Combating Terrorism
U.S. Efforts to Address the Terrorist Threat in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas Require a Comprehensive Plan and Continued Oversight Gao ID: GAO-08-820T May 20, 2008Since 2002, destroying the terrorist threat and closing safe havens have been key national security goals. The United States has provided Pakistan, a key ally in the war on terror, more than $10 billion in funds and assistance. Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas' (FATA) rugged terrain, poor economic conditions, low literacy, underdeveloped infrastructure, and unique legal structure, all add to the complexity of efforts to address the terrorist threat in the FATA. This testimony discusses the (1) progress of U.S. national security goals in the FATA, (2) status of U.S. efforts to develop a comprehensive plan, and (3) oversight of U.S. Coalition Support Funds (CSF) provided to Pakistan. The testimony is based on recent reports on the status of a comprehensive plan (GAO-08-622) and preliminary observations on the use and oversight of U.S. CSF (GAO-08-735R).
The United States has not met its national security goals to destroy terrorist threats and close the safe haven in Pakistan's FATA. According to U.S. officials and intelligence documents, since 2002, al Qaeda and the Taliban have used Pakistan's FATA and the border region to attack Pakistani, Afghan, as well as U.S. and coalition troops; plan and train for attacks against U.S. interests; destabilize Pakistan; and spread radical Islamist ideologies that threaten U.S. interests. GAO found broad agreement that al Qaeda had established a safe haven in the FATA. A 2008 DNI assessment states that al Qaeda is now using the FATA to put into place the last elements necessary to launch another attack against America. The United States has relied principally on the Pakistani military to address its national security goals in the FATA. Of the approximately $5.8 billion directed at efforts in the FATA border region from 2002 through 2007, about 96 percent ($5.56 billion) was U.S. CSF, used to reimburse the Pakistani military. U.S. and Pakistani government officials recognize that relying primarily on the Pakistani military has not succeeded in neutralizing al Qaeda and preventing the establishment of a safe haven in the FATA. The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (2003), independent 9/11 Commission (2004), and congressional legislation (2004 and 2007) called for a comprehensive plan that included all elements of national power--diplomatic, military, intelligence, development assistance, economic, and law enforcement support to address the threat in the FATA. Since 2002, the U.S. Embassy in Pakistan has not had a Washington-supported, comprehensive plan to combat terrorists and close the terrorist safe haven. In 2006, the United States and Pakistan began an effort to focus on other elements of national power beyond military. However, as of last month there was not a formally approved comprehensive plan and support from the recently elected Pakistani government was uncertain. Continued oversight is required to ensure the development and effective implementation of a comprehensive plan and the proper use of the billions of U.S. dollars devoted to assisting Pakistan in its efforts to combat terrorism in the FATA. Preliminary results from GAO's ongoing work on the oversight of U.S. CSF indicate that Defense may have recently increased its oversight of CSF. In 2007, Defense officials at the U.S. embassy in Pakistan--the Office of the Defense Representative to Pakistan (ODRP)--began playing a larger role in overseeing CSF reimbursement claims. Furthermore, Defense recently deferred or disallowed a larger amount of Pakistani claims. For the months September 2004 - February 2007, Defense disallowed or deferred an average of just over 2 percent of the Pakistani government's CSF claims. For the most recent claims (March - June 2007) processed in February 2008, Defense disallowed or deferred over 20 percent. The extent of ODRP's oversight in the future is unclear, given that its role has not been formalized.
GAO-08-820T, Combating Terrorism: U.S. Efforts to Address the Terrorist Threat in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas Require a Comprehensive Plan and Continued Oversight
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Testimony:
Before the Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South and Central Asian
Affairs, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery:
Expected at 3:00 p.m. EDT:
Tuesday, May 20, 2008:
Combating Terrorism:
U.S. Efforts to Address the Terrorist Threat in Pakistan's Federally
Administered Tribal Areas Require a Comprehensive Plan and Continued
Oversight:
Statement of Gene L. Dodaro:
Acting Comptroller General:
GAO-08-820T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-08-820T, a testimony report to before the
Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South and Central Asian Affairs,
Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate.
Why GAO Did This Study:
Since 2002, destroying the terrorist threat and closing safe havens
have been key national security goals. The United States has provided
Pakistan, a key ally in the war on terror, more than $10 billion in
funds and assistance. Pakistan‘s Federally Administered Tribal Areas‘
(FATA) rugged terrain, poor economic conditions, low literacy,
underdeveloped infrastructure, and unique legal structure, all add to
the complexity of efforts to address the terrorist threat in the FATA.
This testimony discusses the (1) progress of U.S. national security
goals in the FATA, (2) status of U.S. efforts to develop a
comprehensive plan, and (3) oversight of U.S. Coalition Support Funds
(CSF) provided to Pakistan. The testimony is based on recent reports on
the status of a comprehensive plan (GAO-08-622) and preliminary
observations on the use and oversight of U.S. CSF (GAO-08-735R).
