U.S. Postal Service
Financial Crisis Demands Aggressive Action
Gao ID: GAO-10-538T March 18, 2010
The U.S. Postal Service's (USPS) financial condition and outlook deteriorated significantly during fiscal year 2009. USPS was not able to cut costs fast enough to offset declining mail volume and revenues resulting from the economic recession and changes in the use of mail, such as electronic bill payment. In July 2009, GAO added USPS's financial condition and outlook to its High-Risk List and reported that USPS urgently needed to restructure to improve its financial viability. Declines in mail volume and revenue, large financial losses, increasing debt, and financial obligations will continue to challenge USPS. This testimony provides (1) information on USPS's financial condition and forecast and (2) GAO's perspective on the need for USPS restructuring. In addition, questions and issues are included for Congress to consider regarding USPS's proposal to reduce delivery from 6 to 5 days. This testimony is based on GAO's past and ongoing work, including its work on postal reform issues, its report adding USPS's financial condition and outlook to its High-Risk List, and updated information on USPS's financial condition and outlook.
As mail volume declined by 35 billion pieces (about 17 percent) in fiscal years 2007 through 2009, USPS's financial viability deteriorated, with close to $12 billion in losses, and it does not expect total mail volume to return to its former level when the economy recovers. USPS forecasts that total mail volume will decline to 167 billion pieces in fiscal year 2010--the lowest level since fiscal year 1992, and 22 percent less than its fiscal year 2006 peak. It also projects a record loss of over $7 billion. Further, USPS has halted construction of most new facilities and expects to borrow $3 billion in fiscal year 2010, which would bring its total outstanding debt to $13.2 billion, close to its $15 billion statutory limit. Looking forward, USPS projects that by fiscal year 2020, total mail volume will further decline by 16 percent, to the lowest level since 1986. Absent additional actions to cut costs and increase revenues, USPS expects financial losses will escalate over the next decade. Action is urgently needed in multiple areas by USPS and Congress to address USPS's pressing challenges so that it can achieve financial viability, including restructuring USPS operations, networks, and workforce to reflect changes in mail volume, revenue, and use of mail. The longer it takes for USPS and Congress to address USPS's challenges, the more difficult they will be to overcome. When GAO placed USPS's financial condition and outlook on its High-Risk List, it identified the following key actions USPS and/or Congress could take: reduce employee compensation and benefits; consolidate retail and processing networks; consolidate administrative field structure; generate revenue through new or enhanced products; change funding requirements for retiree health benefits; and realign delivery services. GAO will analyze USPS's proposal to reduce delivery from 6 to 5 days when it becomes available. Included in this testimony are questions and issues for Congress to consider regarding delivery changes. GAO will also be issuing its report later this spring that provides its perspective on USPS's financial crisis, as well as additional options for restructuring.
GAO-10-538T, U.S. Postal Service: Financial Crisis Demands Aggressive Action
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Testimony:
Before the Subcommittee on Financial Services and General Government,
Committee on Appropriations, U.S. Senate:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery:
Expected at 2:30 p.m. EDT:
Thursday, March 18, 2010:
U.S. Postal Service:
Financial Crisis Demands Aggressive Action:
Statement of Phillip Herr, Director:
Physical Infrastructure Issues:
GAO-10-538T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-10-538T, a testimony to the Subcommittee on
Financial Services and General Government, Committee on
Appropriations, U.S. Senate.
Why GAO Did This Study:
The U.S. Postal Service‘s (USPS) financial condition and outlook
deteriorated significantly during fiscal year 2009. USPS was not able
to cut costs fast enough to offset declining mail volume and revenues
resulting from the economic recession and changes in the use of mail,
such as electronic bill payment.
In July 2009, GAO added USPS‘s financial condition and outlook to its
High-Risk List and reported that USPS urgently needed to restructure
to improve its financial viability. Declines in mail volume and
revenue, large financial losses, increasing debt, and financial
obligations will continue to challenge USPS.
