Combating Terrorism

Funding Data Reported to Congress Should Be Improved Gao ID: GAO-03-170 November 26, 2002

Congress responded to the attacks of September 11, 2001, with dramatic funding increases to combat terrorism. Even before these attacks, Congress was concerned about increased funding in this area, and based on findings from a 1997 GAO report, mandated that the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) report annually on funding to combat terrorism. In this review, GAO was asked to analyze such funding trends, describe difficulties in coordinating combating terrorism budgets, assess data reported to Congress, and describe the executive branch's efforts to maximize the effective use of combating terrorism funds. The review relied on OMB's definition of "combating terrorism" to include both homeland security and overseas combating terrorism missions.

GAO calculated, on the basis of OMB's data, that there was a 276-percent total increase in funds designated to combat terrorism during fiscal years 2001 and 2002 (as reported in OMB's annual reports to Congress for 2001 and 2002, respectively). This increase includes a 106-percent increase from the post-September 11 redefinition of combating terrorism to include homeland security activities such as aviation and transportation security, and a 170-percent increase due to funding increases. Difficulties in coordinating budgets to combat terrorism stem from the variety of missions involved and the fact that activities related to combating terrorism are often funded through budget accounts that also provide funding for other activities. Various approaches have been used to address these challenges. The process for preparing the budget for fiscal year 2003 was characterized by collaboration between OMB and the Office of Homeland Security that resulted in the budget priorities included in the President's budget for fiscal 2003. Crosscutting funding data reported to Congress, however, do not adequately support congressional oversight. An OMB annual report summarizing funding for combating terrorism has had limited utility for decision makers because it was issued late in the congressional decision-making process and did not include data on obligations or on duplication in programs for combating terrorism. OMB plans to analyze areas of duplication as part of the preparation of the budget request for fiscal year 2004. If completed, this analysis will enable OMB to comply with the legislative mandate to include such an analysis in its annual report. While the executive branch has established some national strategies important to coordinating the effective use of funds for combating terrorism, it faces challenges in measuring its progress. Although the strategies provide an important first step, they provide neither clearly defined federal and national performance goals and measures for assessing progress, nor set clear funding priorities. Lacking such measures and priorities, it is also difficult to assess whether funding increases are being allocated to the highest-priority programs.

Recommendations

Our recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.

Director: Team: Phone:


GAO-03-170, Combating Terrorism: Funding Data Reported to Congress Should Be Improved This is the accessible text file for GAO report number GAO-03-170 entitled 'Combating Terrorism: Funding Data Reported to Congress Should Be Improved' which was released on November 26, 2002. This text file was formatted by the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) to be accessible to users with visual impairments, as part of a longer term project to improve GAO products‘ accessibility. Every attempt has been made to maintain the structural and data integrity of the original printed product. Accessibility features, such as text descriptions of tables, consecutively numbered footnotes placed at the end of the file, and the text of agency comment letters, are provided but may not exactly duplicate the presentation or format of the printed version. The portable document format (PDF) file is an exact electronic replica of the printed version. We welcome your feedback. Please E-mail your comments regarding the contents or accessibility features of this document to Webmaster@gao.gov. Report to Congressional Requesters: November 2002: Combating Terrorism: Funding Data Reported to Congress Should Be Improved: GAO-03-170: GAO Highlights: Highlights of GAO-03-170, a report to the Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism and Government Information, Senate Committee on the Judiciary; the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence; and the House Committee on the Judiciary. Why GAO Did This Study: Congress responded to the attacks of September 11, 2001, with dramatic funding increases to combat terrorism. Even before these attacks, Congress was concerned about increased funding in this area, and based on findings from a 1997 GAO report, mandated that the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) report annually on funding to combat terrorism. In this review, GAO was asked to analyze such funding trends, describe difficulties in coordinating combating terrorism budgets, assess data reported to Congress, and describe the executive branch‘s efforts to maximize the effective use of combating