U.S. Postal Service
Network Rightsizing Needed to Help Keep USPS Financially Viable
Gao ID: GAO-09-674T May 20, 2009
The recession accelerated declines in mail volume in fiscal year 2008 and flattened revenues despite postal rate increases. That year, mail volume fell by 9.5 billion pieces, or 4.5 percent, and resulted in a net loss of $2.8 billion as the U.S. Postal Service's (USPS) cost-cutting did not close the gap between revenues and expenses. We testified this March before this subcommittee that USPS's financial condition has continued to deteriorate in the first 5 months of fiscal year 2009, with accelerating declines in mail volume and financial losses. USPS projected its financial condition to continue deteriorating for the rest of the fiscal year and to result in an unprecedented cash shortfall of $1.5 billion, assuming that ambitious cost-cutting targets are achieved. This testimony updates that information and focuses on (1) how USPS's financial viability is challenged given current economic conditions and whether USPS can cover its expenses and financial obligations, (2) USPS's opportunities to rightsize its retail and mail processing networks, and (3) what options and trade-offs need to be considered to address mail volume and revenue declines. It is based on GAO's past work and updated information on USPS's finances and networks. We asked USPS for comments on our statement. USPS generally agreed with the accuracy of our statement and provided technical comments, which we incorporated where appropriate.
USPS continues to project a mail volume decline of 10 to 12 percent for fiscal year 2009. As a result, USPS projects ? a financial gap of about $12 billion, which despite planned cost cuts of $5.9 billion, would result in a record annual loss of over $6 billion, and ? an increase in outstanding debt by the annual statutory limit of $3 billion, and, despite this step, an unprecedented $1.5 billion cash shortfall. For fiscal year 2010, USPS currently projects that mail volume will decline by an additional 10 billion pieces, leading to a financial loss similar to the loss in fiscal year 2009 and another possible cash shortfall. Maintaining USPS's financial viability as the provider of affordable, high-quality universal postal service will require actions in a number of areas, such as (1) rightsizing its retail and mail processing networks by consolidating operations and closing unnecessary facilities and (2) reducing the size of its workforce. USPS has made limited progress in rightsizing its networks, an action that is often controversial but necessary to address the unprecedented declines in mail volume and help close the large and growing gap between USPS revenues and expenses. Further, rightsizing USPS's retail and mail processing networks is needed to eliminate growing excess capacity and improve efficiency--action that is critical to maintaining affordable postal rates and streamlining USPS's workforce, which generates close to 80 percent of its costs. USPS has consolidated operations through attrition and currently has about 160,000 employees eligible for retirement. USPS can streamline its retail network by closing unnecessary facilities and promoting lower-cost alternatives such as purchasing stamps by mail, telephone, and the Internet, as well as at drug stores and supermarkets. USPS also has substantial excess capacity in its mail processing network and has proposed consolidating some processing operations at its 21 Bulk Mail Centers and other facilities. In the Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act of 2006, Congress recognized USPS has more facilities than it needs and strongly encouraged streamlining its networks. Rightsizing will require continued congressional support for necessary closures and USPS leadership to address resistance to change. Other options that could help USPS remain financially viable involve difficult trade-offs, including (1) deferring USPS payments for retiree health benefits, which would increase the unfunded retiree health benefit obligation; (2) reducing the frequency of 6-day delivery, which would affect a key aspect of universal service and could further accelerate mail volume decline; (3) downgrading delivery standards, which could affect time-sensitive mail; (4) raising statutory debt limits, which could further exacerbate USPS's financial difficulties in the future; and (5) providing direct appropriations, which would be contrary to the fundamental principle that USPS remain financially self-supporting. Finally, GAO is closely monitoring USPS's financial viability to determine whether to add USPS's need for restructuring to GAO's High-Risk List.
GAO-09-674T, U.S. Postal Service: Network Rightsizing Needed to Help Keep USPS Financially Viable
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Testimony:
Before the Subcommittee on Federal Workforce, Postal Service, and the
District of Columbia, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform,
House of Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery:
Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT:
Wednesday, May 20, 2009:
U.S. Postal Service:
Network Rightsizing Needed to Help Keep USPS Financially Viable:
Statement of Phillip Herr, Director:
Physical Infrastructure Issues:
GAO-09-674T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-09-674T, a hearing before the Subcommittee on Federal
Workforce, Postal Service, and the District of Columbia, Committee on
Oversight and Government Reform, House of Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study:
The recession accelerated declines in mail volume in fiscal year 2008
and flattened revenues despite postal rate increases. That year, mail
volume fell by 9.5 billion pieces, or 4.5 percent, and resulted in a
net loss of $2.8 billion as the U.S. Postal Service‘s (USPS) cost-
cutting did not close the gap between revenues and expenses. We
testified this March before this subcommittee that USPS‘s financial
condition has continued to deteriorate in the first 5 months of fiscal
year 2009, with accelerating declines in mail volume and financial
losses. USPS projected its financial condition to continue
deteriorating for the rest of the fiscal year and to result in an
unprecedented cash shortfall of $1.5 billion, assuming that ambitious
cost-cutting targets are achieved.
This testimony updates that information and focuses on (1) how USPS‘s
financial viability is challenged given current economic conditions and
whether USPS can cover its expenses and financial obligations, (2) USPS‘
s opportunities to rightsize its retail and mail processing networks,
and (3) what options and trade-offs need to be considered to address
mail volume and revenue declines. It is based on GAO‘s past work and
updated information on USPS‘s finances and networks. We asked USPS for
comments on our statement. USPS generally agreed with the accuracy of
our statement and provided technical comments, which we incorporated
where appropriate.