This testimony provides (1) information on USPS‘s financial condition
and forecast and (2) GAO‘s perspective on the need for USPS
restructuring. In addition, questions and issues are included for
Congress to consider regarding USPS‘s proposal to reduce delivery from
6 to 5 days. This testimony is based on GAO‘s past and ongoing work,
including its work on postal reform issues, its report adding USPS‘s
financial condition and outlook to its High-Risk List, and updated
information on USPS‘s financial condition and outlook.
What GAO Found:
As mail volume declined by 35 billion pieces (about 17 percent) in
fiscal years 2007 through 2009, USPS‘s financial viability
deteriorated, with close to $12 billion in losses, and it does not
expect total mail volume to return to its former level when the
economy recovers. USPS forecasts that total mail volume will decline
to 167 billion pieces in fiscal year 2010”the lowest level since
fiscal year 1992, and 22 percent less than its fiscal year 2006 peak.
It also projects a record loss of over $7 billion. Further, USPS has
halted construction of most new facilities and expects to borrow $3
billion in fiscal year 2010, which would bring its total outstanding
debt to $13.2 billion, close to its $15 billion statutory limit.
Looking forward, USPS projects that by fiscal year 2020, total mail
volume will further decline by 16 percent, to the lowest level since
1986. Absent additional actions to cut costs and increase revenues,
USPS expects financial losses will escalate over the next decade.
Figure: USPS Actual and Projected Net Income (Loss), Fiscal Years 2000
to 2020:
[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph]
Fiscal year: 2000;
Actual Income/Loss: -$0.2 billion.
Fiscal year: 2001;
Actual Income/Loss: -$1.68 billion.
Fiscal year: 2002;
Actual Income/Loss: -$0.68 billion.
Fiscal year: 2003;
Actual Income/Loss: $3.87 billion.
Fiscal year: 2004;
Actual Income/Loss: $3.07 billion.
Fiscal year: 2005;
Actual Income/Loss: $1.45 billion.
Fiscal year: 2006;
Actual Income/Loss: $0.9 billion.
Fiscal year: 2007;
Actual Income/Loss: -$5.14 billion.
Fiscal year: 2008;
Actual Income/Loss: -$2.81 billion.
Fiscal year: 2009;
Actual Income/Loss: -$3.79 billion.
Fiscal year: 2010;
Projected Income/Loss: -$7.8 billion.
Fiscal year: 2011;
Projected Income/Loss: -$11.75 billion.
Fiscal year: 2012;
Projected Income/Loss: -$15.14 billion.
Fiscal year: 2013;
Projected Income/Loss: -$16.99 billion.
Fiscal year: 2014;
Projected Income/Loss: -$19.77 billion.
Fiscal year: 2015;
Projected Income/Loss: -$22.56 billion.
Fiscal year: 2016;
Projected Income/Loss: -$25.6 billion.
Fiscal year: 2017;
Projected Income/Loss: -$24.62 billion.
Fiscal year: 2018;
Projected Income/Loss: -$26.98 billion.
Fiscal year: 2019;
Projected Income/Loss: -$30.11 billion.
Fiscal year: 2020;
Projected Income/Loss: -$33.07 billion.
Source: USPS.
[End of figure]
Action is urgently needed in multiple areas by USPS and Congress to
address USPS‘s pressing challenges so that it can achieve financial
viability, including restructuring USPS operations, networks, and
workforce to reflect changes in mail volume, revenue, and use of mail.
The longer it takes for USPS and Congress to address USPS‘s
challenges, the more difficult they will be to overcome. When GAO
placed USPS‘s financial condition and outlook on its High-Risk List,
it identified the following key actions USPS and/or Congress could
take: reduce employee compensation and benefits; consolidate retail
and processing networks; consolidate administrative field structure;
generate revenue through new or enhanced products; change funding
requirements for retiree health benefits; and realign delivery
services. GAO will analyze USPS‘s proposal to reduce delivery from 6
to 5 days when it becomes available. Included in this testimony are
questions and issues for Congress to consider regarding delivery
changes. GAO will also be issuing its report later this spring that
provides its perspective on USPS‘s financial crisis, as well as
additional options for restructuring.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-538T] or key
components. For more information, contact Phillip Herr, at (202) 512-
2834 or herrp@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
I am pleased to participate in this hearing on the U.S. Postal
Service's (USPS) financial condition, a topic we have been continually
monitoring given USPS's deteriorating financial condition during
fiscal year 2009. My statement will provide (1) information on USPS's
financial condition and forecast and (2) our perspective on the need
for USPS restructuring. In addition, we provide questions and issues
for Congress to consider regarding USPS's proposal to reduce delivery
from 6 to 5 days.