terrorism funds. The review relied on OMB‘s definition of ’combating terrorism“ to include both homeland security and overseas combating terrorism missions. What GAO Found: GAO calculated, on the basis of OMB‘s data, that there was a 276- percent total increase in funds designated to combat terrorism during fiscal years 2001 and 2002 (as reported in OMB‘s annual reports to Congress for 2001 and 2002, respectively). This increase includes a 106-percent increase from the post-September 11 redefinition of combating terrorism to include homeland security activities such as aviation and transportation security, and a 170-percent increase due to funding increases. Difficulties in coordinating budgets to combat terrorism stem from the variety of missions involved and the fact that activities related to combating terrorism are often funded through budget accounts that also provide funding for other activities. Various approaches have been used to address these challenges. The process for preparing the budget for fiscal year 2003 was characterized by collaboration between OMB and the Office of Homeland Security that resulted in the budget priorities included in the President‘s budget for fiscal 2003. Crosscutting funding data reported to Congress, however, do not adequately support congressional oversight. An OMB annual report summarizing funding for combating terrorism has had limited utility for decision makers because it was issued late in the congressional decision-making process and did not include data on obligations or on duplication in programs for combating terrorism. OMB plans to analyze areas of duplication as part of the preparation of the budget request for fiscal year 2004. If completed, this analysis will enable OMB to comply with the legislative mandate to include such an analysis in its annual report. While the executive branch has established some national strategies important to coordinating the effective use of funds for combating terrorism, it faces challenges in measuring its progress. Although the strategies provide an important first step, they provide neither clearly defined federal and national performance goals and measures for assessing progress, nor set clear funding priorities. Lacking such measures and priorities, it is also difficult to assess whether funding increases are being allocated to the highest- priority programs. What GAO Recommends: GAO is making recommendations to improve OMB‘s annual report, including collecting and reporting obligation data. It also recommends improvements to performance measures in strategies and performance plans related to combating terrorism. In comments on a draft of this report, OMB expressed concern about collecting obligation data. Other agencies either concurred with the recommendations or made no comment. Contents: Letter: Results in Brief: Conclusions and Recommendations for Executive Action: Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: Scope and Methodology: Briefing Section I: Introduction: Briefing Section II: Funding Analysis: Briefing Section III: Coordination and Priority Setting: Briefing Section IV: Data Reported to Congress: Briefing Section V: Potential for Overlap: Briefing Section VI: Challenges in Effective Use of Funds: Appendixes: Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Defense: Appendix II: Comments from the Department of State: Appendix III: GAO Contacts and Acknowledgments: Related GAO Products: Tables: Table 1: Departments and Agencies Contacted during GAO‘s Review and Their Share of Funding for Combating Terrorism from the President‘s Budget Request for Fiscal Year 2003 of $45 Billion: Table 2: Federal Entities‘ Percentage of Funding for Combating Terrorism: Table 3: Timeline of Budget Events Occurring around September 11, 2001: Abbreviations: ATF: Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms: DHS: Department of Homeland Security: DOD: Department of Defense : FBI: Federal Bureau of Investigations: FEMA: Federal Emergency Management Agency: GAO: General Accounting Office: HHS: Department of Health and Human Services: NSC: National Security Council: OHS: Office of Homeland Security: OMB: Office of Management and Budget: PART: Program Assessment Rating Tool: November 26, 2002: Congressional Requesters: In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the administration and Congress raised the federal government‘s emphasis on combating terrorism through increased appropriations, organizational changes, and legislative proposals to establish the Department of Homeland Security. While the President‘s budget request for fiscal year 2003 elevated the importance of combating terrorism by making homeland security one of the administration‘s top priorities, funding to combat terrorism had been steadily increasing even prior to the September 11 attacks.