What GAO Found:
The United States has not met its national security goals to destroy
terrorist threats and close the safe haven in Pakistan‘s FATA.
According to U.S. officials and intelligence documents, since 2002, al
Qaeda and the Taliban have used Pakistan‘s FATA and the border region
to attack Pakistani, Afghan, as well as U.S. and coalition troops; plan
and train for attacks against U.S. interests; destabilize Pakistan; and
spread radical Islamist ideologies that threaten U.S. interests. GAO
found broad agreement that al Qaeda had established a safe haven in the
FATA. A 2008 DNI assessment states that al Qaeda is now using the FATA
to put into place the last elements necessary to launch another attack
against America. The United States has relied principally on the
Pakistani military to address its national security goals in the FATA.
Of the approximately $5.8 billion directed at efforts in the FATA
border region from 2002 through 2007, about 96 percent ($5.56 billion)
was U.S. CSF, used to reimburse the Pakistani military. U.S. and
Pakistani government officials recognize that relying primarily on the
Pakistani military has not succeeded in neutralizing al Qaeda and
preventing the establishment of a safe haven in the FATA.
The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (2003), independent 9/11
Commission (2004), and congressional legislation (2004 and 2007) called
for a comprehensive plan that included all elements of national power--
diplomatic, military, intelligence, development assistance, economic,
and law enforcement support to address the threat in the FATA. Since
2002, the U.S. Embassy in Pakistan has not had a Washington-supported,
comprehensive plan to combat terrorists and close the terrorist safe
haven. In 2006, the United States and Pakistan began an effort to focus
on other elements of national power beyond military. However, as of
last month there was not a formally approved comprehensive plan and
support from the recently elected Pakistani government was uncertain.
Continued oversight is required to ensure the development and effective
implementation of a comprehensive plan and the proper use of the
billions of U.S. dollars devoted to assisting Pakistan in its efforts
to combat terrorism in the FATA. Preliminary results from GAO‘s ongoing
work on the oversight of U.S. CSF indicate that Defense may have
recently increased its oversight of CSF. In 2007, Defense officials at
the U.S. embassy in Pakistan”the Office of the Defense Representative
to Pakistan (ODRP)--began playing a larger role in overseeing CSF
reimbursement claims. Furthermore, Defense recently deferred or
disallowed a larger amount of Pakistani claims. For the months
September 2004 – February 2007, Defense disallowed or deferred an
average of just over 2 percent of the Pakistani government‘s CSF
claims. For the most recent claims (March – June 2007) processed in
February 2008, Defense disallowed or deferred over 20 percent. The
extent of ODRP‘s oversight in the future is unclear, given that its
role has not been formalized.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO previously recommended that a comprehensive plan be developed to
combat the terrorist threats and close the safe havens in the FATA.
Defense and USAID concurred; State asserted that a comprehensive
strategy exists, while the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence stated that plans exist. In GAO‘s view, these plans have
not been formally integrated into a comprehensive plan. The National
Security Council did not comment.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-820T]. For more
information, contact Charles Michael Johnson Jr. at (202) 512-7331 or
johnsoncm@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
I am pleased to be here today to discuss U.S. efforts to assist
Pakistan combat terrorism in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal
Areas (FATA) and border region. My testimony is based on our two recent
reports on the United States' lack of a comprehensive plan to destroy
the terrorist threat and close the terrorist safe haven in the FATA,
and preliminary results from our ongoing examination of U.S. Coalition
Support Funds (CSF) reimbursements to Pakistan.[Footnote 1] Since
October 2001, the United States has provided Pakistan with over $10
billion for military, economic, and development assistance activities
in support of the critical U.S. national security goals of destroying
terrorist threats and closing terrorist safe havens.[Footnote 2]
Approximately $5.8 billion of this amount has been directed at efforts
to combat terrorism in Pakistan's FATA and border region.
My testimony today discusses (1) U.S. progress in meeting U.S. national
security goals in Pakistan's FATA region; (2) the status of U.S.
efforts to develop a comprehensive plan for the FATA; and (3) the
oversight of U.S. CSF provided to Pakistan.[Footnote 3]
Summary:
In summary, we found the following:
* The United States has not met its national security goals to destroy
terrorist threats and close the safe haven in Pakistan's FATA, a
mountainous region which shares a 373-mile border with Afghanistan.
According to U.S. embassy officials in Islamabad and U.S. intelligence
documents, since 2002, al Qaeda and the Taliban have used Pakistan's
FATA and the border region to attack Pakistani, Afghan, as well as U.S.
and coalition troops; plan and train for attacks against U.S.
interests; destabilize Pakistan; and spread radical Islamist ideologies
that threaten U.S. interests. We found broad agreement that al Qaeda
had established a safe haven in the FATA. A 2008 Director of National
Intelligence (DNI) assessment states that al Qaeda is now using the
Pakistani safe haven to put into place the last elements necessary to
launch another attack against America. The FATA's rugged terrain, wide
spread poverty, high unemployment, low literacy, underdeveloped
infrastructure, and unique legal structure[Footnote 4] all add to the
complexity the U.S. and Pakistani governments face in addressing
terrorist threats in this region.
