Russian Nuclear Submarines
U.S. Participation in the Arctic Military Environmental Cooperation Program Needs Better Justification Gao ID: GAO-04-924 September 9, 2004Norway, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States participate in the Arctic Military Environmental Cooperation (AMEC) program, a multilateral effort that seeks to reduce the environmental impacts of Russia's military activities through technology development projects. AMEC has primarily focused on Russia's aging fleet of nuclear submarines. Section 324 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 required GAO to review AMEC, including its relationship to the Department of Defense's (DOD) Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program. In accordance with the act, GAO (1) assessed the extent to which AMEC supports and complements the CTR program, (2) identified AMEC member countries' financial contributions to the program, (3) assessed AMEC's future program objectives, and (4) evaluated DOD's proposal to expand its technology development activities to Russia's Pacific region.
In a 1999 program plan to the Congress, DOD stated that AMEC projects would support the goals of the CTR program. However, we found that only one of eight AMEC projects designed to support CTR's objective of dismantling Russia's ballistic missile nuclear submarines has done so. This project involved development of a prototype 40-metric ton container to store and transport spent (used) nuclear fuel from Russia's dismantled submarines. Despite AMEC's limited contribution to CTR, DOD officials, including CTR representatives, said that most of the projects can be used to support dismantlement of other types of Russian nuclear submarines. In addition, U.S. and foreign officials cited other benefits of U.S. participation in AMEC, including promoting U.S. foreign policy objectives, particularly with Norway, and facilitating military-to-military cooperation with Russia. From 1996, when the program was established, to April 2004, AMEC member countries had contributed about $56 million to the program. The United States has been the largest contributor, providing about $31 million, or about 56 percent of the total. However, the overall U.S. contribution has decreased from fiscal year 1999 to fiscal year 2004 as U.S. funded projects have been completed and as other AMEC member countries have increased their assistance. In May 2004, AMEC developed a draft strategic plan to guide its future efforts. The plan, which is currently being reviewed by AMEC partners, proposes improving the security of Russia's nuclear submarine bases and securing spent nuclear fuel from dismantled submarines. However, securing bases could be contrary to U.S. policy, which preclude assistance to most operational Russian military sites that contain nuclear weapons, including certain naval facilities. DOD wants to expand its dismantlement technology development efforts to Russia's Pacific region, but has not adequately analyzed the condition of Russia's decommissioned nuclear submarines in the Pacific and their impact on the environment. Furthermore, DOD has not identified specific projects that would be needed beyond those already done in the Arctic region.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-04-924, Russian Nuclear Submarines: U.S. Participation in the Arctic Military Environmental Cooperation Program Needs Better Justification
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Report to Congressional Committees:
September 2004:
RUSSIAN NUCLEAR SUBMARINES:
U.S. Participation in the Arctic Military Environmental Cooperation
Program Needs Better Justification:
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-924]:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-04-924, a report to congressional committees
Why GAO Did This Study:
Norway, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States participate
in the Arctic Military Environmental Cooperation (AMEC) program, a
multilateral effort that seeks to reduce the environmental impacts of
Russia‘s military activities through technology development projects.
AMEC has primarily focused on Russia‘s aging fleet of nuclear
submarines. Section 324 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2004 required GAO to review AMEC, including its
relationship to the Department of Defense‘s (DOD) Cooperative Threat
Reduction (CTR) program. In accordance with the act, GAO (1) assessed
the extent to which AMEC supports and complements the CTR program, (2)
identified AMEC member countries‘ financial contributions to the
program, (3) assessed AMEC‘s future program objectives, and (4)
evaluated DOD‘s proposal to expand its technology development
activities to Russia‘s Pacific region.
What GAO Found:
In a 1999 program plan to the Congress, DOD stated that AMEC projects
would support the goals of the CTR program. However, we found that only
one of eight AMEC projects designed to support CTR‘s objective of
dismantling Russia‘s ballistic missile nuclear submarines has done so.
This project involved development of a prototype 40-metric ton
container to store and transport spent (used) nuclear fuel from
Russia‘s dismantled submarines. Despite AMEC‘s limited contribution to
CTR, DOD officials, including CTR representatives, said that most of
the projects can be used to support dismantlement of other types of
Russian nuclear submarines. In addition, U.S. and foreign officials
cited other benefits of U.S. participation in AMEC, including promoting
U.S. foreign policy objectives, particularly with Norway, and
facilitating military-to-military cooperation with Russia.
From 1996, when the program was established, to April 2004, AMEC member
countries had contributed about $56 million to the program. The United
States has been the largest contributor, providing about $31 million,
or about 56 percent of the total. However, the overall U.S.
contribution has decreased from fiscal year 1999 to fiscal year 2004 as
U.S. funded projects have been completed and as other AMEC member
countries have increased their assistance.
In May 2004, AMEC developed a draft strategic plan to guide its future
efforts. The plan, which is currently being reviewed by AMEC partners,
proposes improving the security of Russia‘s nuclear submarine bases
and securing spent nuclear fuel from dismantled submarines. However,
securing bases could be contrary to U.S. policy, which preclude
assistance to most operational Russian military sites that contain
nuclear weapons, including certain naval facilities.
DOD wants to expand its dismantlement technology development efforts
to Russia‘s Pacific region, but has not adequately analyzed the
condition of Russia‘s decommissioned nuclear submarines in the Pacific
and their impact on the environment. Furthermore, DOD has not
identified specific projects that would be needed beyond those already
done in the Arctic region.
Decommissioned Russian Nuclear Submarines:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends, among other things, that DOD determine whether AMEC
activities should include improving security around Russian nuclear
submarine bases, and whether DOD‘s technology development efforts
should be expanded to nuclear submarine dismantlement in Russia‘s
Pacific region. DOD concurred with all of our recommendations.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
AMEC Projects Have Provided Limited Support for DOD's Cooperative
Threat Reduction Program, but Projects May Be Useful for Other
Purposes:
AMEC Member Countries Have Contributed About $56 Million to the
Program:
AMEC Plans to Significantly Expand Its Role and Redirect Its Focus to
Include Nuclear Security Issues:
DOD Has Not Adequately Justified Its Proposed Initiative to Expand Its
Technology Development to Submarine Dismantlement Activities into
Russia's Pacific Region:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendixes:
Appendix I: List of AMEC Projects:
Appendix II: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Table:
Table 1: Status of AMEC Projects:
Figures:
Figure 1: Russian Submarine That Sank in 2003:
Figure 2: Location of CTR Dismantlement Sites and Russia's Nuclear
Submarines:
Figure 3: AMEC-Designed Container Used to Store and Transport Spent
Nuclear Fuel from Russia's Dismantled Nuclear Submarines:
Figure 4: Interim Storage Pad:
Figure 5: Steel Containers Used to Store Solid Radioactive Waste from
Dismantled Submarines:
Figure 6: Contributions of AMEC Member Countries, as of April 2004:
Figure 7: U.S Agencies' Contributions to AMEC as of April 2004:
Figure 8: U.S. AMEC Program Costs by Category:
Figure 9: U.S. Funding Levels for AMEC, Fiscal Years 1997-2004:
Abbreviations:
AMEC: Arctic Military Environmental Cooperation Program:
CTR: Cooperative Threat Reduction Program:
DOD: Department of Defense:
DOE: Department of Energy:
EPA: Environmental Protection Agency:
G-8: Group of Eight:
Letter September 9, 2004:
Congressional Committees:
Prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union over a decade ago, little was
known about the extent of contamination of the Arctic environment
because of the secrecy of the former Soviet Union regarding its
military activities in the area. However, in 1993, the Russian
government released a report describing over three decades of Soviet-
era dumping of radioactive waste in the ocean as well as radioactive
contamination from nuclear submarine accidents. As a result,
radioactive contamination and environmental concerns generated by the
former Soviet Union's military presence in the Arctic region received
increased attention from the international community, including the
United States. Among the greatest concerns are the handling and storage
of radioactive waste and spent (used) nuclear fuel from Russia's fleet
of 249 ballistic missile and general purpose nuclear
submarines.[Footnote 1] This fleet includes at least 116 decommissioned
nuclear submarines in the Arctic region and 76 decommissioned nuclear
submarines in the Pacific region. Some of these decommissioned
submarines are in poor condition, and one sank in 2003 off the coast of
Norway as it was being towed to a shipyard in Russia for dismantlement.
Figure 1 shows the submarine before it sank.
Figure 1: Russian Submarine That Sank in 2003:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
About 60 percent of Russia's decommissioned submarines still have spent
nuclear fuel on board. Vast amounts of spent nuclear fuel--and liquid
and solid radioactive waste from the submarines--are also being stored
temporarily on special service ships and in coastal shipyards in
Russia.[Footnote 2]
While many of Russia's aging nuclear submarines present environmental
problems, ballistic missile submarines also present a military and
nuclear proliferation threat. The United States has been working with
Russia since the mid-1990s to dismantle decommissioned Russian
ballistic missile nuclear submarines through the Department of
Defense's (DOD) Cooperative Threat Reduction program (CTR).
Administered by DOD's Defense Threat Reduction Agency, CTR funds the
dismantlement of Russia's ballistic missile nuclear submarines to help
Russia meet its commitments under arms reduction treaties with the
United States. The United States does not consider Russia's general
purpose nuclear submarines to be a military or nuclear proliferation
threat and, consequently, does not fund their dismantlement.
As of March 2004, CTR had funded dismantlement of 27 Russian ballistic
nuclear submarines, and CTR plans to partially dismantle up to an
additional 15 submarines by 2013. Specifically, although CTR will
continue to remove the spent fuel from the ballistic missile
submarines' nuclear reactors, seal the reactors, and remove and
eliminate the missile launcher compartments from all submarines that it
dismantles, it will no longer fund the cutting up of the submarines'
bows and sterns. DOD is turning over this part of the dismantlement
process to Russia because, according to DOD, it does not directly
contribute to threat reduction because the bows and sterns do not have
a military value. CTR-funded dismantlement activities are taking place
at four Russian shipyards--three in the Arctic region and one in the
Pacific region.[Footnote 3]
Figure 2 shows the location of CTR dismantlement sites and Russia's
nuclear submarines.
Figure 2: Location of CTR Dismantlement Sites and Russia's Nuclear
Submarines:
[See PDF for image]
Notes: Multiple nuclear submarines are located at the various sites.
CTR uses two additional shipyards in the vicinity of Severodvinsk for
dismantlement purposes: Sevmash and Zvezdochka.
[End of figure]
To help reduce the environmental impacts of Russia's military
activities in the Arctic region, the United States, Norway, and Russia
established the Arctic Military Environmental Cooperation program
(AMEC) in 1996. The United Kingdom joined AMEC in 2003. Norway
initiated AMEC and requested that the United States participate in the
program to address what Norway perceived as significant environmental
problems located on its border with Russia. Norway is one of the
world's leading seafood exporters and was concerned that these problems
would adversely affect its fishing industry.
AMEC has implemented its program primarily by funding projects to
develop technologies to support the dismantlement of Russia's nuclear
submarines. AMEC has focused on projects such as storing and
transporting radioactive waste from the submarines. The actual
dismantlement of Russian submarines is being funded by a number of
countries. In 2002, DOD requested congressional approval to expand its
environmental technology development activities to Russia's Pacific
region, but the Congress has not acted upon that request.
