Overseas Presence
Framework for Assessing Embassy Staff Levels Can Support Rightsizing Initiatives Gao ID: GAO-02-780 July 26, 2002There have been recurring calls to evaluate and realign, or "rightsize," the number and location of staff at U.S. embassies and consulates and to consider staff reductions to reduce security vulnerabilities. The Office of Management and Budget is implementing this rightsizing initiative by analyzing the U.S. overseas presence and reviewing the staffing allocation process. This report uses a systematic approach to assess overseas workforce size and identifying options for rightsizing, both at the embassy level and for making related decisions worldwide. GAO's framework links staffing levels to the following three critical elements of overseas diplomatic operations: (1) physical/technical security of facilities and employees, (2) mission priorities and requirements, and (3) cost of operations. Unlike an analysis that considers the elements in isolation, GAO's rightsizing framework encourages consideration of a full range of options, along with the security, mission, and cost trade-offs. Policy makers could use this information to decide whether to add, reduce, or change the staff mix at an embassy.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-02-780, Overseas Presence: Framework for Assessing Embassy Staff Levels Can Support Rightsizing Initiatives
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Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans
Affairs, and International Relations, Committee on Government Reform,
House of Representatives:
United States General Accounting Office:
GAO:
July 2002:
Overseas Presence:
Framework for Assessing Embassy Staff Levels Can Support Rightsizing
Initiatives:
Overseas Presence:
GAO-02-780:
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Development of a Rightsizing Framework:
Rightsizing Framework Complements OMB Initiatives:
Conclusion:
Recommendation for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Scope and Methodology:
Appendix I: Timeline of Rightsizing Initiatives since the
1998 Embassy Bombings:
Appendix II: Rightsizing Framework and Corresponding
Questions:
Appendix III: Comments from the Office of Management and
Budget:
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of State:
GAO‘s Comments:
Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Staff Acknowledgments:
Figure:
Figure 1: Framework for Embassy Rightsizing:
Abbreviations:
OMB: Office of Management and Budget
OPAP: Overseas Presence Advisory Panel
MPP: Mission Performance Plan:
Letter:
July 26, 2002:
The Honorable Christopher Shays
Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security,
Veterans Affairs, and International Relations
Committee on Government Reform
House of Representatives:
Dear Mr. Chairman:
Following the 1998 terrorist bombings of two U.S. embassies in Africa
that resulted in more than 220 deaths and 4,000 injuries, there have
been recurring calls to evaluate and realign--or rightsize--the number
and location of staff at U.S. embassies and consulates and to consider
staff reductions where practical to reduce security
vulnerabilities.[Footnote 1] The administration showed its support for
rightsizing in the President‘s Management Agenda[Footnote 2] by
directing all agencies operating overseas to rightsize their presence.
The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) is implementing this
rightsizing initiative by analyzing the U.S. overseas presence and
reviewing the staffing allocation process. Given the high costs of
maintaining more than 60,000 Americans and foreign nationals overseas
and the events of September 11, 2001, that highlighted the security
vulnerability of Americans worldwide, the administration‘s rightsizing
initiative aims to reconfigure U.S. government overseas staff to the
minimum number necessary to meet U.S. foreign policy goals.
In May 2002, we presented testimony on a framework for determining the
appropriate number of staff to be assigned to a U.S. embassy.[Footnote
3] As you requested, this report presents the framework discussed in
our testimony that outlines the key criteria for evaluating the U.S.
overseas presence, along with examples of key questions that may be
useful in making rightsizing decisions. We developed the framework by
reviewing previous reports on rightsizing and overseas staffing issues,
such as the Overseas Presence Advisory Panel (OPAP) report,[Footnote 4]
and interviewing officials from the Department of State, other U.S.
agencies operating overseas, and OMB. We tested the framework during
our fieldwork at the U.S. embassy in Paris. In each section of this
report, we include observations in applying the framework at that
embassy. We plan additional work later this year to refine the
framework and demonstrate how it can be used in other regions and
environments.
Results in Brief:
Our framework provides a systematic approach for assessing overseas
workforce size and identifying options for rightsizing, both at the
embassy level and for making related decisions worldwide. The framework
links staffing levels to three critical elements of overseas diplomatic
operations: (1) physical/technical security of facilities and
employees, (2) mission priorities and requirements, and (3) cost of
operations. The first element includes analyzing the security of
embassy buildings, the use of existing secure space, and the
vulnerabilities of staff to terrorist attack. The second element
focuses on assessing embassy priorities and the staff‘s workload
requirements. The third element involves developing and consolidating
cost information from all agencies at a particular embassy to permit
cost-based decision making. Unlike an analysis that considers the
elements in isolation, the rightsizing framework encourages
consideration of a full range of options, along with the security,
mission, and cost trade-offs. With this information, decision makers
would then be in a position to determine whether rightsizing actions
are needed either to add staff, reduce staff, or change the staff mix
at an embassy. Options for reducing staff could include relocating
functions to the United States or to regional centers and outsourcing
functions. Our analysis of the U.S. embassy in Paris demonstrated the
framework‘s viability--for example, by highlighting security concerns
that may warrant staff reductions and by identifying options for
relocating some staff--for example, to the United States and other
locations in Europe.
In this report, we are recommending that the Director of OMB ensure
that our framework is used in the administration‘s rightsizing
initiative, starting with its assessments of staffing levels and
rightsizing options in U.S. embassies in Europe and Eurasia. OMB, in
commenting on a draft of our report, agreed with the framework‘s
elements and options and said that it plans to build upon the framework
in examining all posts within the European and Eurasia Bureau. The
Department of State said that it welcomed our work on developing a
framework as a commonsense approach for considering staffing issues.