* The United States has relied principally on the Pakistani military to
address its national security goals in the FATA. There has been
relatively limited development assistance or efforts to improve
governance as a means to mitigate underlying causes of terrorism in the
FATA. Of the approximately $5.8 billion directed at efforts in the FATA
and border region from 2002 through 2007, we determined that about 96
percent ($5.56 billion) of this amount was used to reimburse the
Pakistani government through CSF [Footnote 5] for military operations,
3 percent ($187 million) was directed towards a border security
program, and 1 percent ($40 million) was spent on USAID development
activities.
* Defense, State, intelligence, U.S. embassy, and Pakistani government
officials in power at the time of our review, recognize that relying
primarily on the Pakistani military has not succeeded in neutralizing
al Qaeda and preventing the establishment of a safe haven in the FATA.
In 2006, the embassy, Defense, State, and USAID, in conjunction with
the Pakistani government, began an effort to focus more attention on
other key elements of national power, such as development assistance,
infrastructure improvements, and public diplomacy, to address U.S.
national security goals in the FATA. However, this effort has not been
formally approved by U.S. government stakeholders who would play a key
role in the funding and implementation of such an effort, and support
from the recently elected Pakistani government is uncertain.
* A comprehensive approach is needed as required by the
administration's own National Strategy for Combating Terrorism,
recommended by the independent 9/11 Commission, and mandated by
congressional legislation.[Footnote 6] Since 2002, the U.S. Embassy in
Pakistan has not had a Washington-supported, comprehensive plan to
combat terrorists and close the terrorist safe haven in the FATA. We
have recommended that the administration produce a comprehensive plan
using all elements of national power to combat terrorist threats and
close safe havens in Pakistan's FATA region. The comprehensive plan
should also include key components called for in the Intelligence
Reform Act and components that we have previously reported as being
needed to improve the effectiveness of plans involving
multidepartmental efforts to combat terrorism.[Footnote 7] Among other
things, the plan should:
- place someone directly in charge of this multidepartment effort to
improve accountability;
- articulate a clear strategy to implement the national security goal
to destroy terrorists and close the safe haven in the FATA;
- clarify roles and responsibilities of each department for
implementing the goal, including establishing compatible policies and
procedures to operate across agency boundaries;
- provide guidance on setting funding priorities and providing
resources to meet these national security goals; and:
- require a monitoring system and provide periodic reports to Congress
on the progress and impediments to meeting national security goals in
Pakistan.
* Continued oversight is needed to ensure the development and effective
implementation of a comprehensive plan. Further, it is important that
there is sufficient oversight of the billions of U.S. dollars devoted
to assisting the Pakistani government in its efforts to combat
terrorism in the FATA. Preliminary results from our ongoing work
focusing on the use and oversight of U.S. CSF show that Defense may
have recently increased its oversight of CSF. For example, in 2007,
Defense officials at the U.S. embassy in Pakistan--the Office of the
Defense Representative to Pakistan (ODRP)--began playing a larger role
in overseeing CSF reimbursement claims. Furthermore, Defense recently
deferred or disallowed a larger amount of Pakistani claims.
Specifically, for the months September 2004 - February 2007, Defense
disallowed or deferred an average of just over 2 percent of the
Pakistani government's CSF reimbursement claims. For the most recent
reimbursement (March-June 2007 claims) processed in February 2008,
Defense disallowed or deferred over 20 percent of Pakistan's claim. Our
preliminary observations indicated that this was the first time that
ODRP recommended significant denials or deferrals of Pakistani claims.
[Footnote 8] The extent of ODRP's oversight in the future is unclear,
given that its role has not been formalized.
* In response to our previous reports, Defense and USAID concurred with
our recommendation that a comprehensive plan was needed; State asserted
that a comprehensive strategy exists, while the Office of the Director
of National Intelligence stated that plans to combat terrorism exist.
In our view, these plans have not been formally integrated into a
comprehensive plan as called for by Congress and that cover the full
range of unique challenges associated with the FATA. Additionally,
Defense recognized the importance and necessity of oversight over CSF.
Background:
Some of the characteristics of the FATA make it attractive to terrorist
groups, such as al Qaeda and Taliban, seeking a safe haven. The FATA is
mountainous and shares a 373-mile border with Afghanistan. It has an
estimated population of 3.1 million people, and is one of Pakistan's
poorest regions, with high poverty, high unemployment, low literacy,
and an underdeveloped infrastructure (See fig. 1).
Figure 1: Map of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, Pakistan:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is a map of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas,
Pakistan. The following Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATAs) are
indicated on the map:
* Bajaur Agency;
* Mohmand Agency;
* Khyber Agency;
* Kurrum Agency;
* Orakzai Agency;
* North Waziristan Agency;
* South Waziristan Agency.
