Intelligence Reform
GAO Can Assist the Congress and the Intelligence Community on Management Reform Initiatives
Gao ID: GAO-08-413T February 29, 2008
For decades, GAO has assisted Congress in its oversight role and helped federal departments and agencies with disparate missions to improve the economy, efficiency, and effectiveness of their operations. GAO's work provides important insight on matters such as best practices to be shared and benchmarked and how government and nongovernmental partners can become better aligned to achieve important outcomes for the nation. In addition, GAO provides Congress with foresight by highlighting the long-term implications of today's decisions and identifying key trends and emerging challenges facing our nation before they reach crisis proportions. For this hearing, GAO was asked to (1) highlight governmentwide issues where it has made a major contribution to oversight and could assist the intelligence and other congressional committees in their oversight of the Intelligence Community, and (2) comment on the potential impact on GAO's access to perform audit work on personnel security clearances if the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) were to assume management of this issue from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). Given historical challenges to GAO's ability to audit the Intelligence Community's programs and activities, this testimony also discusses GAO's views on Senate bill S. 82, known as the Intelligence Community Audit Act of 2007.
GAO has considerable experience in addressing governmentwide management challenges, including such areas as human capital, acquisition, information technology, strategic planning, organizational alignment, and financial and knowledge management, and has identified many opportunities to improve agencies' economy, efficiency, and effectiveness, and the need for interagency collaboration in addressing 21st century challenges. For example, over the years, GAO has addressed the human capital issues, such as acquiring, developing, and retaining talent; strategic workforce planning; building results-oriented cultures; pay for performance; contractors in the workforce; and personnel security clearances, which affect all federal agencies, including the Intelligence Community. Furthermore, GAO identified delays and other impediments in the Department of Defense's (DOD) personnel security clearance program, which also maintains clearances for intelligence agencies within DOD. GAO designated human capital transformation and personnel security clearances as high-risk areas. GAO also recently issued reports addressing Intelligence Community-related management issues, including intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; space acquisitions; and the space acquisition workforce. If ODNI were to assume management responsibilities over security clearances across the federal government, GAO's ability to continue monitoring this area and provide Congress information for its oversight role could be adversely affected. In 2006, OMB's Deputy Director for Management suggested that OMB's oversight role of the governmentwide security clearance process might be transferred to the ODNI. GAO has established and maintained a relatively positive working relationship with the ODNI, but limitations on GAO's ability to perform meaningful audit and evaluation work persist. While GAO has the legal authority to audit the personnel security clearance area, if the ODNI were to assume management responsibilities over this issue, then it may be prudent to incorporate some legislative provision to reinforce GAO's access to information needed to conduct such audits and reviews. GAO supports S. 82 and believes that if it is enacted, the agency would be well-positioned to assist Congress in oversight of Intelligence Community management reforms. S. 82 would reaffirm GAO's existing statutory authority to audit and evaluate financial transactions, programs, and activities of elements of the Intelligence Community, and to access records necessary for such audits and evaluations. GAO has clear audit and access authority with respect to elements of the Intelligence Community, subject to a few limited exceptions. However, for many years, the executive branch has not provided GAO the level of cooperation needed to conduct meaningful reviews of elements of the Intelligence Community. This issue has taken on new prominence and is of greater concern in the post-9/11 context, especially since the ODNI's responsibilities extend well beyond traditional intelligence activities. The reaffirmation provisions in the bill should help to ensure that GAO's audit and access authorities are not misconstrued in the future.
GAO-08-413T, Intelligence Reform: GAO Can Assist the Congress and the Intelligence Community on Management Reform Initiatives
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Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government
Management, the Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia,
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT:
Friday, February 29, 2008:
Intelligence Reform:
GAO Can Assist the Congress and the Intelligence Community on
Management Reform Initiatives:
Statement of David M. Walker Comptroller General of the United States:
GAO-08-413T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-08-413T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on
Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the
District of Columbia, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs, U.S. Senate.
Why GAO Did This Study:
For decades, GAO has assisted Congress in its oversight role and helped
federal departments and agencies with disparate missions to improve the
economy, efficiency, and effectiveness of their operations. GAO‘s work
provides important insight on matters such as best practices to be
shared and benchmarked and how government and nongovernmental partners
can become better aligned to achieve important outcomes for the nation.
In addition, GAO provides Congress with foresight by highlighting the
long-term implications of today‘s decisions and identifying key trends
and emerging challenges facing our nation before they reach crisis
proportions.
For this hearing, GAO was asked to (1) highlight governmentwide issues
where it has made a major contribution to oversight and could assist
the intelligence and other congressional committees in their oversight
of the Intelligence Community, and (2) comment on the potential impact
on GAO‘s access to perform audit work on personnel security clearances
if the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) were to
assume management of this issue from the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB). Given historical challenges to GAO‘s ability to audit the
Intelligence Community‘s programs and activities, this testimony also
discusses GAO‘s views on Senate bill S. 82, known as the Intelligence
Community Audit Act of 2007.
What GAO Found:
GAO has considerable experience in addressing governmentwide management
challenges, including such areas as human capital, acquisition,
information technology, strategic planning, organizational alignment,
and financial and knowledge management, and has identified many
opportunities to improve agencies‘ economy, efficiency, and
effectiveness, and the need for interagency collaboration in addressing
21st century challenges. For example, over the years, GAO has addressed
the human capital issues, such as acquiring, developing, and retaining
talent; strategic workforce planning; building results-oriented
cultures; pay for performance; contractors in the workforce; and
personnel security clearances, which affect all federal agencies,
including the Intelligence Community. Furthermore, GAO identified
delays and other impediments in the Department of Defense‘s (DOD)
personnel security clearance program, which also maintains clearances
for intelligence agencies within DOD. GAO designated human capital
transformation and personnel security clearances as high-risk areas.
GAO also recently issued reports addressing Intelligence Community-
related management issues, including intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance; space acquisitions; and the space acquisition
workforce.
If ODNI were to assume management responsibilities over security
clearances across the federal government, GAO‘s ability to continue
monitoring this area and provide Congress information for its oversight
role could be adversely affected. In 2006, OMB‘s Deputy Director for
Management suggested that OMB‘s oversight role of the governmentwide
security clearance process might be transferred to the ODNI. GAO has
established and maintained a relatively positive working relationship
with the ODNI, but limitations on GAO‘s ability to perform meaningful
audit and evaluation work persist. While GAO has the legal authority to
audit the personnel security clearance area, if the ODNI were to assume
management responsibilities over this issue, then it may be prudent to
incorporate some legislative provision to reinforce GAO‘s access to
information needed to conduct such audits and reviews.