[Footnote 1] Understanding funding trends as well as the budget processes used to make resource decisions will be key to developing future funding initiatives, particularly as Congress considers funding priorities as well as the implications of establishing the proposed Department of Homeland Security. At the time we finalized this report, the Department had not been established. On the basis of findings from a 1997 GAO report, Congress required the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to report annually on funding to combat terrorism. You requested that we review such funding for fiscal years 1998 through 2003. In September 2002, we briefed staff in your offices on our preliminary findings. As agreed with your offices, this report: * provides a trend analysis of funds used to combat terrorism, * describes the difficulties in coordinating budgets to combat terrorism across agencies and the efforts to address them, * assesses the adequacy of crosscutting data on funding to combat terrorism reported to Congress, * discusses the efforts to identify and minimize potential areas of duplication, and: * describes the challenges faced by the executive branch in maximizing the effectiveness of these funds. Results in Brief: The upward climb of federal government funding to combat terrorism in the years prior to the attacks of September 11, 2001, was dwarfed by the dramatic funding increases that occurred afterward. These latter increases occurred as budget priorities quickly shifted to missions for combating terrorism and as the scope of combating terrorism was redefined to include homeland security missions, such as border and transportation security. As a result, funds designated for combating terrorism increased 276 percent from fiscal year 2001 through fiscal 2002 (106 percent due to changes in definition and scope, and 170 percent due to funding increases), as reported in OMB‘s annual reports to Congress on combating terrorism.[Footnote 2] In the same time frame, the Department of Defense and other national security agencies received the largest share of funds for combating terrorism (over 30 percent), although the Department of Health and Human Services‘ (HHS) and the Federal Emergency Management Agency‘s (FEMA) shares of such funds have risen substantially. There has also been a change in priorities among mission categories for combating terrorism as defined by OMB. Since fiscal year 2001, funding priorities have shifted from the physical security of government and the national populace and investigative, intelligence, and offensive activities to research and development related to combating terrorism and preparing and responding to terrorist incidents. The executive branch is faced with several difficulties in coordinating funding to combat terrorism, and approaches to such coordination have varied. The difficulties include (1) the large number of agencies involved; (2) the wide variety of missions represented, including intelligence, law enforcement, health services, and environmental protection; and (3) the global nature of missions for combating terrorism. In addition, funding for missions for combating terrorism is often subsumed in budget accounts that provide funding for other activities. Over the past 4 years, various approaches to coordinating budget requests prior to and during OMB‘s review have been employed to address these challenges. For example, during the fiscal year 2001 and 2002 budget processes, interagency working groups led by OMB and the National Security Council (NSC) made recommendations prior to the agencies‘ formal submissions to OMB. During the period immediately following September 11, 2001, the greatest attention was given to those activities for combating terrorism related to homeland security. As a result, coordination for the budget process for fiscal year 2003 was primarily between OMB and the newly created Office of Homeland Security (OHS). Together, these offices set priorities that resulted in the budget initiatives for homeland security included in the President‘s budget for fiscal year 2003. Efforts to coordinate the budget request for fiscal year 2004 are characterized by uncertainties with agencies‘ development of budgets in the face of the evolving status and structure of the proposed Department of Homeland Security and delays in final appropriations for fiscal 2003. Crosscutting funding data reported to Congress do not adequately support congressional oversight. OMB‘s annual reports to Congress on combating terrorism, which summarizes proposed spending, is not as useful a tool as it might be for effective congressional oversight, partly because (1) recent reports have been published well after the March 1 deadline and (2) the report does not include data on obligations. Although legislation mandating OMB‘s report does not require the presentation of data on obligations for all programs and activities for combating terrorism, we believe that such data are important for understanding the current status of funding and establishing future funding priorities. Also, a common structure to categorize combating terrorism activities among key governmentwide reports is lacking, and the categories cannot be linked to appropriations accounts--the structure used by Congress to fund programs and activities. Consequently, there is no transparency for making policy choices and trade-offs between combating terrorism and other activities. OMB has taken an important step to improve the data used to develop its fiscal 2004 budget request to Congress by requiring agencies to identify funds for combating terrorism by account--the level at which funds are appropriated--in OMB‘s centralized budget database (known as the MAX database). However, the guidance did not require agencies to report on obligations. Potential