Also indicated on the map are:
* Durand Line;
* North-West Frontier Province (NWFP);
* Peshawar;
* Parachinar.
Characteristics of the FATA:
* Rugged Terrain;
* Poor Economic Conditions;
* Low Literacy Rate;
* Underdeveloped Infrastructure;
* Separate Legal Structure.
The boundaries and names used on this map do not imply official
endorsement or acceptance by the U.S. government.
Sources: GAO; USAID and Map Resources (maps).
[End of figure]
The FATA is governed by an administrative system and a judicial system
different from the rest of Pakistan--the Frontier Crimes Regulation
(FCR) of 1901, codified under British rule.[Footnote 9] Because
Pakistan retained the colonial administrative and legal structures of
the British, as codified in the FCR, the FATA populations are legally
separate from and unequal to other Pakistani citizens. Examples of
these differences under the FCR include:
* The FATA residents do not have access to national political parties,
and political parties are forbidden from extending their activities
into the agencies of FATA.
* The FATA is under the direct executive authority of the president of
Pakistan. Laws framed by the National Assembly of Pakistan do not apply
in the FATA unless so ordered by the president.
* FATA residents do not have the right to legal representation. Those
convicted are denied the right of appeal in Pakistan's courts.
* The president's representatives to the FATA, who are called political
agents, can punish an entire tribe for crimes committed on the tribe's
territory by issuing fines, making arrests, implementing property
seizures, and establishing blockades.
Defense has noted that the FCR is a culturally acceptable recognition
of the tribal structure of the FATA, where the population is ethnically
different from the majority of Pakistan's citizens and precludes forced
assimilation. Further, Defense noted that removing the FCR without a
replacement mechanism that is accepted by the indigenous population has
the potential to create a vacuum that could result in negative
consequences.[Footnote 10]
The U.S. Government Has Not Met National Security Goals in Pakistan's
FATA; al Qaeda Remains a Threat and Terrorist Safe Haven Still Exists:
The United States has not met its national security goals to destroy
the terrorist threat and close the safe haven in the FATA. While
national security strategies have called for the use of all elements of
national power, such as diplomatic, military, intelligence, development
assistance, economic, and law enforcement support, to meet these goals,
the United States has relied principally on supporting the Pakistani
military. We found broad agreement, however, that al Qaeda has
regenerated its ability to attack the United States and succeeded in
establishing a safe haven in Pakistan's FATA. In particular, the 2007
National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) and 2008 DNI's Annual Threat
Assessment state that al Qaeda has regenerated its attack capability
and secured a safe haven in Pakistan's FATA.[Footnote 11] These
conclusions are supported by a broad array of sources, including
Defense, State, and senior U.S. embassy officials in Pakistan.
The DNI's 2008 assessment stated that the safe haven in Pakistan
provides al Qaeda with many of the same advantages it had when based
across the border in Afghanistan. According to the assessment, the safe
haven in the FATA serves as a staging area for al Qaeda's attacks in
support of the Taliban in Afghanistan. Further, it serves as a location
for training new terrorist operatives for attacks in Pakistan, the
Middle East, Africa, Europe, and the United States. U.S. government
officials in Washington and Pakistan also acknowledge that al Qaeda has
established a safe haven near Pakistan's border with Afghanistan. The
NIE also found that in the past 2 years, al Qaeda's central leadership
regenerated the core operational capabilities needed to conduct attacks
against the United States. It also found that al Qaeda's central
leadership, based in the border area of Pakistan, is and will remain
the most serious terrorist threat to the United States.
The DNI's 2008 assessment and other sources have concluded that the
resurgence of al Qaeda terrorists on the border between Pakistan and
Afghanistan now pose a preeminent threat to U.S. national security. It
states that al Qaeda is now using the Pakistani safe haven to put the
last element necessary to launch another attack against America into
place, including the identification, training, and positioning of
Western operatives for an attack. The assessment found that al Qaeda
and other Pakistan-based militants now pose a threat to Pakistan. The
assessment found an unparalleled increase in suicide attacks against
Pakistan's military and civilians over the past year, with total
casualties in 2007 exceeding all such attacks in the preceding 5 years.
These attacks were ordered by Pakistan-based militants, many of whom
are allied with al Qaeda. The assessment concluded that radical
elements now have the potential to undermine Pakistan itself.
The United States Has Relied Primarily on the Pakistani Military to
Accomplish Its Goals in Pakistan's FATA, with Limited Focus on Other
Elements of National Power:
The United States has relied principally on the Pakistani military to
address U.S. national security goals in the FATA. There have been
relatively limited efforts, however, to address other underlying causes
of terrorism in the FATA, such as providing development assistance or
addressing the FATA's political needs. For example, although the FATA
has some of the worst development indicators in Pakistan and is ruled
under colonial administrative and legal structures dating from 1901,
the United States has devoted relatively little funding to address
these issues in the FATA.