From AMEC's inception, U.S. participation has been hindered by the lack
of liability protection.[Footnote 4] Without liability protection, the
United States, its contractors, and their employees could be held
financially responsible for an accident or incident that might occur
while performing work on AMEC-funded projects in Russia. In the absence
of liability protection for the AMEC program, the United States has,
for the most part, tied its participation in AMEC projects to DOD's CTR
program liability protocol: the CTR program has liability protection
for all the work that it performs in Russia under an agreement signed
in the early 1990s. In 1998, the Congress made $5 million available to
AMEC from CTR funds and directed DOD to include within AMEC
"cooperative activities on environmental matters in the Arctic region
with the military departments and agencies of other countries,
including the Russian Federation.":
Eight AMEC projects were identified by DOD and U.S. AMEC program
officials as designed to be complementary and supportive of CTR program
objectives. These projects have formed the core of U.S. participation
in the AMEC program. An additional 11 projects have been implemented
since the program's inception to support other AMEC objectives. (For a
complete list of all AMEC projects, underway and completed, see app.
I.) In response to §327 (c), the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 1999, DOD submitted a plan to the Congress which, among
other things, addressed the relationship of AMEC projects to the CTR
program.
Section 324 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2004 required GAO to review AMEC, including the relationship of the
program to DOD's CTR program. In accordance with the act, we (1)
assessed the extent to which AMEC supports and complements the CTR
program, (2) identified participating countries' financial
contributions to AMEC, (3) assessed AMEC's future program objectives,
and (4) evaluated DOD's proposal to expand its technology development
activities to Russia's Pacific region.
To address these objectives, we obtained and analyzed AMEC program
documents and met with AMEC members from Norway, Russia, the United
Kingdom, and the United States. We also met with representatives from
Japan to discuss their views about partnering with DOD on technology
development activities in the Pacific. We obtained data on AMEC's
mission, project implementation, and costs from DOD, the Department of
Energy (DOE), the Department of State, and the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA). We also attended an AMEC meeting of the principals in
April 2004 in Svalbard, Norway, at which high-level officials from each
member country discussed program plans and project implementation. We
also attended a separate meeting of AMEC technical representatives that
focused on the development of a draft "strategic plan" to guide the
program in the future. More details on our scope and methodology can be
found in appendix II. We conducted our work from January through August
2004 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards.
Results in Brief:
In a 1999 program plan to the Congress, DOD stated that AMEC projects
would support the objectives of DOD's Cooperative Threat Reduction
program. However, we found that only one of eight AMEC projects
established to support and complement CTR's program for the
dismantlement of Russia's ballistic missile nuclear submarines has
directly benefited the CTR program. The one project involved
development of a prototype 40-metric ton container to store and
transport spent nuclear fuel from Russia's dismantled submarines. CTR
officials told us that the containers met an immediate need for
adequate storage space for the spent nuclear fuel removed from the
dismantled submarines. With regard to the other seven AMEC projects, we
found the following:
* One project, the development of a storage pad to hold the 40-metric
ton nuclear fuel storage containers, was completed too late to support
CTR's dismantlement efforts at a particular Russian shipyard. That
shipyard had originally been designated as a dismantlement site for
ballistic missile submarines, but by the time the pad was completed
Russia had decided that it would no longer dismantle ballistic missile
submarines at that site. This project cost about $2.9 million.
* Two projects, involving development of technology to prevent
corrosion inside the storage containers and a mobile facility to treat
liquid radioactive wastes from dismantled nuclear submarines, were
either terminated or suspended. The first project, for which U.S.
expenditures totaled $396,000, was terminated after CTR officials
selected a U.S. contractor to develop the technology instead of working
through AMEC. With regard to the second project, CTR determined that
there was already adequate liquid radioactive waste treatment capacity
at the facilities where submarines were being dismantled and therefore
did not support the project. EPA, which managed the project, continues
to hold about $700,000 in project funds that were transferred from the
Department of the Navy several years ago.
* Two projects--developing treatment methods and steel storage
containers for solid radioactive waste--were implemented at a mobile
waste treatment facility located at a Russian shipyard where the CTR
program is not dismantling Russian nuclear submarines. U.S.
expenditures for these projects, including the waste treatment
facility, totaled about $12 million.
* Finally, two projects--the development of a radiation detection
system that will be used to protect the health and safety of workers
who dismantle submarines and the provision of U.S. supplied dosimeters
(radiation detection devices)--do not have a direct or immediate
benefit to the CTR program. The radiation detection system, on which
the United States spent $1.7 million, is being implemented at a site
where Russia decided to stop dismantling ballistic submarines. The
U.S.-supplied dosimeters project was described as a failure by the AMEC
project manager because the dosimeters did not meet Russian technical
specifications and were not used for a couple of years. In July 2004,
Russia's representative to AMEC notified DOD that the dosimeters were
now being used.
Despite AMEC's limited contribution to the CTR program, U.S. and
foreign officials said that U.S. participation in AMEC has achieved
other benefits. In their view, AMEC plays an important role in
promoting U.S. foreign policy interests. In particular, U.S. officials,
including the Ambassador to Norway, told us that the U.S. relationship
with Norway has been strengthened through AMEC. Norwegian ministry of
defense and foreign affairs representatives agreed with this view.
Furthermore, while most AMEC projects do not support dismantlement of
Russia's ballistic submarines, U.S. officials, including CTR
representatives, said the projects are supporting dismantlement of
other types of nuclear submarines.
AMEC member countries had contributed about $56 million to the program
as of April 2004. The United States has been the largest contributor,
providing about $31 million, or about 56 percent of the total, since
the program was established in 1996. Other countries' contributions are
as follows: Russia about $13 million; Norway about $12 million; and the
United Kingdom about $100,000 since joining AMEC 1 year ago. DOD has
provided over 90 percent of U.S. funds for AMEC. DOE and EPA have
provided the remaining U.S. funds. U.S. contributions to AMEC have
declined from 1999 to 2004 as U.S.-funded projects have been completed.
According to U.S. officials, the United States plans to contribute
about $3 million annually from fiscal year 2006 to fiscal year 2011,
the latest date for which projections have been made.
In May 2004, AMEC developed a draft strategic plan, which is currently
being reviewed by AMEC partners, that proposes improving security at
Russia's nuclear submarine bases, including developing technologies
that will help secure, among other things, spent nuclear fuel and
radioactive waste from Russia's decommissioned and dismantled nuclear
submarines. AMEC's draft plan raises several concerns because it
proposes (1) expanding AMEC's mission, (2) securing operational
military bases that have nuclear weapons, including naval facilities,
and (3) securing spent nuclear fuel from Russian submarines. Improving
the security of Russian military bases may be contrary to U.S. policy
and securing spent nuclear fuel from Russian submarines, according to
DOE officials, is a low priority as a proliferation or radiological
dispersion device (dirty bomb) threat compared with other radioactive
sources, such as abandoned electrical generators containing large
amounts of strontium-90. DOE officials told us that, based on available
data, spent fuel from Russian submarines does not present a
sufficiently high risk from a security perspective to warrant the
commitment of resources. Irrespective of AMEC's proposed plans, U.S.
participation in AMEC faces an uncertain future because the United
States lacks liability protection for AMEC projects in Russia. The
Department of State is seeking a U.S. governmentwide solution regarding
liability issues with Russia but the matter has not been resolved.
Consequently, the United States was only participating in a few
projects, including (1) improving the safe towing of decommissioned
nuclear submarines and (2) improving the buoyancy of decommissioned
nuclear submarines.
Although DOD would like to establish a program similar to AMEC for
Russia's Pacific region, DOD has neither adequately analyzed the
condition of Russia's submarines in the Pacific and their impact on the
environment nor identified specific projects that would be needed
beyond those already being done in the Arctic. Furthermore, Japan,
which plans to dismantle more than 25 Russian nuclear submarines in the
Pacific, has no current plans to join with the United States in a
technology development program.
This report makes recommendations to the Secretary of Defense to
determine, in consultation with the Secretaries of Energy and State,
whether AMEC's role should be expanded to include improving security
around Russian nuclear submarine bases and to help ensure that U.S.
participation in AMEC is consistent with overall U.S. nuclear
nonproliferation efforts in Russia. The report also recommends that the
Secretary of Defense assess whether DOD should expand its submarine
dismantlement technology efforts to Russia's Pacific region and, if so,
determine what form U.S. participation in such efforts would take.
Furthermore, we recommend that the Administrator, EPA, determine, in
consultation with the Secretary of the Navy, if the funds designated
for AMEC's liquid waste project are still needed. If not, we recommend
that the Administrator and the Secretary determine whether to reprogram
the funds or to propose rescinding the funds.
We provided draft copies of this report to the Departments of Defense
and Energy and EPA for their review and comment. DOE had no comments
and EPA provided technical comments, which we incorporated as
appropriate. In its written comments, DOD concurred with all of our
recommendations. However, DOD raised some concerns, including AMEC's
role and relationship to the CTR program and AMEC's impact on
multinational programs, such as the G-8 Global Partnership initiative.
We have addressed these matters in our evaluation of agency comments.
Background:
AMEC provides a forum for Norway, Russia, the United States, and the
United Kingdom to collaborate in addressing military-related
environmental concerns in the Arctic region. The AMEC Declaration and
"Terms of Reference" established the framework and organization for
sharing information and technology and implementing projects. The
Declaration focuses AMEC activities on radioactive and chemical
contamination issues resulting from past military activities in the
Arctic region and stresses cooperation between the military
organizations.
AMEC's "Terms of Reference" establishes the organizational structure
and possible ways of financing the AMEC program. It identifies
representatives (principals) from each member country's respective
department or ministry of defense. These representatives approve their
countries' participation in AMEC activities and are responsible for
obtaining resources from their respective governments to ensure that
AMEC objectives are achieved. An AMEC steering group recommends
specific projects to the representatives from each country, prioritizes
approved work, provides project management, and determines which member
country will take the lead on each project.
DOD's Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Installations and
Environment provides policy oversight for U.S. participation in AMEC.
Within the United States, the Department of the Navy, which was named
as the executive agent in 1998, manages the AMEC national program
office. All contracting functions are managed by the Naval Facilities
Engineering Command. Although DOD is the lead U.S. agency for AMEC, the
Departments of Energy and State and EPA provide technical and policy
support.
AMEC Projects Have Provided Limited Support for DOD's Cooperative
Threat Reduction Program, but Projects May Be Useful for Other
Purposes:
In a 1999 program plan to the Congress, DOD stated that AMEC projects
would support the goals of the CTR program. However, our analysis of
these projects shows that only one of the eight projects established to
support CTR objectives of dismantling Russia's ballistic missile
nuclear submarines did so. The remaining seven projects were either
completed too late, terminated or suspended, or implemented at
shipyards or sites not directly associated with CTR's dismantlement
program. Despite their limited impact on the CTR program, most of these
projects can be used to support dismantlement of Russia's general
purpose nuclear submarines, according to DOD officials. Furthermore,
U.S. and foreign representatives asserted that AMEC has achieved other
important benefits and that continued U.S. participation in the program
is critical because the United States provides significant technical
support.