GAO supports S. 82 and believes that if it is enacted, the agency would
be well-positioned to assist Congress in oversight of Intelligence
Community management reforms. S. 82 would reaffirm GAO‘s existing
statutory authority to audit and evaluate financial transactions,
programs, and activities of elements of the Intelligence Community, and
to access records necessary for such audits and evaluations. GAO has
clear audit and access authority with respect to elements of the
Intelligence Community, subject to a few limited exceptions. However,
for many years, the executive branch has not provided GAO the level of
cooperation needed to conduct meaningful reviews of elements of the
Intelligence Community. This issue has taken on new prominence and is
of greater concern in the post-9/11 context, especially since the
ODNI‘s responsibilities extend well beyond traditional intelligence
activities. The reaffirmation provisions in the bill should help to
ensure that GAO‘s audit and access authorities are not misconstrued in
the future.
What GAO Recommends:
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
[hyperlink, http://www.GAO-08-413T]. For more information, contact Davi
M. D'Agostino, 202-512-5431 or dagostinod@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
I am pleased to be here before you today to address how GAO could
assist Congress and the Intelligence Community.[Footnote 1] You asked
that I discuss how GAO's expertise and capacity to perform program
reviews of key governmentwide issues, as well as some recent work we
have done related to intelligence activities, could be useful in
assisting congressional oversight of Intelligence Community management
reforms under consideration. Second, as requested, I will comment on
the potential impact on GAO's ability to perform audit work on
personnel security clearances if the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence (ODNI) were to assume management of this issue from the
Office of Management and Budget (OMB). Finally, given historical
challenges to GAO's ability to audit the Intelligence Community's
programs and activities, I would like to discuss GAO's views on Senate
bill S. 82, known as the Intelligence Community Audit Act of
2007.[Footnote 2] My comments today are based primarily on GAO's
completed work and on our institutional knowledge, drawn from our prior
reviews at the Department of Defense (DOD) and other federal agencies
of human capital management, personnel security clearances, and other
areas that directly affect the Intelligence Community, as well as on
publicly available reports. (See the list of related GAO products at
the end of this statement.)
Summary:
First, GAO has assisted Congress for decades in its oversight role and
helped federal departments and agencies with disparate missions to
improve the economy, efficiency, and effectiveness of their operations.
In addition, GAO's work also provides important insight and foresight
to complement the work we have performed for Congress for many years. A
number of the governmentwide management challenges we have addressed,
such as human capital transformation, acquisition, information
technology, strategic planning, organizational alignment, financial and
knowledge management, and personnel security clearances, affect most
federal agencies, including those within the Intelligence Community.
Moreover, we have designated some of these areas as high- risk for the
federal government.[Footnote 3] Human capital transformation and
personnel security clearances also have been repeatedly identified as
areas of weakness within the Intelligence Community by others,
including the Subcommittee on Oversight, House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence; the Congressional Research Service; and
independent commissions.[Footnote 4] Specifically, strategic human
capital transformation and related management reforms; DOD's new pay-
for-performance system, known as the National Security Personnel System
(NSPS); contractors in the workforce; and personnel security clearances
are among the serious challenges going forward. We also have recently
completed work on several management issues that are directly related
to the Intelligence Community, and we have the capabilities to further
support the intelligence and other appropriate congressional committees
with their oversight needs. Specifically, we have performed in-depth
reviews and issued reports on intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (ISR) systems requirements, operations, and
acquisitions; on space acquisitions; and on the space acquisition
workforce--issues that are current and critical within the Intelligence
Community.[Footnote 5] For the most part, DOD has agreed with our
findings and recommendations. In addition, GAO's highly qualified and
experienced staff--including its analysts, auditors, lawyers, and
methodologists--and secure facilities position us to perform intensive
reviews to assess the transformation and related management reforms
under consideration within the Intelligence Community, especially in
connection with human capital and acquisition and contracting-related
issues.
Second, if the ODNI assumes management of governmentwide personnel
security clearances, then GAO's ability to continue to review personnel
security clearances could be impaired unless greater cooperation is
forthcoming from the Intelligence Community. Although we have
established and maintained a relatively positive working relationship
with the ODNI, limitations on our ability to perform meaningful audit
and evaluation work persist. The ODNI might assume management
responsibilities for the security clearance process in the event that
either of two potential changes were to occur. First, in 2006, OMB's
Deputy Director for Management suggested that the agency's oversight
role of the governmentwide security clearance process might be
transferred to the ODNI. Alternatively, the ODNI could assume
leadership, to some extent, over implementation of a new security
clearance process. A team established by the Director of National
Intelligence, the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, and
OMB's Deputy Director for Management is developing a proposed security
clearance process that could be implemented governmentwide. If ODNI
were to assume leadership or oversight responsibilities for
governmentwide personnel security clearances, then it might be prudent
to incorporate some legislative provision to reinforce GAO's access to
the information needed to conduct audits and reviews in the personnel
security clearance area.
Third, with the support of Congress and S. 82, GAO would be well-
positioned to provide the intelligence and other appropriate
congressional committees with an independent, fact-based evaluation of
Intelligence Community management reform initiatives. S. 82, if
enacted, would amend title 31 of the United States Code to reaffirm
GAO's authority to audit and evaluate financial transactions, programs,
and activities of the Intelligence Community. The bill also would
provide that GAO may conduct an audit or evaluation of intelligence
sources and methods or covert actions only upon the request of the
intelligence committees or congressional majority or minority leaders.
It also would provide that GAO perform such work and use agency
documents in space provided by the audited agencies. We support this
bill and believe that if it is enacted, GAO would be well-positioned to
assist Congress with its oversight functions relating to the
Intelligence Community. The reaffirmation provisions in the bill should
also help to ensure that GAO's audit and access authorities are not
misconstrued in the future.
Background:
GAO's Authority to Review Intelligence Community Programs:
Generally, we have broad authority to evaluate agency programs and
investigate matters related to the receipt, disbursement, and use of
public money.[Footnote 6] To carry out our audit responsibilities, we
have a statutory right of access to agency records. Specifically,
federal agencies are required to provide us information about their
duties, powers, activities, organization, and financial
transactions.[Footnote 7] In concert with our statutory audit and
evaluation authority, this provision gives GAO a broad right of access
to agency records, including records of the Intelligence Community,
subject to a few limited exceptions. GAO's access statute authorizes
enforcement of GAO's access rights through a series of steps specified
in the statute, including the filing of a civil action to compel
production of records in federal district court. However, GAO may not
bring an action to enforce its statutory right of access to a record
relating to activities that the President designates as foreign
intelligence or counterintelligence activities.[Footnote 8]
GAO's statutory authorities permit us to evaluate a wide range of
activities in the Intelligence Community, including the management and
administrative functions that intelligence agencies, such as the
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), have in common with all federal
agencies. However, since 1988, the Department of Justice (DOJ) has
maintained that Congress intended the intelligence committees to be the
exclusive means of oversight, effectively precluding oversight by us.