My statement is based upon our past and ongoing work, including our
work on postal reform issues, our report adding USPS's financial
condition and outlook to our High-Risk List, and updated information
on USPS's financial condition and outlook. We conducted this
performance audit in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform
the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a
reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit
objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a
reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit
objectives.
USPS's Financial Condition Has Deteriorated and its Outlook is Poor:
As mail volume declined by 35 billion pieces (about 17 percent) in
fiscal years 2007 through 2009, USPS's financial condition
deteriorated, with close to $12 billion in losses, and it does not
expect total mail volume to return to its former level when the
economy recovers. This volume decline was largely due to the economic
downturn and changing use of the mail, with mail continuing to shift
to electronic communications and payments. In July 2009, we added
USPS's financial condition and outlook to our High-Risk List and
reported that USPS urgently needed to restructure to address its
financial viability.[Footnote 1] Despite $6.1 billion in cost savings
in fiscal year 2009 as well as congressional action that relieved USPS
of $4 billion in mandated payments to prefund postal retiree health
benefits,[Footnote 2] USPS still reported a loss of $3.8 billion for
the year. Also, USPS debt increased by the annual statutory limit of
$3 billion, bringing outstanding debt to $10.2 billion at the end of
fiscal year 2009.
These declines along with large financial losses, increasing debt and
financial obligations, are projected to continue to challenge USPS.
Most recently, total mail volume for the first quarter of fiscal year
2010 was down almost 4.5 billion pieces, a decrease of almost 9
percent over last year. For fiscal years 2010 and 2011, USPS is
projecting annual deficits exceeding $7 billion and additional
pressures to generate sufficient cash to meet its obligations.
Further, USPS has halted construction of most new facilities and has
budgeted $1.5 billion in capital cash outlays (mostly for prior
commitments), which is down from the average of $2.2 billion in the
previous 5 fiscal years. USPS also expects to borrow $3 billion in
fiscal year 2010, which would bring its total outstanding debt to
$13.2 billion, close to its $15 billion statutory limit, which it
could reach as early as fiscal year 2011. USPS projects that financial
losses will escalate over the next decade, with cumulative losses of
over $230 billion by fiscal year 2020 if its planned cost reduction
and revenue generation initiatives are not implemented. (see figure 1).
Figure 1: USPS Actual and Projected Net Income (Loss), Fiscal Years
2000 to 2020:
[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph]
Fiscal year: 2000;
Actual Income/Loss: -$0.2 billion.
Fiscal year: 2001;
Actual Income/Loss: -$1.68 billion.
Fiscal year: 2002;
Actual Income/Loss: -$0.68 billion.
Fiscal year: 2003;
Actual Income/Loss: $3.87 billion.
Fiscal year: 2004;
Actual Income/Loss: $3.07 billion.
Fiscal year: 2005;
Actual Income/Loss: $1.45 billion.
Fiscal year: 2006;
Actual Income/Loss: $0.9 billion.
Fiscal year: 2007;
Actual Income/Loss: -$5.14 billion.
Fiscal year: 2008;
Actual Income/Loss: -$2.81 billion.
Fiscal year: 2009;
Actual Income/Loss: -$3.79 billion.
Fiscal year: 2010;
Projected Income/Loss: -$7.8 billion.
Fiscal year: 2011;
Projected Income/Loss: -$11.75 billion.
Fiscal year: 2012;
Projected Income/Loss: -$15.14 billion.
Fiscal year: 2013;
Projected Income/Loss: -$16.99 billion.
Fiscal year: 2014;
Projected Income/Loss: -$19.77 billion.
Fiscal year: 2015;
Projected Income/Loss: -$22.56 billion.