One of Eight AMEC Projects Had a Direct Impact on CTR's Efforts to
Dismantle Russia's Ballistic Nuclear Submarines:
Only one of eight AMEC projects established to support and complement
CTR's program for the dismantlement of Russia's ballistic missile
nuclear submarines has directly benefited the program. According to a
program plan that DOD submitted to the Congress in 1999, AMEC was being
conducted in close cooperation with the CTR program so that the two
programs would benefit each other. The program plan stated that AMEC
projects supported CTR submarine dismantlement activities. Some of the
projects were expected to provide design and engineering support, while
other projects were designed to fill gaps in the CTR program.
According to CTR officials, however, only one AMEC project, the
development of a prototype 40-metric ton container used to store and
transport spent nuclear fuel from dismantled Russian ballistic missile
nuclear submarines, was able to meet CTR program objectives.[Footnote
5] U.S. expenditures for this project totaled about $2.9 million, and
the Navy chose EPA's Office of International Programs to manage the
project. The containers helped solve an immediate problem--finding
adequate storage capacity for the spent nuclear fuel removed from the
submarines. CTR and EPA officials told us that the storage containers
solved a "bottleneck," enabling CTR to remove more spent fuel and
facilitate dismantlement efforts. According to DOD and EPA, when
serially produced the AMEC container costs 80 percent less than the
cost of a Russian manufactured storage container. CTR has purchased 25
containers and plans to purchase an additional 35 to transport and
store the spent fuel from dismantled ballistic nuclear submarines in
Russia. Russia is also using the containers to store and transport
spent nuclear fuel from general purpose nuclear submarines. Figure 3
shows an AMEC-designed storage container.
Figure 3: AMEC-Designed Container Used to Store and Transport Spent
Nuclear Fuel from Russia's Dismantled Nuclear Submarines:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Regarding the other seven AMEC projects that were established to
support or complement the CTR program, we found the following:
* A project, also managed by EPA, to develop a storage pad to hold the
storage containers was completed too late to support CTR's
dismantlement efforts associated with a Russian shipyard that had been
used as a CTR dismantlement site.[Footnote 6] According to AMEC and EPA
officials, the storage pad's completion was delayed due to problems
identifying and obtaining all required Russian clearances and licenses
to operate the storage pad; in the intervening time Russia decided it
would no longer dismantle ballistic missile submarines at the shipyard.
As a result, the storage pad is not used to support the CTR program but
will be used for temporary storage of spent nuclear fuel from Russia's
general purpose nuclear submarines. U.S. expenditures for this project
totaled $2.9 million.
* One project, involving development of technology to prevent corrosion
inside the spent nuclear fuel storage containers, was terminated before
completion because the CTR program withdrew its support and did not
provide liability protection. In April 2002, CTR directed AMEC to
develop and manufacture a spent nuclear fuel storage container
dehydration system. The dehydration system was needed to extract water
from the storage containers to inhibit corrosion and increase the
containers' service life. However, in December 2003, the CTR program
terminated AMEC's participation in the project and selected a U.S.
contractor, instead of working through AMEC, to design a larger
dehydration system.[Footnote 7] U.S. expenditures for this project
totaled $396,000.
* Two projects involving solid radioactive waste treatment and solid
radioactive waste storage were implemented at a site where CTR is not
dismantling ballistic missile nuclear submarines. These projects were
designed to assist the Russian navy manage the large volume of waste
generated by dismantlement of nuclear submarines. The waste treatment
project identified, among other things, technologies that could reduce
the volume of solid waste from decommissioned nuclear submarines and
make it easier and more economical to store the material. The second
project supported the development and production of 400 steel
containers for the Russian navy to transport and store solid
radioactive waste. Prior to the project, no Russian-designed and
manufactured container had ever been certified to transport solid
radioactive waste. According to the AMEC project manager, the projects
introduced Russian representatives to western business practices,
including improved contract management techniques. U.S. expenditures
for these projects, which have been completed and consolidated at a
mobile solid waste treatment facility built at a Russian shipyard,
totaled about $12 million, including the cost of the facility.
* AMEC's project to develop a demonstration radiation detection system
to protect the health and safety of workers who dismantle submarines
does not directly benefit the CTR program. The demonstration system is
installed at the interim storage pad site, which is not being used to
support the CTR program. U.S. AMEC and CTR officials were uncertain if
the radiation detection system would be deployed at any of the CTR
dismantlement sites in Russia. CTR officials said that while they
support projects that protect workers' heath and safety, they would not
have funded this project and are uncertain how it promotes CTR
dismantlement goals. U.S. expenditures for this project totaled $1.7
million.
* A related project that supplied about 125 DOE surplus dosimeters
(radiation detection devices) to the Russian navy was described as a
failure by the AMEC project manager. He told us that the navy would not
use these dosimeters due to, among other things, technical concerns and
had put the equipment in storage for a couple of years. We brought this
matter to the attention of a U.S. AMEC official who subsequently
contacted the Russian AMEC representative and was informed that the
dosimeters would be distributed. In July 2004, Russia's representative
to AMEC notified DOD that the dosimeters were now being used.
* Finally, an AMEC project to develop a mobile liquid waste processing
facility that could be used in remote locations in Russia was suspended
because CTR did not support it. A CTR official told us that CTR never
endorsed the project because adequate capacity for liquid radioactive
waste treatment already existed at the facilities where submarines were
being dismantled. As a result, CTR would not extend liability
protection for the project. EPA, which was chosen by the Department of
the Navy to manage the project, still has about $700,000 in unspent
project funds that were transferred from the Navy beginning in 1999.
EPA officials told us that the funds must be reprogrammed by December
31, 2004, unless the Navy provides an extension, or they will be
returned to the U.S. Treasury.
U.S. AMEC officials told us that ultimately several of the projects
that were established to meet CTR objectives did not do so because of
changing requirements and plans. However, they asserted that the
projects were planned with the full cooperation and approval of the CTR
program and the appropriate Russian government agencies.
CTR officials told us they have no further need for AMEC assistance in
carrying out their plans to continue dismantling Russian ballistic
missile nuclear submarines until 2013. These officials asserted,
however, that AMEC plays a useful role in helping address environmental
issues and technology development and that this role should be
continued. Although only one AMEC project that was established to
support CTR did so, these officials believed that most of these
projects can be used to support dismantlement of Russia's general
purpose submarines. The storage pad, for example, can hold spent
nuclear fuel from all types of Russian nuclear submarines and will
facilitate the shipment of the fuel to the centralized storage facility
at Mayak. Similarly, the steel containers for solid waste are already
being used to store radioactive waste from dismantled general purpose
submarines, according to U.S. and Russian officials. A DOE official
told us that Russia also plans to use the steel containers to store
waste from older ballistic missile submarines that are not scheduled to
be dismantled with CTR assistance. Figure 4 shows the storage pad, and
figure 5 depicts the solid waste steel containers funded by AMEC.
Figure 4: Interim Storage Pad:
[See PDF for image]
Note: A storage container is being loaded into one of the pad's cells.
[End of figure]
Figure 5: Steel Containers Used to Store Solid Radioactive Waste from
Dismantled Submarines:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
U.S. and Foreign Officials Believe That AMEC Has Benefits Beyond
Projects Supporting CTR:
Despite AMEC's limited impact on the CTR program, U.S. and foreign
officials told us that AMEC has achieved other benefits as well and
that continued U.S. participation in the program is critical. DOD and
Department of State officials said that one of AMEC's most important
benefits is promoting U.S. foreign policy objectives, particularly with
Norway, a long-standing NATO ally, and with other nations in the Arctic
region. The U.S. Ambassador to Norway told us that while AMEC is a very
modest program in terms of expenditures, Norway views it as (1) a
critically important part of the U.S-Norwegian bilateral relationship,
and (2) an effective multilateral effort to address one of its primary
policy concerns--environmental protection in the Barents Sea region.
The participation of the United States and the United Kingdom gives
Norway political clout and technical expertise that Norway would not
have working on a bilateral basis with Russia. Norwegian officials from
the ministry of defense and ministry of foreign affairs reinforced
these views. The U.S. Ambassador to Russia also gave us his views about
AMEC. In a May 24, 2004, letter to GAO, he noted that AMEC's
accomplishments include the construction of the solid waste treatment
and storage facility where there are a large number of Russian nuclear
submarines awaiting dismantlement. Furthermore, he recommended that the
United States continue to participate in AMEC and consider expanding
the program to Russia's Pacific fleet.
U.S. and foreign officials also asserted that another important aspect
of AMEC is that it facilitates military-to-military cooperation with
Russia. Officials noted that AMEC has enabled military personnel from
the United States, Norway, and United Kingdom to visit Russian naval
facilities that they had previously been unable to visit. According to
these officials, access to the facilities enables AMEC to better
understand the environmental conditions and technologies required to
assist with dismantlement efforts. Russia's AMEC representative told us
that AMEC is a useful way to improve communications among the member
countries' military organizations. He also noted, however, that Russia
would find other ways to promote cooperation on environmental security
issues if AMEC did not exist.
DOE officials told us that AMEC has produced tangible benefits in its
efforts to plan an emergency exercise in the Murmansk region in late
2004. The exercise, which will be conducted as an AMEC project, entails
staging an accident involving spent nuclear fuel from a Russian nuclear
submarine. Participants in the exercise will include representatives
from the Russian navy and emergency responders from various Russian
organizations, including the Federal Agency for Atomic Energy, Ministry
of Defense, and the Institute for Nuclear Safety. In addition, nuclear
emergency management personnel from neighboring countries as well as
the International Atomic Energy Agency are expected to participate.
According to DOE officials, this exercise will be the first time that
DOE can simulate an accident involving spent nuclear fuel from a
Russian submarine.
AMEC Member Countries Have Contributed About $56 Million to the
Program:
From 1996 to April 2004, AMEC member countries contributed about $56
million to the program. The United States has been the largest
contributor, providing about $31 million or about 56 percent of the
total, with Russia, Norway, and the United Kingdom contributing the
remainder. Within the U.S. government, although DOD has provided over
90 percent of all funds, DOE and EPA have also contributed. U.S.
contributions have declined from 1999 to 2004 as U.S.-funded projects
have been completed and as other member countries increased their
contributions. According to DOD officials, U.S. contributions to AMEC
are planned to be about $3 million per year from fiscal year 2006 to
fiscal year 2011.
The United States Has Been the Leading Contributor to AMEC, Providing
More Than One-Half of Total Program Funds:
From 1996 until April 2004, AMEC member countries contributed about $56
million to the program. Figure 6 provides a breakout of AMEC members'
contributions.
Figure 6: Contributions of AMEC Member Countries, as of April 2004:
[See PDF for image]
Note: The United Kingdom contribution accounts for less than 1 percent
of total AMEC contributions.
[End of figure]
As figure 6 shows, the United States has contributed the greatest
amount of any AMEC member country--about 56 percent of the total.
According to available data, Russia contributed about $13 million;
Norway contributed about $12 million; and the United Kingdom provided
about $100,000 because it only recently joined AMEC.
Norway's contributions were initially limited because it did not have
an agreement with Russia that provided liability protection for the
Norwegian government or its contractors who would be providing
assistance through AMEC. In May 1998, Norway signed an agreement with
Russia that included liability protection, and since then Norway has
contributed funds to several projects, including the development of a
radiation detection system and steel storage containers for solid
radioactive waste. Norway plans to contribute an additional $8 million
to AMEC over the next few years, and Norwegian officials told us that
they are committed to an equitable sharing of costs with the other AMEC
member countries.
