued out-of-service orders to 306 of these carriers. An FMCSA
official told us that it did not issue out-of-service orders to the
remaining three carriers either because the agency could not locate
them or because the carrier was still subject to an out-of-service
order that FMCSA issued several years prior to the 2005 compliance
review.
* After FMCSA reviewed evidence of corrective action submitted by
carriers, it upgraded the final safety ratings of 214 carriers (23 to
satisfactory and 191 to conditional).
* Due to an error in assigning the proposed safety rating to one
carrier, FMCSA upgraded its final safety rating to conditional.
For the remaining 14 carriers, FMCSA did not (1) provide us information
on whether and how it followed up with 7 carriers in time for us to
incorporate it in this statement and (2) respond to our request to
clarify its follow-up approach for another 7 carriers in time for us to
incorporate it in this statement.
Under its policies, FMCSA is generally required to assign the carrier a
final rating of unsatisfactory and to issue it an out-of-service order
after either 45 or 60 days, depending on the nature of the carrier's
business.[Footnote 16] Of the about 300 out-of-service orders that
FMCSA issued to carriers rated unsatisfactory following compliance
reviews conducted in fiscal year 2005, FMCSA told us that 89 percent
were issued on time, 9 percent were issued between 1 and 10 days late,
and 2 percent were issued more than 10 days late. We are working with
FMCSA to verify these numbers. An FMCSA official told us that in the
few instances where an out-of-service order was issued more than 1 week
late, the primary reason for the delay was that the responsible FMCSA
division office had difficulty scheduling follow-up compliance reviews
and thus held off on issuing the orders.
FMCSA Monitors Carriers to Identify Those That Are Violating Out-of-
Service Orders, but It Does Not Take Additional Action against Many of
the Violators It Identifies:
FMCSA uses two primary means to try to ensure that carriers that have
been placed out of service do not continue to operate. First, FMCSA
partners with states to help them suspend, revoke, or deny vehicle
registration to carriers that have been placed out of service. FMCSA
refers to these partnerships as the Performance and Registration
Information Systems Management program (PRISM). PRISM links FMCSA
databases with state motor vehicle registration systems and roadside
inspection personnel to help identify vehicles operated by carriers
that have been issued out-of-service orders. As of January 2007, 45
states had been awarded PRISM grants and 27 states were operating with
PRISM capabilities.
Second, FMCSA monitors carriers for indicators--such as roadside
inspections, moving violations, and crashes--that they may be violating
an out-of-service order and visits some of the suspect carriers to
examine their records to determine whether they did indeed violate the
order. FMCSA told us it is difficult to detect carriers operating in
violation of out-of-service orders because its resources do not allow
it to visit each carrier or conduct roadside inspections on all
vehicles, and we agree. In fiscal years 2005 and 2006, 768 of 1,996
carriers (38 percent) that were subject to an out-of-service order had
a roadside inspection or crash; FMCSA cited only 26 of these 768
carriers for violating an out-of-service order. An FMCSA official told
us that some of these carriers, such as carriers that were operating
intrastate or that had leased its vehicles to other carriers, may not
have been violating the out-of-service order. He said that FMCSA did
not have enough resources to determine whether each of the carriers was
violating an out-of-service order.
FMCSA Conducted Compliance Reviews on About Half of All High-risk
Carriers That It Was Required to By Statute:
From August 2006 through February 2007, FMCSA data indicate that the
agency performed compliance reviews on 1,136 of the 2,220 (51 percent)
carriers that were covered by its mandatory compliance review
policy.[Footnote 17] The Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient
Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users act requires that FMCSA
conduct compliance reviews on carriers rated as SafeStat category A or
B for 2 consecutive months. In response to this requirement, FMCSA
implemented a policy in June 2006 requiring a compliance review within
6 months for any such carrier unless the carrier had received a
compliance review within the previous 12 months. An FMCSA official told
us that the agency did not have enough resources to conduct compliance
reviews on all of the 2,220 carriers within 6 months.
In April 2007, FMCSA revised the policy because it believes that it
required compliance reviews for some carriers that did not need them,
leaving FMCSA with insufficient resources to conduct compliance reviews
on other carriers that did need them. Specifically, FMCSA believes that
carriers that had already had a compliance review were targeted
unnecessarily after they had corrected identified violations, but these
violations continued to adversely affect their SafeStat rating because
SafeStat penalizes carriers for violations regardless of whether they
have been corrected. The new policy requires compliance reviews within
6 months for carriers that have been in SafeStat category A or B for 2
consecutive months and received their last compliance 2 or more years
ago (or have never received a compliance review) and offers some
discretion to FMCSA division offices. For example, division offices can
decide not to conduct a compliance review if its SafeStat score is
based largely on violations that have been corrected or on accidents
that occurred prior to the carrier's last compliance review. We believe
that these changes are consistent with the act's requirement and give
FMCSA appropriate discretion in allocating its compliance review
resources.