What GAO Found:
USPS continues to project a mail volume decline of 10 to 12 percent for
fiscal year 2009. As a result, USPS projects:
* a financial gap of about $12 billion, which despite planned cost cuts
of $5.9 billion, would result in a record annual loss of over $6
billion, and;
* an increase in outstanding debt by the annual statutory limit of $3
billion, and, despite this step, an unprecedented $1.5 billion cash
shortfall.
For fiscal year 2010, USPS currently projects that mail volume will
decline by an additional 10 billion pieces, leading to a financial loss
similar to the loss in fiscal year 2009 and another possible cash
shortfall.
Maintaining USPS‘s financial viability as the provider of affordable,
high-quality universal postal service will require actions in a number
of areas, such as (1) rightsizing its retail and mail processing
networks by consolidating operations and closing unnecessary facilities
and (2) reducing the size of its workforce. USPS has made limited
progress in rightsizing its networks, an action that is often
controversial but necessary to address the unprecedented declines in
mail volume and help close the large and growing gap between USPS
revenues and expenses. Further, rightsizing USPS‘s retail and mail
processing networks is needed to eliminate growing excess capacity and
improve efficiency”action that is critical to maintaining affordable
postal rates and streamlining USPS‘s workforce, which generates close
to 80 percent of its costs. USPS has consolidated operations through
attrition and currently has about 160,000 employees eligible for
retirement. USPS can streamline its retail network by closing
unnecessary facilities and promoting lower-cost alternatives such as
purchasing stamps by mail, telephone, and the Internet, as well as at
drug stores and supermarkets. USPS also has substantial excess capacity
in its mail processing network and has proposed consolidating some
processing operations at its 21 Bulk Mail Centers and other facilities.
In the Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act of 2006, Congress
recognized USPS has more facilities than it needs and strongly
encouraged streamlining its networks. Rightsizing will require
continued congressional support for necessary closures and USPS
leadership to address resistance to change.
Other options that could help USPS remain financially viable involve
difficult trade-offs, including:
* deferring USPS payments for retiree health benefits, which would
increase the unfunded retiree health benefit obligation;
* reducing the frequency of 6-day delivery, which would affect a key
aspect of universal service and could further accelerate mail volume
decline;
* downgrading delivery standards, which could affect time-sensitive
mail;
* raising statutory debt limits, which could further exacerbate USPS‘s
financial difficulties in the future; and;
* providing direct appropriations, which would be contrary to the
fundamental principle that USPS remain financially self-supporting.
Finally, GAO is closely monitoring USPS‘s financial viability to
determine whether to add USPS‘s need for restructuring to GAO‘s High-
Risk List.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-674T] or key
components. For more information, contact Phillip Herr at (202) 512-
2834 or herrp@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Chairman Lynch, Ranking Member Chaffetz, and Members of the
Subcommittee:
I am pleased to be here today to participate in this oversight hearing
on the U.S. Postal Service's (USPS) operations and network. My
statement addresses the following questions:
* How is USPS's financial viability challenged given current economic
conditions and can USPS cover its expenses and financial obligations?
* What opportunities does USPS have to rightsize its retail and mail
processing networks?
* What options and trade-offs need to be considered to address
significant mail volume and revenue declines?
My statement is based on our continuing monitoring of USPS's financial
condition and outlook, and our past and continuing work on USPS network
operations. We obtained updated information on USPS results for this
fiscal year through the second quarter and USPS's outlook for fiscal
years 2009 and 2010. We conducted this performance audit in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards
require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,
appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence
obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions
based on our audit objectives.
USPS Financial Viability Is Threatened by Declining Mail Volume and
Revenues:
As of the end of the second quarter, USPS projects a mail volume
decline of 10 to 12 percent for fiscal year 2009, more than double the
4.5 percent total volume decline in fiscal year 2008 and the largest
decline since the Great Depression. As a result, USPS is projecting the
following:
* a potential financial gap of about $12 billion between revenues and
expenses, which USPS projects will be diminished by achieving cost
savings of $5.9 billion--leading to a net loss of over $6 billion;
[Footnote 1]
* an increase in outstanding debt by the annual statutory limit of $3
billion; and, despite this borrowing,
* an unprecedented $1.5 billion cash shortfall. USPS has reported that
it does not expect to generate sufficient cash from operations to fully
fund its fiscal year 2009 obligations for workers' compensation (about
$1.1 billion), due in September 2009, and future retiree health
benefits ($5.4 billion) that is due by September 30, 2009.
Fiscal year 2010 is also likely to be challenging. USPS is currently
projecting that mail volume will decline by an additional 10 billion
pieces, leading to a financial loss similar to the loss in fiscal year
2009 and another possible cash shortfall. Under this scenario, USPS may
increase its outstanding debt by an additional $3 billion, which would
bring its total debt to $13.2 billion at the end of fiscal year 2010--
only $1.8 billion less than its $15 billion statutory limit. See
appendix I for more detailed financial information.
USPS's $5.9 billion cost-cutting target for this fiscal year is
unusually ambitious in that it exceeds annual cost-cutting targets it
has set since 2001, which ranged from nearly $900 million to $2
billion. However, even if it achieves its cost-cutting target for
fiscal year 2009, USPS projects cash shortfalls because it does not
expect its cost-cutting efforts and rate increases will fully offset
the impact of mail volume declines and other factors that increase
costs--notably semiannual cost-of-living allowances (COLA) for postal
employees covered by union contracts. Compensation and benefits
constitute close to 80 percent of USPS costs--a percentage that has
remained similar over the years despite major advances in technology
and automating postal operations. Also, USPS continues to pay a higher
share of employee health benefit premiums than other federal agencies.