Russia's contributions to AMEC were used to support, among other
things, development of the storage container for spent nuclear fuel,
the interim storage pad, and the solid waste treatment and storage
technologies. A U.S. AMEC official told us that he reviewed Russia's
itemized list of project costs and was satisfied that the costs were a
fair representation of Russia's financial contributions. However,
Russia's future contributions are uncertain. A Russian representative
to AMEC told us that Russia will continue to contribute financially to
projects but noted that there are limited resources available. Other
member countries told us that Russia would probably make mostly "in
kind" contributions to the program, including labor and materials for
specific projects.
The United Kingdom, which joined AMEC in June 2003, has contributed
about $100,000 for preliminary planning related to projects focusing on
buoyancy and the safe towing of nuclear submarines. The United Kingdom
has pledged an initial contribution of $9 million to AMEC in order to
fund a preliminary group of projects.
DOD Has Provided the Majority of U.S. Funds to AMEC:
DOD has provided the majority of U.S. funding to AMEC--about $28
million, or 91 percent of the total U.S. contribution. DOE and EPA have
provided the remaining funds, about $2.6 million and $200,000,
respectively. Figure 7 depicts the breakdown of U.S. funds for AMEC by
each agency.
Figure 7: U.S Agencies' Contributions to AMEC as of April 2004:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
U.S. funds have been used to support a variety of AMEC activities.
About $24 million of the U.S. contributions to AMEC were used to fund
projects, such as the storage container for spent nuclear fuel from
ballistic missile submarines and the storage pad. The remainder funded
program management (about $5.4 million), studies (about $1.0 million),
and meetings (about $0.5 million). Figure 8 provides a breakdown of
these amounts.
Figure 8: U.S. AMEC Program Costs by Category:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
U.S. Program Contributions to AMEC Have Declined:
The overall U.S. contribution to AMEC decreased from fiscal year 1999
to fiscal year 2004, as U.S.-funded projects have been completed and as
other AMEC member countries have increased their assistance. During the
period when U.S. contributions started to decline, Norway and Russia
increased their contributions. As figure 9 shows, U.S. funding peaked
at almost $6 million in fiscal year 1998 when large scale projects such
as the spent nuclear fuel storage container and storage pad were moving
into implementation. Since fiscal year 2001, U.S. contributions have
steadily declined and in fiscal year 2004, DOD allocated $2.5 million
to AMEC.
Figure 9: U.S. Funding Levels for AMEC, Fiscal Years 1997-2004:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
AMEC program officials stated that in the future, member countries
expect to share equally in AMEC project costs. U.S. AMEC officials
stated that U.S. annual assistance to AMEC will be $3 million annually
from fiscal year 2006 to fiscal year 2011, the latest date for which
projections have been made. This projection was based on prior years'
contributions as well as matching other members' planned contributions.
AMEC Plans to Significantly Expand Its Role and Redirect Its Focus to
Include Nuclear Security Issues:
AMEC's draft strategic plan, which is currently being reviewed by AMEC
partners, envisions helping to secure Russian submarines, submarine
bases, shipyards, and spent nuclear fuel and represents a significant
expansion and redirection of AMEC's objectives. AMEC's proposal to
improve submarine base security may be contrary to U.S. policy. In
addition, according to DOE officials, spent fuel from Russian
submarines is a low priority as a nuclear proliferation threat compared
to other radioactive sources, such as abandoned electrical generators
containing large amounts of strontium-90. Regardless of AMEC's plans,
U.S. participation in AMEC faces an uncertain future because the United
States lacks liability protection to participate in AMEC projects in
Russia.
AMEC Plans to Expand Its Role into Securing Nuclear Materials from
Russian Submarines:
In May 2004, AMEC developed a draft strategic plan to guide its future
efforts through 2015 that represents a significant expansion and
redirection of its program. According to the draft plan, recent world
events demonstrate the need to focus on emerging issues related to
safety and security, with an emphasis on nuclear nonproliferation,
nuclear threat reduction, and environmental sustainability. The draft
plan states that spent nuclear fuel and other radioactive wastes
generated during dismantlement of Russia's nuclear submarines are
unprotected, presenting a significant proliferation risk. As a result,
AMEC proposes giving priority to projects that will help secure spent
nuclear fuel and other material that presents a radiological hazard and
proposes addressing security problems at Russian shipyards, naval
bases, support vessels, and other facilities associated with the
dismantlement process. AMEC's draft plan calls for focusing on the
following program areas:
* nuclear security issues in support of the Group of Eight (G-8) Global
Partnership priorities;
* nuclear submarine dismantlement;
* management of hazardous waste generated as a result of military
activities; and:
* environmental sustainability, safety, and security of military
activities and installations.
According to AMEC officials, AMEC's future direction will be closely
aligned with the priorities established by the G-8 Global Partnership
plan to combat the spread of weapons and materials of mass destruction.
In 2002, the G-8 announced this new initiative. The United States and
the other G-8 members--Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia,
and the United Kingdom plus the European Union--pledged $20 billion
over the next 10 years to fund nonproliferation activities in the
former Soviet Union. One of the key areas identified by the G-8 is
nuclear submarine dismantlement. All of the G-8 countries, according to
the Department of State, are contributing to the dismantlement of
Russia's decommissioned general purpose nuclear submarines. Other non-
G-8 Global Partnership countries are also participating in this effort.
[Footnote 8] AMEC program partners--the United Kingdom and Norway--have
declared that they intend to use the AMEC program as one means of
fulfilling their G-8 Global Partnership obligations. According to AMEC
officials, future project development should include ways to reduce
the security risks posed by all types of Russian nuclear submarines.
With the G-8 priorities in mind, AMEC's nuclear security working group,
which helped develop the draft strategic plan, proposed several areas
of possible engagement, including:
* evaluating state-of-the-art technology to enhance security at Russian
naval bases and shipyards,
* improving security of ships known as "service vessels" that are used
to store spent nuclear fuel from dismantled nuclear submarines,
* consolidating radiological sources to improve their security, and:
* coordinating and increasing security of fueled submarines in transit.
Regarding the security of Russian naval bases, the working group
proposed evaluating, among other things, whether radar systems designed
to detect low-profile targets, sonar systems designed to detect
subsurface threats, and systems designed to detect small quantities of
nuclear materials would improve security. AMEC technical staff would
then develop recommendations and present them to AMEC's representatives
for consideration as follow-on projects. To improve the security of
service vessels, the working group proposed incorporating protective
measures, including radiation detectors, motion detectors, and closed
circuit televisions. The working group also suggested reviewing a
Russian study that focuses on consolidating radiological sources at
several facilities. Based on this review, AMEC may suggest additional
technical areas to be included in the study to improve its usefulness
as a way to improve security. Finally, the working group proposed
training personnel and developing procedures to produce a vulnerability
assessment for, among other things, bases, shipyards, and radioactive
waste storage facilities.
AMEC's Draft Plan Has Not Been Coordinated with DOE and DOD Nuclear
Nonproliferation Offices:
To date, AMEC's draft plan to address security issues associated with
Russia's nuclear submarines and support facilities has not been
coordinated with DOD's CTR policy office, DOD's Office of
Nonproliferation Policy, or DOE's National Nuclear Security
Administration--the organization primarily responsible for securing
nuclear materials in Russia.[Footnote 9] U.S. AMEC officials told us
that coordinating AMEC's draft plan with other U.S. government agencies
at an earlier stage would have been useful because of the program's
planned expansion to include nuclear security. The draft plan was
developed by an AMEC technical guidance group and is now being reviewed
by AMEC representatives from the United Kingdom, Norway, and Russia.
According to DOD, the next step will be to meet with AMEC partners in
September 2004 to finalize their comments and to review project
proposals. U.S. AMEC plans to submit the final draft of the strategic
plan to the U.S. interagency coordination process later in 2004. Once
the interagency coordination is completed, the plan will go to the
representatives of the AMEC partners for final approval.
A DOD Nonproliferation Policy official told us that he had not seen
AMEC's draft strategic plan. According to a CTR policy official, many
of the proposed areas of engagement identified by the nuclear security
working group were unnecessary because they would apply to protecting
fuel within nuclear submarines, which is less vulnerable to theft or
diversion. In addition, he noted that one proposed engagement--the
review of security measures for Russian naval bases and shipyards--
could be contrary to U.S. interagency guidelines established in 2003
that preclude the delivery of security-related assistance to most
operational military sites in Russia that have nuclear weapons,
including certain navy facilities. For example, the U.S. policy
precludes assistance for improving security at operational sites where
submarines loaded with nuclear weapons are docked.[Footnote 10]
DOE officials from the National Nuclear Security Administration, who
are primarily responsible for securing nuclear material in Russia,
expressed concerns about AMEC's proposed expansion to include nuclear
security. These officials, which included the Director of the Office of
Global Radiological Threat Reduction, told us that securing spent
nuclear fuel from dismantled Russian nuclear submarines is a low
priority, based on available information.[Footnote 11] DOE takes a
risk-based approach to threat reduction by considering the quantity,
form, transportability, and surrounding security threats posed by high-
risk radiological materials. Based on these criteria, DOE has concluded
that spent fuel from Russian submarines does not present a sufficiently
high risk to warrant the commitment of resources. Rather, DOE places a
higher priority on the highest-risk radiological materials, such as
sealed radiological sources found in radioisotope thermo-electric
generators, which contain strontium-90; blood irradiators;
sterilization facilities; and large radiological storage
locations.[Footnote 12] As a result, DOE officials stated that DOE does
not wish to participate in securing spent nuclear fuel.
DOE is funding a study that will prepare site-specific analyses of
spent nuclear fuel inventories and terrorism vulnerability assessments
for Russian nuclear submarine dismantlement sites. This study is
expected to be complete in September 2004. The Director of the Office
of Global Radiological Threat Reduction told us that DOE would use the
information from the study to further evaluate the risks posed by spent
nuclear fuel. He asserted, however, that securing spent nuclear fuel
from nuclear submarines is primarily an environmental issue--not a
proliferation concern. Furthermore, he stated that AMEC's proposed
nuclear security plan, if implemented, could have significant policy
implications for all U.S. nonproliferation programs. For example,
countries, including Russia, could request DOE assistance for securing
spent nuclear fuel from dismantled nuclear submarines. If DOE agreed to
provide this assistance, its resource requirements could dramatically
increase because of the amount of spent nuclear fuel in the submarines
and at coastal storage facilities.
Future U.S. Participation in AMEC Is Hampered by Lack of Liability
Protection:
Regardless of AMEC's future plans, U.S. participation in AMEC faces an
uncertain future because the United States does not have liability
protection for AMEC projects in Russia other than those that were
undertaken in support of CTR. From 1996 to 2002, U.S. AMEC officials
worked with the other AMEC member countries to obtain liability
protection through a separate agreement. According to DOD officials,
this effort was suspended because the State Department is negotiating
liability protection for a broad range of U.S. programs with Russia.