FMCSA Does Not Assess Maximum Fines for All the Violations Required by
Law:
FMCSA does not assess the maximum fines against all carriers as we
believe the law requires. The law requires FMCSA to assess the maximum
allowable fine for each serious violation by a carrier that is found
(1) to have committed a pattern of such violations (pattern
requirement) or (2) to have previously committed the same or a related
serious violation (repeat requirement).[Footnote 18] However, FMCSA's
policy on maximum fines does not fully meet these requirements. FMCSA
enforces both requirements using what is known as the "three-strikes
rule," applying the maximum allowable fine when it finds that a motor
carrier has violated the same regulation three times within a 6-year
period. FMCSA officials said they interpret both parts of the act's
requirements to refer to repeat violations, and because they believe
that having two distinct policies on repeat violations would confuse
motor carriers, it has chosen to address both requirements with its
single three-strikes policy.
FMCSA's interpretation does not carry out the statutory mandate to
impose maximum fines in two different cases. In contrast to FMCSA, we
read the statute's use of the distinct terms "a pattern of violations"
and "previously committed the same or a related violation" as requiring
FMCSA to implement two distinct policies. A basic principle of
statutory interpretation is that distinct terms should be read as
having distinct meanings. In this case, the statute not only uses
different language to refer to the violations for which maximum fines
must be imposed but also sets them out separately and makes either type
of violation subject to the maximum penalties. Therefore, one carrier
may commit a variety of serious violations and another carrier may
commit the same or a substantially similar serious violation as a
previous violation; the language on its face requires FMCSA to assess
the maximum allowable fine in both situations--patterns of violations
as well as repeat offenses.
FMCSA could define a pattern of serious violations in numerous ways
that are consistent with the act's pattern requirement. Our assessment
of eight potential definitions shows that the number of carriers that
would be subject to maximum fines depends greatly on the definition.
(See table 4.) For example, a definition calling for two or more
serious violations in each of at least four different regulatory areas
during a compliance review would have made 38 carriers subject to
maximum fines in fiscal year 2006. In contrast, a definition calling
for one or more serious violations in each of at least three different
regulatory areas would have made 1,529 carriers subject to maximum
fines during that time.[Footnote 19]
Table 4: Number of Motor Carriers That Would Have Been Subject to
Maximum Fines under Various Definitions of a Pattern of Serious
Violations, Fiscal Years 2004 through 2006:
Regulatory areas with serious violations: 2 or more;
Number of carriers in 2004 with: 1 or more serious violations per area:
2,935;
Number of carriers in 2004 with: 2 or more serious violations per area:
177;
Number of carriers in 2005 with: 1 or more serious violations per area:
3,004;
Number of carriers in 2005 with: 2 or more serious violations per area:
158;
Number of carriers in 2006 with: 1 or more serious violations per area:
3,348;
Number of carriers in 2006 with: 2 or more serious violations per area:
225.
Regulatory areas with serious violations: 3 or more;
Number of carriers in 2004 with: 1 or more serious violations per area:
1,372;
Number of carriers in 2004 with: 2 or more serious violations per area:
64;
Number of carriers in 2005 with: 1 or more serious violations per area:
1,430;
Number of carriers in 2005 with: 2 or more serious violations per area:
58;
Number of carriers in 2006 with: 1 or more serious violations per area:
1,529;
Number of carriers in 2006 with: 2 or more serious violations per area:
114.
Regulatory areas with serious violations: 4 or more;
Number of carriers in 2004 with: 1 or more serious violations per area:
494;
Number of carriers in 2004 with: 2 or more serious violations per area:
16;
Number of carriers in 2005 with: 1 or more serious violations per area:
557;
Number of carriers in 2005 with: 2 or more serious violations per area:
25;
Number of carriers in 2006 with: 1 or more serious violations per area:
530;
Number of carriers in 2006 with: 2 or more serious violations per area:
38.
Regulatory areas with serious violations: 5 or more;
Number of carriers in 2004 with: 1 or more serious violations per area:
83;
Number of carriers in 2004 with: 2 or more serious violations per area:
2;
Number of carriers in 2005 with: 1 or more serious violations per area:
115;
Number of carriers in 2005 with: 2 or more serious violations per area:
9;
Number of carriers in 2006 with: 1 or more serious violations per area:
115;
Number of carriers in 2006 with: 2 or more serious violations per area:
7.
Source: GAO analysis of FMCSA data.
[End of table]
We also interpret the statutory language for the repeat requirement as
calling for a "two-strikes" rule as opposed to FMCSA's three-strikes
rule interpretation. FMCSA's interpretation imposes the maximum fine
only after a carrier has twice previously committed such violations.
The language of the statute does not allow FMCSA's interpretation;
rather, it requires FMCSA to assess the maximum allowable fine for each
serious violation against a carrier that has previously committed the
same serious violation.[Footnote 20]
In fiscal years 2004 through 2006, more than four times as many
carriers had a serious violation that constituted a second strike than
carriers that had a third strike. (See table 5.) For example, in fiscal
year 2006, 1,320 carriers had a serious violation that constituted a
second strike, whereas 280 carriers had a third strike.