Further, USPS has high overhead (institutional) costs that are hard to
change in the short term, such as providing universal service that
includes 6-day delivery and a network of close to 37,000 post offices
and retail facilities.
Proposed legislation could help to maintain USPS's short-term solvency
by reducing USPS payments for retiree health benefits by $2.0 billion
in fiscal year 2009 and $2.3 billion in fiscal year 2010.[Footnote 2]
As in prior testimony, we support providing 2 years of relief from
these payments to assist USPS through its short-term difficulties while
minimizing the impact on USPS's unfunded retiree health benefits
obligation.[Footnote 3] We do not support the additional 6 years of
relief that the proposed legislation would also provide, because it
would lead to an estimated $75 billion (rather than $43 billion) in
unfunded obligations for USPS retirees' health benefits in 2017.
Further, we believe the proposed legislation does not address USPS's
long-term problems related to declining mail volume, particularly in
First-Class Mail, which covers most USPS overhead costs.
Maintaining USPS's financial viability as the provider of affordable,
high-quality universal postal service will require actions in a number
of areas. The Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act of 2006 (PAEA)
enabled USPS to retain earnings that can finance needed capital
investments and repay debt. Although USPS is developing revenue
initiatives from new flexibilities provided in the 2006 act, it does
not expect these initiatives to generate much net revenue in the short
term. Further, USPS has curtailed capital spending to conserve cash, an
action that may be a necessary stopgap measure. However, this is not a
sustainable long-term strategy because USPS will need to continue
making investments to maintain and modernize its infrastructure,
address its maintenance backlog, automate postal operations, replace
aging vehicles, and cover expenses to consolidate operations and
rightsize its retail and mail processing networks.
Action Is Needed to Rightsize USPS Networks and Workforce:
Network rightsizing by consolidating operations and closing unnecessary
facilities is likely to be only one of many steps that USPS will need
to take to remain financially viable in the long run. Rightsizing
USPS's retail and mail processing networks is needed to eliminate
excess capacity, improve efficiency that is critical to maintaining
affordable postal rates, and facilitate streamlining USPS's workforce,
which generates close to 80 percent of its costs. Excess capacity has
grown with unprecedented declines of mail volume, which are projected
to continue through fiscal year 2010. As we recently testified, as its
mail volumes decline, USPS does not have sufficient revenues to cover
the growing costs of providing service to new residences and businesses
while also maintaining its large network of retail and processing
facilities.[Footnote 4]
We have reported since 2003 that USPS needs to realign its retail and
processing networks and rightsize its workforce.[Footnote 5] In 2005,
when mail volume was 212 billion pieces, we reported that excess
capacity in USPS's retail and mail processing networks created
opportunities for it to increase efficiency and reduce costs.[Footnote
6] The recession has accelerated the decline in mail volume and
revenues so that dramatic action--beyond USPS's incremental
streamlining efforts--is needed. Closing postal facilities is often
controversial but is necessary to streamline costs and eliminate excess
capacity.
USPS has made some limited progress in streamlining its mail processing
network by closing smaller facilities such as Airport Mail Centers and
Remote Encoding Centers and consolidating some operations through Area
Mail Processing consolidations.[Footnote 7] However, USPS has closed
only 1 of its approximately 400 major mail processing facilities. USPS
has often faced resistance from employees, affected communities, and
Members of Congress when it has attempted to consolidate its operations
and networks. In enacting PAEA, Congress recognized USPS had more
facilities than it needs and strongly encouraged streamlining its
networks, noting this can pave the way for eliminating excess costs.
Continued congressional support for necessary closures would be helpful
to facilitate progress in this area. USPS has taken steps to address
our recommendations that it enhance the transparency and strengthen the
accountability of its realignment efforts and thus should be positioned
to take action.
Rightsizing postal retail and mail processing networks can eliminate
costly excess capacity and enable USPS to continue streamlining its
workforce through attrition. About 160,000 USPS employees will be
eligible for retirement in fiscal year 2009 (not counting the 150,000
employees offered early retirement). Further, nearly 130,000 additional
USPS employees are expected to become newly eligible for retirement in
fiscal years 2010 through 2013--including more than 30,000 employees in
each of these fiscal years. As USPS consolidates its operations, it can
reduce costs and operate more efficiently with fewer employees. Network
rightsizing is likely to be only one of many steps that USPS will need
to take to remain financially viable in the long run. Nevertheless,
network rightsizing and reducing the size of its workforce are
necessary to address the unprecedented declines in mail volume and help
close the large and growing gap between USPS revenues and expenses.
We recognize that USPS faces formidable resistance to closing and
consolidating facilities because of concerns about the effects of such
actions on service, employees, and local communities. Retail
alternatives may be more convenient and cost-effective, but customers
could resist changing long-standing habits. However, other businesses
have successfully shifted many customer activities to self-service,
including check-in at airports, checkout at grocery stores, self-
service at gas stations, and automated teller machines at financial
institutions. It is preferable for USPS to take action now rather than
hoping that mail volume will revive sufficiently when the economy
recovers. The outlook for USPS's core business of First-Class Mail--
which covered nearly two-thirds of USPS overhead costs in fiscal year
2008--is for declines to continue for the foreseeable future as
communications and payments continue to shift to electronic
alternatives.
USPS senior management will need to provide leadership and work with
stakeholders to overcome resistance to streamlining its retail and mail
processing facilities for such actions to be successfully implemented.