These negotiations have not been concluded, and therefore U.S. AMEC,
which does not have liability protection, has limited participation in
new projects.[Footnote 13]
In the interim, U.S. AMEC officials have explored other options to
acquire liability protection. For example, U.S. AMEC has continued to
request approval from CTR to extend liability protection for the mobile
liquid waste treatment facility project. However, CTR has rejected the
request because the project does not support CTR objectives. In
addition, according to CTR officials, the program does not require any
additional AMEC assistance and it will not extend liability protection
for future AMEC projects. In the interim, U.S. AMEC officials were able
to acquire limited liability protection to participate in two new
projects led by the United Kingdom: (1) the safe towing of
decommissioned nuclear submarines and (2) improving the buoyancy of
decommissioned nuclear submarines. U.S. AMEC officials have received
State Department approval to provide limited assistance to these
projects using the United Kingdom's bilateral agreement with Russia as
the basis for liability protection. U.S. AMEC plans to transfer funds
to a United Kingdom contractor to perform a feasibility study
associated with the two projects. According to U.S. AMEC officials, the
United Kingdom has offered to sign all future contracts with Russia
that will "hold the United States harmless of any liability." An
agreement to implement this proposed solution to the liability problem
had not been completed at the time of our review.
DOD Has Not Adequately Justified Its Proposed Initiative to Expand Its
Technology Development to Submarine Dismantlement Activities into
Russia's Pacific Region:
In response to Russia's request for assistance to address environmental
problems resulting from military activities in the Pacific, DOD plans
to expand its technology demonstration efforts to that region by
developing a program similar to AMEC. However, DOD has neither
adequately analyzed the condition of Russia's radioactive waste
problems resulting from, among other things, decommissioned and
dismantled nuclear submarines in the Pacific nor their impact on the
environment. Furthermore, DOD has not identified specific projects that
would be needed beyond those already being done for the Arctic region.
Finally, Japan, which is assisting Russia dismantle submarines in the
Pacific, has no current plans to join DOD in a technology development
program.
DOD Has Proposed Expanding Its Technology Development Efforts but Has
Not Adequately Analyzed the Environmental Risks or Projects That Would
Be Needed:
In November 1998, Russia requested DOD's assistance to establish an
organization similar to AMEC in Russia's Pacific region to address
environmental problems. Russia proposed 17 technical cooperation
projects to develop and manufacture such things as a mobile ecological
laboratory, a marine unit for ocean oil spill cleanup, and a
transportable unit for radioactive waste water treatment. DOD began
exploring ways to establish a cooperative program with Russia that had
the potential to expand into regional cooperation with Japan and
possibly other countries in the region. According to DOD officials,
Congress needed to authorize expansion of the program into the Pacific
region before projects could be implemented. Within DOD's fiscal year
2003 defense authorization bill, DOD sought to obtain congressional
approval to amend AMEC's enabling legislation to expand the program to
the Pacific region. However, no congressional action was taken on the
proposal. DOD proposed new legislation within the fiscal year 2004
defense authorization bill to develop a separate cooperative program in
the Pacific region, but no congressional action was taken on that
initiative either.
Although DOD has asserted that the expansion of cooperative efforts is
necessary because of serious environmental contamination in the Pacific
region, its proposal is not based on an adequate analysis of the
region's environmental conditions. Furthermore, DOD has not developed a
comprehensive plan that identifies priorities, resource requirements,
or timeframes for accomplishing the proposed expansion. Some U.S.
environmental experts have noted that a master plan is needed in the
Far East to prioritize tasks. Such a master plan is currently being
developed to assist G-8 submarine dismantlement efforts in the Arctic
region. This master plan, which is funded by the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development, is expected to help donor countries
improve coordination and reduce the likelihood of duplication of
assistance efforts.
DOD and State Department officials told us that while the problems in
the Pacific are generally known, they have not been thoroughly
documented and analyzed compared to conditions in the Arctic, which has
been the focus of international assistance. However, they said that
available information indicates that conditions in the Pacific pose
environmental risks. For example, there are environmental problems
associated with Russia's decommissioned and dismantled nuclear
submarines, and there are inadequate and unprotected storage facilities
for spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste. A 1994 report prepared by
Greenpeace documented the radioactive waste situation in the Russian
Pacific Fleet, including waste disposal problems, submarine
decommissioning and safety, and the security of naval fuel.[Footnote
14] There have also been more recent attempts to document environmental
risks posed by Russia's nuclear submarines in the Pacific region. For
example, in 2003, a study by the International Institute for Applied
Systems Analysis, which was funded by AMEC, found that a release of
radioactivity from an accident aboard a Russian nuclear submarine in
the Russian Pacific region could, under certain conditions, reach the
United States in 3 to 5 days.
DOD has taken steps to develop more comprehensive data on environmental
conditions in the Pacific region. It awarded a contract to a Russian
organization to study the status, characteristics, radiation potential,
and risks of submarine dismantlement in the Pacific. The study will
include a discussion of sources of radioactive contamination and
nonradioactive contamination, problems associated with monitoring and
environmental remediation, and sources of hazard and risk. In addition,
it will focus on (1) developing a methodology for prioritizing tasks
based on safety needs, threats, and risks; (2) developing a risk-based
high-priority list of urgent tasks; and (3) proposing a structure and
design for a strategic plan for future actions. Once the study is
completed, DOD plans to develop a plan for the proposed Pacific
initiative.
In the interim, DOD has created a list of projects that were developed
under AMEC for the Arctic region that may be applicable to the Pacific.
These projects include (1) ensuring the buoyancy of decommissioned
nuclear submarines, (2) providing handling for spent nuclear fuel, and
(3) developing processing technologies for solid radioactive waste.
According to DOD, additional projects would have to be developed in
consultation with Russia and would need to take into account different
climatic conditions in the Pacific. For example, the Pacific region
encompasses areas with humid summers that could affect the type of
equipment used. In addition, projects would also have to make
allowances for the poorly developed infrastructure found in Russia's
Far East. These factors could increase the complexity and costs
associated with the projects.
Japan Is Dismantling Russia's Nuclear Submarines in the Pacific but
Does Not Plan to Establish a Technology Development Program with DOD:
According to DOD officials, DOD envisions partnering with Japan to
develop a master plan that will specify projects based on assessments
of the environmental conditions in the Pacific region. In addition, DOD
has invited Japan to participate in the ongoing DOD-funded assessment
of the environmental risks posed by decommissioned nuclear submarines
in the Pacific.
Officials from Japan's Embassy to the United States and Japan's
Ministry of Foreign Affairs told us that Russia's decommissioned
nuclear submarines in the Pacific pose environmental and security
concerns. These officials were particularly concerned that radioactive
contamination from nuclear submarines could damage Japan's fishing
industry. However, according to an official from Japan's Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, Japan has no current plans to join DOD in a technology
development program in the Pacific region. The official told us that
although Japan is interested in AMEC-sponsored technologies--and how
they might be applied to submarine dismantlement in the Pacific--Japan
prefers to work under the auspices of the G-8 Global Partnership. Japan
has committed more than $200 million to the Global Partnership. Within
the committed amount, Japan plans to allocate about $100 million for
projects related to dismantlement of Russia's nuclear submarines and
other environmental projects in Russia. In December 2003, Japan began
assisting the Russian dismantlement of a general purpose nuclear
submarine, and the project is expected to be completed later this year.
The project is expected to cost about $7.4 million, including upgrades
to the military facility where dismantlement is taking place. Japan may
fund the dismantlement of 26 additional Russian nuclear submarines over
the next several years.
AMEC representatives from the United Kingdom and Norway told us that
their countries are not interested in funding a technology development
program in the Pacific region. However, they asserted that a regional
approach, similar to AMEC, might be useful to assist with submarine
dismantlement efforts in that region.
Conclusions:
With the completion of projects related to the CTR program, U.S.
participation in AMEC is at a crossroads. AMEC is heading in a new
direction that represents a significant expansion from its original
environmental charter. AMEC officials have not adequately justified the
expansion of the program to secure spent nuclear fuel and other
material and to address security problems at Russian shipyards, naval
bases, support vessels, and other facilities associated with the
dismantlement process. Regardless of AMEC's plans, however, the U.S.
role will be limited until the liability issue with Russia is resolved.
The proposed expansion of AMEC's goals to include improving security
around naval bases where Russia is decommissioning and dismantling
nuclear submarines is a low priority objective and may be inconsistent
with U.S security policy. DOE, which is responsible for securing
nuclear materials in Russia, does not believe that spent nuclear fuel
and other associated radioactive materials from Russia's nuclear
submarines pose a high priority threat and therefore have told us they
would not fund any initiatives in this area. Furthermore, improving
security around Russian submarine bases may be inconsistent with U.S.
policy, which generally precludes providing security upgrades around
operational Russian naval facilities.
In addition, DOD's interest in expanding its technology development
activities to Russia's Pacific fleet of nuclear submarines is not based
on an analysis that demonstrates the need to do so, although efforts
are underway to study the environmental risks. Previously developed
technologies for Russia's Arctic fleet could potentially be applied to
dismantling Russia's nuclear submarines in the Pacific, and there is no
assessment concluding that additional projects are needed. Furthermore,
Japan, which is most concerned about contamination from aging or
damaged nuclear submarines in the Pacific, has begun dismantling
Russian submarines in the Pacific under the auspices of the G-8 program
and has not requested DOD's assistance in technology development. If
further analysis in the Pacific shows that environmental conditions
warrant assistance, DOD officials stated that congressional approval
for this initiative will be required.
Finally, we believe that better oversight is needed to ensure that
project funds are spent on a timely basis. The approximately $700,000
in unspent funds transferred from the Department of the Navy to EPA
almost 5 years ago for the mobile liquid waste project raises concerns
about the adequacy of financial and management controls being exercised
over the program.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To help ensure that the United States' continued participation in AMEC
supports--and is consistent with--overall U.S. assistance efforts in
Russia, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense, in consultation
with the Secretaries of Energy and State, take the following actions:
* determine whether AMEC's role should be expanded to include
activities such as improving security around Russian nuclear submarine
bases and:
* ensure that AMEC's efforts are well defined, closely coordinated, and
complementary with other U.S. nuclear nonproliferation programs managed
by the Departments of Defense and Energy.
Regarding DOD's proposed Pacific initiative, we recommend that the
Secretary of Defense:
* assess whether technology development activities should be expanded
to include submarine dismantlement in that region, and if determined it
is necessary, request congressional approval for this expansion to the
Pacific region; and:
* determine what form U.S. participation in such a technology
development program would take, such as a bilateral effort or a
multilateral organization similar to AMEC.
Furthermore, we recommend that the Administrator, Environmental
Protection Agency determine, in consultation with the Secretary of the
Navy, if the funds that were designated for AMEC-related activities are
still needed for the purpose intended. If not, we recommend that the
Administrator and the Secretary determine whether to reprogram the
funds for other AMEC-related activities or to propose rescinding the
funds.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We provided the Departments of Defense and Energy and EPA with draft
copies of this report for their review and comment. DOE had no comments
and EPA provided technical comments, which we incorporated as
appropriate. DOD provided written comments, which are presented as
appendix III.
DOD concurred with all of our report's recommendations. However, in
commenting on our draft report, DOD raised several concerns and
observations, including: (1) AMEC's primary role is not to support the
Cooperative Threat Reduction program (CTR) but to minimize the
ecological security risks associated with military activities in the
Arctic; (2) DOD's program plan submitted to the Congress in 1999 did
not state that AMEC projects would support the goals of the CTR
program; (3) our report did not adequately capture AMEC's impact on and
relationship to other U.S./multinational programs such as the G-8
Global Partnership initiative; (4) AMEC's draft plan is a work in
progress and is currently undergoing coordination with partner
countries; and (5) our report does not capture the trend that shows
increased partner country funding. Our response to DOD's comments on
the report is as follows.