duplication of effort has been identified in our past reviews, and the administration has made efforts to minimize such duplication. We have found in the past that there is a risk of duplication in areas such as assistance to state and local governments, information management and technology, and research and development, and we recommended that a focal point for combating terrorism be established to better coordinate such programs. In addition, we reported that OMB has not included an analysis of potential duplication as part of its annual reports to date, as required in the 1997 legislation establishing the reporting requirement. In the wake of the September 11 attacks, the President established focal points for homeland security and combating terrorism overseas--the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security in OHS and the Director for Combating Terrorism within the NSC, respectively. Furthermore, the administration anticipates that the proposed Department of Homeland Security would address some areas of duplication. However, the proposed Department will exclude some agencies with homeland security missions and, therefore, could not address all areas of potential duplication without interagency coordination. OMB has stated that it plans to review the budget proposal for fiscal year 2004 to identify areas of duplication. Such an analysis, if reported, would increase the visibility of potential duplication areas to Congress. While the executive branch has established some national strategies important to maximizing the effective use of funds for combating terrorism, it faces challenges in measuring progress against its goals. The administration has published two of three national strategies intended to address the terrorist threat both domestically and internationally. The National Strategy for Homeland Security provides an important first step in establishing strategic objectives and mission areas, and proposes to consolidate the administration of these functions in the proposed Department of Homeland Security. The strategy also directs Departments and agencies to create performance measures by which progress can be measured and future resources allocated. However, at the federal and national levels, for the most part, the strategy does not provide performance goals and measures to assess progress and improve preparedness, nor does it set clear funding priorities among and within the various initiatives. In the absence of clear performance goals, measures, and funding priorities, it is difficult to assess whether funding increases are being allocated to the highest-priority programs. Notwithstanding incomplete guidance from the national strategies, some Departments and agencies have either updated or are in the process of updating strategic and performance plans to reflect priorities for combating terrorism. For combating terrorism overseas, the President issued the National Security Strategy of the United States of America, but the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism is still pending. Conclusions and Recommendations for Executive Action: Congressional decision makers require governmentwide information on funding for combating terrorism (including obligations) in a timely fashion. In preparing the fiscal year 2004 budget request to Congress, OMB is requiring agencies to provide information on combating terrorism (including homeland security) so that funding for these activities can be identified by account--the level at which funds are appropriated. If made available to Congress, this information should greatly improve the transparency of funding requested for combating terrorism programs and activities within Departments and across the federal government. Although this is an important first step, OMB has not required agencies to separately identify obligations for relevant programs and activities. Without obligation information, it is impossible to know (1) how much funding from prior years is still available to potentially offset new requests, (2) whether the rate of spending for a program is slower than anticipated, or (3) what the level of effort (i.e., the size of the program) is for a particular year as well as for a program over time. OMB‘s annual report on funding for combating terrorism summarizes funding data for the current and next fiscal years, and is supposed to be issued by March 1 of each year and identify duplication of efforts. To be a useful tool, we believe it should also include obligation data for the reasons described above. However, the report has had limited utility because it (1) has been issued in the late spring and summer-- late in the congressional budget decision-making process, (2) does not include data on obligations, and (3) neglects to identify areas of duplication. It is important for the government to establish federal-and national- level goals and performance measures to maximize the effectiveness of funds to combat terrorism. The administration has made progress in publishing national strategies to address priorities for combating terrorism, but these strategies do not include governmentwide performance measures. Establishing these priorities will be critical for individual agencies in aligning their strategic and performance plans, including performance measures, with governmentwide