In our 2001 testimony about GAO's access to information on CIA programs
and activities, we noted that in 1994 the CIA Director sought to
further limit our audit work of intelligence programs, including those
at DOD.[Footnote 9] In 2006, the ODNI agreed with DOJ's 1988 position,
stating that the review of intelligence activities is beyond GAO's
purview. While we strongly disagree with DOJ and the ODNI's
view,[Footnote 10] we foresee no major change in limits on our access
without substantial support from Congress--the requestor of the vast
majority of our work. Congressional impetus for change would have to
include the support of the intelligence committees, which have
generally not requested GAO reviews or evaluations of CIA's or other
intelligence agencies' activities for many years. With support,
however, we could evaluate some of the basic management functions that
we now evaluate throughout other parts of the federal government, such
as human capital, acquisition, information technology, strategic
planning, organizational alignment, and financial and knowledge
management.
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004:
As this Subcommittee is well aware, the Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA) established the Director of
National Intelligence to serve as the head of the Intelligence
Community; act as the principal advisor to the President, the National
Security Council, and the Homeland Security Council for intelligence
matters related to national security; and oversee and direct the
implementation of the National Intelligence Program.[Footnote 11] Since
its inception, the ODNI has undertaken a number of initiatives,
including the development of both 100-and 500-day plans for integration
and collaboration. One of the core initiatives of these plans is to
modernize the security clearance process across the Intelligence
Community and at the national level, where other federal agencies,
including DOD, OMB, and Office of Personnel Management (OPM) are also
engaged.
Among other things, IRTPA also directed the President to select a
single department, agency, or element of the executive branch to be
responsible for day-to-day oversight of the government's security
clearance process.[Footnote 12] In June 2005, the President issued an
executive order that assigned OMB responsibility for ensuring the
effective implementation of a policy that directs agency functions
related to determinations of personnel eligibility for access to
classified information be uniform, centralized, efficient, effective,
timely, and reciprocal.[Footnote 13] In its new capacity, OMB assigned
the responsibility for the day-to-day supervision and monitoring of
security clearance investigations, as well as for tracking the results
of individual agency-performed adjudications, to OPM. With respect to
(1) personnel employed or working under a contract for an element of
the Intelligence Community and (2) security clearance investigations
and adjudications for Sensitive Compartmented Information, OMB assigned
the responsibility for supervision and monitoring of security clearance
investigations and tracking adjudications to the ODNI. In May 2006,
OMB's Deputy Director for Management stated during a congressional
hearing that the agency's oversight role in improving the
governmentwide clearance process might eventually be turned over to the
ODNI.[Footnote 14]
GAO Experience in Governmentwide Human Capital Issues and Other
Management Areas Can Assist Congress and the Intelligence Community on
Management Reforms:
For decades, we have assisted Congress in its oversight role and helped
agencies with disparate missions to improve the economy, effectiveness,
and efficiency of their operations and the need for interagency
collaboration in addressing 21ST century challenges, and we could
assist the intelligence and other appropriate congressional committees
in their oversight of the Intelligence Community as well. Our work also
provides important insight on matters such as best practices to be
shared and benchmarked and how government and its nongovernmental
partners can become better aligned to achieve important outcomes for
the nation. In addition, GAO provides Congress with foresight by
highlighting the long-term implications of today's decisions and
identifying key trends and emerging challenges facing our nation before
they reach crisis proportions. For the purpose of this hearing, I will
discuss our extensive experience in addressing governmentwide human
capital issues and other management issues that can assist the
intelligence and other appropriate congressional committees in their
oversight of Intelligence Community transformation and related
management reforms.
Human Capital Transformation and Management Are Governmentwide High-
Risk Issues also Affecting the Intelligence Community:
GAO has identified a number of human capital transformation and
management issues over the years, such as acquisition, information
technology, strategic planning, organizational alignment, financial and
knowledge management, and personnel security clearances, as cross-
cutting, governmentwide issues that affect most federal agencies,
including those within the Intelligence Community. Human capital
transformation and management issues have also been repeatedly
identified as areas of weakness within the Intelligence Community by
other organizations, including the Subcommittee on Oversight, House
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence; the Congressional Research
Service; and independent commissions, such as the 9/11 Commission and
Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission.[Footnote 15] Moreover, the ODNI
has acknowledged that Intelligence Community agencies face some of the
governmentwide challenges that we have identified, including
integration and collaboration within the Intelligence Community
workforce and inefficiencies and reciprocity of personnel security
clearances.[Footnote 16] Significant issues affecting the Intelligence
Community include strategic human capital transformation and reform
issues, DOD's new pay-for-performance management system called NSPS,
the extent to which agencies rely on, oversee, and manage their
contractor workforce, and personnel security clearances. In fact, we
have identified some of these programs and operations as high-risk
areas due to a range of management challenges.[Footnote 17]
Strategic Human Capital Transformation and Related Management Reforms
across the Government:
GAO and others have reported that the Intelligence Community faces a
wide range of human capital challenges, including those dealing with
recruiting and retaining a high-quality diverse workforce,
implementation of a modernized performance management system, knowledge
and skill gaps, integration and collaboration, and succession planning.
Our extensive work on government transformation distinctly positions us
to assist the intelligence and other appropriate congressional
committees to oversee the Intelligence Community's efforts to address
these human capital challenges as well as to inform congressional
decision making on management issues. Our work on governmentwide
strategic human capital management is aimed at transforming federal
agencies into results-oriented, high-performing organizations.
Transformation is necessary because the federal government is facing
new and more complex challenges than ever before, and agencies must re-
examine what they do and how they do it in order to meet those
challenges. Central to this effort are modern, effective, economical,
and efficient human capital practices, policies, and procedures
integrated with agencies' mission and program goals.