Fiscal year: 2016;
Projected Income/Loss: -$25.6 billion.
Fiscal year: 2017;
Projected Income/Loss: -$24.62 billion.
Fiscal year: 2018;
Projected Income/Loss: -$26.98 billion.
Fiscal year: 2019;
Projected Income/Loss: -$30.11 billion.
Fiscal year: 2020;
Projected Income/Loss: -$33.07 billion.
Source: USPS.
Note: The projection for fiscal year 2010 is from USPS's Fiscal Year
2010 Integrated Financial Plan. USPS projections for fiscal years 2011
through 2020 are from its plan and assume that (1) USPS takes no
management actions beyond those in its fiscal year 2009 budget and (2)
USPS's total statutory borrowing limit of $15 billion would be
increased to accommodate these losses.
[End of figure]
Further, USPS does not expect total mail volume to return to its
former levels when the economy recovers. It projects that total mail
volume will decline to 167 billion pieces in fiscal year 2010--a level
not seen since fiscal year 1992, and 22 percent less than its fiscal
year 2006 peak. By fiscal year 2020, USPS projects, at best, further
volume declines of about 16 percent, to about 150 billion pieces, the
lowest level since 1986 (see figure 2).
Figure 2: Actual and Projected Total Mail Volume, Fiscal Years 1971
through 2020:
[Refer to PDF for image: line graph]
Billions of pieces of mail:
Fiscal year: 1971;
Volume of mail: 87.0 billion.
Fiscal year: 1972;
Volume of mail: 87.2 billion.
Fiscal year: 1973;
Volume of mail: 89.7 billion.
Fiscal year: 1974;
Volume of mail: 90.1 billion.
Fiscal year: 1975;
Volume of mail: 89.3 billion.
Fiscal year: 1976;
Volume of mail: 89.8 billion.
Fiscal year: 1977;
Volume of mail: 93.2 billion.
Fiscal year: 1978;
Volume of mail: 96.9 billion.
Fiscal year: 1979;
Volume of mail: 99.8 billion.
Fiscal year: 1980;
Volume of mail: 106.3 billion.
Fiscal year: 1981;
Volume of mail: 110.1 billion.
Fiscal year: 1982;
Volume of mail: 114.1 billion.
Fiscal year: 1983;
Volume of mail: 119.4 billion.
Fiscal year: 1984;
Volume of mail: 131.5 billion.
Fiscal year: 1985;
Volume of mail: 140.1 billion.
Fiscal year: 1986;
Volume of mail: 147.4 billion.
Fiscal year: 1987;
Volume of mail: 153.9 billion.
Fiscal year: 1988;
Volume of mail: 161.0 billion.
Fiscal year: 1989;
Volume of mail: 161.6 billion.
Fiscal year: 1990;
Volume of mail: 166.3 billion.
Fiscal year: 1991;
Volume of mail: 165.9 billion.
Fiscal year: 1992;
Volume of mail: 166.4 billion.
Fiscal year: 1993;
Volume of mail: 171.2 billion.
Fiscal year: 1994;
Volume of mail: 178.0 billion.
Fiscal year: 1995;
Volume of mail: 180.7 billion.
Fiscal year: 1996;
Volume of mail: 183.4 billion.
Fiscal year: 1997;
Volume of mail: 190.9 billion.
Fiscal year: 1998;
Volume of mail: 196.9 billion.
Fiscal year: 1999;
Volume of mail: 201.6 billion.
Fiscal year: 2000;
Volume of mail: 207.9 billion.
Fiscal year: 2001;
Volume of mail: 207.5 billion.
Fiscal year: 2002;
Volume of mail: 202.8 billion.
Fiscal year: 2003;
Volume of mail: 202.2 billion.
Fiscal year: 2004;
Volume of mail: 206.1 billion.
Fiscal year: 2005;
Volume of mail: 211.7 billion.
Fiscal year: 2006;
Volume of mail: 213.0 billion.
Fiscal year: 2007;
Volume of mail: 212.2 billion.
Fiscal year: 2008;
Volume of mail: 202.7 billion.