Background:
The U.S. government maintains more than 250 diplomatic posts overseas
(embassies, consulates, and other diplomatic offices) with
approximately 60,000 personnel representing more than 50 government
agencies and subagencies. The departments of Defense and State together
comprise more than two-thirds of American personnel overseas under
chiefs of mission authority--36 percent and 35 percent,
respectively.[Footnote 5] The costs of maintaining staff overseas vary
by agency but in general, as OMB has reported, they are high. The
Deputy Director of OMB recently testified that the average annual cost
of having one full-time direct-hire American family of four in a U.S.
embassy is $339,100.[Footnote 6]
Following the 1998 embassy bombings, two high-level independent groups
called for the reassessment of overseas staffing levels. The
Accountability Review Boards that sent two teams to the region to
investigate the bombings concluded that the United States should
consider adjusting the size of its overseas presence to reduce security
vulnerabilities.[Footnote 7] Following the Accountability Review
Boards‘ report, OPAP concluded that some embassies were
disproportionately sized and needed staff adjustments to adapt to new
foreign policy priorities and reduce security vulnerabilities. The
panel recommended creating a permanent interagency committee to develop
a methodology to determine the appropriate size and locations of the
U.S. overseas presence. OPAP also suggested a series of actions to
adjust overseas presence, including relocating some functions to the
United States and to regional centers where feasible. However, the
State-led interagency committee that was established to respond to
OPAP‘s recommendations did not produce a standard rightsizing
methodology. As we previously reported,[Footnote 8] the committee did
not spend sufficient time at overseas locations to fully assess
workload issues or consider alternative ways of doing business. To move
the issue forward, in August 2001, the President‘s Management Agenda
identified rightsizing as one of the administration‘s priorities. In
addition, the President‘s fiscal year 2003 international affairs
budget[Footnote 9] (1) highlighted the importance of making staffing
decisions on the basis of mission priorities and costs and (2) directed
OMB to analyze agencies‘ overseas staffing and operating costs (see
app. I for a summary of previous rightsizing initiatives).
Development of a Rightsizing Framework:
Although there is general agreement on the need for rightsizing the
U.S. overseas presence, there is no consensus on how to do it. As a
first step, we developed a framework that includes a set of questions
to guide decisions on overseas staffing (see app. II for the set of
questions). We identified three critical elements that should be
systematically evaluated as part of this framework: (1) physical/
technical security of facilities and employees, (2) mission priorities
and requirements, and (3) cost of operations. If the evaluation shows
problems, such as security risks, decision makers should then consider
the feasibility of rightsizing options, including relocating staff or
downsizing. On the other hand, evaluations of agencies‘ priorities may
indicate a need for additional staff at embassies or greater external
support from other locations. Figure 1 illustrates the framework‘s
elements and options.
Figure 1: Framework for Embassy Rightsizing:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
State and other agencies in Washington, D.C., including OMB, could use
this framework as a guide for making overseas staffing decisions. For
example, ambassadors could use this framework to ensure that embassy
staffing is in line with security concerns, mission priorities and
requirements, and cost of operations. At the governmentwide level,
State and other agencies could apply the framework to free up resources
at oversized posts, reallocate limited staffing resources worldwide,
and introduce greater accountability into the staffing process.
The following sections describe in more detail the three elements of
our framework, examples of key questions to consider for each element,
and potential rightsizing options. We also include examples of how the
questions in the framework were useful for examining rightsizing issues
at the U.S. embassy in Paris.
Physical/Technical Security of Facilities and Employees:
The substantial loss of life caused by the bombings of the U.S.
embassies in Africa and the ongoing threats against U.S. diplomatic
buildings have heightened concern about the safety of our overseas
personnel. State has determined that about 80 percent of embassy and
consulate buildings do not fully meet security standards. Although
State has a multibillion-dollar plan under way to address security
deficiencies around the world, security enhancements cannot bring most
existing facilities in line with the desired setback--the distance from
public thoroughfares--and related blast protection requirements.
Recurring threats to embassies and consulates highlight the importance
of rightsizing as a tool to minimize the number of embassy employees at
risk.
What Is the Threat and Security Profile of the Embassy?
The Accountability Review Boards recommended that the Secretary of
State review the security of embassies and consider security in making
staffing decisions. We agree that the ability to protect personnel
should be a key factor in determining embassy staffing levels. State
has prepared a threat assessment and security profile for each embassy,
which can be used when assessing staff levels. While chiefs of
mission[Footnote 10] and State have primary responsibility for
assessing overseas security needs and allocating security resources,
all agencies should consider the risks associated with maintaining
staff overseas. The Paris embassy, our case study, illustrates the
importance of facility security in determining staffing levels. As at
many posts, the facilities in Paris predate current security standards.
The Department of State continues to mitigate security limitations by
using a variety of physical and technical security countermeasures.
That said, none of the embassy‘s office buildings meets current
standards.
Mission Priorities and Requirements:
The placement and composition of staff overseas must reflect the
highest priority goals of U.S. foreign policy. Moreover, the
President‘s Management Agenda states that U.S. interests are best
served by ensuring that the federal government has the right number of
people at the right locations overseas.
What Are the Embassy‘s Priorities?
Currently, there is no clear basis on which to evaluate an embassy‘s
mission and priorities relative to U.S. foreign policy goals. State‘s
fiscal year 2000-2002 Mission Performance Plan (MPP)[Footnote 11]
process does not require embassies to differentiate among the relative
importance of U.S. strategic goals. The Chairman of OPAP testified in
May 2002 that no adequate system exists to match the size and
composition of the U.S. presence in a given country to the embassy‘s
priorities.[Footnote 12] Currently it is difficult to assess whether
700 people are needed at the Paris embassy. For example, the fiscal
year 2000-2002 MPP includes 15 of State‘s 16 strategic goals, and
overall priorities are neither identified nor systematically linked to
resources. In recent months, State has revised the MPP process to
require each embassy to set five top priorities and link staffing and
budgetary requirements to fulfilling these priorities. A successful
delineation of mission priorities will complement our rightsizing
framework and support future rightsizing efforts to adjust the
composition of embassy staff.
Are Workload Requirements Validated and Prioritized?
Embassy workload requirements include influencing policy of other
governments, assisting Americans abroad, articulating U.S. policy,
handling official visitors, and providing input for various reports and
requests from Washington. In 2000, on the basis of a review of six
different U.S. embassies, the State-led interagency committee found the
perception that Washington‘s requirements for reports and other
information requests were not prioritized and placed unrealistic
demands on staff. We also found this same perception among some offices
in Paris. Scrutiny of workload requirements could potentially identify
work of low priority such as reporting that has outlived its
usefulness. Currently, State monitors and sends incoming requests for
reports and inquiries to embassies and consulates, but it rarely
refuses requests and leaves the prioritization of workload to the
respective embassies and consulates. Washington‘s demands on an embassy
need to be evaluated in light of how they affect other work
requirements and the number of staff needed to meet these requirements.