In 2001, we added strategic human capital management to the list of
governmentwide high-risk areas because of the long-standing lack of a
consistent strategic approach for marshaling, managing, and maintaining
the human capital needed to maximize government performance and ensure
its accountability. Although the federal government made progress in
addressing these issues in the years that followed, we found that more
can be done in four key areas: (1) top leadership in agencies must
provide the attention needed to address human capital and related
organizational transformation issues; (2) agencies' human capital
planning efforts need to be fully integrated with mission and program
goals; (3) agencies need to enhance their efforts to acquire, develop,
and retain talent; and (4) organizational cultures need to promote high
performance and accountability.
NSPS Is a Key Example of GAO's Programmatic Review of Human Capital
Transformation Challenges:
Based on our experience in addressing agencies' performance management
challenges, we are uniquely positioned to help Congress evaluate such
issues within the Intelligence Community, including the development and
implementation of its pay-for-performance personnel management
system.[Footnote 18] As an example of our experience in this area, I
would like to highlight our work on DOD's new civilian personnel
management system--the NSPS--which has provided Congress with insight
on DOD's proposal, design, and implementation of this system. The
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004[Footnote 19]
provided DOD with authority to establish a new framework of rules,
regulations, and processes to govern how the almost 700,000 defense
employees are hired, compensated, promoted, and disciplined.[Footnote
20] Congress provided these authorities in response to DOD's position
that the inflexibility of the federal personnel systems was one of the
most important constraints to the department's ability to attract,
retain, reward, and develop a civilian workforce to meet the national
security mission of the 21st century.
Prior to the enactment of the NSPS legislation in 2003, we raised a
number of critical issues about the proposed system in a series of
testimonies before three congressional committees.[Footnote 21] Since
then, we have provided congressional committees with insight on DOD's
process to design its new personnel management system, the extent to
which DOD's process reflects key practices for successful
transformation, the need for internal controls and transparency of
funding, and the most significant challenges facing DOD in implementing
NSPS.[Footnote 22]
Most important, we have noted in testimonies and reports that DOD and
other federal agencies must ensure that they have the necessary
institutional infrastructure in place before implementing major human
capital reform efforts, such as NSPS. This institutional infrastructure
includes, at a minimum, a human capital planning process that
integrates the agency's human capital policies, strategies, and
programs with its program goals, mission, and desired outcomes; the
capabilities to effectively develop and implement a new human capital
system; and the existence of a modern, effective, and credible
performance management system that includes adequate safeguards to
ensure a fair, effective, nondiscriminatory, and credible
implementation of the new system. While GAO strongly supports human
capital reform in the federal government, how it is done, when it is
done, and the basis upon which it is done can make all the difference
in whether such efforts are successful.
Contractor Workforce in Government Is an Emerging Governmentwide Issue
also Acknowledged as a Challenge for the Intelligence Community:
An additional major issue of growing concern, both within and outside
the Intelligence Community, deals with the type of work that is being
performed by contractors, the need to determine the appropriate mix of
government and contractor employees to meet mission needs, and the
adequacy of oversight and accountability of contractors.[Footnote 23]
These are areas where we also are well-positioned to provide additional
support to the intelligence committees. While there are benefits to
using contractors to perform services for the government--such as
increased flexibility in fulfilling immediate needs--GAO and others
have raised concerns about the federal government's increasing reliance
on contractor services.[Footnote 24] A key concern is the risk
associated with contractors providing services that closely support
inherently governmental functions. Inherently governmental functions
require the exercise of discretion in applying government authority
and/or in making decisions for the government; as such, they should be
performed by government employees, not contractors.[Footnote 25] In
2007, I testified before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs that the proper role of contractors in providing
services to the government was the topic of some debate.[Footnote 26] I
would like to reiterate that, in general, I believe there is a need to
focus greater attention on which functions and activities should be
contracted out and which should not, to review and reconsider the
current independence and conflict-of-interest rules relating to
contractors, and to identify the factors that prompt the government to
use contractors in circumstances where the proper choice might be the
use of civil servants or military personnel. Similarly, it is important
that the federal government maintain an accountable and capable
workforce, responsible for strategic planning and management of
individual programs and contracts.
In a September 2007 report, we identified a number of concerns
regarding the risk associated with contractors providing services that
closely support inherently governmental functions.[Footnote 27] For
example, an increasing reliance on contractors to perform services for
core government activities challenges the capacity of federal officials
to supervise and evaluate the performance of these activities. The
Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) provides agencies examples of
inherently governmental functions that should not be performed by
contractors.[Footnote 28] For example, the direction and control of
intelligence and counter-intelligence operations are listed as
inherently governmental functions.[Footnote 29] Yet in 2006, the
Director of National Intelligence reported that the Intelligence
Community finds itself in competition with its contractors for
employees and is left with no choice but to use contractors for work
that may be "borderline inherently governmental."[Footnote 30] Unless
the federal government, including Intelligence Community agencies, pays
the needed attention to the types of functions and activities performed
by contractors, agencies run the risk of losing accountability and
control over mission-related decisions.
Personnel Security Clearances Continue to Experience Delays and
Impediments:
For more than 3 decades, GAO's reviews of personnel security clearances
have identified delays and other impediments in DOD's personnel
security clearance program, which maintains about 2.5 million
clearances, including clearances for intelligence agencies within DOD.
These long-standing problems resulted in our adding the DOD personnel
security clearance program to our high-risk list in January 2005. One
important outgrowth of this designation has been the level of
congressional oversight from this Subcommittee, as well as some
progress.[Footnote 31]
In the past few years, several positive changes have been made to DOD-
-as well as governmentwide--clearance processes because of increased
congressional oversight, recommendations from our work, and new
legislative and executive requirements. One of OMB's efforts to improve
the security clearance process involved taking a lead in preparing a
November 2005 strategic plan to improve personnel security clearance
processes governmentwide. In its February 2007 and 2008 annual IRTPA-
mandated reports to Congress,[Footnote 32] OMB noted additional
improvements that had been made to the security clearance process
governmentwide. For example, OMB had issued standards for reciprocity
(an agency's acceptance of a clearance issued by another agency), OPM
had increased its investigative workforce, and DOD and other agencies
had dramatically increased their use of OPM's Electronic Questionnaires
for Investigations Processing system to reduce the time required to get
a clearance by 2 to 3 weeks. Further, the Director of National
Intelligence, the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, and
OMB's Deputy Director for Management established a team, the Joint
Security Clearance Process Reform Team, to improve the security
clearance process. The team is to develop a transformed, modernized,
and reciprocal security clearance process that is supposed to be
universally applicable to DOD, the Intelligence Community, and other
federal agencies. The extent to which this new process will be
implemented governmentwide, or whether leadership of the new system
will be assigned to the ODNI, however, remains uncertain.