Fiscal year: 2009;
Volume of mail: 177.1 billion.
Fiscal year: 2010;
Volume of mail: 166.1 billion.
Fiscal year: 2011;
Volume of mail: 164.0 billion.
Fiscal year: 2012;
Volume of mail: 164.6 billion.
Fiscal year: 2013;
Volume of mail: 164.6 billion.
Fiscal year: 2014;
Volume of mail: 161.6 billion.
Fiscal year: 2015;
Volume of mail: 158.6 billion.
Fiscal year: 2016;
Volume of mail: 155.5 billion.
Fiscal year: 2017;
Volume of mail: 153.3 billion.
Fiscal year: 2018;
Volume of mail: 151.4 billion.
Fiscal year: 2019;
Volume of mail: 150.0 billion.
Fiscal year: 2020;
Volume of mail: 148.9 billion.
Projected fiscal year 2020 volume is the lowest level since fiscal
year 1986.
Source: USPS.
[End of figure]
* First-Class Mail volume has declined 19 percent since it peaked in
fiscal year 2001 and USPS projects that it will decline by another 37
percent over the next decade. (see fig. 3). This mail is highly
profitable and generates over 70 percent of the revenues used to cover
USPS overhead costs.
* Standard Mail (primarily advertising) volume has declined 20 percent
since it peaked in fiscal year 2007, and is projected to remain
roughly flat over the next decade. This class of mail is profitable
overall but lower priced, so it takes 2.5 pieces of Standard Mail, on
average, to equal the profit from the average piece of First-Class
Mail. Standard Mail volume was affected by large rate increases in
2007 for flat-sized mail, such as catalogs, and the recession that
affected advertising such as mortgage, home equity, and credit card
solicitations. These solicitations appear unlikely to return to former
levels. Standard Mail also faces growing competition from electronic
alternatives, increasing the possibility that its volume may decline
in the long-term.
Figure 3: Actual and Projected First-Class Mail and Standard Mail
Volume, Fiscal Years 1990 through 2020:
[Refer to PDF for image: multiple line graph]
Billions of pieces of mail:
Fiscal year: 1990;
First Class: 89.3 billion;
Standard Mail: 63.7 billion.
Fiscal year: 1991;
First Class: 90.3 billion;
Standard Mail: 62.4 billion.
Fiscal year: 1992;
First Class: 90.8 billion;
Standard Mail: 62.5 billion.
Fiscal year: 1993;
First Class: 92.2 billion;
Standard Mail: 65.8 billion.
Fiscal year: 1994;
First Class: 95.3 billion;
Standard Mail: 69.4 billion.
Fiscal year: 1995;
First Class: 96.3 billion;
Standard Mail: 71.1 billion.
Fiscal year: 1996;
First Class: 98.2 billion;
Standard Mail: 71.7 billion.
Fiscal year: 1997;
First Class: 99.7 billion;
Standard Mail: 77.3 billion.
Fiscal year: 1998;
First Class: 100.4 billion;
Standard Mail: 82.5 billion.
Fiscal year: 1999;
First Class: 101.9 billion;
Standard Mail: 85.7 billion.
Fiscal year: 2000;
First Class: 103.5 billion;
Standard Mail: 90.1 billion.
Fiscal year: 2001;
First Class: 103.7 billion;
Standard Mail: 89.9 billion.
Fiscal year: 2002;
First Class: 102.4 billion;
Standard Mail: 87.2 billion.
Fiscal year: 2003;
First Class: 99.1 billion;
Standard Mail: 90.5 billion.
Fiscal year: 2004;
First Class: 97.9 billion;
Standard Mail: 95.6 billion.
Fiscal year: 2005;
First Class: 98.1 billion;
Standard Mail: 100.9 billion.
Fiscal year: 2006;
First Class: 97.5 billion;
Standard Mail: 102.4 billion.
Fiscal year: 2007;
First Class: 95.9 billion;
Standard Mail: 103.5 billion.
Fiscal year: 2008;
First Class: 91.7 billion;
Standard Mail: 99.1 billion.