For example, the economics section in Paris reported that Washington-
generated requests resulted in missed opportunities for assessing how
U.S. private and government interests are affected by the many ongoing
changes in the European banking system.
How Do Agencies Determine Staffing Levels?
The President‘s Management Agenda states that there is no mechanism to
assess the overall rationale for and effectiveness of where and how
many U.S. employees are deployed overseas. Each agency in Washington
has its own criteria for assigning staff to U.S. embassies. Some
agencies have more flexibility than others in placing staff overseas,
and Congress mandates the presence of others. Thorough staffing
criteria are useful for determining and reassessing staffing levels and
would allow agencies to better justify the number of overseas staff. We
found that the criteria to locate staff in Paris vary significantly by
agency. Some agencies use detailed staffing models, but most do not.
Furthermore, they do not fully consider embassy priorities or the
overall workload requirements on the embassy in determining where and
how many staff are necessary.
Could an Agency‘s Mission Be Pursued in Other Ways?
Some agencies are entirely focused on the host country, while others
have regional responsibilities or function almost entirely outside the
country in which they are located. Some agencies have constant
interaction with the public, while others require interaction with
their government counterparts. Some agencies collaborate with other
agencies to support the embassy‘s mission, while others act more
independently and report directly to Washington. Analyzing where and
how agencies conduct their business overseas may lead to possible
rightsizing options. For example, the mission of the National Science
Foundation involves interaction with persons throughout Europe and
Eurasia and therefore raises the question of whether it needs Paris-
based staff.
Cost of Operations:
The President‘s Management Agenda noted that the full costs of sending
staff overseas are unknown. The Deputy Director of OMB testified that
there is a wide disparity among agencies‘ reported costs for a new
position overseas.[Footnote 13] Without comprehensive cost data,
decision makers cannot determine the correlation between costs and the
work being performed, nor can they assess the short-and long-term costs
associated with feasible business alternatives.
What Are an Embassy‘s Operating Costs?
We agree with the President‘s Management Agenda that staffing decisions
need to include a full range of factors affecting the value of U.S.
presence in a particular country, including the costs of operating the
embassy. However, we found no mechanism to provide the ambassador and
other decision makers with comprehensive data on all agencies‘ costs of
operations at an embassy. This lack of consolidated cost data for
individual embassies makes linking costs to staffing levels, embassy
priorities, and desired outcomes impossible. This is a long-standing
management weakness that, according to the President, needs to be
corrected. Our work in Paris demonstrates that this embassy is
operating without fundamental knowledge and use of comprehensive cost
data. State officials concurred that it is difficult to fully record
the cost of all agencies overseas because of inconsistent accounting
and budgeting systems. Nevertheless, we were able to document an
estimated total cost for all agencies operating in France in fiscal
year 2001 at more than $100 million. To do this, we developed a
template in consultation with State and OMB to capture different
categories of operating costs, such as salaries and benefits, and
applied the template to each agency at the embassy.
Are Costs Commensurate with Expected Outcomes?
Once costs are known, it is important to relate them to the embassy‘s
performance. This will allow decision makers to (1) assess the relative
cost-effectiveness of various program and support functions and (2)
make cost-based decisions when setting mission priorities and staffing
levels and determining the feasibility of alternative business
approaches. With comprehensive data, State and other agencies could
make cost-based decisions at the embassy level as well as on a global
basis.
Rightsizing Options:
Analyses of security, mission, and cost may suggest the need for more
or fewer staff at an embassy or an adjustment to the overall staff mix.
Independent analysis of each element can lead to changes. However, all
three elements of the framework need to be considered together to make
reasonable decisions regarding staff size. For example, if the security
element is considered in isolation and existing facilities are deemed
highly vulnerable, managers may first consider adding security
enhancements to existing buildings; working with host country law
enforcement agencies to increase embassy protection; reconfiguring
existing space to accommodate more people in secure space; and leasing,
purchasing, or constructing new buildings. However, consideration of
all elements of the framework may suggest additional means for reducing
security vulnerabilities, such as reducing the total number of staff.
Our framework encourages consideration of a full range of options along
with the security, mission, and cost trade-offs.
Our framework is consistent with the views of rightsizing experts who
have recommended that embassies consider alternative means of
fulfilling mission requirements. For example, OPAP concluded that staff
reductions should be considered as a means of improving security, and
the Chairman of OPAP, in May 2002 testimony, supported elimination of
some functions or performing functions from regional centers or the
United States.[Footnote 14] Moreover, President Bush has told U.S.
ambassadors that ’functions that can be performed by personnel in the
U.S. or at regional offices overseas should not be performed at a
post.“ Our analysis highlights five possible rightsizing options to
carry out these goals, but this list is not exhaustive. These suggested
options include:
1. relocating functions to the United States,
2. relocating functions to regional centers,
3. relocating functions to other locations under chief of mission
authority where relocation back to the United States or to regional
centers is not practical,
4. purchasing services from the private sector, and:
5. changing business practices.
Our case study at the Paris embassy illustrates the applicability of
these options, which have the potential to reduce the number of
vulnerable staff in the embassy buildings. These options may be
applicable to as many as 210 positions in Paris. The work of about 120
staff could be relocated to the United States--State already plans to
relocate the work of more than 100 of these employees. In addition, the
work of about 40 other positions could be handled from other locations
in Europe, while more than 50 other positions are commercial in nature
and provide services that are available in the private sector. For
example:
* Some functions at the Paris embassy could be relocated to the United
States. State is planning to relocate more than 100 budget and finance
positions from the Financial Services Center in Paris to State‘s
financial center in Charleston, South Carolina, by September 2003. In
addition, we identified other agencies that perform similar financial
functions and could probably be relocated. For example, four Voice of
America staff provide payroll services to correspondent bureaus and
freelance reporters around the world and would benefit from collocation
with State‘s Financial Services Center.
* The Paris embassy could potentially relocate some functions to the
regional logistics center in Antwerp, Belgium, and the planned 23-acre
secure regional facility in Frankfurt, Germany, which has the capacity
for approximately 1,000 people. The Antwerp facility could handle part
of the embassy‘s extensive warehouse operation, which is currently
supported by about 25 people. In addition, some administrative
operations at the embassy, such as procurement, could potentially be
handled out of the Frankfurt facility. Furthermore, staff at agencies
with regional missions could also be moved to Frankfurt. These staff
include a National Science Foundation representative who spent
approximately 40 percent of his time in 2001 outside of France; four
staff who provide budget and finance support to embassies in Africa;
and some Secret Service agents who cover eastern Europe, central Asia,
and parts of Africa.