USPS must explain its plans in an open and transparent manner; engage
with its unions, management associations, the mailing industry, and
political leaders; and then demonstrate results of actions. In turn,
these stakeholders need to recognize that major change is urgently
needed if USPS is to remain financially viable.
USPS Can Streamline Its Retail Network while Improving Access:
USPS can streamline its retail network while improving access by
closing unnecessary retail facilities and promoting lower-cost
alternatives such as purchasing stamps by mail, telephone, and the
Internet, as well as carrier pickup of packages. USPS has long
recognized the need to adjust its retail network to provide optimal
service at the lowest possible cost and has worked to expand low-cost
alternatives. Alternative retail options currently generate about a
quarter of USPS's retail revenue. USPS continues to rely on providing
service at traditional post offices, branches, and stations and has not
significantly downsized its retail operations in recent years (see fig.
1). Opportunities to reduce retail facilities are particularly evident
in urban and suburban areas, where USPS retail locations are close to
one another, customers have more options, and facilities are expensive
to operate and maintain.
Figure 1: USPS Retail Facilities, Fiscal Years 2003 and 2008:
[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph]
Number of facilities, total:
Fiscal year 2003: 37,579;
Fiscal year 2008: 36,723.
Facilities operated by USPS employees: Post Offices:
Fiscal year 2003: 27,556;
Fiscal year 2008: 27,232.
Facilities operated by USPS employees: Classified branches, stations,
and carrier annexes:
Fiscal year 2003: 5,796;
Fiscal year 2008: 5,509.
Contract facilities: Contract branches, stations, and Community
Post Offices:
Fiscal year 2003: 4,227;
Fiscal year 2008: 3,982.
Source: USPS.
[End of figure]
Retail Alternatives Have Expanded but Generate Only a Quarter of Retail
Revenue:
USPS has made progress in expanding the alternatives to traditional
post offices and postal retail facilities. In 2008, customers could
access postal services at more than 70,000 physical locations as well
as other options to purchase stamps and mail packages (see table 1).
Some postal services, such as stamp sales, are provided at alternative
locations (e.g., drug stores and supermarkets). In addition, self-
service options such as Automated Postal Centers are located in postal
retail facilities.
Table 1: Alternative USPS Retail Options and Number of Locations,
February 2008:
Partner programs:
Alternative retail options: Stamps on Consignment;
Description: Grocery and convenience stores and bank automated teller
machines that sell stamps;
Number of locations: 53,196.
Alternative retail options: Contract Postal Units;
Description: Contracted locations that offer full-service retail, but
are not owned or staffed by USPS;
Number of locations: 4,510.
Alternative retail options: Approved Shipper;
Description: Independent companies that offer USPS services along with
competitor products;
Number of locations: 1,914.
Self-service:
Alternative retail options: Automated Postal Centers;
Description: Kiosks that support the majority of transactions of a full-
service retail counter;
Number of locations: 2,496.
Alternative retail options: Vending machines;
Description: Machines that allow purchase of stamps for cash, which are
being removed from many locations;
Number of locations: 9,439.
Alternative retail options: Stamps by mail and telephone;
Description: Customers can order stamps that are delivered to their
address;
Number of locations: Not applicable.
Alternative retail options: The Postal Store (USPS Web site);
Description: Customers can purchase stamps and postal-related
merchandise and online postage for Express Mail and Priority Mail at a
reduced rate;
Number of locations: Not applicable.
Alternative retail options: Click-N-Ship;
Description: Online service enables customers to print postage labels
and arrange to send packages;
Number of locations: Not applicable.
Total locations: 71,555.
Source: USPS.
[End of table]
USPS has also been expanding its self-service options to provide
customers access to its services without visiting a physical location.
For example, USPS has sold stamps by phone and mail for several years,
and customers can purchase stamps at the USPS Web site. Further, USPS
has introduced Click-N-Ship, which enables customers to use its Web
site to print postage labels, including for Priority Mail, Express
Mail, and international mail, and schedule package pickup, saving a
trip to a post office. USPS has reported that use of its Web site
continues to grow, both in number of transactions and revenue
generated, and has plans to continue upgrading its Web site.
USPS Needs to Rightsize Its Network of Postal Retail Facilities:
USPS can streamline its network of close to 37,000 post offices,
branches, and stations--a network that has remained largely static
despite expanding use of retail alternatives and shifts in population.
In December 2007, we reported that USPS had not achieved a goal
established in its 2002 Transformation Plan of proactively identifying
unneeded retail facilities in overserved areas consistent with leading
federal practices.[Footnote 8] USPS actions to align retail access were
limited to closing some vacated facilities through "emergency
suspensions" and reducing staff by curtailing operations at some other
facilities.[Footnote 9] We noted in our 2007 report that leading
federal practices identify criteria for rightsizing facility networks-
-such as considering facilities' importance and utilization--but USPS
did not consider these criteria. Our analysis showed wide variation in
the number of postal retail facilities among comparable counties in
urban areas, and a number of facilities we visited for that work
appeared to merit consideration for closure based on one or more of the
federal criteria.
We also found that USPS has a maintenance backlog for its retail
facilities, including facilities that we visited which had chronically
leaking roofs and visible interior and exterior damage. USPS officials
stated that USPS has historically underfunded its maintenance needs and
insufficient funding has caused USPS to focus on reactive maintenance-
-that is, "emergency" and "urgent" repairs--at the expense of routine
maintenance to prevent problems. Since our 2007 report was issued, USPS
has limited its capital expenditures to help conserve cash, an action
that may affect its ability to make progress on its maintenance
backlog. One way to minimize maintenance costs is to reduce the number
of facilities that must be maintained.