Fiscal year: 2009;
First Class: 83.8 billion;
Standard Mail: 82.7 billion.
Fiscal year: 2010;
First Class: 77.1 billion;
Standard Mail: 78.9 billion.
Fiscal year: 2011;
First Class: 71.4 billion;
Standard Mail: 82.2 billion.
Fiscal year: 2012;
First Class: 69.2 billion;
Standard Mail: 84.9 billion.
Fiscal year: 2013;
First Class: 67.0 billion;
Standard Mail: 87.0 billion.
Fiscal year: 2014;
First Class: 64.9 billion;
Standard Mail: 86.7 billion.
Fiscal year: 2015;
First Class: 61.8 billion;
Standard Mail: 86.3 billion.
Fiscal year: 2016;
First Class: 59.2 billion;
Standard Mail: 85.9 billion.
Fiscal year: 2017;
First Class: 57.3 billion;
Standard Mail: 85.7 billion.
Fiscal year: 2018;
First Class: 55.6 billion;
Standard Mail: 85.5 billion.
Fiscal year: 2019;
First Class: 54.0 billion;
Standard Mail: 85.8 billion.
Fiscal year: 2020;
First Class: 52.4 billion;
Standard Mail: 86.3 billion.
Source: USPS.
[End of figure]
In addition to the projected losses caused by declining mail volume,
USPS believes that stagnant revenue, costs of providing universal
service, and rising workforce costs will also lead to losses.
USPS and Congress Need to Act Aggressively to Address Financial Crisis:
USPS urgently needs to restructure to improve its current and long-
term financial viability. On March 2, 2010, USPS addressed these
issues in its plan, entitled "Ensuring a Viable Postal Service for
America: An Action Plan for the Future,"[Footnote 3] which identified
seven key areas where-in it would need legislative changes or
congressional support. Improving its financial viability is critical
because USPS plays a vital role in the U.S. economy, and is at the
core of a mailing industry valued at about a trillion dollars,
according to USPS. Moreover, it is the largest civilian federal
agency, employing approximately 599,000 career employees as of
December 31, 2009 and operating a total of about 38,000 facilities
nationwide as of September 30, 2009.
We have previously concluded that restructuring is needed in multiple
areas, including action and support by Congress, since no single
change will be sufficient to address USPS's pressing challenges.
According to USPS, even if it took all of the actions it could under
existing law, it would still face unsustainable losses of at least
$115 billion by 2020. A major challenge for USPS is to cut costs and
restructure quickly enough to offset unprecedented volume and revenue
declines--particularly costs related to its workforce, retail and
processing networks, and delivery services--so that it can cover its
operating expenses. We have an ongoing review, as mandated by the
Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act of 2006,[Footnote 4] to
evaluate options and actions for the long-term structural and
operational reforms of USPS. Due to the urgency of the USPS financial
crisis, we plan to issue our study in April 2010, ahead of the
December 2011 statutory deadline.
When we placed USPS's financial condition and outlook on our High-Risk
List, we identified the following key actions USPS and/or Congress
could take:[Footnote 5]
1. Reduce compensation and benefit costs through:
* retirements: Annually through 2020, about 5 percent of USPS
employees will be eligible and expected to retire, according to USPS.
That represents approximately 300,000 employees, about half of the
workforce as of March 2, 2010.
* lower benefit costs: USPS pays a higher percentage of employee
health benefit premiums than other federal agencies (80 percent versus
72 percent, respectively). In addition, USPS pays 100 percent of
employee life insurance premiums, while other federal agencies pay
about 33 percent.
2. Consolidate retail and processing networks:
* Remove excess capacity in the 600 mail processing facilities
nationwide, where processing capacity for First-Class Mail exceeds
processing needs by 50 percent.
* Maximize use of lower-cost retail alternatives: Approximately 30
percent of USPS retail revenue currently comes through alternate
channels, such as stamps bought by mail, on the Internet, and at
grocery stores, indicating that customers have begun shifting to such
alternatives.
* Reduce the network of 36,500 retail facilities, where maintenance
has been underfunded for years, resulting in deteriorating facilities
and a maintenance backlog. USPS recently reported that it has more
retail facilities than McDonalds, Starbucks, and Walgreens combined.