* There are additional positions in Paris that may not need to be in
the primary embassy buildings where secure space is at a premium. The
primary function of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
representative is to act as a liaison to European space partners.
Accomplishing this work may not require retaining office space at the
embassy. In fact, the American Battle Monuments Commission has already
established a precedent for this, housing about 25 staff in separate
office space in a suburb of Paris. In addition, a Department of Justice
official works in an office at the French Ministry of Justice. However,
dispersing staff raises additional security issues that need to be
considered.[Footnote 15]
* Given Paris‘s modern transportation and communication links and large
private-sector service industry, the embassy may be able to purchase
services from the private sector, which would reduce the number of
full-time staff at risk at the embassy if the services can be performed
from another location.[Footnote 16] We identified as many as 50
positions at the embassy that officials in Washington and Paris agreed
are commercial in nature, including painters, electricians, plumbers,
and supply clerks.
* Reengineering business functions could help reduce the size of the
Paris embassy. Consolidating inventories at the warehouse could
decrease staff workload. For instance, household appliances and
furniture are maintained separately by agency with different warehouse
staff responsible for different inventories. Purchasing furniture
locally[Footnote 17] for embassies such as Paris could also reduce
staffing and other support requirements.
Advances in technology, increased use of the Internet, and more flights
from the United States may reduce the need for certain full-time
permanent staff overseas. Moreover, we have identified opportunities to
streamline or reengineer embassy functions to improve State‘s
operations and reduce administrative staffing requirements,
particularly in western Europe, through measures that would reduce
residential housing and furniture costs.[Footnote 18] We reported in
March 2001[Footnote 19] that State has a number of outmoded and
inefficient business processes. Our cost analyses of the U.S. embassy‘s
housing office in Brussels and the housing support function at the U.S.
embassy in London illustrated how reengineering could potentially
result in significant savings.
Rightsizing Framework Complements OMB Initiatives:
To implement the President‘s Management Agenda, OMB and State have
indicated that they plan to assess staffing requirements, costs, and
options at embassies in Europe and Eurasia. As part of this effort,
they are attempting to identify staff who could be relocated to the
planned regional facility in Frankfurt. Applying our framework in this
effort would provide a systematic means of assessing staff levels and
considering embassy costs and relocation and other rightsizing options.
Furthermore, OMB and State have other initiatives under way that will
make it easier to use the framework in the future. For example, to make
it easier to consider the costs of the U.S. overseas presence, OMB is
gathering data on overseas costs for each agency and the costs of
establishing new positions, and is assessing the process by which
agencies request funding to assign additional staff overseas. To help
assess mission priorities and workload, OMB and State are reviewing how
embassies have implemented the revised MPPs, which are designed to more
clearly set priorities, and how these plans could be used to determine
allocation of embassy resources. We plan to monitor OMB‘s progress in
implementing the rightsizing initiative and work with it to incorporate
comprehensive cost data into the overseas staffing process.
Conclusion:
Our rightsizing framework was designed to allow decision makers to
systematically link embassy staffing levels and requirements to three
critical elements of embassy operations--physical security, mission
priorities and requirements, and cost. Using our framework‘s common set
of criteria for making staffing assessments and adjustments would be an
important step toward establishing greater accountability and
transparency in the overseas staffing process. The key questions of the
framework will help decision makers identify the most important factors
affecting an embassy‘s staffing levels and consider rightsizing options
to either add or reduce staff or adjust the staff mix. Rightsizing
experts told us that the framework appears applicable to all embassies.
Although we have tested it only at the U.S. embassy in Paris and are in
the process of refining it, we too believe that the framework can
provide guidance for executive branch rightsizing exercises at other
embassies.
Recommendation for Executive Action:
To facilitate the use of a common set of criteria for making staff
assessments and adjustments at overseas posts and encourage decision
makers to consider security, mission priorities and requirements, and
costs, we recommend that the Director of the Office of Management and
Budget ensure that our framework is used as a basis for assessing
staffing levels in the administration‘s rightsizing initiative,
starting with its assessments of staffing levels and rightsizing
options at U.S. embassies in Europe and Eurasia.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
OMB and State provided written comments on a draft of this report (see
apps. III and IV). OMB said that it appreciated our efforts to develop
a rightsizing framework. OMB agreed with the framework‘s key elements
and options and plans to build upon the framework in examining staffing
at all posts within the European and Eurasia Bureau. However, OMB
expressed concern regarding whether the GAO methodology can be
uniformly applied at all posts worldwide. Nonetheless, OMB noted that
it looks forward to working with us and the State Department in using
the framework as a starting point to develop a broader methodology that
can be applied worldwide.
State said that it welcomed our work in developing a framework for
rightsizing. State noted the difficulties of previous efforts to
develop a methodology, including attempts by the Overseas Presence
Advisory Panel and a State-led interagency rightsizing committee. It
stated that it has taken steps to regionalize responsibilities in the
United States and overseas where appropriate. In addition, State
provided technical comments that we have incorporated into this report,
as appropriate.
Scope and Methodology:
To develop the elements of the rightsizing framework and corresponding
checklist of suggested questions, we analyzed previous reports on
overseas staffing issues, including those of the Accountability Review
Boards, OPAP, and the State-led interagency rightsizing committee. We
interviewed officials from OMB to discuss the administration‘s current
rightsizing initiatives in relation to the President‘s Management
Agenda. We discussed embassy staffing with rightsizing experts,
including the Chairman of OPAP and the current and former
Undersecretary of State for Management. We also interviewed officials
from the Departments of State, Defense, the Treasury, Commerce,
Justice, and Agriculture as well as officials from other agencies with
personnel in France.