USPS Needs to Streamline Its Mail Processing Network to Reduce Excess
Capacity:
We reported in 2005 that USPS had substantial excess capacity in its
mail processing network.[Footnote 10] Long-term trends have further
increased excess capacity in the processing network such as continuing
automation, declining volume of single-piece First-Class Mail (e.g.,
bill payments and personal correspondence), and destination entry of
Standard Mail (e.g., mail that is transported by mailers to USPS
facilities that are generally closer to where the mail is delivered)
that reduces the need for USPS mail processing and long-distance
transportation of mail. Trends contributing to excess capacity in the
USPS processing and transportation networks include the following:
* Advances in automation--New automation equipment enables USPS to sort
mail faster and more efficiently, a development that, with declining
mail volumes, has resulted in more equipment downtime. In addition, new
equipment, referred to as the Flats Sequencing System, will sort flat-
sized mail (e.g., large envelopes, catalogs, and magazines) into
delivery order, which is expected to reduce the need for space-
intensive manual sorting at delivery units. Because delivery units are
often colocated with post offices, branches, and stations, eliminating
the excess space could involve relocating or consolidating retail
activities.
* Decline in single-piece First-Class Mail--The volume of this mail has
declined from about 60 billion pieces in fiscal year 1990 to about 38.6
billion pieces in fiscal year 2008, and is projected by USPS to decline
to about 34.5 billion pieces in fiscal year 2009. Thus, there is less
mail that is processed end to end through USPS's processing network.
* Increases in destination-entered Standard Mail--Destination entry of
Standard Mail has increased from 26 percent in fiscal year 1991, when
destination entry discounts were introduced, to 80 percent in fiscal
year 2008. About half of Standard Mail is destination-entered at the
USPS processing facility closest to the final destination of the mail,
thus entirely bypassing USPS's network of Bulk Mail Facilities.
Conversely, Standard Mail entered at "origin" mail processing
facilities has declined from 74 to 20 percent.
The shift in how mailers use the USPS mail processing network provides
opportunities to eliminate growing excess capacity. Last summer, we
testified that USPS had taken steps to strengthen its processes for
consolidating its Area Mail Processing (AMP) operations. [Footnote 11]
Since then, USPS has initiated additional studies of proposed AMP
consolidations, and the status of 33 recent AMP proposals is detailed
in appendix II. Another major mail processing consolidation initiative
that USPS has begun this year is realignment of its 21 Bulk Mail
Centers and its Surface Transfer Centers into what is now referred to
as Network Distribution Centers. It is important for USPS to make
significant progress in consolidating its networks and reducing excess
capacity or it may face more drastic cost-cutting options and have less
time to achieve necessary cost reductions.
Other Options to Help USPS Remain Financially Viable Involve Difficult
Trade-offs:
Besides the option to defer payments for retiree health benefits
discussed earlier, there are other options, all of which are difficult
and require trade-offs, including:
* reducing the frequency of delivery from 6 days,
* downgrading delivery standards,
* allowing USPS to accumulate additional debt by raising statutory debt
limits, and:
* reverting to direct appropriations to help finance postal operations.
Cutting delivery frequency would affect a key aspect of universal
postal service and could further accelerate the decline in mail volume,
thereby wiping out much or all of the potential savings from reducing
delivery costs. Although USPS asked Congress in January 2009 to
eliminate the long-standing appropriation provision mandating 6-day
delivery, it has provided little information on how it would reduce
delivery frequency and the potential impact on cost, volume, revenues,
and customers. USPS estimated in 2008 that a year-round reduction in
delivery frequency to 5 days a week could save $3.5 billion annually,
assuming this reduction would have no effect on mail volume. The Postal
Regulatory Commission (PRC) estimated in 2008 that USPS could annually
save $1.9 billion by reducing delivery to 5 days, making some different
assumptions, including assuming this would lead to a 2 percent volume
decline. Thus, the USPS and PRC studies suggest that the potential
savings from reducing delivery frequency is potentially sensitive to
mailer response. Congress should have a more complete analysis of the
trade-offs involved as it considers potential statutory changes in this
area.
Although USPS has the authority to downgrade delivery standards for
timely delivery of mail, this could affect time-sensitive payments,
correspondence, advertising, or packages. Should USPS downgrade
standards on a nationwide or substantially nationwide basis, it would
be required to request an advisory opinion from the PRC, which would
lead to a public proceeding.[Footnote 12] This mechanism could also be
used to explore the broader implications of reducing delivery
frequency.
An option that would provide USPS with stopgap relief would be to raise
the statutory debt limits to keep USPS financially solvent. However,
this could further exacerbate USPS's financial difficulties in the
future, when USPS and its customers may have difficulty repaying a
larger amount of debt through higher postal rates. Direct
appropriations, another option, would be contrary to the fundamental
principle that USPS remain financially self-supporting through
efficient, businesslike operations.
Finally, it is possible that USPS cost-cutting could affect service,
particularly if USPS continues its incremental approach of reducing
work hours through attrition while attempting to retain all of its
major mail processing facilities. As USPS's Inspector General recently
testified before this subcommittee, "if staff reductions are not
coordinated with facility reductions, the Postal Service runs the risk
of having protracted anemic staffing within an oversized network."
[Footnote 13] To its credit, USPS has recently reported high levels of
service performance for single-piece First-Class Mail despite its
financial difficulties and cost-cutting efforts. However, it will be
important for USPS to continue making progress on measuring and
reporting the delivery performance for its major types of mail, as well
as the effects of network changes.