Further, it stated that its post offices average about 600 visits per
week, representing only 10 percent of average weekly visits to
Walgreens.
3. Consolidate field administrative structure: Review the need for 74
district offices and 8 area offices.
4. Generate revenue through new or enhanced products: Use its pricing
and product flexibility to maximize profitable mail volume.
In the past, we have also discussed, and the Postal Service has
recently proposed, additional options for restructuring that would
require congressional approval:
1. Change funding requirements for retiree health benefits: USPS asked
Congress to revise the funding requirements for its retiree health
benefit obligation. USPS had difficulty making its required payment to
prefund retiree health benefits in fiscal year 2009 and has warned
that it may have similar difficulty for fiscal year 2010. As noted, in
fiscal year 2009, a looming cash shortfall led to last-minute
congressional action to reduce USPS's required payments to prefund
retiree health benefits from $5.4 billion to $1.4 billion.
2. Realign delivery services with changing use of mail: USPS has asked
Congress to allow it to reduce delivery from 6 days to 5 days per
week, stating that eliminating Saturday delivery would provide annual
savings of about $3 billion.[Footnote 6] The Postal Regulatory
Commission (PRC) estimated in 2008 that eliminating Saturday delivery
would result in savings of about $1.9 billion, based on somewhat
different assumptions regarding the likely effects on mail volume and
costs.
The Postmaster General stated in March 2010 that USPS plans to request
a PRC advisory opinion on this change, which would lead to a public
proceeding that would include input by interested parties. Before this
plan could be implemented, Congress would need to stop including
statutory restrictions contained in USPS annual appropriations that
mandate 6-day delivery. Congress might wish to consider several
questions regarding such a change:
1. How would eliminating Saturday delivery impact USPS's efforts to
grow mail volume and encourage commercial mailers to continue using
the mail?
2. How would eliminating Saturday delivery affect mail processing
costs? Salary and benefits for mail processing employees and carriers?
3. What will be the expected effects on delivery service standards?
4. How will consumers and business customers be affected by a move to
5-day delivery? How does USPS plan to mitigate these effects?
5. How does USPS plan to communicate eliminating Saturday delivery and
other related changes to mailers and the public?
6. Will there be sufficient P.O. boxes to handle a potential spike in
demand for those customers wishing to pick up mail on Saturdays?
7. How much lead time would be needed for USPS to modify its
operations and financial systems before eliminating Saturday delivery?
8. What other options has USPS considered that could significantly
reduce costs without reducing delivery service?
These issues need to be addressed in the expected USPS 5-day delivery
proposal so that stakeholders fully understand the potential
ramifications of these changes. More broadly, USPS faces larger issues
with regard to restructuring and its financial viability. The longer
it takes for USPS and Congress to address USPS's challenges, the more
difficult they will be to overcome.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be pleased
to answer any questions that you or other Members of the Subcommittee
may have.
Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
For further information regarding this statement, please contact
Phillip Herr at (202) 512-2834 or herrp@gao.gov. Individuals who made
key contributions to this statement include Teresa Anderson, Tonnyé
Conner-White, Colin Fallon, Brandon Haller, Margaret McDavid, and
Crystal Wesco.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] GAO, High-Risk Series, Restructuring the U.S. Postal Service to
Achieve Sustainable Financial Viability, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-937SP] (Washington, D.C.: July 28,
2009).
[2] A looming cash shortfall in 2009 necessitated last-minute
congressional action to reduce USPS's mandated payments to prefund
retiree health benefits from $5.4 billion to $1.4 billion. Pub. L. No.
111-68, § 164, 123 Stat. 2023 (Oct. 1, 2009).
[3] USPS's plan and related material are available at [hyperlink,
http://www.usps.com/strategicplanning/futurepostalservice.htm].
[4] Pub. L. No. 109-435, § 710 (Dec. 20, 2006).
[5] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-937SP].
[6] USPS plans call for continuing providing window retail service and
delivery to post office boxes on Saturday, as well as remittance mail
service for business mailers.
[End of section]
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