To further develop and test the framework, we conducted a case study at
the U.S. embassy in Paris. To assess embassy security, we reviewed
security reports, interviewed security experts, and made direct
observations. To assess missions‘ priorities and requirements, we
interviewed and collected data from the U.S. Ambassador to France, the
Deputy Chief of Mission, and other high-ranking embassy officials as
well as officials from more than 35 sections at the Paris embassy. We
also interviewed agency officials in Washington, D.C., and in Paris to
determine the criteria used by agencies to set staffing levels at the
Paris embassy. To assess costs, we interviewed budget and financial
management officials from State and collected data on the different
categories of operating costs, such as salaries and benefits, from each
agency with staff assigned to the Paris embassy. To determine the
feasibility of rightsizing actions, we collected and analyzed data
associated with (1) relocating certain functions to the United States,
regional centers in Europe, or other locations in France and (2)
outsourcing or streamlining some functions. We visited State‘s regional
logistics and procurement offices in Antwerp, Belgium, and Frankfurt,
Germany, which have been considered as options for expanded regional
operations in Europe. To determine if opportunities exist to outsource
functions, we collected and analyzed data on the business and staffing
practices of Paris-based businesses, other U.S. embassies in western
Europe, and other bilateral diplomatic missions in Paris.
We conducted our work between September 2001 and May 2002 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
We are sending copies of this report to other interested Members of
Congress. We are also sending copies of this report to the Director of
OMB and the Secretary of State. Copies will be made available to others
upon request. In addition, this report will be available at no charge
on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
contact me on (202) 512-4128. Another GAO contact and staff
acknowledgments are listed in appendix V.
Sincerely yours,
Jess T. Ford
Director, International Affairs and Trade:
Signed by Jess T. Ford:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Timeline of Rightsizing Initiatives since the 1998 Embassy
Bombings:
Time frame: January 1999; Initiative: Following the bombings of the
U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, that
killed more than 220, including 12 Americans, and injured more than
4,000, the Accountability Review Boards recommended that the Department
of State look into decreasing the size and number of embassies and
consulates to reduce employees‘ vulnerability to attack.
Time frame: November 1999; Initiative: The Overseas Presence Advisory
Panel (OPAP) reported that overseas staffing levels had not been
adjusted to reflect changing missions and requirements; thus, some
embassies were too large and some were too small. OPAP said rightsizing
was an essential component of an overall program to upgrade embassy and
consulate capabilities, and it recommended that this be a key strategy
to improve security by reducing the number of staff at risk. OPAP also
viewed rightsizing as a way to decrease operating costs by as much as
$380 million annually if a 10 percent worldwide staffing reduction
could be achieved.
Time frame: February 2000; Initiative: President Clinton directed the
Secretary of State to lead an interagency effort to (1) develop a
methodology for assessing embassy staffing and (2) recommend
adjustments, if necessary, to staffing levels at six pilot study
embassies. We reported that the interagency committee was not
successful in developing such a methodology. Although the committee
concluded that it was impractical to develop a standard approach
because of differences among embassies, we reported that the pilot
studies had limited value because they were conducted without focused,
written guidelines, and committee members did not spend enough time at
each embassy for a thorough evaluation.
Time frame: August 2001; Initiative: The President‘s Management Agenda
identified rightsizing as one of the administration‘s management
priorities. President Bush directed the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) to collect, analyze, and review overall U.S. government staffing
to help reconfigure overseas staff allocation to the minimum number
necessary to achieve U.S. foreign policy goals.
Time frame: February 2002; Initiative: The President‘s fiscal year 2003
international affairs budget highlighted the importance of making
staffing decisions on the basis of mission priorities and costs and
directed OMB to analyze agencies‘ overseas staffing and operating
costs.
Sources: GAO analysis of the reports of the Accountability Review
Boards, OPAP, and the Interagency Committee and of the President‘s
Management Agenda and the fiscal year 2003 international affairs
budget.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix II: Rightsizing Framework and Corresponding Questions:
Physical/technical security of facilities and employees: What is the
threat and security profile of the embassy?.
Physical/technical security of facilities and employees: Has the
ability to protect personnel been a factor in determining staffing
levels at the embassy?.
Physical/technical security of facilities and employees: To what extent
are existing office buildings secure?.
Physical/technical security of facilities and employees: Is existing
space being optimally utilized?.
Physical/technical security of facilities and employees: Have all
practical options for improving the security of facilities been
considered?.
Physical/technical security of facilities and employees: Do issues
involving facility security put the staff at an unacceptable level of
risk or limit mission accomplishment?.
Physical/technical security of facilities and employees: Do security
vulnerabilities suggest the need to reduce or relocate staff?.
Mission priorities and requirements: What are the
staffing levels and mission of each agency?.
Mission priorities and requirements: How do
agencies determine embassy staffing levels?.
Mission priorities and requirements: Is there an
adequate justification for the number of employees at each agency
compared with the agency‘s mission?.
Mission priorities and requirements: Is there
adequate justification for the number of direct hire personnel devoted
to support and administrative operations?.
Mission priorities and requirements: What are the
priorities of the embassy?[A].
Mission priorities and requirements: Does each
agency‘s mission reinforce embassy priorities?.
Mission priorities and requirements: To what extent
are mission priorities not being sufficiently addressed due to staffing
limitations or other impediments?.
Mission priorities and requirements: To what extent
are workload requirements validated and prioritized and is the embassy
able to balance them with core functions?.
Mission priorities and requirements: Do the
activities of any agencies overlap?.
Mission priorities and requirements: Given embassy
priorities and the staffing profile, are increases in the number of
existing staff or additional agency representation needed?.
Mission priorities and requirements: To what extent
is it necessary for each agency to maintain its current presence in
country, given the scope of its responsibilities and its mission?; -
Could an agency‘s mission be pursued in other ways?; - Does an agency
have regional responsibilities or is its mission entirely focused on
the host country?.
Cost of operations: What is the
embassy‘s total annual operating cost?.
Cost of operations: What are the
operating costs for each agency at the embassy?.
Cost of operations: To what extent
are agencies considering the full cost of operations in making staffing
decisions?.
Cost of operations: To what extent
are costs commensurate with overall embassy strategic importance, with
agency programs, and with specific products and services?.
Consideration of rightsizing options: What are the
security, mission, and cost implications of relocating certain
functions to the United States, regional centers, or to other
locations, such as commercial space or host country counterpart
agencies?.
Consideration of rightsizing options: To what extent
could agency program and/or routine administrative functions
(procurement, logistics, and financial management functions) be handled
from a regional center or other locations?.
Consideration of rightsizing options: Do new
technologies and transportation links offer greater opportunities for
operational support from other locations?.
Consideration of rightsizing options: Do the host
country and regional environments suggest there are options for doing
business differently, that is, are there adequate transportation and
communications links and a vibrant private sector?.