In closing, we are closely monitoring USPS's financial viability as
USPS responds to unprecedented declines in mail volume and revenues. In
2001, when we designated USPS's transformation efforts and long-term
outlook as high-risk, USPS's financial outlook had deteriorated
significantly and we were concerned that USPS had no comprehensive plan
to address its financial, operational, and human capital
challenges.[Footnote 14] In 2007, we removed this high-risk designation
because USPS had developed and was implementing a Transformation Plan
that addressed many of its challenges, and Congress had enacted
comprehensive postal reform legislation giving USPS additional pricing
flexibility and other mechanisms to help USPS remain competitive.
[Footnote 15] At this point, it is not clear to what degree USPS's
current financial difficulties are primarily tied to the current
economic downturn--versus long-term trends such as changing use of the
mail--and to what degree USPS's financial condition will improve when
the economy recovers. Depending on how effectively USPS responds to
mail volume and revenue trends, removes costs, and manages its cash
flow, we may consider adding USPS's financial viability and need to
restructure its operations to our High-Risk List.[Footnote 16]
In commenting on a draft of this testimony, USPS generally agreed with
the accuracy of our statement and provided technical comments, which we
incorporated where appropriate.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be pleased
to answer any questions that you or the Members of the Subcommittee may
have.
Contact and Acknowledgments:
For further information regarding this statement, please contact
Phillip Herr at (202) 512-2834 or herrp@gao.gov. Individuals who made
key contributions to this statement include Shirley Abel, Teresa
Anderson, Keith Cunningham, Kenneth John, Emily Larson, Hannah Laufe,
Susan Ragland, and Crystal Wesco.
[End of section]
Appendix I: USPS Mail Volumes and Revenues:
Table 1: USPS Mail Volume: Results for Fiscal Year 2008 and Current
USPS Projections for Fiscal Years 2009 and 2010:
First-Class Mail[A];
Mail volume: (millions of pieces):
Actual: 2008: 91,697;
Projected: 2009: 83,649;
Projected: 2010: 78,029;
Mail volume: (percentage change from previous fiscal year):
Actual: 2008: -4.8;
Projected: 2009: -8.8;
Projected: 2010: -6.7.
Domestic: single-piece;
Mail volume: (millions of pieces):
Actual: 2008: 38,558;
Projected: 2009: 34,455;
Projected: 2010: 31,140;
Mail volume: (percentage change from previous fiscal year):
Actual: 2008: -8.8;
Projected: 2009: -10.6;
Projected: 2010: -9.6.
Domestic: bulk;
Mail volume: (millions of pieces):
Actual: 2008: 52,719;
Projected: 2009: 48,831;
Projected: 2010: 46,560;
Mail volume: (percentage change from previous fiscal year):
Actual: 2008: -1.7;
Projected: 2009: -7.4;
Projected: 2010: -4.7.
Standard Mail;
Mail volume: (millions of pieces):
Actual: 2008: 99,084;
Projected: 2009: 85,820;
Projected: 2010: 82,468;
Mail volume: (percentage change from previous fiscal year):
Actual: 2008: -4.3;
Projected: 2009: -13.4;
Projected: 2010: -3.9.
Periodicals;
Mail volume: (millions of pieces):
Actual: 2008: 8,605;
Projected: 2009: 7,785;
Projected: 2010: 6,847;
Mail volume: (percentage change from previous fiscal year):
Actual: 2008: -2.2;
Projected: 2009: -9.5;
Projected: 2010: -12.0.
Package Services;
Mail volume: (millions of pieces):
Actual: 2008: 846;
Projected: 2009: 765;
Projected: 2010: 723;
Mail volume: (percentage change from previous fiscal year):
Actual: 2008: -7.5;
Projected: 2009: -9.6;
Projected: 2010: -5.5.
Subtotal: Market-Dominant Mail[B];
Mail volume: (millions of pieces):
Actual: 2008: 201,128;
Projected: 2009: 178,637;
Projected: 2010: 168,719;
Mail volume: (percentage change from previous fiscal year):
Actual: 2008: -4.5;
Projected: 2009: -11.2;
Projected: 2010: -5.6.
Competitive Mail;
Mail volume: (millions of pieces):
Actual: 2008: 1,575;
Projected: 2009: 1,363;
Projected: 2010: 1,282;
Mail volume: (percentage change from previous fiscal year):
Actual: 2008: -3.4;
Projected: 2009: -13.5;
Projected: 2010: -5.9.
Grand Total;
Mail volume: (millions of pieces):
Actual: 2008: 202,703;
Projected: 2009: 180,000;
Projected: 2010: 170,000;
Mail volume: (percentage change from previous fiscal year):
Actual: 2008: -4.5;
Projected: 2009: -11.2;
Projected: 2010: -5.6.
Source: USPS.
[A] First-Class Mail includes domestic and international First-Class
Mail.
[B] Volume is not shown for small categories of market-dominant mail,
including single-piece international First-Class Mail, USPS mail, and
Free Mail for the Blind.
[End of table]
Table 2: USPS Revenues: Results for Fiscal Year 2008 and Current USPS
Projections for Fiscal Years 2009 and 2010:
First-Class Mail[A];
Revenue: (millions of dollars):
Actual: 2008: $38,179;
Projected: 2009: $35,824;
Projected: 2010: $34,036;
Revenue: (percentage change from previous fiscal year):
Actual: 2008: -0.6;
Projected: 2009: -6.2;
Projected: 2010: -5.0.