strategic direction and guidance. On the basis of these conclusions, we make the following recommendations. * To help Congress obtain timely information on spending that supports the President‘s annual budget request for combating terrorism, OMB should require agencies to provide information on obligations in its MAX database--the database used by OMB to produce the President‘s annual budget request. * To improve the usefulness of OMB‘s Annual Report to Congress on Combating Terrorism, OMB should: * publish the report by the required March 1 deadline to provide information for congressional budget deliberations; * include obligations as reported in the MAX database; and: * include, as required by Congress, an analysis of areas where overlap in programs could result in unnecessary duplication of effort. * To help maximize the effective use of funds for combating terrorism, * OHS and NSC should include national-level, as well as federal governmentwide, performance measures as a supplement to existing strategies and in future revisions to strategies for homeland security and the combating of terrorism overseas and: * OMB, in conjunction with OHS and NSC, should direct relevant Departments to develop or enhance performance objectives and measures for combating terrorism in alignment with performance measures in national strategies, and include performance measures for combating terrorism in the governmentwide plan that OMB is required to produce annually. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: In October 2002, we requested comments on a draft of this report from the Director of OMB; the Secretaries of Defense, Energy, Health and Human Services, State, Transportation, and the Treasury; the Attorney General of the United States; the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency; and the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency. In addition, copies of the report were made available to OHS and NSC for their comment. In oral comments on the report, OMB staff questioned whether the value added of collecting obligation data related to combating terrorism would be worth the effort. While OMB staff acknowledged that OMB examiners use obligation data in assessing the appropriateness of agency budget requests overall, they felt that budget authority data provide the most insight into combating terrorism programs and facilitate follow up on areas of concern. Furthermore, they explained that, in the MAX database, obligation data are collected for specific programs that correspond to major agency activities, and these activities may or may not line up with combating terrorism programs. Aligning these activities with combating terrorism programs would require splitting up agency activities in the MAX database, which are familiar and useful, into terrorism-specific activities. Therefore, OMB staff suggested these obligations would more likely have to be collected and/or displayed through a parallel process outside the MAX database. Targeting such an effort on obligations would not be the most productive way to provide more insight into combating terrorism priorities or to enhance the value of the Annual Report, according to the officials. We agree with OMB that budget authority data provide valuable insights into programs. However, we disagree that obligation data related to combating terrorism also are not worth collecting and reporting. First, we believe that the very reason why OMB examiners find the obligation data useful to them is the same reason that congressional decision makers would find the data useful--obligation data gives decision makers an insight as to whether programs are being run according to plans established by their budget projections. We acknowledge that collecting these data would pose an additional workload on both OMB and agency budget officials, but believe that such a workload is warranted in light of the high priority placed on this issue. OMB itself gave the issue high priority when it required agencies to report on budget authority data according to combating terrorism categories, including homeland security. Furthermore, the creation of the Department of Homeland Security will make this type of detailed information more important, as the Executive Branch tries to integrate 22 agencies into the Department. Finally, for some of the programs related to combating terrorism, the law establishing the reporting requirement already requires OMB to report obligation data. We also received comments from other Departments and agencies. DOD concurred with our recommendations to OMB and its comments are reprinted in appendix I. The State Department also concurred with our recommendations. In its comments, the State Department cited its efforts in various coordination activities and its plans to improve its performance planning and measurement. As an example, the Department established the Office of Strategic and Performance Planning to improve strategic plans and ensure that funding is linked to such plans. The State Department‘s comments are reprinted in appendix II. FEMA concurred with our recommendations in oral comments to the report. OHS and NSC did not provide comments on our recommendations to them. The remaining Departments and agencies informed us that they had no substantive comments on the