Consideration of rightsizing options: To what extent
is it practical to purchase embassy services from the private sector?.
Consideration of rightsizing options: Does the ratio
of support staff to program staff at the embassy suggest opportunities
for streamlining?.
Consideration of rightsizing options: Can functions
be reengineered to provide greater efficiencies and reduce requirements
for personnel?.
Consideration of rightsizing options: Are there best
practices of other bilateral embassies or private corporations that
could be adapted by the U.S. embassy?.
Consideration of rightsizing options: To what extent
are there U.S. or host country legal, policy, or procedural obstacles
that may impact the feasibility of rightsizing options?.
[A] Embassy priorities are the U.S. government priorities in that
country.
Source: GAO.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix III: Comments from the Office of Management and Budget:
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503:
July 11, 2002:
THE DIRECTOR:
Jess T. Ford, Director International Affairs and Trade United States
General Accounting Office 441 G Street, NW:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Dear Mr. Ford:
The Office of Management and Budget is pleased to have the opportunity
to provide comments on your draft report, ’Framework for Assessing
Embassy Staff Levels Can Support Rightsizing Initiatives.“ We
appreciate the effort by GAO to develop a rightsizing methodology that
fits soundly with the Administration‘s rightsizing initiative.
OMB agrees that mission priorities, cost and security are key elements
to the rightsizing framework. In addition, workload requirements,
options for information technology, regionalization possibilities and
competitive sourcing opportunities should be considered in order to
adapt the methodology to fit each post.
Rightsizing is not a synonym for downsizing. It is meant to signify the
most efficient, cost-effective deployment of resources overseas in away
that assures US representation matches and serves US priorities.
Rightsizing requires a fundamental change in the way that we link the
United States Government‘s mission overseas with our foreign policy
goals and then determine which agency is best suited to implement and
achieve those goals.
Agencies should be held accountable in budgeting for their overseas
staffing decisions. We are in the process of addressing this by working
with the State Department to develop a rent surcharge proposal.
Agencies need to be encouraged to consider the total cost to the United
States Government (USG) of sending personnel overseas. We are
addressing
this by adapting the A-11 Budget Request process to agencies and
requesting they include overseas staffing and cost data in FY04.
Ambassadors are currently delegated authority for staffing decisions
but have little cost data or information on real agency needs. They
should be provided with multiagency cost and staffing information so
that they are well informed and empowered to manage resources,
requirements and staff to the appropriate level. We have addressed this
by working with the State Department to revise the mission performance
planning process (MPP). The FY04 MPPs now include: multiagency input,
workload requirements by priority on each agency and projected over
several years, a reduction in the number of priorities posts may claim
(from up to 15 to up to 5) and Ambassador certification of the entire
document.
It is easy to suggest that agencies should assign staff to a region not
a country, but it is hard particularly for smaller agencies to make
significant resource shifts to such an option. We are addressing this
by coordinating the acquisition and rightsizing of the Creekbed
hospital in Frankfurt as a pilot for regional-based efforts. This will
be a regional center for Europe and Eurasia. We are also looking at
potential alternative regional centers in other European locations.
We are not confident the GAO methodology can be uniformly applied at
all posts worldwide. While the results seem to work well in Paris,
there are a multitude of other posts with widely varied issues and
needs that may not be addressed in this methodology. We believe that
the methodology proposed in this report may serve as a valuable
starting point for the development of a broader methodology that can be
applied worldwide. Based on the recommendations in this report we look
forward to working with you and the State Department to develop a
rightsizing methodology that can be applied to all new and existing
embassies.
The Administration‘s interagency rightsizing initiative is moving from
recommendations to concrete steps that will have an impact on how
resources of all USG agencies are deployed overseas. On a practical
level, OMB, State, and other USG agencies have been working to ensure
that a proposed new interagency regional center in Frankfurt, Germany
is developed from the outset to serve country-specific and regional
needs. State and OMB are analyzing the current staff USG agencies have
in Frankfurt as well as some functions USG agencies perform across
Europe, to determine which functions could be regionalized in Frankfurt
or performed from the United States. A more extensive pilot project on
interagency rightsizing is underway to examine all posts within the
European and Eurasia Bureau. This pilot effort will involve OMB and
interagency cooperation and build upon the rightsizing work of GAO to
consider how to conduct rightsizing on a larger scale. Finally, State
and OMB are working to develop a cost sharing mechanism that would
apply to all USG agencies to finance the construction of new embassies.
If properly designed, a cost sharing mechanism for capital costs could
be a powerful on-going incentive to rightsize future presence at new
posts.
Once again, we appreciate the opportunity to comment and hope that you
will incorporate our observations into your final report to Congress.
If you have any questions concerning this response, please contact Ms.
Alexandra Gianinno of the International Affairs Division at (202) 395-
1483.
Sincerely,
Mitchell E. Daniels, Jr. Director:
Signed by Mitchell E. Daniels, Jr. Director:
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of State:
Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the report text appear at the
end of this appendix.
United States Department of State:
Washington, D.C.20520:
Dear Ms. Westin:
We appreciate the opportunity to review your draft report, ’OVERSEAS
PRESENCE: Framework for Assessing Embassy Staff Levels Can Support
Rightsizing Initiatives,“ GAO-02-780, GAO Job Code 320123.
The enclosed Department of State comments are provided for
incorporation with this letter as an appendix to the final report.
If you have any questions concerning this response, please contact
William Duffy, Policy Analyst, Office of Management Policy, at (202)
647-0093.
Sincerely,
Christopher B. Burnham Assistant Secretary and Chief Financial
Officer:
Signed by Christopher B. Burnham:
Enclosure:
As stated.
cc: GAO/IAT - John Brummet State/OIG - Mr. Berman State/M/P -
Marguerite Coffey:
Ms. Susan S. Westin, Managing Director, International Affairs and
Trade, U.S. General Accounting Office.
Department of State Comments on GAO Draft Report OVERSEAS PRESENCE:
Framework for Assessing Embassy Staff Levels Can Support Rightsizing
Initiatives (GAO Report 02-780, GAO Job Code 320123):
The Department of State welcomes GAO‘s work on developing a right-
sizing framework. GAO‘s framework lays out a common-sense approach that
asks the kinds of questions Chiefs of Mission (COMs) and other
decision-makers have always routinely addressed through formal and
informal processes when considering staffing issues.