Approximately $5.8 billion has been directed at efforts to combat
terrorism in Pakistan's FATA and the border region. As figure 2 shows,
about 96 percent of this amount was used to reimburse the Pakistani
government through CSF for military operations in support of Operation
Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, most significantly against terrorists
in Pakistan's FATA and border region. We identified only two
nonmilitary activities that occurred in the FATA and border region:
State's border security program, which received about $187 million, and
USAID development assistance activities, which amounted to about $40
million.
Figure 2: Percentage of U.S. Funding Directed towards Activities in
Pakistan's FATA and Border Region, Fiscal Years 2002 to 2007:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is a pie-chart depicting the following data:
Percentage of U.S. Funding Directed towards Activities in Pakistan's
FATA and Border Region, Fiscal Years 2002 to 2007:
Military efforts: 96%;
Border Security Program: 3%;
Development assistance: 1%.
Elements of National Power:
* Diplomatic;
* Military;
* Intelligence;
* Development assistance;
* Economic;
* Law enforcement support.
Source: GAO analysis of Defense, State, and USAID data.
[End of figure]
According to a State Department report, Pakistan's military forces have
had some tactical successes in the FATA. The Pakistani government
stationed military and paramilitary forces along the border with
Afghanistan, and security operations in the FATA disrupted terrorist
activity by targeting and raiding al Qaeda and other militant safe
havens.[Footnote 12] According to State, Pakistan has helped kill or
capture hundreds of suspected terrorists, including al Qaeda operatives
and Taliban leaders.
Key Government Stakeholders Recognize That a More Comprehensive
Approach Is Needed:
Defense, State, U.S. embassy, and Pakistani government officials
recognize that relying primarily on the Pakistani military has not
succeeded in neutralizing al Qaeda and preventing the establishment of
a safe haven in the FATA. State's April 2007 Country Reports on
Terrorism states that, despite having Pakistani troops in the FATA, the
government of Pakistan has been unable to exert control over the area.
The report concluded that Pakistan has now recognized that military
operations alone would not restore security and stability to the FATA.
Similarly, U.S. embassy officials in Pakistan stated that Taliban and
al Qaeda elements have created a safe haven in the FATA and have used
it to plan and launch attacks on Afghan, Pakistani, U.S., and coalition
forces in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The embassy further noted that al
Qaeda and the Taliban continue to recruit, train, and operate in the
FATA.
No Comprehensive Plan for Guiding U.S. Efforts in the FATA Has Been
Developed, as Called for by the Administration and Congress:
The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (2003), the independent
9/11 Commission (2004), and Congress in repeated legislation (2004 and
2007) recognized that a comprehensive plan employing all elements of
national power--diplomatic, military, intelligence, development
assistance, economic, and law enforcement support--was needed to combat
terrorism and close terrorist safe havens in Pakistan's FATA region.
However, a comprehensive plan to meet U.S. national security goals in
the region has not yet been developed. Even after the creation of the
National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), an organization specifically
intended to develop, implement, and monitor multidepartment plans to
combat terrorism, the embassy has lacked a Washington-approved,
comprehensive plan that combines the capabilities of Defense, State,
USAID, intelligence agencies, and other U.S. departments to combat
terrorism in the FATA.
In addition, Defense, State, embassy officials, the DNI, and USAID
recognize that a comprehensive approach is needed to meet U.S. national
security goals in Pakistan. The Pakistani government in power at the
time of our review, also recognized that it must take a more
comprehensive approach to defeating terrorism and that an intensified
and sustained effort that combines administrative, economic,
educational, legal, and social reforms to defeat the terrorist threat
is required, according to the DNI.[Footnote 13]
Pakistan and the U.S. Embassy Are Encouraging More Focus on Other Key
Elements of National Power to Achieve U.S. Goals in the FATA:
In March 2006, the president of Pakistan requested that the
United.States. support Pakistan's effort to support a more
comprehensive approach to combating terrorism in the FATA. As a result,
the U.S. embassy in Pakistan began coordinating efforts by Defense,
State, and USAID to develop department-specific efforts to support
Pakistan's Sustainable Development Plan for the FATA. Pakistan's
Sustainable Development Plan is a 9-year, $2 billion effort to provide
economic development, extend the influence of the Pakistani government,
and establish security in the FATA. To assist this effort, Defense
undertook a counterinsurgency assessment in the FATA and began
developing its Security Development Plan. At the same time, USAID
provided technical assistance to the Pakistani government to help
formalize its Sustainable Development Plan, as well as to plan USAID-
development assistance activities in the FATA. This approach, if
approved by the administration and key U.S. government agency
stakeholders, would constitute the U.S. government's first attempt to
focus more attention on other key elements of national power to address
U.S. counterterrorism goals in the FATA.