Domestic: single-piece;
Revenue: (millions of dollars):
Actual: 2008: $19,396;
Projected: 2009: $17,878;
Projected: 2010: $16,592;
Revenue: (percentage change from previous fiscal year):
Actual: 2008: -3.8;
Projected: 2009: -7.8;
Projected: 2010: -7.2.
Domestic: bulk;
Revenue: (millions of dollars):
Actual: 2008: $17,880;
Projected: 2009: $16,963;
Projected: 2010: $16,526;
Revenue: (percentage change from previous fiscal year):
Actual: 2008: -2.7;
Projected: 2009: -5.1;
Projected: 2010: -2.6.
Standard Mail;
Revenue: (millions of dollars):
Actual: 2008: $20,586;
Projected: 2009: $18,183;
Projected: 2010: $17,843;
Revenue: (percentage change from previous fiscal year):
Actual: 2008: -0.9;
Projected: 2009: -11.7;
Projected: 2010: -1.9.
Periodicals;
Revenue: (millions of dollars):
Actual: 2008: $2,295;
Projected: 2009: $2,114;
Projected: 2010: $1,917;
Revenue: (percentage change from previous fiscal year):
Actual: 2008: 4.9;
Projected: 2009: -7.9;
Projected: 2010: -9.3.
Package Services;
Revenue: (millions of dollars):
Actual: 2008: $1,845;
Projected: 2009: $1,743;
Projected: 2010: $1,662;
Revenue: (percentage change from previous fiscal year):
Actual: 2008: 1.8;
Projected: 2009: -5.5;
Projected: 2010: -4.6.
Subtotal: Market-Dominant Mail[B];
Revenue: (millions of dollars):
Actual: 2008: $62,906;
Projected: 2009: $57,864;
Projected: 2010: $55,457;
Revenue: (percentage change from previous fiscal year):
Actual: 2008: -0.4;
Projected: 2009: -8.0;
Projected: 2010: -4.2.
Market-Dominant Special Services;
Revenue: (millions of dollars):
Actual: 2008: $2,814;
Projected: 2009: $2,805;
Projected: 2010: $2,634;
Revenue: (percentage change from previous fiscal year):
Actual: 2008: 5.4;
Projected: 2009: -0.3;
Projected: 2010: -6.1.
Competitive Mail and Services;
Revenue: (millions of dollars):
Actual: 2008: $8,382;
Projected: 2009: $7,986;
Projected: 2010: $7,544;
Revenue: (percentage change from previous fiscal year):
Actual: 2008: 6.4;
Projected: 2009: -4.7;
Projected: 2010: -5.5.
Grand Total;
Revenue: (millions of dollars):
Actual: 2008: $74,968;
Projected: 2009: $69,623;
Projected: 2010: $66,652;
Revenue: (percentage change from previous fiscal year):
Actual: 2008: 0.0;
Projected: 2009: -7.1;
Projected: 2010: -4.3.
Source: USPS.
[A] First-Class Mail includes domestic and international First-Class
Mail.
[B] Revenue is not shown for small categories of market-dominant mail,
including single-piece international First-Class Mail and First-Class
Mail fees. Revenue other than revenue for market-dominant and
competitive products and services is not shown, such as nonpostal
products and services, real estate, appropriations, and investment
income.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix II: Status of 2008-2009 Proposed Area Mail Processing
Consolidations as of May 15, 2009:
[End of section]
Area Mail Processing (AMP) study initiated:
Total AMP proposals: 33;
Public meeting held: 12;
AMP: not approved: 4;
AMP: approved: 4.
1. Aberdeen, SD, to Dakota Central, SD;
Public meeting held: [Empty];
AMP: not approved: [Check];
AMP: approved: [Empty].
2. Athens, GA, to North Metro, GA;
Public meeting held: [Check];
AMP: not approved: [Empty];
AMP: approved: [Empty].
3. Binghamton, NY, to Syracuse, NY;
Public meeting held: [Empty];
AMP: not approved: [Empty];
AMP: approved: [Empty].
4. Bloomington, IN, to Indianapolis, IN;
Public meeting held: [Empty];
AMP: not approved: [Empty];
AMP: approved: [Empty].
5. Bronx, NY, to Morgan, NY;
Public meeting held: [Empty];
AMP: not approved: [Check];
AMP: approved: [Empty].
6. Canton, OH, to Akron, OH;
Public meeting held: [Empty];
AMP: not approved: [Empty];
AMP: approved: [Check].
7. Cape Cod, MA, to Brockton, MA;
Public meeting held: [Empty];
AMP: not approved: [Empty];
AMP: approved: [Empty].
8. Dallas, TX, to North Texas, TX;
Public meeting held: [Empty];
AMP: not approved: [Empty];
AMP: approved: [Empty].
9. Detroit, MI, to Pontiac, MI;
Public meeting held: [Check];
AMP: not approved: [Empty];
AMP: approved: [Empty].
10. Flint, MI, to Pontiac, MI;
Public meeting held: [Check];
AMP: not approved: [Empty];
AMP: approved: [Empty].
11. Hattiesburg, MS, to Gulfport, MS;
Public meeting held: [Check];
AMP: not approved: [Empty];
AMP: approved: [Empty].
12. Industry, CA, to Santa Ana, CA and/or Santa Clarita, CA;
Public meeting held: [Empty];
AMP: not approved: [Empty];
AMP: approved: [Empty].
13. Kansas City, KS, to Kansas City, MO;
Public meeting held: [Empty];
AMP: not approved: [Empty];
AMP: approved: [Check].
14. Lakeland, FL, to Tampa, FL;
Public meeting held: [Empty];
AMP: not approved: [Empty];
AMP: approved: [Check].