We endorse GAO‘s definition of rightsizing:
Rightsizing [is] aligning the number and location of staff assigned
overseas with foreign policy priorities and security and other
constraints. Rightsizing may result in the addition or reduction of
staff, or a change in the mix of staff at a given embassy or consulate.
A range of U.S.G. agencies has traditionally staffed U.S. embassies and
consulates. The current number of American direct hire positions under
the authority of Chiefs of Mission stands at about 18,000, smaller now
than at its 1966 peak of 42,000. The current level is essentially the
same as in 1990, and reflects a 4.5% decline since 1995. Since at least
the 1950s, the Department of State has represented a third or less of
all overseas staffing.
Rationalizing the U.S. Government‘s overseas presence - an objective of
successive Administrations since the 1960s - is no easy task. Past
efforts to develop an interagency staffing methodology have not
succeeded. The 1999 Overseas Presence Advisory Panel (OPAP), for
example, did not develop such a methodology, even though its original
charter charged it with ’preparing a report recommending the criteria
by which [the USG] might determine the location, size, and composition
of overseas posts in the coming decade.“:
There is no substitute for face-to-face interaction with host
governments and publics.State continues to support the principle of
universality, under which the U.S. Government maintains an on-the-
ground presence in virtually all nations with which we have diplomatic
relations. We agree with OPAP‘s conclusion that ’a universal, on-the-
ground overseas presence is more critical than ever to the nation‘s
well-being.“:
The Department of State‘s policy is to pursue regionalization
initiatives when appropriate. It relies heavily on centralizing a
variety of administrative, consular, and some policy functions (e.g.,
Labor Attaches, Environment and Science hubs), either overseas or in
the United States. State has four U.S. regional centers:
* The Fort Lauderdale Regional Center provides support services to U.S.
posts throughout the Western Hemisphere. * The National Visa Center in
Portsmouth NH and the Kentucky Consular Center in Williamsburg KY
perform various consular tasks traditionally carried out at individual
posts.
* The Charleston (SC) Financial Service Center provides financial
services for U.S. posts throughout the Western Hemisphere and for some
European posts, and is in the process of assuming financial services
for additional European and African posts formerly carried out at the
regional Financial Service Center in Paris.
State is also shifting routine passport production from overseas posts
to U.S. domestic passport agencies in order to take advantage of the
high security passport photodigitization process installed in the
United States.
When relocation to the United States is not feasible, U.S.G. agencies
(including State) use many embassies and consulates such as Frankfurt
and Bangkok as regional platforms for their activities.
As GAO has pointed out, a major U.S.G. regionalization effort now
underway is the Frankfurt Regional Support Center, to be located on the
site of what was the Department of Defense‘s 469th Hospital. The Center
will be home to numerous personnel from State and other U.S.G. agencies
with regional responsibilities for Africa, Europe, Eurasia, and the
Middle East.
A large number of staff in non-regional centers also have regional
responsibilities. For example, employees manage many medical and
security functions on a regional basis. While we can gain economies
(usually in the management field) by regionalizing some functions, this
does not eliminate the need for more people at some posts.
In addition, it should be pointed out that there are negative aspects
to regionalization. One drawback to locating personnel away from the
posts they serve is reduced linguistic and cultural awareness and
knowledge that is required to function well-issues for which GAO has
previously criticized State. In this context, it should be noted that
for a regional American officer to function effectively when s/he does
not have language and cultural skills, the regionally serviced post
basically needs to hire at least one foreign national employee to work
the issues in the regional officer‘s absence. Fundamentally, as OPAP
concluded ’a universal, on-the-ground overseas presence is more
critical than ever to the nation‘s well-being.“:
Another drawback is that the Department of State reports that it is
increasingly difficult to find personnel who are willing to provide
true regional service, i.e., spend 600 of their time on the road.
Although the issue may be addressable through career or financial
incentives, there will be costs associated with going over to a
’regional“ basis of service.
GAO prioritizes the three elements in its framework as Security -
Mission - Cost. We think a more logical priority would put ’mission“
first. The first question that must be answered before all others is
whether the United States has a compelling reason to be in a particular
location. If the answer is ’Yes,“ then it may be necessary to place
personnel there, even in the face of serious security concerns or
excessive costs (e.g., the recent opening of the U.S. Embassy in Kabul,
Afghanistan). If the answer is ’No,“ the question of whether personnel
can be securely or economically located there is irrelevant.
The draft GAO report does not mention some of the primary drivers for
other agencies‘ overseas staff increases.
* Agencies want to maintain independence. Despite the ’country team“
concept, agency offices in missions seek to avoid the constraints of
standardized mission services, practices, systems, and regulations.
As long as agencies are free to maintain independent and separate
support standards, they will add in-house staff to achieve them.
The GAO report (p. 9) notes this indirectly in mentioning the
separate furniture inventories and warehouse staff in Paris, but it
does not make clear that this can be a primary driver of staff size
rather than a corollary result.
* The ’rank-in-job“ system of non-Foreign Affairs Agencies encourages
incentives for staff growth that are not part of the growth dynamic for
the ’rank-in-person“ Foreign Affairs agencies. Conversely, reducing
staff tends toward downgrading of staff and meets resistance.
* Office assets of non-Foreign Affairs agencies are often linked to
size as well. For example, most agency heads at posts have government
owned vehicles; almost no agencies other than State participate in
pooled vehicles for transporting staff. The larger an agency unit, the
more justification it has to expand the number of vehicles it has. This
principle extends to other resources/assets as well.
* The costs of overseas offices‘ operations are often infinitesimal
compared to the agency‘s total programs, which are primarily
domestically based (e.g., Defense, Agriculture, Justice) and only small
blips at the agency-level budget allocations. As a result, serious
analysis of the sizing of an agency‘s overseas presence and
coordination with other activities and mission priorities is often
neglected. The COM through the NSDD 38 process effectively bears the
entire burden of enforcing rightsizing. The COM has little in the way
of resources, time, or practical mechanisms for communication about
agency objectives and priorities in placing personnel at a particular
mission. Nor is there any organizational structure charged with
evaluating whether the agencies‘ mission could be better achieved from
a different location. Without an enforcement mechanism, GAO‘s proposed
criteria will not be effectively applied and it is likely that the
particular needs of the requesting agencies will prevail over the
broader interest in rightsizing.