Proposed Bilateral Efforts to Focus on More Elements of National Power:
According to officials with the U.S. embassy and Pakistani government
officials in power at the time of our review, a more comprehensive
approach is critical to addressing the terrorist threat in the FATA and
would represent a significant departure from the past. As such, the
United States began an effort in fiscal year 2007 to provide over $1
billion from fiscal year 2007 through 2011 for development assistance,
security, infrastructure, and public diplomacy in support of the
Pakistani government. This approach represents the first effort by the
U.S. embassy to directly plan, implement, coordinate, and monitor a
multidepartment effort to combat terrorism in the FATA.
The embassy planned to spend $187.6 million on this initial effort
using fiscal year 2007 funds. The funding has been directed to four
areas:
* Development: The $99 million development effort would be led by USAID
and would include capacity building for the FATA institutions needed to
plan, manage, and monitor development projects; efforts to build
community and government relations; funding for health and education
services; and efforts to increase employment and economic
growth.[Footnote 14]
* Security: The $54.1 million Defense and State security effort would
include training for military and paramilitary units in the FATA--
including the Frontier Corps, special operations forces, and air crews-
-and for providing night vision goggles, radios, and other equipment.
* Infrastructure: The $32.5 million the U.S. embassy has designated for
infrastructure improvements related to both its security and
development efforts would be used for road construction, the Frontier
Corps training center, and border surveillance outposts.
* Public diplomacy: $2 million in funding was allotted for public
diplomacy programs.
According to the embassy, the success of this new effort in the FATA
will depend on close coordination among an array of institutions within
the U.S. and Pakistani governments. The new effort also will involve
partner agencies and allies, including the United Kingdom, Japan, and
Europe; the Asian Development Bank; nongovernmental organizations; and
the Pakistani private sector, civil society, and the tribes of the
FATA.
This effort, however, does not yet constitute a comprehensive plan and
has not been formally approved by U.S. government stakeholders who
would play a key role in the funding and implementation of such an
effort. Support from the recently elected Pakistani government, at the
time of our review, was also uncertain.
Preliminary Observations on the Use and Oversight of U.S. Coalition
Support Funds Provided to Pakistan:
For the period covering October 2001 through June 2007, the United
States reimbursed Pakistan about $5.56 billion in CSF for military
operations in FATA and other support in the war on terror. CSF
reimbursement funds are paid directly into the Pakistani government
treasury and become sovereign funds. Once they become sovereign funds,
the U.S. government has no oversight authority over these funds.
In response to a Defense Inspector General review conducted in 2003,
Defense implemented additional guidance to improve oversight of the CSF
reimbursed to Pakistan. Moreover, in 2007, the ODRP began playing a
larger role in overseeing CSF reimbursement claims.
In performing oversight, ODRP reviews the Pakistani claims and
indicates that, to the best of its knowledge, military support was
provided and expenses were actually incurred. U.S. Central Command
(CENTCOM) then validates that Pakistani operations listed were
essential to support U.S. military operations in the theater. The
claims are sent to the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Comptroller, who (1) performs a macro-level review comparing the cost
to similar operations, and (2) assesses whether the cost categories are
reasonable, selected subcategories are reasonable compared to U.S.
costs, and costs are consistent with previous claims. In addition, both
the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy and the State Department
verify that the reimbursement is consistent with the U.S. government's
National Security Strategy and that the CSF payment does not adversely
impact the balance of power in the region.
In recent months,[Footnote 15] Defense has disallowed or deferred a
larger amount of CSF reimbursement claims from Pakistan, as shown in
figure 3.
Figure 3: Amount of Pakistan Government CSF Claims Disallowed or
Deferred by Month:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is a line graph depicting the following data:
Amount of Pakistan Government CSF Claims Disallowed or Deferred by
Month:
September 2004: $0.462 million;
October 2004: $0.442 million;
November 2004: $0.072 million;
December 2004: $0.3639 million;
January 2005: $1.5939 million;
February 2005: $0.3162 million;
March 2005: $3.151 million;
April 2005: $0.3286 million;
May 2005: $1.4398 million;
June 2005: $1.35 million;
July 2005: $1.3901 million;
August 2005: $1.5829 million;
September 2005: $3.6818 million;
October 2005: $0.234868 million;
November 2005: $0;
December 2005: $0.000339 million;
January 2006: $1.539 million;
February 2006: $0.55607 million;
March 2006: $1.2734 million;
April 2006: $1.02555 million;
May 2006: $3.30517 million;
June 2006: $3.9917 million;
July 2006: $1.311 million;
August 2006: $1.9533 million;
September 2006: $6.23081 million;
October 2006: $7.17288 million;
November 2006: $5.60229 million;
December 2006: $5.22462 million;
January 2007: $5.21479 million;
February 2007: $3.85375 million;
March 2007: $23.4936 million;
April 2007: $21.7683 million;
May 2007: $20.7287 million;
June 2007: $15.2004 million;
Source: DOD. GAO has not verified the reliability of DOD Comptroller‘s
data processing.