15. Long Beach, CA, to Santa Ana, CA and/or Los Angeles, CA;
Public meeting held: [Empty];
AMP: not approved: [Empty];
AMP: approved: [Empty].
16. Manasota, FL, to Tampa, FL;
Public meeting held: [Empty];
AMP: not approved: [Empty];
AMP: approved: [Check].
17. Mansfield, OH, to Akron, OH;
Public meeting held: [Check];
AMP: not approved: [Empty];
AMP: approved: [Empty].
18. New Castle, PA, to Pittsburgh, PA;
Public meeting held: [Empty];
AMP: not approved: [Empty];
AMP: approved: [Empty].
19. Oxnard, CA, to Santa Clarita, CA;
Public meeting held: [Empty];
AMP: not approved: [Empty];
AMP: approved: [Empty].
20. Plattsburgh, NY, to Burlington, VT;
Public meeting held: [Empty];
AMP: not approved: [Check];
AMP: approved: [Empty].
21. Portsmouth, NH, to Manchester, NH;
Public meeting held: [Check];
AMP: not approved: [Empty];
AMP: approved: [Empty].
22. Queens, NY, to Brooklyn, NY;
Public meeting held: [Check];
AMP: not approved: [Empty];
AMP: approved: [Empty].
23. Quincy, IL, to Springfield, IL;
Public meeting held: [Empty];
AMP: not approved: [Empty];
AMP: approved: [Empty].
24. Sioux City, IA, to Sioux Falls, SD;
Public meeting held: [Empty];
AMP: not approved: [Check];
AMP: approved: [Empty].
25. South Florida, FL, to Ft. Lauderdale, FL, and Miami, FL;
Public meeting held: [Check];
AMP: not approved: [Empty];
AMP: approved: [Empty].
26. Springfield, MA, to Hartford, CT;
Public meeting held: [Empty];
AMP: not approved: [Empty];
AMP: approved: [Empty].
27. Staten Island, NY, to Brooklyn, NY;
Public meeting held: [Check];
AMP: not approved: [Empty];
AMP: approved: [Empty].
28. Utica, NY, to Syracuse, NY;
Public meeting held: [Empty];
AMP: not approved: [Empty];
AMP: approved: [Empty].
29. Watertown, NY, to Syracuse, NY;
Public meeting held: [Empty];
AMP: not approved: [Empty];
AMP: approved: [Empty].
30. Western Nassau, NY, to Mid-Island, NY;
Public meeting held: [Empty];
AMP: not approved: [Empty];
AMP: approved: [Empty].
31. Wilkes Barre, PA, to Scranton, PA, and Lehigh Valley, PA;
Public meeting held: [Check];
AMP: not approved: [Empty];
AMP: approved: [Empty].
32. Winchester, VA, to Dulles, VA;
Public meeting held: [Check];
AMP: not approved: [Empty];
AMP: approved: [Empty].
33. Zanesville, OH, to Columbus, OH;
Public meeting held: [Check];
AMP: not approved: [Empty];
AMP: approved: [Empty].
Source: USPS. See [hyperlink, http://www.usps.com/all/amp.htm] for the
current status of all proposed AMP consolidations.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] USPS lost $2.8 billion in fiscal year 2008--its second-largest
annual loss since 1971.
[2] H.R. 22, 111th Cong.
[3] GAO, U.S. Postal Service: Escalating Financial Problems Require
Major Cost Reductions to Limit Losses, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-475T] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 25,
2009); U.S. Postal Service: Deteriorating Postal Finances Require
Aggressive Actions to Reduce Costs, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-332T] (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 28,
2009).
[4] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-332T].
[5] GAO, U.S. Postal Service: Key Postal Transformation Issues,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-812T] (Washington, D.C.:
May 29, 2003); U.S. Postal Service: Bold Action Needed to Continue
Progress on Postal Transformation, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-108T] (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 5,
2003).
[6] GAO, U.S. Postal Service: The Service's Strategy for Realigning Its
Mail Processing Infrastructure Lacks Clarity, Criteria, and
Accountability, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-261]
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 8, 2005).
[7] Remote encoding centers are separate plants established to apply
address barcodes on letters that could not be read by the automated
equipment in the mail processing plants.
[8] GAO, U.S. Postal Service Facilities: Improvements in Data Would
Strengthen Maintenance and Alignment of Access to Retail Services,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-41] (Washington, D.C.:
Dec. 10, 2007).
[9] USPS is required to consider specific factors in making a
determination to close a post office and to give persons served the
opportunity to present their concerns regarding such proposals. 39
U.S.C §404(d). USPS also cannot close a small post office solely
because it operates at a deficit. 39 U.S.C. §101(b).
[10] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-261].
[11] GAO, U.S. Postal Service: USPS Has Taken Steps to Strengthen
Network Realignment Planning and Accountability and Improve
Communication, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1022T]
(Washington, D.C.: July 24, 2008).
[12] 39 U.S.C. §3661.
[13] USPS Office of the Inspector General, Oral Statement on the
Financial Stability of the Postal Service (Arlington, Va.: Mar. 25,
2009).
[14] GAO, U.S. Postal Service: Transformation Challenges Present
Significant Risks, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-01-598T]
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 4, 2001).
[15] GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-310] (Washington, D.C.: January
2007).
[16] Since 1990, GAO has identified federal programs and operations as
"high risk" that, in some cases, need broad-based transformations to
address major economy, efficiency, or effectiveness challenges. See
GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-271] (Washington, D.C.: January
2009).
[End of section]
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