In our view, our draft report properly characterized AMEC's role and
gave the program credit for achieving technology benefits and promoting
U.S. foreign policy objectives. As we stated in the draft report, AMEC
was established to help reduce the environmental impacts of Russia's
military activities in the Arctic region. However, we also noted that
U.S. participation in AMEC was hindered by the absence of liability
protection. Given this lack of liability protection, the United States
has, for the most part, tied its participation in AMEC projects to
DOD's CTR liability protocol. We noted, however, in the draft report
that a number of AMEC projects are not linked to the CTR program.
It is unclear to us why DOD asserted in its comments that its 1999
program plan does not state that AMEC was expected to support CTR
projects. In fact, DOD's program plan clearly states on page 7 that
"All AMEC activities currently underway in Russia are in support of CTR
Ballistic Missile Submarine Dismantlement projects and thus are
governed by CTR Implementing Agreement of August 26, 1993, between DOD
and the Ministry of Economics of the Russian Federation, addressing
strategic offensive arms elimination." In addition, we disagree with
DOD's assertion that we did not adequately portray AMEC's relationship
to other U.S./multinational programs, including the G-8 Global
Partnership initiative. Our draft report recognized that AMEC's future
direction would be closely aligned with priorities established by the
G-8 Global Partnership. We also noted that AMEC program partners have
declared their intention to use AMEC as one way to fulfill their G-8
Global Partnership obligations. Furthermore, we recognized in the draft
report that AMEC's strategic plan is a draft document and is being
coordinated with partner countries.
Regarding member countries' contributions to AMEC, our report addresses
this matter as well. We stated in our draft report that overall U.S.
funding decreased from fiscal year 1999 to fiscal year 2004 as U.S.-
funded projects have been completed and as other AMEC member countries
have increased their assistance. However, in response to DOD's comment,
we added this information to the highlights page of the report.
DOD concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary of Defense, in
consultation with the Secretaries of Energy and State, determine
whether AMEC's role should be expanded to include activities such as
improving security around Russian nuclear submarine bases. However, DOD
stated that AMEC's planned expansion will not include submarine base
security but will focus on activities such as the G-8 Global
Partnership initiative and ecological security. DOD stated that
improving security around Russian nuclear submarine bases was part of a
draft strategic plan that is currently being coordinated with member
countries and it is inappropriate to portray any elements of the draft
plan as anything other than a plan in progress.
We are encouraged that DOD now states that it will not engage in
activities to improve the security at Russian nuclear submarine bases-
-activities that could be contrary to U.S. policy. However, we believe
it is important to note that AMEC was considering improving submarine
base security as part of its draft strategic plan. In our view, if AMEC
provided assistance to improve the security of Russia's submarine
bases, it would have represented a significant departure from the
program's original environmental security objectives.
DOD also provided technical comments, which we have incorporated into
the report as appropriate. Below, we summarize several of these
technical comments and provide our response.
DOD incorrectly asserted in its technical comments that our draft
report did not address two aspects of section 324 of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 that required us to
review AMEC: (1) the extent to which the AMEC program supports the G-8
Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass
Destruction Initiative and (2) the current and proposed technology
development and demonstration role of AMEC in U.S. nonproliferation
efforts. As we previously noted, our draft report provides information
on the relationship between AMEC and the G-8 Global Partnership, noting
that the future direction of AMEC will be tailored to support G-8
Global Partnership goals. The draft report also identified the various
technology demonstration projects that have been proposed and
implemented, including recent projects focusing on the safe towing and
improved buoyancy of decommissioned nuclear submarines. These projects
are expected to support G-8 nonproliferation goals as well as U.S.
security interests.
DOD also asserted that we had mischaracterized AMEC's contribution to
CTR as "limited" because we did not factor into our analysis the
financial benefits resulting from the prototype 40-metric ton spent
nuclear fuel storage container developed by AMEC. DOD claims that the
cost savings from these containers has essentially paid for the AMEC
program. As stated in the draft report, the AMEC containers cost less
to produce than the container Russia developed to store the spent
nuclear fuel and we have revised the report to more accurately indicate
the amount of savings per container as noted in DOD's comments.
However, we believe that DOD has not understood the larger point of our
analysis. While we recognize in the report that the storage container
project has proven beneficial, the other seven projects that were
established to support CTR objectives have had limited impact on the
CTR program. In our view, one project, regardless of its benefit, does
not compensate for the shortfalls of the other projects in supporting
CTR program objectives.
DOD stated that the report does not capture the draft nature of the
AMEC strategic plan and does not properly explain the coordination
process among partner countries. We disagree with this assertion. We
properly identified the plan as a draft document throughout the report.
Furthermore, the draft report contained information about the
coordination process that DOD officials provided to us on July 14,
2004. However, we have incorporated additional information in the
report about coordination timeframes to reflect DOD's comments.
In its technical comments, DOD also stated that U.S. participation in
AMEC faces an uncertain future due to changing program direction, and
not because it lacks liability protection. We disagree with this
assertion. U.S. AMEC officials told us that U.S. participation in new
AMEC projects was hampered due to the lack of liability protection.
These officials never indicated during the course of our review that
changing program requirements were impacting the program. In fact, they
stated in a positive vein that future U.S. participation in AMEC would
be tied to the G-8 Global Partnership initiative, which was aligned
with U.S. national security interests.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense; the
Secretary of Energy; the Administrator, National Nuclear Security
Administration; the Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency;
the Director, Office of Management and Budget; and interested
congressional committees. We will also make copies available to others
upon request. In addition, this report will be available at no charge
on the GAO Web site at [Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, I can
be reached at 202-512-3841 or [Hyperlink, aloisee@gao.gov]. Key
contributors to this report were Julie Chamberlain, Nancy Crothers,
Robin Eddington, Glen Levis, and Jim Shafer.
Signed by:
Gene Aloise:
Acting Director, Natural Resources and Environment:
List of Committees:
The Honorable John W. Warner:
Chairman:
The Honorable Carl Levin:
Ranking Minority Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Ted Stevens:
Chairman:
The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye:
Ranking Minority Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Duncan Hunter:
Chairman:
The Honorable Ike Skelton:
Ranking Minority Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Jerry Lewis:
Chairman:
The Honorable John P. Murtha:
Ranking Minority Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives:
[End of section]
Appendixes:
Appendix I: List of AMEC Projects:
The following table lists AMEC projects under way, completed, newly
started, or terminated.
Table 1: Status of AMEC Projects:
Project: Prototype;
40-metric ton storage container;
Status: Completed;
Project description: Developing a prototype storage container for the
interim storage and transport of spent nuclear fuel from dismantled
Russian nuclear submarines;
Project established to support CTR? Yes.
Project: Storage pad;
Status: Completed;
Project description: Developing concrete pad for temporary storage of
spent nuclear fuel containers prior to their shipment to a permanent
storage facility;
Project established to support CTR? Yes.
Project: Drying technology for 40-metric ton storage containers;
Status: Terminated;
Project description: Developing technology to eliminate water from
storage containers to inhibit corrosion and increase container storage
life;
Project established to support CTR? Yes.
Project: Liquid radioactive waste treatment;
Status: Suspended;
Project description: Developing mobile technology for treating liquid
radioactive waste at remote sites;
Project established to support CTR? Yes.
Project: Solid radioactive waste treatment;
Status: Completed;
Project description: Identifying and developing technologies to
process (reduce volume and stabilize) solid radioactive waste from
dismantled nuclear submarines;
Project established to support CTR? Yes.
Project: Solid radioactive waste storage;
Status: Completed;
Project description: Identifying and developing technologies to safely
store solid radioactive waste from dismantled nuclear submarines;
Project established to support CTR? Yes.
Project: Radiation detection system;
Status: Completed;
Project description: Developing and testing a system using Norwegian
software and Russian hardware to monitor radiation levels of spent
nuclear fuel on decommissioned/dismantled nuclear submarines;
Project established to support CTR? Yes.
Project: Dosimeters;
Status: Completed;
Project description: Providing the Russian navy with DOE-surplus
dosimeters (radiation detection devices) to monitor radiation levels
within proximity of nuclear submarines. Norway also provided Russia
with dosimeters, but the equipment was manufactured in Russia;
Project established to support CTR? Yes.
Project: Radioactive waste management facility;
Status: Completed;
Project description: Supporting development of a center for
radioactive waste storage at a Russian navy shipyard. The project
integrates the technologies developed in the solid radioactive waste
treatment and solid radioactive waste storage projects;
Project established to support CTR? No.
Project: Improving buoyancy of decommissioned nuclear submarines[A];
Status: Under way;
Project description: Identifying technologies to improve the buoyancy
of decommissioned nuclear submarines;
Project established to support CTR? No.
Project: Improving towing technologies[A];
Status: Under way;
Project description: Developing and manufacturing equipment for the
safe towing of decommissioned nuclear submarines;
Project established to support CTR? No.
Project: Submarine dismantlement[B];
Status: Newly started;
Project description: Dismantling a general purpose Russian nuclear
submarine to use AMEC-developed technologies. This project is a United
Kingdom-Norway initiative and the United States is providing technical
expertise;
Project established to support CTR? No.
Project: Submarine dismantlement;
Status: Newly started;
Project description: Reducing the hazardous wastes generated during
submarine dismantlement (e.g., by using explosive cutting techniques
to reduce the release of gases);
Project established to support CTR? No.
Project: Contaminated soil;
Status: Partially completed;
Project description: Project implemented/designated/funded by Russia
and Norway to select technologies for dealing with military
nonradioactive hazardous material spills in the Arctic;
Project established to support CTR? No.
Project: "Clean ship" technologies;
Status: Completed;
Project description: Examining technologies and designing a vessel to
collect and process naval ship waste in the Barents Sea region. The
vessel was never built. The intent is now to demonstrate clean ship
technologies;
Project established to support CTR? No.
Project: Phase 2 "clean ship" technology;
Status: Terminated;
Project description: Constructing a vessel to collect and process data
on naval ship waste in the Barents Sea region;
Project established to support CTR? No.
Project: Environmental management of military bases;
Status: Under way;
Project description: Addressing environmental protection issues at
Arctic military bases;
Project established to support CTR? No.
Project: Disposal of submarine batteries;
Status: Terminated;
Project description: Proposing solutions for the management of used
submarine storage batteries;
Project established to support CTR? No.
Project: Emergency preparedness exercise;
Status: Under way;
Project description: Planning and staging an exercise involving an
accident with spent nuclear fuel;
Project established to support CTR? No.
Source: AMEC.
Notes: The United States provided or plans to provide funds for all of
these projects, except the contaminated soil project, which was funded
by Norway and Russia.
We did not consider the radioactive waste management facility to be a
project that was established to directly support CTR program
objectives. The facility was constructed to house technology
demonstration projects.
[A] This project was proposed by the United Kingdom. The United States
is providing funding only for preliminary project planning due to
liability concerns.