Note: There is a lag between the provision of support and DOD's
reimbursement of these costs. Submitted costs were (a) recommended for
approval; (b) "deferred" or returned for additional documentation; or
(c) "disallowed" for not being consistent with the scope of CSF.
[End of figure]
We plan to monitor the status and progress of the U.S. government in
developing this effort and provide an assessment in a subsequent report
covering security, political, and development assistance activities
undertaken by the United States to meet U.S. national security goals in
the FATA. This work is being conducted in response to requests from the
House Committee on Foreign Affairs; the Subcommittee on the Middle East
and South Asia, House Committee on Foreign Affairs; the Subcommittee on
National Security and Foreign Affairs, House Committee on Oversight and
Government Reform; Senator Harkin; and Senator Menendez.
Conclusion:
Combating terrorism is the United States' top national security
priority at home and abroad. The U.S. national security strategies have
consistently called for using all elements of national power to combat
terrorism, including diplomatic, military, intelligence, development
assistance, economic, and law enforcement support. Because the use of
the various elements of national power falls under the authority of
numerous U.S. government agencies, a comprehensive plan is required to
ensure that the full capacity of the U.S. government is focused on
meeting U.S. national security goals.
We believe that such a plan would help to ensure coordination,
integration, and implementation of U.S. efforts to close the terrorist
safe haven in the FATA. A comprehensive plan to combat terrorism in the
FATA that establishes goals, objectives, priorities, outcomes, and
milestones, including specific performance measures, would allow an
assessment of progress and help ensure accountability of U.S. efforts.
As such, we believe that the administration should develop a
comprehensive plan using the full capabilities provided by Defense,
State, USAID, and other U.S. agencies and stakeholders to further
assist Pakistan in combating terrorism.
Additionally, the U.S. has spent billions of CSF on Pakistan military
operations in the FATA border region. As these funds continue to
support Pakistani operations in the FATA, it is important that there is
adequate oversight.
Prior Recommendations for Executive Action:
In our report issued in April 2008, we recommended that the National
Security Advisor and the Director of the NCTC, in consultation with the
Secretaries of Defense and State, and the Administrator of USAID, the
intelligence community, and other executive departments as deemed
appropriate, implement the congressional mandate to develop a
comprehensive plan using all elements of national power to combat the
terrorist threat and close their safe haven in Pakistan's FATA region.
The comprehensive plan should also include key components called for in
the Intelligence Reform Act, the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/
11 Commission Act of 2007, and components that we have previously
reported as being needed to improve the effectiveness of plans
involving multidepartmental efforts to combat terrorism.[Footnote 16]
Among other things, the plan should:
* place someone directly in charge of this multidepartment effort to
improve accountability;
* articulate a clear strategy to implement the national security goal
to destroy terrorists and close its safe haven in the FATA;
* clarify roles and responsibilities of each department for
implementing the goal, including establishing compatible policies and
procedures to operate across agency boundaries;
* provide guidance on setting funding priorities and providing
resources to meet these national security goals; and:
* require a monitoring system and provide periodic reports to Congress
on the progress and impediments to meeting national security goals in
Pakistan.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
In response to our previous reports, Defense and USAID concurred with
our recommendation that a comprehensive plan was needed; State asserted
that a comprehensive strategy exists, while the Office of the Director
of National Intelligence stated that plans to combat terrorism exist.
In our view, these plans have not been formally integrated into a
comprehensive plan as called for by Congress. Additionally, Defense
recognized the importance and necessity of oversight over CSF.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to answer
any questions that you or other Members have at this time.
GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgements:
For questions regarding this testimony, please contact Charles Michael
Johnson Jr. on (202) 512-7331, or johnsoncm@gao.gov. Other contributors
to this statement were Hynek Kalkus, Assistant Director; Edward J.
George; Claude Adrien; David Hancock; Karen Deans; Mark Dowling; and
Jena Sinkfield.
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Our objectives and findings for this testimony were based on two
recently issued reports.[Footnote 17] To address these objectives, for
our earlier reports, we reviewed relevant national security strategies,
the 9/11 Commission Report, key congressional legislation, and related
documentation from the Departments of Defense (Defense) and State
(State) and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and
discussed these issues with relevant department officials.[Footnote 18]
To determine progress in meeting national security goals, we compared
the national security goals with unclassified assessments conducted by
the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), State, and U.S. officials
operating in Pakistan. We have previously reported on the need for
plans to combat terrorism to include elements that would enhance
interagency cooperation and improve effectiveness.[Footnote 19]
To determine if comprehensive plans that included these key elements
were developed and contained the elements recommended by national
security documents and legislation, we requested all plans addressing
U.S. efforts in the FATA from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA),
Defense, NCTC, NSC, State, USAID, and the U.S. Embassy in Pakistan. We
reviewed all plans made available from Defense, State, USAID and the
U.S. Embassy in Pakistan. The CIA, NCTC, and National Security Council
(NSC) did not provide any plans.