The report does not mention International Cooperative Administrative
Support Services (ICASS), implemented in FY 1998. ICASS is the shared
administrative support system through which more than 250 U.S.
government entities at our overseas posts obtain essential services and
share costs of operating facilities and services. ICASS‘s cost
distribution system ensures that a more comprehensive estimate of the
cost of each agency‘s presence overseas is reflected in that agency‘s
budget.
One example GAO cites as a position that could be transferred from
Paris to Frankfurt - the National Science Foundation - is particularly
troubling. According to GAO, the representative ’spent approximately 40
percent of his time in 2001 outside of France“ (p. 9). We disagree with
the proposition that a position whose incumbent spends 600 of the time
in one location should be moved to a ’regional“ location elsewhere.
We look forward to continuing to work with GAO and the Office of
Management and Budget on rightsizing.
The following are GAO‘s comments on the Department of State‘s letter
dated July 9, 2002.
GAO‘s Comments:
1. We did not set priorities for the elements in the framework that
appear in this report. As we state on page 9, decision makers need to
consider all three elements of the framework together to make
reasonable decisions regarding staff size.
2. In the mission priorities and requirements section, the framework
includes the question, ’To what extent is it necessary for each agency
to maintain its current presence in country?“ The amount of time that
officials spend in country is a key factor needed to answer the
question and in this case the location of the National Science
Foundation‘s representative in Paris warranted further analysis as a
possible candidate for rightsizing. The mandate of the National Science
Foundation representative is to communicate with bilateral and
multilateral counterpart agencies in more than 35 countries in Europe
and Eurasia. The representative stated that he could do his job from
any location in Europe, as long as he has high-speed internet
connectivity. Given security limitations at facilities in Paris and the
availability, in the near future, of secure space in Frankfurt,
Germany, decision makers should consider these types of positions for
relocation.
[End of section]
Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
John Brummet (202) 512-5260:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the person named above, David G. Bernet, Janey Cohen,
Chris Hall, Katie Hartsburg, Lynn Moore, and Melissa Pickworth made key
contributions to this report.
[End of section]
FOOTNOTES
[1] Throughout this report, we refer to rightsizing issues at
embassies. However, the rightsizing process is also applicable to
diplomatic offices that are located outside the capital cities. For our
purposes, we define rightsizing as aligning the number and location of
staff assigned overseas with foreign policy priorities and security and
other constraints. Rightsizing may result in the addition or reduction
of staff, or a change in the mix of staff at a given embassy or
consulate.
[2] Office of Management and Budget, The President‘s Management Agenda,
Fiscal Year 2002 (Washington, D.C.: August 2001).
[3] U.S. General Accounting Office, Overseas Presence: Observations on
a Rightsizing Framework, GAO-02-659T (Washington, D.C.: May 1, 2002).
[4] Secretary of State Madeline Albright established OPAP following the
1998 embassy bombings in Africa to consider the organization of U.S.
embassies and consulates. Department of State, America‘s Overseas
Presence in the 21st Century, The Report of the Overseas Presence
Advisory Panel (Washington, D.C.: November 1999).
[5] U.S. Department of State, Trends in American (US) Full-Time
Permanent (FTP) Direct-Hire (USDH) World Wide Positions FY 1985 - FY
2001 (Washington, D.C.: June 2001).
[6] Testimony of Nancy Dorn, Deputy Director of the Office of
Management and Budget, before the Subcommittee on National Security,
Veterans Affairs, and International Relations, House Committee on
Government Reform, on May 1, 2002.
[7] Secretary of State Albright appointed the Accountability Review
Boards to investigate the facts and circumstances surrounding the 1998
embassy bombings in East Africa. Department of State, Report of the
Accountability Review Boards on the Embassy Bombings in Nairobi and Dar
Es Salaam (Washington, D.C.: January 1999).
[8] U.S. General Accounting Office, Overseas Presence: More Work Needed
on Embassy Rightsizing, GAO-02-143 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 27, 2001).
[9] Office of Management and Budget, Budget of the U.S. Government,
Fiscal Year 2003 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 4, 2002).
[10] According to the Foreign Service Act of 1980 (P.L. 96-465), as
amended, ’chiefs of mission“ are principal officers in charge of
diplomatic missions of the United States or of a U.S. office abroad,
such as U.S. ambassadors, who are responsible for the direction,
coordination, and supervision of all government executive branch
employees in a given foreign country (except employees under a military
commander).
[11] Mission Performance Plans are annual embassy plans describing
performance goals and objectives.
[12] Testimony of Lewis B. Kaden, chairman of the Overseas Presence
Advisory Panel, before the Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans
Affairs, and International Relations, House Committee on Government
Reform, on May 1, 2002.
[13] Dorn, May 1, 2002.
[14] Kaden, May 1, 2002.
[15] Following the 1998 embassy bombings, a provision was passed into
law, codified at 22 U.S.C. § 4865, that requires the Secretary of
State, in selecting a site for any new U.S. diplomatic facilities
abroad, to ensure that all U.S. personnel under chiefs of mission
authority be located on the site. However, the Secretary of State may
waive this requirement, if the Secretary, together with the heads of
those agencies with personnel who would be located off site, determine
that security considerations permit it and that it is in the U.S.
national interests.
[16] With enactment of the Federal Activities Inventory Reform Act of
1998 (P.L. 105-270), Congress mandated that U.S. government agencies
identify activities within each office that are not ’inherently
governmental,“ that is, commercial activities. Competitive sourcing
involves using competition to determine whether a commercial activity
should be performed by government personnel or contractors. The
President‘s Management Agenda states that competition historically has
resulted in a 20-to 50-percent cost savings for the government.
[17] State currently has a central contract requiring that all overseas
posts purchase furniture from the United States and not from local
sources. Logistics management officials at State said that the contract
is currently under renegotiation and that the revised agreement will
include local procurement allowances for pilot posts.
[18] U.S. General Accounting Office, State Department: Options for
Reducing Overseas Housing and Furniture Costs, GAO/NSIAD-98-128
(Washington, D.C.: July 31, 1998).
[19] U.S. General Accounting Office, Supporting Congressional
Oversight: Framework for Considering Budgetary Implications of Selected
GAO Work, GAO-01-447 (Washington, D.C.: May 9, 2001).
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