report. Technical comments from OMB, the Department of Defense, and the Environmental Protection Agency were incorporated as appropriate. Scope and Methodology: Our scope includes federal Departments and agencies that have key missions for combating terrorism and, when combined, represent 97 percent of the total funding requested for combating terrorism in the presidential budget request for fiscal year 2003, as shown in table 1. Table 1: Departments and Agencies Contacted during GAO‘s Review and Their Share of Funding for Combating Terrorism from the President‘s Budget Request for Fiscal Year 2003 of $45 Billion: Department/Agency: National Security[A]; Percent of funding to combat terrorism: 32. Department/Agency: Department of Transportation; Percent of funding to combat terrorism: 16. Department/Agency: Department of Justice; Percent of funding to combat terrorism: 16. Department/Agency: Department of Health and Human Services; Percent of funding to combat terrorism: 10. Department/Agency: Federal Emergency Management Agency; Percent of funding to combat terrorism: 8. Department/Agency: The Treasury; Percent of funding to combat terrorism: 6. Department/Agency: Department of State; Percent of funding to combat terrorism: 5. Department/Agency: Department of Energy; Percent of funding to combat terrorism: 3. Department/Agency: Environmental Protection Agency; Percent of funding to combat terrorism: 1. Department/Agency: Other; Percent of funding to combat terrorism: 3. Department/Agency: Total; Percent of funding to combat terrorism: 100. Source: OMB, 2002 Annual Report to Congress on Combating Terrorism, June 2002. [A] National Security includes Department of Defense and intelligence community funding combined to keep figures unclassified. Because the intelligence community includes intelligence elements from the Departments of State, Energy, the Treasury and Justice, the percentages displayed for these Departments do not represent the entirety of these Departments‘ budgets for combating terrorism. [End of table] In addition, our scope included OMB, OHS, and NSC. We did not include classified intelligence agencies‘ budgets in detail. Intelligence community agencies and their corresponding classified budgets will be included in a separate review by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. To analyze funding trends of federal funding to combat terrorism, we relied on OMB‘s annual reports containing data from fiscal year 1998 through the budget request for fiscal year 2003. The 2002 report included data from the emergency supplemental appropriation signed into law on September 18, 2001, but did not include data from a second emergency supplemental appropriation signed into law on August 2, 2002.[Footnote 3] Although OMB provided us data from the August 2002 appropriation, we did not receive the data in time to incorporate into our report. We used the definitions from the OMB annual reports, as summarized below: * Homeland security: Activities within the United States coordinated by OHS. * Overseas combating terrorism: Activities outside the United States coordinated by NSC, excluding direct military actions. * Combating terrorism: Combination of homeland security and overseas combating terrorism, further divided into four main categories: * Research and development: Developing technologies to deter, prevent, or mitigate acts of terrorism. * Preparing for and responding to terrorist incidents: Planning, training, equipment, and personnel directed at incident response. * Physical security of government and national populace: Protecting federally owned, leased, occupied facilities; federal employees, including high-ranking officials, and the national populace from terrorist acts as well as physical protection of the national infrastructure. * Investigative, intelligence, and offensive capabilities: Reducing the ability of groups or individuals to commit terrorist acts, and the investigation of terrorist acts when they occur and prosecution of their perpetrators. To describe difficulties in coordinating budgets to combat terrorism and efforts to address them, we reviewed data from OMB and OHS. In addition, we evaluated data from Departments and agencies with critical missions for combating terrorism, as well as data from our previous reports. We conducted interviews with knowledgeable officials and discussed their views on the effectiveness of interagency approaches. To assess the adequacy of funding data reported to Congress, we compared OMB‘s annual reports with the legislative requirement for drafting the reports and identified potential areas for improvement on the basis of other common budget presentations. To identify areas of potential duplication of effort among agencies and the efforts to minimize them, we relied on our past and ongoing analyses of programs for combating terrorism and reviewed the administration‘s proposals for minimizing such duplication. To identify the challenges faced by the executive branch in maximizing the effectiveness of funds for combating terrorism, we relied on our recent analyses of national strategies and interviewed key agency officials to determine whether performance plans were updated to reflect revised missions for combating terrorism. Our work was conducted from March through September 2002 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. We will send copies of this report to appropriate congressional committees and to the federal agencies and offices discussed in this report. We will make copies available to other interested parties upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact Raymond Decker at (202) 512-6020 or Paul Posner at (202) 512- 9573. Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix III. Signed by Raymond J. Decker: Raymond J. Decker Director Defense Capabilities and Management: Signed by Paul L. Posner: Paul L. Posner Managing Director Strategic Issues: List of Congressional Requesters: The Honorable Dianne Feinstein Chairman The Honorable Jon Kyl Ranking Minority Member Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism and Government Information Committee on the Judiciary U.S. Senate: The Honorable Bob Graham Chairman The Honorable Richard C. Shelby Ranking Minority Member Select Committee on Intelligence U.S. Senate: The Honorable James F. Sensenbrenner, Jr. Chairman The Honorable John Conyers, Jr. Ranking Minority Member Committee on the Judiciary House of Representatives: [End of section] Briefing Section I: Introduction: [See PDF for image] [End of figure] In a 1997 report, we found that the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the National Security Council (NSC) did not regularly collect, aggregate, and review data on funding to combat terrorism on a governmentwide basis for the many Departments and agencies involved in combating terrorism.[Footnote 4] On the basis of our findings, Congress required OMB to establish a reporting system on the budgeting and expenditure of such funds, and, since 1998, OMB has been required to prepare both a classified and an unclassified report on combating terrorism to Congress by March 1 of each year.[Footnote 5] The report must: * include a list of proposed amounts to be expended for programs for combating terrorism and activities in the current and next fiscal year, * describe specific programs and activities, * list priorities with respect to programs and activities, * summarize obligations and expenditures on domestic emergency preparedness for terrorist incidents involving weapons of mass destruction, and: * identify duplication of efforts. The 2002 OMB report provides funding and programmatic information on 27 federal entities that have received funds for combating terrorism. These federal entities are responsible for the federal government‘s efforts to combat terrorist activity both domestically and overseas, including defense against terrorist incidents involving weapons of mass destruction. After the September 11 attacks, OMB included an analysis of homeland security as part of its June 2002 report. [See PDF for image] [End of figure] Departments‘ and agencies‘ submissions of their budget requests for fiscal year 2003 to OMB coincided closely with the attacks of September 11, 2001. In response to the attacks, the first of two emergency supplemental appropriations, totaling $40 billion--of which $12 billion was provided for the combating terrorism mission--was signed into law on September 18, 2001.[Footnote 6]The remaining $28 billion from that supplemental appropriation was provided for other missions, such as military actions overseas and recovery at the attack sites. Since this supplemental appropriation was enacted in the last 2-week period of fiscal year 2001, most of these funds were not available to agencies for obligation until fiscal year 2002 and were allocated over several months. The second supplemental appropriation was signed into law on August 2, 2002.[Footnote 7] Other key events occurred to influence funding decisions as OMB considered what requests should be included in the emergency supplemental appropriation, reviewed agencies‘ budget requests for fiscal year 2003, and notified agencies of funding decisions in late November during a process known as ’passback.“ On October 4, 2001, the first known victim of the anthrax attack died, drawing more attention to funding needed to counter the threat from biological weapons. On October 8, 2001, the Office of Homeland Security (OHS) was established and given responsibility for developing a national strategy for homeland security and related homeland security activities, including certifying that budget requests for homeland security were necessary and appropriate. On November 19, 2001, the Transportation Security Administration was established, with a budget request of $4.8 billion for fiscal year 2003.[Footnote 8] On February 4, 2002, the President submitted the budget request for fiscal year 2003 to Congress. OMB‘s 2002 Annual Report on Combating Terrorism, which includes data from the request for fiscal year 2003, was issued in June 2002. In the spring and summer of 2002, offices within the Executive Office of the President issued guidance related to preparing the budget request for fiscal year 2004. On April 24, 2002, OMB issued initial budget guidance indicating that homeland security was one of the key priorities for fiscal year 2004. In June 2002, OMB issued the A-11 Circular, which outlined guidance for the preparation, submission, and execution of the budget to the agencies. In the summer of 2002, the President issued two documents that OMB cited as key guidance for agencies to develop