Any attempts to reform the current security clearance process,
regardless of which agency or organization undertakes the effort,
should include some key factors. Specifically, current and future
efforts to reform personnel security clearance processes should
consider, among other things, determining whether clearances are
required for positions, incorporating more quality control throughout
the clearance processes to supplement current emphases on timeliness,
establishing metrics for assessing all aspects of clearance processes,
and providing Congress with the long-term funding requirements of
security clearance reform.
Although we have not worked with the entire Intelligence Community as
part of our body of work on security clearances, we have worked with
DOD intelligence agencies. For example, in the period from 1998 through
2001, we reviewed National Security Agency clearance investigative
reports and Defense Intelligence Agency adjudicative reports.
Similarly, our February 2004 report examined information about
adjudicative backlogs DOD-wide and the situation in those two
intelligence agencies.[Footnote 33] Importantly, since 1974, we have
been examining personnel security clearances mostly on behalf of
Congress and some on behalf of this Subcommittee. Through scores of
reports and testimonies, we have acquired broad institutional knowledge
that gives us a historical view of key factors that should be
considered in clearance reform efforts. We are well positioned to
assist Congress in its oversight of this very important area.
Recent GAO Reviews of Intelligence-Related Programs and Activities:
In addition to our work on human capital transformation and personnel
security clearance issues, our recent work has also addressed
management issues--such as ISR systems, space acquisitions, and the
space acquisition workforce--that directly affect the Intelligence
Community and illustrate our ability to further support the
intelligence and other appropriate congressional committees in their
oversight roles. GAO's highly qualified and experienced staff--
including its analysts, auditors, lawyers, and methodologists--and
secure facilities position us to perform intensive reviews that could
be useful in assessing the transformation and related management
reforms under consideration within the Intelligence Community,
especially in connection with human capital and acquisition and
contracting-related issues. GAO personnel who might perform work
relating to the Intelligence Community have qualifications, skills,
expertise, clearances and accesses, and experience across the federal
government, in the national security arena, and across disciplines. For
example, GAO methodologists have expertise in designing and executing
appropriate methodological approaches that help us develop
recommendations to improve government operations. Our attorneys advise
GAO's analysts, issue external legal decisions and legal opinions, and
prepare testimony, legislation, and reports on subjects reflecting the
range of government activity. This legal work, for example, involves
subjects such as information technology, international affairs and
trade, foreign military sales, health and disability law, and education
and labor law. GAO also already has personnel with appropriate
clearances and accesses. I would like to highlight a couple of examples
of GAO's work to demonstrate our expertise and capacity to perform
intensive reviews in intelligence-related matters.
GAO's Work Addressing ISR Requirements, Operations, and Acquisitions
Identified Opportunities for Improvement:
In the past year, we have testified and issued reports addressing DOD's
ISR systems, including unmanned aircraft systems. The term "ISR"
encompasses multiple activities related to the planning and operation
of sensors and assets that collect, process, and disseminate data in
support of current and future military operations. Intelligence data
can take many forms, including optical, radar, or infrared images, or
electronic signals. In April 2007, we testified that DOD has taken some
important first steps to formulate a strategy for improving the
integration of future ISR requirements, including the development of an
ISR Integration Roadmap and designating ISR as a test case for its
joint capability portfolio management concept. We also testified that
opportunities exist for different services to collaborate on the
development of similar weapon systems as a means for creating a more
efficient and affordable way of providing new capabilities to the
warfighter.[Footnote 34] As part of another review of ISR programs, we
found that nearly all of the systems in development we examined had
experienced some cost or schedule growth.[Footnote 35] As part of our
work, we selected 20 major airborne ISR programs and obtained
information on current or projected operational capabilities,
acquisition plans, cost estimates, schedules, and estimated
budgets.[Footnote 36] We analyzed the data to determine whether pairs
of similar systems shared common operating concepts, capabilities,
physical configurations, or primary contractors. We reviewed
acquisition plans for programs in development to determine whether they
had established sound business cases or, if not, where the business
case was weak. We reviewed cost and schedule estimates to determine
whether they had increased and, where possible, identified reasons for
the increases. Based on our research and findings, we recommended that
DOD develop and implement an integrated enterprise-level investment
strategy, as well as report to the congressional defense committees the
results of ISR studies underway and identify specific plans and actions
it intends to take to achieve greater jointness in ISR programs. DOD
generally agreed with our recommendations.
We have also performed in-depth reviews of individual space programs
that are shared with the Intelligence Community. For example, in recent
years we have examined the Space Radar program, which is expected to be
one of the most complex and expensive satellite developments ever. We
reported that while the program was adopting best practices in
technology development, its schedule and cost estimates may be overly
optimistic and its overall affordability for DOD, which was
parternering with the Intelligence Community, was
questionable.[Footnote 37] Our concerns were cited by the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence in its discussion of reasons for reducing
funding for Space Radar.[Footnote 38]
GAO's Work on the Space Acquisition Workforce Recommended Management
Improvements:
Our work on the space acquisition workforce is another example of in-
depth programmatic reviews we have been able to perform addressing
intelligence-related matters. In a September 2006 report, we identified
a variety of management issues dealing with Air Force space
personnel.[Footnote 39] This is a critical issue because the Air Force
provides over 90 percent of the space personnel to DOD, including the
National Reconnaissance Office (NRO). We found that the Air Force has
done needs assessments on certain segments of its space workforce, but
it has not done an integrated, zero-based needs assessment of its space
acquisition workforce. In the absence of an integrated, zero-based
needs assessment of its space acquisition workforce and a career field
specialty, the Air Force cannot ensure that it has enough space
acquisition personnel or personnel who are technically proficient to
meet national security space needs--including those in the Intelligence
Community. As a part of this work, we collected and analyzed Air Force
personnel data in specific specialty codes related to space acquisition
and tracked their career assignments, training, and progression,
including those assigned to the NRO. For example, we collected and
analyzed data on space acquisition positions and personnel from
multiple locations, and conducted discussion groups about topics
including education and prior experience with junior and midgrade
officers at the Space and Missile Systems Center in California. We made
recommendations to DOD to take actions to better manage its limited
pool of space acquisition personnel, and DOD generally agreed with our
findings and recommendations.
GAO's Access to Perform Audit Work Could be Affected If the ODNI
Assumes Management of Personnel Security Clearances:
Our ability to continue monitoring security clearance-related problems
in DOD as well as other parts of the federal government and to provide
Congress with information for its oversight role could be adversely
affected if the ODNI assumes management responsibility over this area.