[B] According to DOD, participation is limited to providing technical
expertise because the United States is not funding the dismantlement of
Russia's general purpose nuclear submarines.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix II: Scope and Methodology:
To assess the extent to which AMEC supports and complements the CTR
program, we obtained and analyzed AMEC project files, reviewed
pertinent supporting documentation, including project justifications,
and discussed each project with program and project managers from the
Departments of Defense and Energy, the Environmental Protection Agency,
and Brookhaven National Laboratory. Department of State officials also
provided their views about the projects. Of particular importance was
an AMEC program plan that DOD submitted to the Congress in response to
the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999. In the
plan, DOD provided information on AMEC projects' relationship to the
CTR program. We used this plan as the basis for determining how AMEC
projects supported the CTR program. During our review, we also
interviewed DOD's Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Installations
and Environment, who is responsible for establishing U.S. policy for
AMEC, to obtain his views on the impact of AMEC projects and the
program's overall benefits. In April 2004, we attended a meeting of the
AMEC principals in Svalbard, Norway, to obtain additional information
about the AMEC program, including project implementation. During the
meeting, we interviewed the principals and their staff from the United
Kingdom, Norway, and Russia. These principals included the Commander of
U.S. Navy Installations, the Head of Environmental Safety of the
Russian Armed Forces, the Deputy Director General of Norway's Security
Policy Department, and a representative from the United Kingdom's Royal
Navy responsible for environmental issues. We also interviewed U.S.
embassy officials in Oslo, Norway, including the U.S. Ambassador. The
U.S. Ambassador to Russia provided his perspectives about AMEC in a
letter to us dated May 24, 2004. We also interviewed officials from
Norway's federal audit agency (Riksrevisjonen) and the Bellona
Foundation, a Norwegian nongovernmental organization that focuses on
environmental issues in the Arctic.
To identify AMEC financial contributions, including those from the
United States, we obtained data from the AMEC program office in DOD,
which is responsible for tracking all financial activities related to
U.S. participation in AMEC. In addition, the AMEC program office, at
our request, obtained financial data from Norway and Russia. The United
Kingdom's data were provided to us by the AMEC Steering Group Co-
Chairman. We obtained responses to a series of questions focused on
data reliability covering issues such as data entry access, internal
control procedures, and the accuracy and completeness of the data from
a United Kingdom AMEC official. Although we did not interview AMEC
officials from Russia and Norway, we discussed in detail the Russian
and Norwegian financial data with U.S. AMEC officials. Based on the
United Kingdom responses and these discussions with U.S. AMEC
officials, we concluded that the data were sufficiently reliable for
the purposes of this report.
With regard to the U.S. contributions to AMEC, we reviewed the data and
posed a number of questions to the AMEC program office to determine the
reliability of the financial data. Specifically, we (1) met with AMEC
program officials to discuss these data in detail; (2) obtained from
key officials responses to a series of questions focused on data
reliability covering issues such as data entry access, internal control
procedures, and the accuracy and completeness of the data; and (3)
added follow-up questions whenever necessary. Based on this work, we
determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of
this report based on the work we performed to assure the data's
reliability.
To assess AMEC's future program objectives, we examined documents
prepared by AMEC and interviewed officials responsible for developing
the draft strategic plan. Specifically, in May 2004, we attended a
meeting of AMEC's Technical Guidance Group in Gettysburg, Pennsylvania,
where the plan was formulated. While at the meeting we discussed AMEC's
future plans with (1) the United Kingdom's AMEC Steering Group Co-
Chairman (representing the Royal Navy), (2) representatives from
Norway's Ministry of Defense and Norway's Defense Research
Establishment, (3) a representative from Russia's Armed Forces
Environmental Safety organization, and (4) the AMEC Steering Group Co-
Chairman from DOD. In addition, we used the draft strategic plan to
analyze AMEC's long-term goals and objectives, including its proposal
to include nuclear security as a new program objective. We also
discussed AMEC's nuclear security focus with officials from the Office
of the Secretary of Defense for Cooperative Threat Reduction Policy,
DOD's Office of Nonproliferation, and DOE's National Nuclear Security
Administration. At DOE, we interviewed the Principal Assistant Deputy
Administrator, Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation; Director,
Office of Global Threat Reduction; and the Acting Assistant Deputy
Administrator, Office of International Material Protection and
Cooperation. We also discussed these matters with a Brookhaven National
Laboratory official who is leading a DOE-sponsored study on the risks
associated with spent nuclear fuel from dismantled Russian nuclear
submarines.
We obtained and analyzed pertinent program files maintained by DOD to
evaluate DOD's plan to expand its technology development activities to
the Pacific region. We also obtained available studies and reports
prepared by Greenpeace International and the International Institute
for Applied Systems Analysis that identified the conditions and risks
posed by radioactive contamination. We supplemented this information
with interviews with knowledgeable officials from Vanderbilt University
and the Department of State. The official from Vanderbilt University is
responsible for managing an AMEC-funded project on radioactive
contamination in the Far East. We also interviewed an official from
Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs to obtain information about Japan's
views of the environmental problems associated with radioactive waste
generated by Russia's nuclear submarines.
We conducted our review from January through August 2004 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense:
OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:
ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY AND LOGISTICS:
3000 DEFENSE PENTAGON:
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3000:
August 24, 2004:
Mr. Gene Aloise:
Acting Director, Natural Resources and Environment:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G. Street, N.W.:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Dear Mr. Aloise:
The Department of Defense (DoD) appreciates this opportunity to respond
to the Government Accountability Office's (GAO) draft report, "RUSSIAN
NUCLEAR SUBMARINES: U.S. Participation in the Arctic Military
Environmental Cooperation Program Needs Better Justification," dated
August 3, 2004, (GAO Code 360424/GAO-04-924).
The Department has reviewed the draft GAO report and has the following
concerns and observations:
* The Arctic Military Environmental Cooperative (AMEC) primary role is
not to support the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program, but to
minimize the ecological security risks associated with military
activities in the Arctic.
* The Department's 1999 program plan to Congress did not state that AMEC
projects would support the goals of the CTR program. The 1999 program
plan states that "AMEC is currently being conducted in close
cooperation with the CTR program such that these two programs have a
beneficial synergistic relationship." This is in accordance with the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, Public Law
105-261. As some CTR requirements changed after project inception or
delays prevented project use by CTR, some CTR-related projects were
carried forward for use outside the CTR program. These projects were
consistent with broader program goals and AMEC legislation.
* The report does not adequately capture AMEC's impact on and
relationship with other U.S./multinational programs such as the G-8
Global Partnership Initiative, nor AMEC's ability to serve as an
enabler for these programs. Within the United States, the Department of
State considers AMEC part of our programs supporting the G-8
Initiative.
* Although the report text describes the full program funding situation,
the report's summaries do not capture the trend toward increased
partner country funding. In recent years, Norwegian contributions have
greatly increased, and both Norway and the United Kingdom plan to
contribute individually at levels at least equal to FY04 and future
U.S. contributions.
AMEC's draft strategic plan, written in May to support the G-8 Global
Partnership, is a work-in-progress and is currently undergoing
coordination with partner countries. Many concepts within the plan are
those of partner countries and will either be accepted once the US
begins its interagency coordination of the document or will be carried
out by member nations under their own funding without US participation.
Enclosed are the Department's specific responses to the recommendations
and technical comments. We request that you include our attached
comments in your final report.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Alex A. Beehler:
Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Environment, Safety and
Occupational Health):
Enclosures As stated:
GAO DRAFT REPORT - DATED AUGUST 3, 2004 GAO CODE 360424/GAO-04-924:
"RUSSIAN NUCLEAR SUBMARINES: U.S. Participation in the Arctic Military
Environmental Cooperation Program Needs Better Justification":
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COMMENTS TO THE RECOMMENDATIONS:
RECOMMENDATION 1: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense, in
consultation with the Secretaries of Energy and State, determine
whether AMEC's role should be expanded to include activities such as
improving security around Russian nuclear submarine bases (p. 40, GAO
Draft Report).
DOD RESPONSE: DoD concurs with this recommendation. We agree that the
Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretaries of Energy
and State, determine whether AMEC's role should be expanded to include
activities such as the G-8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of
Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction Initiative (G8 Initiative).
DoD believes U.S. AMEC's future should be tied to the G-8 Initiative
and ecological security activities. The Department of State considers
AMEC one of several programs supporting the G-8 Initiative. DoD notes
that the U.S.'s expanded role will not include activities such as
improving security around Russian nuclear submarine bases. "Improving
security around Russian Nuclear submarine bases" was part of a draft
AMEC strategic plan that is currently being coordinated with AMEC
partner countries before it goes through the U.S. interagency
coordination process. It is inappropriate to portray any elements of
this draft plan as anything other than a draft plan in progress.
RECOMMENDATION 2: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense, in
consultation with the Secretaries of Energy and State, ensure that
AMEC's efforts are well defined, closely coordinated, and complementary
with other U.S. nuclear nonproliferation programs managed by the
departments of Defense and Energy (p. 40, GAO Draft Report).
DOD RESPONSE: DoD concurs with this recommendation. DoD further
believes the coordination should also include programs being
administered by the Department of State such as the G-8 Global
Partnership Initiative.
RECOMMENDATION 3: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
assess whether technology development activities should be expanded to
include submarine dismantlement in that region, and if determined
necessary, request congressional approval for this expansion to the
Pacific region (p. 41, GAO Draft Report).
DOD RESPONSE: DoD concurs with this recommendation. The Pacific region
provides unique opportunities for nuclear submarine dismantlement
technology demonstrations. Some
Pacific region dismantlement sites are much further from the bases
where the decommissioned submarines are located than in NW Russia, and
special considerations for the safe transport of the submarines must be
considered. The region also has damaged submarines with Spent Nuclear
Fuel. The importance of developing technology that dismantles
submarines safely in this region is demonstrated by such accidents as
Chazma Bay. Although this accident occurred almost 20 years ago, highly
radioactive contaminated areas remain. The safe transport of
decommissioned submarines from naval bases in Kamchatka to the
dismantlement site in Vladivostok is of special concern to the
Japanese, because the transport route is very close to the Japanese
homeland. DoD will continue coordination with interested nations such
as Japan to develop specific projects. Japanese interest in these
issues is shown by their official attendance at the May 2004 meeting
that developed the draft strategic plan, their participation in a July
2004 project meeting concerning the safe transport of submarines to
their dismantlement site and plan, to participate in the September 2004
meeting that will finalize the AMEC partners comments on the draft
strategic plan and to review project proposals.
RECOMMENDATION 4: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
determine what form that U.S. participation in such a technology
development program would take, such as a bilateral effort or a
multilateral organization similar to AMEC (p. 41, GAO Draft Report).
DOD RESPONSE: DoD concurs with this recommendation. Any decision on the
future structure of a technology development program for the Pacific
will be fully coordinated and considered. The current AMEC structure
provides an excellent model for cooperative activities and will assist
in developing a Pacific program, but the exact form of the program must
be determined.
RECOMMENDATION 5: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of the Navy
consult with the Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency (EPA),
to determine whether funds that were designated for AMEC-related
activities are still needed for the purpose intended. If not, GAO
recommended that the Secretary and Administrator determine whether to
reprogram the funds for other AMEC-related activities or to propose
rescinding the funds (p. 41, GAO Draft Report).
DOD RESPONSE: DoD concurs with this recommendation. This project was on
hold for an extended period awaiting nuclear liability coverage, first
from the proposed AMEC Trilateral Agreement and then from the
Multilateral Nuclear Environmental Programme in Russia (MNEPR).