Table 5: Number of Motor Carriers That Would Have Been Subject to
Maximum Fines under Two-strikes and Three-strikes Repeat Violator
Policies, Fiscal Years 2004 through 2006:
Policy: Two strikes;
2004: 1,251;
2005: 1,292;
2006: 1,320;
Total: 3,863.
Policy: Three strikes[A];
2004: 269;
2005: 284;
2006: 280;
Total: 833.
Source: GAO analysis of FMCSA data.
[A] FMCSA's policy currently assesses the maximum fine for 3 violations
in the same regulatory area.
[End of table]
Carriers that commit a pattern of violations may also commit a second
strike violation. For example, three of the seven carriers that had two
or more serious violations in each of at least five different
regulatory areas also had a second strike in fiscal year 2006. Were
FMCSA to make policy changes along the lines discussed here, we believe
that the new policies should address how to deal with carriers with
serious violations that both are part of a pattern and repeat the same
or similar previous violations.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be pleased
to respond to any questions that you or other Members of the
Subcommittee might have.
GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgement:
For further information on this statement, please contact Susan Fleming
at (202) 512-2834 or flemings@gao.gov. Individuals making key
contributions to this testimony were David Goldstein, Eric Hudson, and
James Ratzenberger.
[End of section]
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FOOTNOTES
[1] Large trucks are those with a gross vehicle weight greater than
10,000 pounds. A bus is a motor vehicle that is used to carry more than
8 people.
[2] This figure includes an unidentified number of carriers that are
registered but are no longer in business. Carriers continually enter
and exit the industry. Since 1998, the industry has increased in size
by an average of about 29,000 interstate carriers per year.
[3] GAO, Motor Carrier Safety: A Statistical Approach Will Better
Identify Commercial Carriers That Pose High Crash Risks Than Does the
Current Federal Approach, GAO-07-585 (Washington, D.C.: June 11, 2007).
[4] FMCSA requires that states report crashes within 90 days. Sometimes
states report crashes late. To allow for this occurrence, we analyzed
data on crashes occurring from July 2004 through December 2005 that may
have been reported as late as June 2006.
[5] GAO, Internal Control: Standards for Internal Control in the
Federal Government, GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 1999).
In assessing the extent to which FMCSA's management of its compliance
reviews is consistent with our internal controls, we were not able to
verify the statements made by FMCSA and state officials and
investigators about their performance and management of compliance
reviews because doing so was not practicable given our time and
resource constraints.
[6] Negative binomial regression is often used to model count data
(e.g., crashes).
[7] Except for carriers of hazardous materials, FMCSA does not have the
authority to prohibit motor carriers from operating intrastate.
[8] GAO-07-585.
[9] These results corroborate studies performed by the Volpe National
Transportation Systems Center and Oak Ridge National Laboratory. See
GAO-07-585.
[10] On average, the negative binomial regression model approach
identified larger motor carriers than did SafeStat, which is how a 9
percent increase in the crash rate translated into 9,500 additional
crashes.
[11] The weights on the safety evaluation areas have remained unchanged
since September 1999, when the weight on the driver area was increased
from 1.0 to 1.5.
[12] See GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1.
[13] The required number of inspections is based on the number of
vehicles operated by the carrier and subject to federal regulations.
[14] An inspector would not be able to inspect the minimum number of
vehicles if, for example, fewer than the minimum number of vehicles
were available on-site for inspection.
[15] In December 2005, we reported more fully on FMCSA's enforcement
activities. See GAO, Large Truck Safety: Federal Enforcement Efforts
Have Been Stronger Since 2000, but Oversight of State Grants Needs
Improvement, GAO-06-156 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 15, 2005).
[16] Under certain circumstances (for example, if the carrier is making
good faith efforts to improve its safety), FMCSA may allow a carrier
with a proposed rating of unsatisfactory to continue to operate for a
limited time.
[17] An FMCSA official told us that the agency believes that these data
overestimate the number of carriers that were required to but did not
receive a compliance review, primarily because FMCSA has indications
that some carriers are actually inactive.
[18] Motor Carrier Safety Improvement Act of 1999, Pub. L. 106-159, §
222(b)(2), 113 Stat. 1748, 1769 (49 U.S.C.A. § 521 Note).
[19] Our definitions are for analysis purposes only. We are not
suggesting which, if any, of these pattern definitions FMCSA should
adopt as its policy, nor is our exclusive focus on patterns involving
only violations identified during a single compliance review meant to
suggest that the definition of pattern could not require that serious
violations occur over multiple compliance reviews.
[20] The statute (section 222(c)) does allow the Secretary to determine
and document that extraordinary circumstances merit a lower than
maximum fine in a particular case, if for example a carrier can
establish that repetition was not a result of its failure to take
appropriate remedial action.
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