First, in 2006, OMB's Deputy Director for Management has suggested that
the agency's oversight role of the governmentwide security clearance
process might be transferred to the ODNI. Alternatively, the ODNI could
assume leadership, to some extent, of a new security clearance process
that is intended for governmentwide implementation by a team
established by the Director of National Intelligence, the Under
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, and OMB's Deputy Director for
Management. While we have the legal authority to audit the personnel
security clearance area if its oversight is moved to the ODNI or if the
Joint Security Clearance Process Reform Team's proposed process is
implemented governmentwide, we could face difficulties in gaining the
cooperation we need to access the information.
Although we have established and maintained a relatively positive
working relationship with the ODNI, limitations on our ability to
perform meaningful audit and evaluation work persist. Specifically, we
routinely request and receive substantive threat briefings and copies
of finished intelligence products prepared under the ODNI, and we meet
with officials from the ODNI and obtain information about some of their
activities. We also receive the ODNI agency comments and security
reviews on most of our draft reports, as appropriate. However, since
some members of the Intelligence Community have taken the position that
the congressional intelligence committees have exclusive oversight
authority, we do not audit or evaluate any programs or activities of
the ODNI, nor are we able to verify or corroborate factual briefings or
information provided. This resistance to providing us access to
information has taken on new prominence and is of greater concern in
the post-9/11 context, especially since the Director of National
Intelligence has been assigned responsibilities addressing issues that
extend well beyond traditional intelligence activities. For example,
the ODNI and the National Counterterrorism Center refused to provide us
security-related cost data for the 2006 Olympic Winter Games in Turin,
Italy, although we were provided this type of data in prior reviews of
the Olympic Games.
If we continue to experience limitation on the types and amounts of
information we can obtain from the Intelligence Community, then GAO may
not be able to provide Congress with an independent, fact-based
evaluation of the new security clearance process during its development
and, later, its implementation. Either of these actions could occur
without legislation. If the ODNI were to take leadership or oversight
responsibilities for governmentwide personnel security clearances, it
might be prudent to incorporate some legislative provision to reinforce
GAO's access to the information needed to conduct audits and reviews in
the personnel security clearance area.
GAO Comments on the Intelligence Community Audit Act of 2007:
Finally, GAO supports S. 82 and we would be well-positioned to provide
Congress with an independent, fact-based evaluation of Intelligence
Community management reform initiatives with the support of Congress
and S. 82. Specifically, S. 82 would, if enacted, reaffirm GAO's
authority, under existing statutory provisions, to audit and evaluate
financial transactions, programs, and activities of elements of the
Intelligence Community, and to access records necessary for such audits
and evaluations. GAO has clear audit and access authority with respect
to elements of the Intelligence Community,[Footnote 40] subject to a
few limited exceptions. However, since 1988, DOJ and some members of
the Intelligence Community have questioned GAO's authority in this
area. In addition, for many years, the executive branch has not
provided GAO with the level of cooperation needed to conduct meaningful
reviews of elements of the Intelligence Community. As previously noted,
this issue has taken on new prominence and is of greater concern in the
post-9/11 context, especially since the Director of National
Intelligence has been assigned responsibilities addressing issues that
extend well beyond traditional intelligence activities, such as
information sharing. The implications of executive branch resistance to
GAO's work in the intelligence area were highlighted when the ODNI
refused to comment on GAO's March 2006 report involving the
government's information-sharing efforts, maintaining that DOJ had
"previously advised" that "the review of intelligence activities is
beyond the GAO's purview." We strongly disagree with this view. GAO has
broad statutory authorities to audit and evaluate agency financial
transactions, programs, and activities, and these authorities apply to
reviews of elements of the Intelligence Community.[Footnote 41]
Importantly, S. 82, in reaffirming GAO's authorities, recognizes that
GAO may conduct reviews, requested by relevant committees of
jurisdiction, of matters relating to the management and administration
of elements of the Intelligence Community in areas such as strategic
planning, financial management, information technology, human capital,
knowledge management, information sharing, organizational
transformation and management reforms, and collaboration practices. In
recognition of the heightened level of sensitivity of audits and
evaluations relating to intelligence sources and methods or covert
actions, this bill would restrict GAO audits and evaluations of
intelligence sources and methods or covert actions to those requested
by the intelligence committees or congressional majority or minority
leaders. In addition, in the context of reviews relating to
intelligence sources and methods or covert actions, the bill contains
several information security-related provisions. The bill includes, for
example, provisions (1) requiring GAO to perform our work and use
agency documents in facilities provided by the audited agencies; (2)
requiring GAO to establish, after consultation with the Select
Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives, procedures
to protect such classified and other sensitive information from
unauthorized disclosure; and (3) limiting GAO's reporting of results of
such audits and evaluations strictly to the original requester, the
Director of National Intelligence, and the head of the relevant element
of the Intelligence Community. In our view, Congress should consider
amending the bill language to include the intelligence committees in
these reporting provisions when the congressional leadership is the
original requester.
The reaffirmation provisions in the bill should help to ensure that
GAO's audit and access authorities are not misconstrued in the future.
One particularly helpful provision in this regard is the proposed new
section 3523a(e) of title 31, specifying that no "provision of law
shall be construed as restricting or limiting the authority of the
Comptroller General to audit and evaluate, or obtain access to the
records of, elements of the intelligence community absent specific
statutory language restricting or limiting such audits, evaluations, or
access to records." This provision makes clear that, unless otherwise
specified by law, GAO has the right to evaluate and access the records
of elements of the Intelligence Community pursuant to its authorities
in title 31 of the United States Code.
Chairman Akaka, Senator Voinovich, and Members of the Subcommittee,
this concludes my prepared testimony. I would be happy to respond to
any questions that you or other Members of the Subcommittee may have at
this time.
Contact and Acknowledgments:
For further information regarding this testimony, please contact Davi
M. D'Agostino, Director, Defense Capabilities and Management, at (202)
512-5431 or dagostinod@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of
Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last
page of this statement. Individuals who made key contributions to this
testimony are Mark A. Pross, Assistant Director; Tommy Baril; Cristina
T. Chaplain; Jack E. Edwards; Brenda S. Farrell; Robert N. Goldenkoff;
John P. Hutton; Julia C. Matta; Erika A. Prochaska; John Van Schaik;
Sarah E. Veale; and Cheryl A. Weissman.
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
General Cross-Cutting Issues:
GAO Strategic Plan 2007-2012. GAO-07-1SP. Washington, D.C.: March 2007.