Although the MNEPR agreement is in effect, the U.S. has not accepted
the liability terms. The AMEC partners have expressed renewed interest
in this project and have proposed using their bilateral agreement with
Russia to provide the appropriate liability protection. DoD is
coordinating this effort with EPA.
GAO DRAFT REPORT - DATED AUGUST 3, 2004 GAO CODE 360424/GAO-04-924:
"RUSSIAN NUCLEAR SUBMARINES: U.S. Participation in the Arctic Military
Environmental Cooperation Program Needs Better Justification":
TECHNICAL COMMENTS:
1. Page 8, paragraph 2 - The reports does not adequately capture AMEC's
impact on and relationship to other U.S./multinational programs such as
the G-8 Global Partnership Initiative, nor AMEC's ability to serve as
an enabler to these programs. Within the U.S., the Department of State
considers AMEC part of our programs supporting the G-8 Initiative.
Section 324 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2004 requires the Comptroller General to:
(a) Conduct a review of the Arctic Military Environmental Cooperation
program, including-
(1) the current and proposed technology development and demonstration
role of the program in United States nonproliferation efforts; and:
(2) the relationship of the program to the Cooperative Threat Reduction
Program specified in section 1501(b) of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 (Public Law 104-201; 110 Stat.
2731; 50 U.S.C. 2362 note). (b) Elements of Review-The review shall
include an assessment of the following:
(1) Whether the conditions in the Western Pacific region require an
expansion of the Arctic Military Environmental Cooperation program to
include that region.
(2) The extent to which foreign countries, including Russia, make
financial contributions to the program.
(3) The extent to which the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program and
the G-8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials
of Mass Destruction Initiative use the program.
(4) Whether the program is important to the disarmament and
nonproliferation functions of the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program.
(5) Future-year funding and program plans of the Department of Defense
for the program.
The GAO report addresses only the following: (1) assessment of the
extent to which AMEC supports and complements the CTR program, (2)
identification of participating countries' financial contributions to
AMEC, (3) assessment of AMEC's future program objectives, and (4)
evaluation of DoD's proposal to expand its technology development
activities to Russia's Pacific region.
2. Page 9, Paragraph 1-The Department's 1999 program plan to Congress
did not state that AMEC projects would support the goals of the CTR
program. The 1999 program plan states that:
"AMEC is currently being conducted in close cooperation with the CTR
program such that these two programs have a beneficial synergistic
relationship." This is in accordance with the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, Public Law 105-261.
3. Page 10, second subparagraph last sentence - In the August 2, 2004,
letter that was provided to GAO, the Russian AMEC Principal, General
Yunak, expresses his satisfaction with the progress of AMEC projects
and states that the U.S. dosimeters provided under Project 1.5 are
currently being used by the shipyard during the nuclear submarine
dismantlement process.
4. Page 10, last paragraph first sentence - This paragraph
characterizes AMEC as providing "limited contribution to CTR" The AMEC
program essentially paid for itself since the AMEC cask costs 80% less
than the current single-purpose Russian SNF transport container. It
takes 10 -12 casks per submarine, and CTR plans to dismantle over 40
submarines. This "limited contribution to CTR" characterization should
also be corrected in the summary page in the section "What GAO Found."
Fast paragraph sixth line from the bottom, by deleting "Despite AMEC's,
limited contribution to CTR."
5. Page 11, paragraph 1 second to last sentence - U.S. funding levels
did decline as U.S. funded projects have been completed, but also
because foreign contributions have been increasing.
6. Page 11, paragraph 2 - The draft strategic plan is a work in
progress. It has not been approved by the AMEC Principals nor vetted
through the interagency process. These documents were given to GAO to
show that the AMEC program was progressing toward development of a path
forward. The next step is to meet with AMEC partners in September 2004
to finalize their comments on the draft plan and to review project
proposals. The U.S. will submit the final draft for U.S. interagency
coordination later in 2004.
7. Page 11, paragraph 2, third sentence from the bottom - U.S.
participation in AMEC faces an uncertain future not because it lacks
liability protection, but because of changing program direction. Page
34 of the GAO report mentions that other options are being explored to
acquire liability protection.
8. Page 12, paragraph 1 - It is not that the Japanese lack interest,
they just have not found a way to join AMEC since their dismantlement
program comes under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and has no military
link. The Japanese participated in the May 2004 meeting that developed
the draft strategic plan, they participated in a July 2004 project
meeting concerning the safe transport of submarines to their
dismantlement site, and they plan to participate in the September 2004
meeting with the AMEC partners.
9. Page 15, second sentence - The EPA official provided the following
information regarding the cost of the container to DoD: "When serially-
produced, this container costs less than 20% of the cost of the current
single-purpose Russian SNF transport container." This means that the
container costs 80% less than the Russian container, not 20% less.
10. Page 17, subparagraph 1-The CTR-supplied equipment and
infrastructure at the Russian shipyard Nerpa will also be available for
the dismantlement of Russia's general purpose submarines.
11. Page 17, subparagraph 2 - CTR has now limited this project to
simply providing the design of the dehydration system to Russia.
12. Page 19 and 20, last two paragraphs - the GAO quotes AMEC officials
as asserting that planning was done for CTR projects with "full
cooperation and approval of the CTR program and the appropriate Russian
government agencies." This language, however, is not included in the
summaries, which seem to blame the AMEC program for lack of support.
The summaries also do not include the final paragraph of the report,
which states that AMEC plays a useful role. This supports the idea that
AMEC has other uses. To reinforce this point within the limited space
in the one-page summary, the DoD suggests that in the first paragraph
under "What GAO found," the words "including the CTR program" be added
after "DoD officials" six lines from the bottom of the paragraph.
13. Page 23, paragraph 1-The U.S. Ambassador to Russia stated in a
letter that he recommended "consideration of expansion of the AMEC
program to the Russian Pacific Fleet where the opportunity exists to
conduct a similar multi-national program with Russia, US, Japan and
Republic of Korea."
14. Page 25, bottom and 26 - this makes the points about future funding
for the program, all of which is not included in the summaries. The
first sentence, on page 28, is an excellent quote that easily could be
placed in the summary.
15. Page 32, paragraph 1 --The report does not capture the nature of
the AMEC strategic plan as a draft work in progress and does not
properly explain the coordination process. The plan is currently under
review by Russia and Norway. The United Kingdom has already commented.
After coordination among the national participants is completed, the
plan will be coordinated within DoD as well as through an interagency
process to ensure that it reflects the U.S. position. This plan will
then go to the representatives of AMEC partners for final approval.
16. Page 34, middle paragraph, fourth line - Change "Since 1996" to
"From 1996 to 2002." The last line also should have "not" after
"does."
17. Page 35, top of page, first line - The goal of this project is not
to remove radioactive waste from decommissioned nuclear submarines but
to improve the buoyancy of these submarines to keep them from sinking
while awaiting dismantlement.
(360424):
FOOTNOTES
[1] Nuclear submarines are powered by nuclear reactors that are encased
in the hull. Russia's nuclear submarines include ballistic missile
submarines that are designed to launch nuclear weapons, guided cruise
missile submarines, torpedo attack submarines, and special mission
purpose submarines. This report refers to all Russian nuclear
submarines except for the ballistic missile submarines as general
purpose submarines.
[2] The spent nuclear fuel accounts for 99 percent of the radioactivity
from decommissioned nuclear submarines and requires special handling.
[3] The process for submarine dismantlement and radioactive waste
removal is extensive and complicated. It requires the removal of
deckhouse enclosures and other detachable parts while the submarine is
still afloat. Then the submarine's spent nuclear fuel is removed, and
the reactor compartments are cut out and prepared for long-term
storage. Most submarines have two reactors, each containing 180-280
fuel assemblies. The reactor compartments are sealed and buoyancy
compartments are attached. This process creates liquid and solid
radioactive waste. The missile compartment and bow and stern are
removed and the remainder of the hull is recycled where feasible.
According to a DOD official, the dismantlement process, including the
transportation of the spent nuclear fuel, can take up to 18 months.
[4] In 2003, several countries, including the United States, signed the
Multilateral Nuclear Environmental Program in the Russian Federation,
to facilitate the implementation of nuclear-related assistance programs
with Russia. It was intended that this agreement would provide, among
other things, liability protection to countries working with Russia.
However, the United States has not signed the liability annex to the
agreement because the United States is negotiating a separate liability
agreement with Russia.
[5] The project covered the design, licensing, and construction of the
prototype container. Certification of the container was delayed for
about 2 years due to a jurisdictional dispute between Gosatomnadzor,
the Russian civilian nuclear regulatory authority, and the military
regulatory authority in Russia regarding the relative roles and
responsibilities for transport and handling of the spent nuclear fuel
using both military and civilian equipment.
[6] The storage pad, which is located adjacent to the Nerpa shipyard,
is being used to collect spent nuclear fuel from a variety of sites in
northwest Russia. The shipyard, which has CTR-supplied equipment and
infrastructure improvements, will also be available for the
dismantlement of Russia's general purpose nuclear submarines.
[7] According to EPA, CTR subsequently canceled funding for the
construction of the large dehydration facility after the design had
been completed. EPA officials informed us that to their knowledge there
is no dehydration system in Russia that meets western standards.
Therefore, corrosion and chemical decomposition (hydrolysis) can occur
over long-term storage of the containers with spent nuclear fuel.
[8] Australia, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden
are also engaged in this area through supporting nuclear and
environmental work in northwest Russia, or, in the case of Norway,
through direct funding of the dismantlement of submarines. Australia,
which joined the G-8 Global Partnership in 2004, plans to work with
Japan to support the dismantling of general purpose submarines in the
Pacific region.
[9] The National Nuclear Security Administration is a separately
organized agency within DOE that was created in October 1999 with
responsibility for the nation's nuclear weapons, nonproliferation, and
naval reactors programs.
[10] For more information on this issue, see GAO, Weapons of Mass
Destruction: Additional Russian Cooperation Needed to Facilitate U.S.
Efforts to Improve Security at Russian Sites, GAO-03-482 (Washington,
D.C.: Mar. 24, 2003).
[11] DOE's Office of Global Radiological Threat Reduction's mission is
to reduce the threat posed by high-risk radiological materials that
could be used in a dirty bomb by identifying and securing such
materials on a worldwide basis.
[12] For more information, see GAO, Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S. and
International Assistance Efforts to Control Sealed Radioactive Sources
Need Strengthening, GAO-03-638 (Washington, D.C.: May 16, 2003).
[13] The impasse over liability protection focuses on Russia's failure
to ratify an extension of the agreement used to establish the CTR
program. That agreement, which entered into force upon signature in
1992, contained a blanket exemption from liability for all activities
funded through the CTR program. The agreement's term was 7 years, but
in 1999 the United States and Russia agreed to a provisionally applied
7-year extension. However, the Russian parliament has not ratified the
extension. The U.S. position is that CTR ratification is a necessary
precursor to consideration of liability issues in other agreements with
Russia.
[14] Prepared by Joshua Handler, Research Coordinator, Greenpeace Trip
Report, Subject: Radioactive Waste Situation in the Russian Pacific
Fleet, Nuclear Waste Disposal Problems, Submarine Decommissioning,
Submarine Safety, and Security of Naval Fuel, (October 27, 1994).
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