In addition, we conducted field work in Pakistan in both Islamabad and
Peshawar, near the FATA, and met with officials from the U.S. embassy
and consulate, Pakistan's Ministries of Defense and Interior, the 11th
Army Corps, the Frontier Corps, the FATA Secretariat, and a Pakistani
nongovernmental organization with experience working in the FATA, as
well as international donors.[Footnote 20] We determined the amount of
U.S. funding to Pakistan by analyzing Defense, State, and USAID budget
documents covering the period from fiscal years 2002 through 2007. We
determined the amount and oversight process used for CSF reimbursements
to Pakistan by analyzing Defense documents covering reimbursement
claims for the period from fiscal years 2002 through June 2007.
We conducted these performance audits from July 2007 through May 2008
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence
obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings based on our
audit objectives.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] See [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-622],
Combating Terrorism: The United States Lacks Comprehensive Plan to
Destroy the Terrorist Threat and Close the Safe Haven in Pakistan's
Federally Administered Tribal Areas (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 2008); and
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-735R], Preliminary
Observations on the Use and Oversight of U.S. Coalition Support Funds
Provided to Pakistan (Washington, D.C.: May 2008).
[2] These goals have been set forth in the 2002 National Security
Strategy, the 2003 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, and the
2004 9/11 Commission Report, and have been endorsed by the Intelligence
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-458, sec 7102
(b)(3)) and the Implementing the Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission
Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-53, sec. 2042(b)(2)).
[3] See Appendix I for a brief description of our scope and
methodology. The work on which this testimony is based was conducted in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
[4] The FATA is governed by the Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR) of
1901. This legal system, codified under British rule, is separate from
and unequal to the legal system governing the rest of Pakistan. The
information on foreign law in this report does not reflect our
independent legal analysis but is based on interviews and secondary
sources.
[5] CSF reimburses Pakistan for a variety of activities in support of
the global war on terror, the majority of which consists of Army and
Air Force operations against terrorists in Pakistan's FATA and the
border region. However, some of the CSF also supports Pakistani Navy
and Air Force activities outside of this area. Defense was unable to
quantify what was reimbursed for activities outside the FATA and the
border region at the time of our report, and therefore, we included all
CSF as funds going toward the FATA and the border region. CSF
reimbursement funds are paid to the Pakistani government treasury and
become sovereign funds.
[6] The administration's 2003 National Strategy for Combating
Terrorism, the independent 9/11 Commission Report, and Congress's (1)
Intelligence Reform Act and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-
458, sec. 7120) and (2) the Implementing the Recommendations of the 9/
11 Commission Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-53, sec. 2042 (c)) all support the
development of a comprehensive plan that uses all elements of national
power. Elements of national power include diplomatic, military,
intelligence, development assistance, economic, and law enforcement
support.
[7] GAO, Combating Terrorism: Law Enforcement Agencies Lack Directives
to Assist Foreign Nations to Identify, Disrupt, and Prosecute
Terrorists, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-697]
(Washington, D.C., May 25, 2007); GAO, Results-Oriented Government:
Practices That Can Help Enhance and Sustain Collaboration among Federal
Agencies, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-15]
(Washington, D.C., Oct. 21, 2005); and GAO, Combating Terrorism:
Observations on National Strategies Related to Terrorism, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-519T] (Washington, D.C., Mar.
3, 2003).
[8] Submitted costs can be (a) recommended for approval; (b) "deferred"
and returned for additional documentation; or (c) "disallowed" for not
being consistent with the scope of CSF.
[9] The information on foreign law in this report does not reflect our
independent legal analysis but is based on interviews and secondary
sources.
[10] A recent announcement by Pakistani Prime Minister Yousaf Raza
Gillani regarding the repeal of the FCR drew mixed reactions from
tribesmen and political leaders, some of whom called for amendments to
the FCR, rather than its repeal.
[11] The DNI's 2007 NIE and its 2008 Annual Threat Assessment are
designed to help U.S. civilian and military leaders develop policies to
protect U.S. national security interests and represent the combined
judgments of 16 U.S. intelligence agencies, according to the NIE.
[12] Department of State report to Congress, pursuant to Section 2042
of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commissions Act of 2007
(P.L. 110-53)
[13] Annual Threat Assessment of the Director of National Intelligence
for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, February 5, 2008.
[14] In providing agency comments on GAO-08-622, USAID stated it
received $88 million for these efforts in the Fiscal Year 2007
Supplemental Appropriation.
[15] The March-June 2007 claims reimbursed in February 2008 are the
latest claims reimbursed by DOD Comptroller, as of May 2008.
[16] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-697],
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-15], and
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-519T].
[17] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-622],
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-735R].
[18] We also requested meetings with the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA), the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), and the National
Security Council (NSC); however, only the CIA agreed to meet with us.
[19] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-697].
[20] We met with international donors from Canada, Japan, the
Netherlands, and the United Kingdom.
[End of section]
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