High Risk Series: An Update. GAO-07-310. Washington, D.C.: January
2007.
Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance and
Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies. GAO-06-15. Washington,
D.C.: October 21, 2005.
Defense Management: Key Elements Needed to Successfully Transform DOD
Business Operations. GAO-05-629T. Washington, D.C.: April 28, 2005.
DOD's High-Risk Areas: Successful Business Transformation Requires
Sound Strategic Planning and Sustained Leadership. GAO-05-520T.
Washington, D.C.: April 13, 2005.
High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-05-207. Washington, D.C.: January
2005.
Results-Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist Mergers and
Organizational Transformations. GAO-03-669. Washington, D.C.: July 2,
2003.
Human Capital:
Human Capital: Federal Workforce Challenges in the 21st Century. GAO-
07-556T. Washington, D.C.: March 6, 2007.
Intelligence Reform: Human Capital Considerations Critical to 9/11
Commission's Proposed Reforms. GAO-04-1084T. Washington, D.C.:
September 14, 2004.
Aviation Security: Federal Air Marshal Service Is Addressing Challenges
of Its Expanded Mission and Workforce but Additional Actions Needed.
GAO-04-242. Washington, D.C.: November 19, 2003.
High-Risk Series: Strategic Human Capital Management. GAO-03-120.
Washington, D.C.: January 2003.
National Security Personnel System:
Human Capital: DOD Needs Better Internal Controls and Visibility over
Costs for Implementing Its National Security Personnel System. GAO-07-
851. Washington, D.C.: July 16, 2007.
Human Capital: Observations on Final Regulations for DOD's National
Security Personnel System. GAO-06-227T. Washington, D.C.: November 17,
2005.
Human Capital: DOD's National Security Personnel System Faces
Implementation Challenges. GAO-05-730. Washington, D.C.: July 14, 2005.
Contracting Workforce in Government:
Military Operations: Implementation of Existing Guidance and Other
Actions Needed to Improve DODís Oversight and Management of Contractors
in Future Operations. GAO-08-436T. Washington, D.C.:†January 24, 2008.
Federal-Aid Highways: Increased Reliance on Contractors Can Pose
Oversight Challenges for Federal and State Officials. GAO-08-198.
Washington, D.C.: January 8, 2008.
Department of Homeland Security: Improved Assessment and Oversight
Needed to Manage Risk of Contracting for Selected Services. GAO-07-990.
Washington, D.C.: September 17, 2007.
Federal Acquisitions and Contracting: Systemic Challenges Need
Attention. GAO-07-1098T. Washington, D.C.: July 17, 2007.
Defense Acquisitions: Improved Management and Oversight Needed to
Better Control DOD's Acquisition of Services. GAO-07-832T. Washington,
D.C.: May 10, 2007.
Security Clearances:
Personnel Clearances: Key Factors to Consider in Efforts to Reform the
Security Processes. GAO-08-352T. Washington, D.C.: February 27, 2008.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Improved Annual Reporting Would Enable More
Informed Congressional Oversight. GAO-08-350. Washington, D.C.:
February 13, 2008.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Delays and Inadequate Documentation Found for
Industry Personnel. GAO-07-842T. Washington, D.C.: May 17, 2007.
DOD Personnel Clearances: New Concerns Slow Processing of Clearances
for Industry Personnel. GAO-06-748T. Washington, D.C.: May 17, 2006.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Government Plan Addresses Some Long-standing
Problems with DOD's Program, But Concerns Remain. GAO-06-233T.
Washington, D.C.: November 9, 2005.
DOD Personnel Clearances: Some Progress Has Been Made but Hurdles
Remain to Overcome the Challenges That Led to GAO's High-Risk
Designation. GAO-05-842T. Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2005.
DOD Personnel Clearances: DOD Needs to Overcome Impediments to
Eliminating Backlog and Determining Its Size. GAO-04-344. Washington,
D.C.: Feb. 9, 2004.
Footnotes:
[1] An Intelligence Community member is a federal government agency,
service, bureau, or other organization within the executive branch that
plays a role in national intelligence. The Intelligence Community
consists of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and 16
different agencies or components: Central Intelligence Agency; Defense
Intelligence Agency; Departments of the Army, the Navy, and the Air
Force; U.S. Marine Corps; National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency;
National Reconnaissance Office; National Security Agency; Department of
Energy; Department of Homeland Security; U.S. Coast Guard; Drug
Enforcement Administration; Federal Bureau of Investigation; Department
of State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research; and Department of the
Treasury. The following members of the Intelligence Community are
organizationally aligned within the Department of Defense: Defense
Intelligence Agency; Departments of the Army, the Navy, and the Air
Force; U.S. Marine Corps; National Geospatial- Intelligence Agency;
National Reconnaissance Office; and National Security Agency.
Additionally, the U.S. Coast Guard is organizationally aligned with the
Department of Homeland Security and the Drug Enforcement Administration
and the Federal Bureau of Investigation are organizationally aligned
with the Department of Justice.
[2] S. 82, Intelligence Community Audit Act of 2007, was introduced on
January 4, 2007.
[3] GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-07-310 (Washington, D.C.:
January 2007). Agencies within the Intelligence Community also are
vulnerable to other high-risk areas, such as contract management,
management of interagency contracting, protecting the federal
government's information systems and the nation's critical
infrastructures, and ensuring the effective protection of technologies
critical to U.S. national security interests.
[4] See U.S. Congress, Subcommittee on Oversight, House Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence, Initial Assessment on the
Implementation of The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act
of 2004 (Washington, D.C.: July 27, 2006); Congressional Research
Service, Intelligence Issues for Congress, RL33539 (Washington, D.C.:
Updated Dec. 18, 2007); National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon
the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States
(Washington, D.C.: July 22, 2004); and The Commission on the
Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of
Mass Destruction, Report to the President of the United States
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 31, 2005).
[5] GAO, Space Based Infrared System High Program and its Alternative,
GAO-07-1088 (Washington, D.C.: Sep. 12, 2007); DOD is Making Progress
in Adopting Best Practices for the Transformational Satellite
Communications System and Space Radar but Still Faces Challenges, GAO-
07-1029R (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 2, 2007); Unmanned Aircraft Systems:
Advance Coordination and Increased Visibility Needed to Optimize
Capabilities, GAO-07-836 (Washington, D.C.: July 11, 2007); Defense
Acquisitions: Greater Synergies Possible for DOD's Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Systems, GAO-07-578 (Washington, D.C.:
May 17, 2007); Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance:
Preliminary Observations on DOD's Approach to Managing Requirements for
New Systems, Existing Assets, and Systems Development, GAO-07-596T
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 19, 2007); and Defense Space Activities:
Management Actions Are Needed to Better Identify, Track, and Train Air
Force Space Personnel, GAO-06-908 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 21, 2006).