budget requests for fiscal year 2004 and performance plans: the proposal for the new Department of Homeland Security and the National Strategy for Homeland Security. Establishing the Department of Homeland Security was under Congress‘s consideration at the time of our review. [End of section] Briefing Section II: Funding Analysis: [See PDF for image] [End of figure] In the years prior to the September 11 attacks, we reported on a rapid increase in the number of federal programs and funding to combat terrorism that spanned multiple agencies. These included (1) programs for training and equipping first responders to address chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear terrorist attacks and (2) federal teams capable of analyzing such weapons, containing terrorist incidents, and providing medical support or response.[Footnote 9] We also reported on significant funding increases, as well as improvements in OMB‘s efforts to track funding related to combating terrorism. After the September 11 attacks, the missions and funding for combating terrorism were dramatically expanded. Most notably, a new group of homeland security activities--such as border and aviation security--was included under the definition ’combating terrorism.“ Since September 11, $12 billion has been appropriated for missions to combat terrorism in a supplemental appropriation, and an additional $45 billion has been requested in the budget request for fiscal year 2003.[Footnote 10] [See PDF for image] [End of figure] As shown in the figure, scope changes and funding increases resulted in a 276-percent surge between 2001 and 2002 (as reported in OMB‘s Annual Reports for 2001 and 2002, respectively). A 106-percent increase is attributed to changes in definition to broaden the scope of combating terrorism, such as the addition of border and homeland security, and a 170-percent increase is attributed to increased funding overall. It is difficult to discuss historical trends in funding for combating terrorism because of the changing scope of programs and activities included before and after the September 11 attacks. In each of the last 5 years, OMB has issued its Annual Report to Congress on Combating Terrorism, which attempts to capture, across the federal government, total spending on combating terrorism and, in the most recent report, related homeland security initiatives. However, as more programs are included in the definition of ’combating terrorism,“ funding comparisons become more complicated. We therefore were unable to determine a funding trend by agency or mission category (including the homeland security initiatives) prior to 2001. [See PDF for image] [A] The emergency supplemental figure includes the emergency supplemental appropriation enacted in September 2001 but does not include the emergency supplemental appropriation enacted in August 2002. Moreover, it includes only the $12 billion designated by OMB as funds for combating terrorism, not the entire $40 billion appropriation. [End of figure] In dollar terms, on the basis of the definition that OMB used in its 2002 report, funding for all federal entities with missions for combating terrorism increased following the attacks. In percentage terms, National Security agencies consistently received the highest proportion of funds, but their share of these funds decreased after September 11, whereas the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the Federal Emergency Management Agency‘s (FEMA) proportion of funds for combating terrorism increased substantially. Most other agencies received a smaller portion of the total funds provided after the attacks, as shown in table 2. Table 2: Federal Entities‘ Percentage of Funding for Combating Terrorism: Federal entity: National Security; Percentage of funding for combating terrorism: Preattack funding: Fiscal year 2001 ($20 billion): 39; Fiscal year 2002 enacted pre-Sept. 11 ($24 billion): 36; Postattack funding: Emergency Supplemental Appropriation enacted Sept. 2001($12 billion): 27; Fiscal year 2003 budget request($45 billion): 32. Federal entity: Department of Transportation; Percentage of funding for combating terrorism: Preattack funding: Fiscal year 2001 ($20 billion): 12; Fiscal year 2002 enacted pre-Sept. 11 ($24 billion): 17; Postattack funding: Emergency Supplemental Appropriation enacted Sept. 2001 ($12 billion): 10; Fiscal year 2003 budget request ($45 billion): 16. Federal entity: Department of Justice; Percentage of funding for combating terrorism: Preattack funding: Fiscal year 2001 ($20 billion): 23; Fiscal year 2002 enacted pre-Sept. 11 ($24 billion): 21; Postattack funding: Emergency Supplemental Appropriation enacted Sept. 2001 ($12 billion): 18; Fiscal year 2003 budget request ($45 billion): 16. Federal entity: Department of Health and Human Services; Percentage of funding for combating terrorism: Preattack funding: Fiscal year 2001 ($20 billion): 2; Fiscal year 2002 enacted pre-Sept. 11 ($24 billion): 1; Postattack funding: Emergency Supplemental Appropriation enacted Sept. 2001 ($12 billion): 22; Fiscal year 2003 budget request ($45 billion): 10. Federal entity: Federal Emergency Management Agency; Percentage of funding for combating terrorism: Preattack funding: Fiscal year 2001 ($20 billion):

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