[6] 31 U.S.C. §§ 712, 717, 3523, and 3524.
[7] 31 U.S.C. § 716.
[8] 31 U.S.C. § 716(d)(1)(A).
[9] GAO, Central Intelligence Agency: Observations on GAO Access to
Information on CIA Programs and Activities, GAO-01-975T (Washington,
D.C.: July 18, 2001).
[10] DOJ's position and our analysis is set forth in more detail in
GAO, Information Sharing: The Federal Government Needs to Establish
Policies and Processes for Sharing Terrorism-Related and Sensitive But
Unclassified Information, GAO-06-385 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 17, 2006).
[11] Pub. L. No. 108-458 ß 1011 (2004) (codified at 50 U.S.C. ß 403).
[12] Pub. L. No. 108-458 ß 3001(b) (2004).
[13] The White House, Executive Order 13381, Strengthening Processes
Relating to Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified National
Security Information (Washington, D.C.: June 27, 2005), as amended.
[14] Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs,
Progress or More Problems: Assessing the Federal Government's Security
Clearance Process, S. Hrg 109-621 (Washington, D.C.: May 17, 2006).
[15] GAO, Intelligence Reform: Human Capital Considerations Critical to
9/11 Commission's Proposed Reforms, GAO-04-1084T (Washington, D.C.:
Sept. 14, 2004). Also see Intelligence Issues For Congress; The 9/11
Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist
Attacks Upon the United States; and Report to the President of the
United States.
[16] ODNI, United States Intelligence Community 100 Day Plan for
Integration and Collaboration (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 11, 2007) and
Office of the Director of National Intelligence, The US Intelligence
Community's Strategic Five Year Human Capital Plan (Washington, D.C.:
June 22, 2006).
[17] GAO-07-310.
[18] Section 308 of H.R. 2082, the bill to authorize appropriations for
fiscal year 2008 for the Intelligence Community, would require the
Director of National Intelligence to submit to Congress a detailed plan
for the compensation-based system of a particular element of the
Intelligence Community before it is implemented.
[19] Pub. L. No. 108-136, § 1101 (2003).
[20] The Department of Homeland Security also has received new
statutory authority to help manage its workforce more strategically.
[21] GAO, Defense Transformation: Preliminary Observations on DOD's
Proposed Civilian Personnel Reforms, GAO-03-717T (Washington, D.C.:
Apr. 29, 2003); Defense Transformation: DOD's Proposed Civilian
Personnel Systems and Governmentwide Human Capital Reform, GAO-03-741T
(Washington, D.C.: May 1, 2003); and Human Capital: Building on DOD's
Reform Efforts to Foster Governmentwide Improvements, GAO-03-851T
(Washington, D.C.: June 4, 2003).
[22] GAO, Human Capital: DOD Needs Better Internal Controls and
Visibility Over Costs for Implementing Its National Security Personnel
System, GAO-07-851 (Washington, D.C.: July 16, 2007) and Human Capital:
Observations on Final Regulations for DOD's National Security Personnel
System, GAO-06-227T (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 17, 2006).
[23] For example, Section 307 of H.R. 2082, the bill to authorize
appropriations for fiscal year 2008 for the Intelligence Community,
would require the Director of National Intelligence to submit a report
to the congressional intelligence committees describing the personal
services activities performed by contractors across the Intelligence
Community, the impact of such contractors on the Intelligence Community
workforce, plans for conversion of contractor employment into
government employment, and the accountability mechanisms that govern
the performance of such contractors.
[24] See, for example, GAO, Highlights of a GAO Forum: Federal
Acquisition Challenges and Opportunities in the 21st Century, GAO-07-
45SP (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 6, 2006) and Acquisition Advisory Panel,
Report of the Acquisition Advisory Panel to the Office of Federal
Procurement Policy and the United States Congress (January 2007).
[25] OMB Circular A-76, Performance of Commercial Activities, May 29,
2003; Federal Acquisition Regulation, Subpart 7.5.
[26] GAO, Federal Acquisitions and Contracting: Systemic Challenges
Need Attention, GAO-07-1098T (Washington, D.C.: July 17, 2007).
[27] GAO, Department of Homeland Security: Improved Assessment and
Oversight Needed to Manage Risk of Contracting for Selected Services,
GAO-07-990 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 17, 2007).
[28] FAR § 7.503(c).
[29] FAR § 7.503(c)(8).
[30] The US Intelligence Community's Strategic Five Year Human Capital
Plan.
[31] GAO, DOD Personnel Clearances: Delays and Inadequate Documentation
Found for Industry Personnel, GAO-07-842T (Washington, D.C.: May 17,
2007); DOD Personnel Clearances: New Concerns Slow Processing of
Clearances for Industry Personnel, GAO-06-748T (Washington, D.C.: May
17, 2006); DOD Personnel Clearances: Government Plan Addresses Some
Long-standing Problems with DOD's Program, But Concerns Remain, GAO-06-
233T (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 9, 2005); and DOD Personnel Clearances:
Some Progress Has Been Made but Hurdles Remain to Overcome the
Challenges That Led to GAO's High-Risk Designation, GAO-05-842T
(Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2005).
[32] Office of Management and Budget, Report of the Security Clearance
Oversight Group Consistent with Title III of the Intelligence Reform
and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (February 2007), and Report of the
Security Clearance Oversight Group Consistent with Title III of the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, (February
2008).
[33] GAO, DOD Personnel Clearances: DOD Needs to Overcome Impediments
to Eliminating Backlog and Determining Its Size, GAO-04-344
(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 9, 2004).
[34] GAO-07-596T.
[35] GAO-07-578.
[36] These programs were either in technology or systems development,
already fielded but undergoing significant upgrade, or operating in the
field but due to be replaced by a system in development and one space-
based program in technology development.
[37] GAO-07-1029R.
[38] S. Rep. No. 110-75, at 48 (2007).
[39] GAO-06-908.
[40] IRTPA (Pub. L. No. 108-458), which established a Director of
National Intelligence, did not alter GAO's authority to audit and
evaluate financial transactions, programs, and activities of elements
of the Intelligence Community.
[41] DOJ's position and our analysis of it is set forth in more detail
in GAO-06-385.
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